Munt v. MN Department of Corrections et al

Filing 126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 69 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 76 Motion for Summary Judgment; Adopting as Modified 115 Report and Recommendation.(Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 2/26/2018. (SMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Joel Marvin Munt,

File No. 16-cv-1206 (SRN/SER)

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

v.
Minnesota Department of Corrections,
Tom Roy, Gloria H. Andreachi, Bruce
Julson, Steve Hammer, and Bruce Reiser,
Defendants.

Joel Marvin Munt, pro se, 236179, MCF–Stillwater, 970 Pickett St. N., Bayport, MN 55003
Lindsay LaVoie, Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, 445 Minnesota St., Suite 900,
St. Paul, MN 55101, for Defendants

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of
Magistrate Judge Steven E. Rau dated December 19, 2017 [Doc. No. 115]. In the R&R,
Magistrate Judge Rau recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 69]
filed by Defendants Minnesota Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Tom Roy, Gloria H.
Andreachi, Bruce Julson, Steve Hammer, and Bruce Reiser (collectively, “Defendants”) be
granted in part and denied in part, and that Plaintiff Joel Marvin Munt’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion
for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 76] be denied.
Plaintiff filed timely objections to the R&R (“Plaintiff’s Objections”) [Doc. No
116]), to which Defendants responded [Doc. No. 117]. Pursuant to federal law, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and local rules, this Court must perform a de novo review of any

portion of the magistrate judge’s R&R to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(b)(3). Based on that de novo
review, this Court adopts the substance of the R&R in its entirety; however, the Court
modifies the ruling of the magistrate judge and grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Court also denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
The R&R thoroughly and accurately describes the relevant facts and lengthy

procedural background of this case, and the Court incorporates it herein by reference.
Briefly stated, Plaintiff is an inmate currently incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional
Facility (“MCF”)-Stillwater. (Aff. of John Quist (“Quist Aff.”) [Doc. No. 63] ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff is serving a life sentence with no possibility of parole. (Second Aff. of Gloria
Andreachi (“Second Andreachi Aff.”) [Doc. No. 72] ¶ 2.) MCF-Stillwater houses
offenders who are deemed the highest risk, or classified as “levels” 4 and 5. (Quist Aff.
¶ 3.) Plaintiff holds the highest classification level of 5. (Id.)
Plaintiff states that his Christian religion “prohibits a wide range of displays it
classifies as indecent.” (Aff. of Joel Munt Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Munt Aff.”) [Doc.
No. 78] ¶ 1.) According to Plaintiff, this prohibition extends to the exposure that results
from “changing clothes, using the toilet, showering, [and] taking a bird bath,” presumably
while others are watching. (Id.; see also Compl. [Doc. No. 1] at 6). 1 According to

1

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain consecutively numbered paragraphs, the
Court’s citations are to particular ECF page numbers.
2

Plaintiff, his religion also generally prohibits him from “being exposed to others.” (Munt
Aff. ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff contends that these “deeply held” religious beliefs against “indecent
displays” are at odds with the physical layout of MCF-Stillwater and several policies
instituted by DOC. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff contends that the layout and design
of the showers at MCF-Stillwater “do not provide sufficient privacy to satisfy [his]
religious beliefs.” (Munt Aff. ¶ 10.) For instance, even though all of the shower stalls
now have an overhead awning and are considered to be single occupancy, Plaintiff
contends that the interior of some of the stalls are still visible from the higher tiers and
from the stairs, permitting individuals to look down and observe the inmates showering in
the stalls. (Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 23.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the shower’s curtain and
door “permit showering inmates to be viewed indecently.” (Id. ¶ 21.)
Because of Plaintiff’s belief that the showers provide insufficient privacy, he
refrains from showering and instead resorts to taking a “bird bath.” (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9, 10.) And
because Plaintiff refrains from showering, he believes that he is being denied a benefit
provided to all other inmates. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Relatedly, Plaintiff takes issue with a policy
that he contends empowers DOC staff to “force inmates to shower.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff
states that if he were forced to shower in the existing MCF-Stillwater showers, the
resultant “indecent display” would be “in violation of [his] beliefs.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff
believes that all the showers at MCF-Stillwater must be modified to provide him with
sufficient privacy, or that his cell must be rebuilt to include a personal shower. (Compl. at
16)
3

The other policies that allegedly clash with Plaintiff’s religious beliefs involve
DOC’s prohibition against the use “privacy sheets” and DOC’s ability to house inmates
in double-occupancy cells (“double-bunking”). (See generally Munt Aff.) Plaintiff
contends that he hangs a “privacy sheet” in his cell, in violation of DOC policy, when he
uses the toilet, changes clothes, and takes a bird bath in order to prevent the indecent
exposure prohibited by his religious beliefs. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 22.) Plaintiff avers that “[w]ithout a
privacy sheet [he] believe[s] attempting any of these activities in [his] cell [would] result
in indecent exposure that is prohibited by [his] religion.” (Id. ¶ 2.) The use of a privacy
sheet, however, only ameliorates the risk of indecent exposure when Plaintiff is housed in
a single-occupancy cell. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.) According to Plaintiff, when he is housed in a
double-occupancy cell, “even a privacy sheet is insufficient to maintain required
decency” while engaging in the aforementioned activities. (Id. ¶ 4.) Thus, to mitigate
these concerns, Plaintiff believes that he must be housed only in a single-occupancy cell,
i.e. be issued a “single-cell restriction,” and that he must be given an exemption to the
rule prohibiting inmates from hanging privacy sheets in their cells. (Compl. at 16.)
Between January and March 2016—and prior to filing this lawsuit—Plaintiff filed
several kites, one grievance, and a subsequent grievance appeal with various Defendants
to raise his privacy concerns and his fear that he would be punished for failing to follow
DOC policies. (See id. at 9–13). In each of the aforementioned communications, Plaintiff
stated that his religious beliefs prohibit the “displays” described above, such as those that
result from use of “public showers” and “open toilet areas.” (See id.) With respect to the
use of a privacy sheet, Plaintiff’s kites requested that he either be permitted to hang one
4

up, or that he be given “a reasonable alternative.” (See, e.g., id. at 9 (Kite A to A East
Unit Staff).) In his kites, Plaintiff stated that he sought an accommodation under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-1(a). (Id.) Plaintiff’s kites, however, did not request that a “single-cell
occupancy restriction” be instituted for him. (See id. at 9–10; see also Second Andreachi
Aff. ¶¶ 5–6.) It was not until he filed a grievance on February 22, 2016 that Plaintiff
mentioned that he expected to be granted a single-cell restriction. (Compl. at 11.)
In response to Plaintiff’s kites and grievance, Defendants offered alternatives
consistent with safety and security concerns at MCF-Stillwater (e.g., compliance with the
Prison Rape Elimination Act). (See id. at 9; see also id. at 12 (proposing that Plaintiff
place a towel over his lap or move the cell chair in front of him when using the toilet).)
In the final disposition of Plaintiff’s grievance, Defendant Reiser dismissed the appeal.
(Id. at 12–13.) He indicated that Plaintiff’s “religious beliefs are being accommodated,”
citing considerations of staff and inmate safety, noting previous suggestions to address
Plaintiff’s privacy concerns, and stating that “showers are considered single occupancy
and have curtains or doors that cover the body’s mid-section.” (Id. at 13.)
On the basis of the aforementioned facts, Plaintiff initiated this suit.
B. Procedural History
On May 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint asserting claims against Defendants
under RLUIPA and Article 1, § 16 of the Minnesota Constitution. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff
argues that Defendants are in violation of RLUIPA and the Minnesota Constitution

5

because they have failed to accommodate his religious beliefs. 2 (Id.) Except for
Defendant Roy, Plaintiff asserts claims against the individual Defendants in both their
individual and official capacities. (Id. at 4–6.)
Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint contends that MCF-Stillwater’s “public”
showers fail to accommodate his religious beliefs, forcing him to take bird baths and
consequently denying him “the same level of services as other inmates.” (Id. at 14.)
Plaintiff contends that DOC has put him in the position of having to choose between
following policy or violating his religious beliefs. (Id.) Plaintiff also highlights the policy
that he contends could allow guards to force him to take a shower, which he states would
result in “a violent, humiliating occurrence that would also force violation of Plaintiff’s
religious beliefs.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges that MCF-Stillwater’s
policy “prohibiting inmates from hanging objects in their cells fails to reasonably
accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs,” (id. at 14), again forcing him to “choose
between potential discipline and adhering to his religion,” (id. at 7). Finally, Plaintiff also
alleges that the double-occupancy cells at MCF-Stillwater fail to reasonably
accommodate him. (Id. at 14.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as follows. First,
Plaintiff asks this Court to declare as violative of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs: (1) DOC’s
2

As this Court has previously explained, there is no private right of action for a violation
of Article I, § 16 of the Minnesota Constitution. See Jihad v. Fabian, No. 09-cv-1604
(SRN/LIB), 2011 WL 1641767, at *3 (D. Minn. May 2, 2011). Accordingly, although
the magistrate judge recommended that this Court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiff brought under the Minnesota Constitution, those
claims must be dismissed, as they are not legally cognizable. This Court thus dismisses
those claims, and this Order only considers Plaintiff’s claims under RLUIPA.
6

policy prohibiting Plaintiff from hanging objects in his cell; (2) the “public showers” at
MCF-Stillwater; and (3) double-bunking generally. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff also asks this
Court to order DOC and MCF-Stillwater to: (1) exempt Plaintiff from the prohibition
against hanging items inside cells, thus allowing him to hang up a privacy sheet; (2)
“provide Plaintiff with a shower that provides him with privacy, either by providing him
with a private shower or by upgrading all showers to provide the required level of
privacy;” and (3) “accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs by placing a single-cell
restriction on him.” (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement of costs. (Id. at 16–17.)
In an Order dated March 29, 2017, this Court denied several motions filed by
Plaintiff, including two for preliminary injunctive relief and one for judgment on the
pleadings. (See Mem. Op. & Order [Doc. No. 67].) On April 28, 2017, Defendants filed
their Motion for Summary Judgment, and on May 1, 2017, Plaintiff also filed his Motion
for Summary Judgment. In an R&R dated December 19, 2017, the magistrate judge
recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in part and
denied in part and that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. (R&R at 14.)
Plaintiff timely objected to the R&R. (See Pl.’s Objs.) Plaintiff does not appear to
object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding his claims against Defendants in
their individual capacities or his claims for damages against Defendants in their official
capacities.

Plaintiff does, however, object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation

regarding his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants in their official
capacities. (See id. ¶¶ 2–12.)

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II.

DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Morris v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 2016). A fact
is “material” only if it may affect the outcome of the lawsuit. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Mkt.
Intelligence, Inc., 812 F.3d 701, 707 (8th Cir. 2016). Likewise, an issue of material fact is
“genuine” only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party
moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the
case are undisputed, Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), and the Court must view the
evidence and any reasonable inference in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “‘may not rest
upon the mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’ and ‘must present affirmative evidence in
order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.’” Ingrassia v. Schafer,
825 F.3d 891, 896 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57). “[T]he
nonmoving party must ‘do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts.’” Conseco Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620 F.3d 902, 910 (8th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586). “[O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial
8

may be relied upon to counter a motion for summary judgment.” Sokol & Assocs., Inc. v.
Techsonic Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 605, 611 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007).
B. Legal Framework
Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise” of an institutionalized individual unless the government
demonstrates that the burden “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 856 (2015).
A “substantial burden exists if the prison policy significantly inhibits or constrains religious
conduct, meaningfully curtails an inmate’s ability to express adherence to his faith, or
denies an inmate reasonable opportunities to engage in fundamental religious activities.”
Jihad v. Fabian, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1026 (D. Minn. 2010) (citing Van Wyhe v. Reisch,
581 F.3d 639, 656 (8th Cir. 2009)). This protection “extends even to religious practices that
are not ‘compelled by, or central to,’ a certain belief system.” Van Wyhe, 581 F.3d at 656
(citation omitted). Thus, RLUIPA does not require inquiry into whether the particular
belief is a central tenet of the prisoner’s religion. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725
(2005). Nor does it require that the belief in question be shared by all of the members of
the religious group. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859.
Claims under RLUIPA proceed under a burden-shifting framework. First, the
institutionalized individual bears the initial burden of proving that the “relevant exercise of
religion is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief,” and that the government’s action,
e.g. a particular policy, substantially burdened his exercise of religion. Id. at 862. Once that
individual meets this burden, the burden shifts to the government to show that its conduct
9

“(1) [was] in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [was] the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 863 (alterations
in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).
C. Analysis
At the outset, the Court notes that the parties do not dispute whether Plaintiff has a
sincerely held religious belief that is being substantially burdened by Defendants. (See R&R
at 18.) In the R&R, the magistrate judge assumed, without deciding, that Plaintiff asserted a
“sincerely held religious belief that is substantially burdened.” (Id.) Accordingly, the
magistrate judge correctly focused on whether Defendants have shown that the restrictions
giving rise to the burden are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest. (Id.)
As explained below, having conducted a de novo review, this Court agrees with the
magistrate judge’s analysis and recommendation as to each “restriction” and overrules
Plaintiff’s Objections in their entirety.
1. Privacy Sheets
The magistrate judge concluded that Defendants have met their burden of
establishing that the MCF-Stillwater prohibition against hanging privacy sheets is the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. (R&R at 18–23.)
Specifically, the magistrate judge concluded that Defendants’ asserted interest in
maintaining safety and security is most certainly compelling, and that the ban against the
use of privacy sheets furthers that compelling interest. (Id. at 18.) The magistrate judge
reasoned that it is simply imperative to a prison’s safety and security that the staff have an
10

unobstructed view inside inmates’ cells. (Id. at 18–20.) Moreover, the magistrate judge
concluded that the ban against privacy sheets is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest. (Id. at 19–23.) The magistrate judge found that “there is
simply no other way for prison officials to maintain prison security without having an
unobstructed view into prisoners’ cells.” (Id. at 20.) The magistrate judge addressed each of
Plaintiff’s contrary arguments in painstaking detail. Notably, as in Fowler v. Crawford, 534
F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008), the magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff’s rejection of
Defendants’ proposed alternatives—such as using a personal towel to provide privacy—
evidences that there are no viable, less restrictive means of furthering the asserted interests
in prison safety and security. (Id. at 21–22 (citing Fowler, 534 F.3d at 938–41).)
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions. In essence, he
renews before this Court the arguments he presented in his Motion for Summary
Judgment and which the magistrate judge thoroughly addressed. (See Pl.’s Objs. ¶¶ 2–8.)
Plaintiff first argues that the policy against privacy sheets does not actually further the
governmental interests asserted by Defendants. (Id. ¶ 2.) He suggests that in order to
show that the policy furthers the governmental interest, Defendants must offer affirmative
evidence that “privacy sheets would aid in any of the negative behavior they claim to
want to prevent.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 6.)
This Court disagrees. “Prison officials need not endure assaults, drug indulgence,
or sexual improprieties before implementing policies designed to prevent such activities
in an uneasy atmosphere. Nor do prison officials charged with managing such a volatile
environment need present evidence of actual problems to justify security concerns.”
11

Fowler, 534 F.3d at 939. But what is more, in this case Defendants have presented
evidence of serious violence that occurred in the past when offenders’ cells were partially
blocked, prior to the implementation of the privacy sheet policy. (Aff. of Bruce Julson
(“Julson Aff.) [Doc. No. 73] ¶ 5.)
Relatedly, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ policy against privacy sheets is
underinclusive, and that such underinclusiveness undercuts Defendants’ arguments that
their interests in security and safety are compelling or being advanced by the policy. (See
Pl.’s Objs. ¶¶ 4, 7–8.) This Court also rejects these arguments. “A prison’s interest in
order and security is always compelling.” Fowler, 534 F.3d at 939. As for
underinclusiveness, the Court is unaware of any record evidence suggesting that
Defendants allow offenders to obstruct the view into their cells by other means, or that
Defendants have policies that allow offenders to hide illicit behavior. See Holt, 135 S. Ct.
at 864 (noting that a prison’s policy prohibiting an inmate from growing a ½-inch beard
was underinclusive because although defendants claimed that the policy was designed to
prevent the flow of contraband, they nevertheless permitted inmates to grow more than
½-inch of hair on their heads). Plaintiff’s bare assertions that the use of privacy sheets is
already widespread is insufficient at this stage. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Objs. ¶ 4.) As the
magistrate judge noted, Defendants have submitted various sworn affidavits stating that
the use of privacy sheets is not allowed, as well as a copy of their official policy clearly
stating that privacy sheets are banned. (See R&R at 20.) “When a motion for summary
judgment is properly made and supported, as [Defendants] did here consistent with their
burden of proof, an opposing party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue
12

for trial.” Fowler, 534 F.3d at 940 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has failed to meet this
burden of production.
Plaintiff next contends that the R&R ignored case law holding that the
government may not decline to accommodate an inmate’s religious beliefs for fear that
others may also want the same “exception” as the one given to Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Objs. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff misreads the R&R. Although the R&R stated that “if [Plaintiff] were allowed
exceptions to the zero-tolerance policy against the hanging of privacy sheets on the basis
of his religious beliefs—taken to its logical extreme—entire prison populations could
obfuscate their activities . . . on the basis of the same . . . religious beliefs,” it did so only
to stress that RLUIPA does not elevate accommodation of religious beliefs over a
prison’s need to maintain order and safety. (See R&R at 19.) This Court agrees with
Plaintiff, in the abstract, that prison officials must consider the individual plaintiff and
may not advance the “classic rejoinder of bureaucrats” that “[i]f I make an exception for
you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 866
(quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436
(2006)). However, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the R&R erroneously adopted
that line of reasoning.
Finally, Plaintiff also contends that the magistrate judge “impermissibly tries to
tell [him] a towel would satisfy decency when [his] sworn affidavit already said it does
not.” (Pl.’s Objs. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff claims that this “logic” contravenes the purpose of the
RLUIPA, as “[a] substantial burden exists if you are forced to behave sinfully or face
discipline, yet [the magistrate judge] thinks inmates still should be forced to commit the
13

sin rather than enforce the law which requires the government to accommodate religious
beliefs.” (Id.) Plaintiff again misses the mark. Relying on binding circuit precedent, the
magistrate judge merely reasoned that Plaintiff’s unwillingness to consider alternatives
evidenced that the outright prohibition against privacy sheets was the least restrictive
means of furthering the compelling governmental interest. Fowler, 534 F.3d at 938
(“[T]he government has satisfied the least restrictive means prong by demonstrating that
other less restrictive alternatives are not acceptable to plaintiff.” (quoting Hamilton v.
Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996))).
In sum, this Court agrees with the magistrate judge that Defendants have met their
burden of establishing that the prohibition against the use of privacy sheets to ensure an
unobstructed view into inmates’ cells is the least restrictive means of furthering the
compelling governmental interests in safety and security. Accordingly, this Court agrees
that summary judgment in favor of Defendants is warranted on this claim.
2. Shower Access
The magistrate judge concluded that Defendants have met their burden of showing
that their denial of Plaintiff’s request for a private shower or that all showers be remodeled
is the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling governmental interest in safety
and security. (R&R at 23–26.) The magistrate judge found that Plaintiff’s request for a
private shower was a “non-starter,” as remodeling a single cell would “place a substantial
burden on [MCF-Stillwater] personnel and costs.” (Id. at 25 (quoting Quist Aff. ¶ 18).) As
for the current layout of the showers at MCF-Stillwater, the magistrate judge found that they
are designed to allow prison officials to see an inmate’s feet “to prevent assaults, attacks,
14

and provide assistance in medical situations,” thereby unquestionably furthering the state’s
interest in security and safety. (Id. at 23 (quoting Defs.’ Mem. [Doc. No. 70] at 5–6).) The
magistrate judge further found that the current design was the least restrictive means of
furthering the compelling governmental interest, again pointing to Plaintiff’s rejection of
alternatives and his “all-or-nothing approach.” (Id. at 25–26.)
Plaintiff objects to these findings and conclusions, again renewing the arguments he
raised before the magistrate judge. For instance, Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge
erred in concluding that the layout of the showers in other prisons—which Plaintiff
contends are private enough to satisfy his religious needs—was a relevant but not
dispositive consideration. (Pl.’s Objs. ¶¶ 9–10; see R&R at 24.) Similarly, Plaintiff objects
to the magistrate judge’s conclusion crediting Defendants’ contentions that building a
private shower for Plaintiff and/or “conforming” all of the showers at MCF-Stillwater
would be impracticable, cost-prohibitive, and against MCF-Stillwater policy. (See R&R at
25; Pl.’s Objs. ¶¶ 10–11.) Throughout his Objections, Plaintiff contends that the magistrate
judge improperly resolved in Defendants’ favor a myriad of “disputed issue[s]” that should
have been left for trial. (Pl.’s Objs. ¶¶ 9, 14.)
Having conducted a de novo review, this Court reaches the same conclusions as the
magistrate judge. At bottom, every argument or “factual dispute” that Plaintiff raises
implicates matters clearly within the professional judgment of Defendants. See Fowler, 534
F.3d at 943 (courts must distinguish between “disputed facts . . . and disputed matters of
professional judgment”). And when “disputes” raised pertain to the professional judgment
of prison administrators, “‘inferences must accord deference to the views of prison
15

authorities’ where those views rest on more than mere speculation and conjecture.” Id. at
943 (quoting Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (plurality)). Indeed, “[j]udgments
regarding prison security are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of
corrections officials, and in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that
the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should
ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Id. at 938 (quoting Hamilton, 74
F.3d at 1553). Here, Plaintiff simply takes issue with the professional judgment of the prison
administrators, but presents no evidence whatsoever that Defendants have exaggerated their
response to safety and security considerations at a penal institution that houses inmates with
violent histories. Cf. id. at 941 (cautioning against judges becoming “the primary arbiters of
what constitutes the best solution to every religious accommodation problem” in state penal
institutions).3
In sum, this Court agrees with the magistrate judge that summary judgment is
warranted in Defendants’ favor on this issue.4

3

Plaintiff also claims that the magistrate judge again impermissibly suggested that
Plaintiff must accept the prison’s alternatives even if they violate his religion. (Pl.’s Objs.
¶ 12) As this Court already discussed, the magistrate judge’s discussion of alternatives
offered to Plaintiff—in this instance, the use of the handicap shower, which may lead to
less exposure—was simply in the context of concluding that Defendants have met their
burden of showing that the challenged policy is the least restrictive alternative. (See R&R
at 25–26.)
4
Plaintiff objects that the magistrate judge made no ruling on forced showers. (Pl.’s Objs.
¶ 29.) However, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that Plaintiff has ever
been forced to shower, or that he has exhausted his administrative remedies on this claim.
Defendants have explained that “[f]orced showers do not occur on a regular basis and
typically only occur in the segregation unit.” (See Quist Aff. ¶ 19.) This claim was thus
not properly presented in this litigation, and is dismissed. But in any event, even if this
issue had been properly presented here, this Court would conclude that Defendants’
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3. Single-Cell Restriction
The magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to him for obtaining a single-cell restriction. (R&R at 26–32). The
magistrate judge found that Plaintiff had failed to follow the prison’s administrative process
requiring that he file a kite up the chain of command, followed by the filing of a grievance
and a grievance appeal, if necessary. (Id. at 27.) Specifically, the magistrate judge concluded
that “there is nothing in the record that demonstrates that [Plaintiff] filed a proper facility
grievance or a proper appeal regarding his challenge to the double-bunking policy.” (Id.)
Once again, Plaintiff renews the same arguments he raised before the magistrate
judge and which are thoroughly addressed in the R&R. Plaintiff primarily contends that the
exhaustion doctrine should not preclude his claim from going forward because he was
unaware of the correct procedures. (Pl.’s Objs. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff claims to have been

completely ignorant of the proper way to request the single-cell restriction, stating that
“nothing in the policy indicates requests can be made nor how such a request would be
made.” (Id.)
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s contentions de novo, and agrees with the
magistrate judge that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. As correctly
found by the magistrate judge, the record is replete with evidence that inmates routinely
request single-cell assignments. (See R&R at 30; Julson Aff. ¶ 9 (“Single cell assignments

policy of requiring inmates to shower in some circumstances is the least restrictive means
of furthering the compelling governmental interest of inmate health and cleanliness. (See
id. (explaining that requiring inmates to shower if they refuse to maintain a certain level
of cleanliness is “done for health and cleanliness”).)
17

are highly sought after and I frequently reviewed these requests.”).) And this Court fully
agrees with the magistrate judge that “if prison staff frequently received single-cell
occupancy requests, it strains credulity to suggest that the process is so opaque as to render
the process incapable of use by an ordinary prisoner.” (R&R at 30 (citing Ross v. Blake, 136
S. Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016).) Indeed, as stated by the Fifth Circuit in the case that Plaintiff
cites in his Objections, there is an “oft-applied and well-established rule[]” that “courts may
not deem grievance procedures unavailable merely because an inmate was ignorant of them,
so long as the inmate had a fair, reasonable opportunity to apprise himself of the
procedures.” Davis v. Fernandez, 798 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2015).
Relatedly, Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge “mistakenly equates a single
cell assignment request to a single cell restriction request,” and that he “fails to offer any
reasons why knowledge of the first (which is widely used) would be . . . relevant to
showing knowledge of the second.” (Pl.’s Objs. ¶ 19 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff points
to a distinction without a difference, and misunderstands that the relevant consideration is
whether he failed to exhaust remedies that were “available” to him. “Available” remedies
are those “capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose: immediately utilizable . . .
accessible.” Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 150 (1986)). Certainly, knowledge of how to request a
single-cell assignment is relevant to whether procedures for requesting a single-cell
restriction are accessible or capable of being used by inmates.

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In sum, this Court agrees with the magistrate judge that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies on the issue of a single-cell restriction, and concludes that
Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim on this issue must be dismissed without prejudice.
As the Eighth Circuit has noted, “[i]n enacting § 3 of RLUIPA, Congress sought to
eliminate ‘frivolous or arbitrary’ barriers impeding prisoners’ exercise of religion.” Fowler,
534 F.3d at 942 (citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716). Here, it is not difficult to “discern the
difference between the arbitrary restrictions Congress sought to proscribe with RLUIPA,”
and the issues Plaintiff raises. See id. Like the magistrate judge, this Court finds no
difficulty concluding that summary judgment is warranted in favor of Defendants on
Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims related to privacy sheets and showers.5 Accordingly, this Court
adopts the substance of the R&R in its entirety and overrules Plaintiff’s Objections.
III.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Magistrate Judge Rau’s R&R of December 19, 2017 [Doc. No. 115] is
ADOPTED as modified herein;
2. Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R [Doc. No. 116] are OVERRULED;
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 76] is DENIED;
4. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 69] is GRANTED:

5

Plaintiff’s recent filing [Doc. No. 122], to which Defendants responded [Doc. No. 123]
urging this Court not to consider Plaintiff’s late filing, does nothing to change this
Court’s analysis. Plaintiff merely points to additional case law (some of which is included
in this Order), and presents additional factual allegations that, even if considered, would
not change this Court’s ultimate conclusion.
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a. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief related to privacy sheets and
access to showers is GRANTED;
b. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims for injunctive and declaratory relief related
to a single-cell restriction are DISMISSED without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies;
c. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims for monetary damages against Defendants in
their official capacities are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction;
d. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims against Defendants in their individual
capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a
claim; and
e. All other claims against Defendants are DISMISSED.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: February 26, 2018

s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge

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