Christianson v. Markquart
ORDER 52 denying request for permission to file a motion for reconsideration filed by Jeffrey Markquart. (Written Opinion) Signed by Chief Judge John R. Tunheim on 2/14/2018. (JMK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 16-1034 (JRT/KMM)
ERIK DANIEL CHRISTIANSON,
JEFFREY MARKQUART, in his official
capacity as Martin County Sheriff,
Bradford W. Colbert, LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO MINNESOTA
PRISONERS, MITCHELL HAMLINE SCHOOL OF LAW, 875
Summit, Room 254, Saint Paul, MN 55105, for plaintiff.
Andrew Allen Wolf and Jason M. Hiveley, IVERSON REUVERS
CONDON, 9321 Ensign Avenue South, Bloomington, MN 55438, for
Plaintiff Erik Christianson brought this action against Martin County Sheriff
Jeffrey Markquart for assessing pay-for-stay costs against Christianson during his stay at
the Martin County Jail. 1 In total, Christianson accrued $7,625 in pay-for-stay costs. He
subsequently sent three letters to Markquart stating that he does not have the ability to
pay the costs and requesting that the jail waive payment of the costs pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b). Christianson argued that Markquart violated Minn. Stat.
§ 641.12, subd. 3(b), and the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota
For a complete summary of facts, see Christianson v. Markquart, No. 16-1034, 2018
WL 461134, at *1-2 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2018).
Constitutions by failing to assess whether Christianson qualifies for a waiver of payment
of the pay-for-stay costs.
Markquart moved for summary judgment. The Court denied Markquart’s motion
and, instead, entered judgment for Christianson. Christianson v. Markquart, No. 161034, 2018 WL 461134, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2018). Markquart has filed a request
for permission to file a motion to reconsider. (Letter from Jason M. Hiveley (“Letter”),
Feb. 7, 2017, Docket No. 52.) The Court will deny this request.
First, Markquart argues that the only dispositive issue in this case is “[w]hether
§ 641.12 required a process for granting a pre-assessment waiver before levying costs”
and the Court therefore impermissibly reached the question whether the statute requires a
process for assessing whether Christianson was entitled to a post-assessment waiver
without notice to Markquart. 2 (Id. at 2.) Markquart’s characterization of the statutory
issue in this case is incorrect. The Complaint alleges that “Minn. Stat. § 641.1
requires Defendant to make a determination of Plaintiff’s ability to pay or the undue
hardship payment would place on the Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 27, Apr. 20, 2016, Docket
No. 1.) The Complaint continues, “As Defendant failed to make any determination
regarding Plaintiff’s ability, or lack thereof, to pay, any fees charged and collected on are
a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the statute.” (Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added).) As
The Court agrees with Markquart that the Court decided the issue on the state-law
grounds – his violation of Minn. Stat. § 641.12 – and did not reach the Due Process Clause issue
in this case. Christianson, 2018 WL 461134, at *5. The Court clarifies that the Due Process
Clause claim is dismissed without prejudice.
framed by the Complaint, Christianson did not restrict the statutory issue to preassessment waivers. Christianson clearly alleged that Markquart failed to make “any
determination” – pre-assessment or post-assessment. Thus, Markquart was on notice that
the claim was at issue.
Second, Markquart argues that “[a] jury could find the letters were improper
accusations not entitled to be treated as waiver requests.”
(Letter at 2.)
reasonable jury could interpret the letters as anything but waiver requests. The first letter
states, “I ask that your office revisit and waive the pay for stay charges.” (Aff. of
Bradford Colbert (“Colbert Aff.”) ¶ 6, Ex. 1 at 2, Aug. 21, 2017, Docket No. 36.) The
second letter also states, “I ask that your office revisit and waive the pay for stay
charges.” (Id., Ex. 2 at 4.) The third letter states, “I am hoping that you will reconsider
charging Mr. Christianson and return any money you have already collected from him.”
(Id., Ex. 3 at 6.) What are these letters if not waiver requests? There is no material issue
of fact that Christianson requested a waiver.
Markquart argues that a jury could have found that these letters “were meant only
to coerce Defendant into agreeing with Plaintiff’s demands.” (Letter at 2.) Markquart
alleges that the letters were coercive because Christianson’s counsel “misrepresented” the
law by asserting that “[b]oth Minn. Stat. § 641.12 and the Constitution require such a
determination before any pay for stay charges can be imposed.” (Colbert Aff. ¶ 6, Ex. 1
at 2.) This argument is absurd.
The only thing Christianson tried to “coerce” Markquart into doing is complying
with his legal obligations. Markquart is correct that the letters “accused” him of violating
Minn. Stat. § 641.12; he violated the statute as a matter of law. The Court concluded that
the statute requires a waiver determination “at some point,” but is ambiguous with
respect to “when” it must be made. Christianson, 2018 WL 461134, at *4-5 (emphasis in
Markquart’s counsel refused to answer whether Martin County had any
procedures to comply with Minn. Stat. § 641.12 and instead continually asserted that no
such procedures were required under the statute. Id. at *5. Markquart was incorrect as a
matter of law and the letters reasonably informed him of this fact.
The letters do not contain a misrepresentation of the law. The Court did not need
to construe the statute to determine whether the statute requires a pre-assessment or postassessment determination because there was no waiver determination made
whatsoever in this case. Moreover, as an act of constitutional avoidance, the Court did
not decide whether the Due Process Clause requires a pre-assessment determination. 3
Christianson’s statements with respect to the statutory or constitutional requirements
could very well be correct.
At the very least, these statements are reasonable
interpretations of undecided law, which were used to support Christianson’s request for
consideration for a waiver. And, even if the Court were to agree that these reasonable
representations of law were somehow “coercive,” Christianson still requested a waiver
and Markquart did not consider whether Christianson was entitled to a waiver as required
by Minn. Stat. § 641.12.
The issue of attorney fees is currently before the Court. (Mot. for Attorney Fees, Jan.
31, 2018, Docket No. 45.) The Court is not making any determination on that issue in this
Markquart had notice that summary judgment against him was inevitable. The
numerous letters requested that Markquart determine whether Christianson was entitled
to a waiver and provided him with a citation to the relevant statute. The Complaint
alleged that Markquart failed to make any determination. (Compl. ¶ 30.) In his
memorandum opposing summary judgment, Christianson suggested that the Court could
grant summary judgment against Markquart. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J., at 3, Aug.
21, 2017, Docket No. 35.) Nevertheless, Markquart never addressed in his reply brief or
at oral argument why the Court should not grant summary judgment against him.
Markquart had sufficient advance notice and adequate opportunity to demonstrate why
summary judgment should not be granted. See Madewell v. Downs, 68 F.3d 1030, 104849 (8th Cir. 1995).
The Court will deny Markquart’s request for permission to file a motion for
Based on the foregoing, and all files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Jeffrey Markquart’s request for permission to file
a motion for reconsideration [Docket No. 52] is DENIED.
DATED: February 14, 2018
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
_______s/John R. Tunheim_______
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Court
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