Haddley v. Next Chapter Technology, Inc. et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. 1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 44 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART consistent with the memorandum above. 2. Count 2 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 18 ) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDI CE as to the County Defendantsthe Minnesota counties of Kittson, Mahnomen, Marshall, Norman, Polk, Red Lake, Roseau, Kandiyohi, Rice, Scott, Stearns, Washington, Becker, Clay, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, Steele, and Waseca. 3. Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate (Doc. No. 51 ) is GRANTED. 4. This matter and Haddley v. Isanti et al., Civil No. 15-2106 (DWF/LIB) are consolidated for all purposes under case number: Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB). 5. Plaintiff shall file a consolidated compla int for the two matters consistent with this order within thirty days of this order. 6. The caption for Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB) will remain the same. 7. Upon the filing of the consolidated amended complaint in Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB), the par ties shall file a dismissal document in Civil No. 15-2106 (DWF/LIB). 8. All pending matters, including discovery, in Civil No. 15-2106 (DWF/LIB) are STAYED unless the parties jointly stipulate to the matters continuing. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 4/25/2017. (BJS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Neil Leonard Haddley,
Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB)
OPINION AND ORDER
Next Chapter Technology, Inc., a corporation;
Vaughn Mulcrone, an individual;
dataBridge, LLC, a limited liability company;
County of Kittson, Minnesota;
County of Mahnomen, Minnesota;
County of Marshall, Minnesota;
County of Norman, Minnesota;
County of Polk, Minnesota;
County of Red Lake, Minnesota;
County of Roseau, Minnesota;
County of Kandiyohi, Minnesota;
County of Rice, Minnesota;
County of Scott, Minnesota;
County of Stearns, Minnesota;
County of Washington, Minnesota;
County of Becker, Minnesota;
County of Clay, Minnesota;
County of Dodge, Minnesota;
County of Isanti, Minnesota;
County of Otter Tail, Minnesota;
County of Mower, Minnesota;
County of Steele, Minnesota; and
County of Waseca, Minnesota;
Alexander Farrell, Esq., and Russell M. Spence, Jr., Esq., Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC,
counsel for Plaintiff Neil Leonard Haddley.
Bruce H. Little, Esq., and Sarah Pruett, Esq., Lindquist & Vennum LLP, counsel for
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim (Doc. No. 44); and Plaintiff’s
Motion to Consolidate (Doc. No. 51). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in
part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate.
Plaintiff Neil Haddley filed suit against Defendants alleging various acts of
copyright infringement stemming from their use and then replacement of a software
program called Scanning Enabler. In 2007, Plaintiff developed Scanning Enabler as a
program to scan documents into Microsoft SharePoint and which also allowed the user to
view and index paper documents without leaving SharePoint. (Doc. No. 18 (“Am.
Compl.”) ¶ 36.) Haddley first published Scanning Enabler in Australia while he was
living there. At the time, Haddley was operating as the sole shareholder of Blue Duck
Pty., Ltd, an Australian entity that Haddley formed in 2006. Blue Duck Pty. had no
formal employees. Instead, Haddley used Blue Duck Pty. as a vehicle to market and sell
Scanning Enabler. (Defs.’ MTD Memo. at 4.) 1
The Court will cite Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motion to
Dismiss as “Defs.’ MTD Memo.” (Doc. No. 46); Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition
as “Pl.’s MTD Opp.” (Doc. No. 48); and Defendants’ Reply Brief as “Defs.’ MTD
Reply” (Doc. No. 49). The Court will cite Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of his
Motion to Consolidate as “Pl.’s Consolidation Memo.” (Doc. No. 54); and Defendants’
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Consolidate as “Defs.’ Consolidation Opp.”
(Doc. No. 58).
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
In 2009, Haddley entered into a resale agreement for Scanning Enabler with
Defendant Next Chapter Technology (“NCT”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 46.) Haddley also
licensed to NCT two versions of Scanning Enabler, which NCT then incorporated into its
document-management program ScottWorks. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) NCT helped develop
ScottWorks for Scott County, Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 51.) Based on the success of
ScottWorks, NCT began marketing the product as CaseWorks to other county
governments in Minnesota. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53.) A number of Minnesota counties purchased
licenses for CaseWorks, which used Scanning Enabler as part of its functionality. These
counties are defendants in this action (generally, the “County Defendants”). 2
In 2012, Haddley began working for NCT. While Haddley worked there, NCT
licensed Scanning Enabler to Clay County and Steele County, Minnesota. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 98.)
To download and access Scanning Enabler, a purchaser was required to enter a unique
license key. (See id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Clay and Steele Counties
exceeded the licenses by downloading too many copies of Scanning Enabler. (Id. ¶¶ 67,
103.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that six of the County Defendants 3 accessed Steele
and Clay counties’ servers to copy Scanning Enabler without paying for additional
(Footnote Continued From Previous Page)
The County Defendants are the Minnesota counties of Kittson, Mahnomen,
Marshall, Norman, Polk, Red Lake, Roseau, Kandiyohi, Rice, Scott, Stearns,
Washington, Becker, Clay, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, Steele, and Waseca.
The six counties are Becker, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, and Waseca.
licenses. Plaintiff also alleges that NCT was actively involved in enabling this system of
shared licenses. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 84.)
Near the end of 2012, Haddley apparently learned that some of the County
Defendants were allegedly using unlicensed versions of Scanning Enabler. (Id. ¶ 131.)
Haddley raised the issue with NCT. Haddley and NCT attempted to resolve the issue, but
could not reach an agreement to remedy Haddley’s concerns. With the issues unresolved,
NCT fired Haddley without cause. (Id. at ¶ 139.) NCT then hired Defendant dataBridge
to create a replacement product for Scanning Enabler. The replacement product was
distributed to the County Defendants. (Id. ¶ 166-67.)
On August 24, 2015, Haddley filed a pro se complaint against eight of the County
Defendants 4 (the “Isanti Matter”). 5 In that complaint, Haddley brought claims related to
the Isanti Defendants’ use of Scanning Enabler. On September 16, 2015, NCT moved to
intervene pursuant to its contractual duty to defend the Isanti Defendants. (Isanti, Doc.
No. 26.) Plaintiff, still pro se, opposed the motion. (Isanti, Doc. No. 36.) On
November 18, 2015, the magistrate judge denied the motion. (Isanti, Doc. No. 49.) In
the Isanti Matter, Haddley has obtained counsel, discovery has closed, and the parties
have cross-moved for summary judgment.
The eight defendants are Becker, Clay, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, Steele,
and Waseca (generally, the “Isanti Defendants”).
Haddley v. Isanti et al., Civ. No. 15-2106 (D. Minn). The Court will cite to
documents in the Isanti Matter as “Isanti, Doc. No. __.”
After hiring counsel, Haddley filed a new complaint here, which was later
amended. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings three claims: (1) a claim against
NCT and its sole shareholder, Vaughn Mulcrone, for copyright infringement for
providing copies of Scanning Enabler to the Isanti Defendants; (2) a claim against all
defendants for copyright infringement stemming from the creation and use of the
replacement product for Scanning Enabler; and (3) a claim against NCT, Mulcrone, and
the Isanti Defendants alleging that they undertook efforts to circumvent Scanning
Enabler’s license-key system.
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc.
No. 44.) Plaintiff has moved to consolidate this case with the Isanti Matter. (Doc. No.
51.) Defendants also moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim for Count 2 as to the
County Defendants and for Count 3 as to the Isanti Defendants.
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the party
asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving jurisdiction. V S Ltd. P’ship v. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). “Subject-matter jurisdiction
is a threshold requirement which must be assured in every federal case.” Kronholm v.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may challenge a plaintiff’s complaint either on its face or
on the factual truthfulness of its averments. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729
n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). When a defendant brings a facial challenge—that is, even if the
allegations were true, they lack an essential element for jurisdiction—a court reviews the
pleadings alone and assumes the allegations are true. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593
(8th Cir. 1993); accord Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6. In a factual challenge to
jurisdiction, the court may consider matters outside the pleadings and weigh the accuracy
of the allegations. Titus, 4 F.3d at 593; accord Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6.
Defendants move to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff’s copyright registration
certificate is materially inaccurate. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
registration certificate incorrectly identifies Haddley as the author of Scanning Enabler,
instead of Blue Duck Pty.—the Australian entity that Plaintiff used to market and sell the
program. Before a plaintiff may file a lawsuit for copyright infringement, the plaintiff
must register his copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 411. 6 If a registration certificate is inaccurate, a
plaintiff may still proceed with a civil action unless the inaccurate information was
provided with knowledge of the inaccuracy and the inaccuracy of the information would
have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse to issue the registration certificate. 17
The holder of a foreign copyright does not need to register before filing suit,
unless he is seeking statutory damages or attorney fees. 17 U.S.C. § 412; see also The
Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Section 412 has no exception excusing foreign works from its
mandate: it requires registration to obtain statutory damages for both domestic and
U.S.C. § 411(b). The misrepresentation must be inaccurate and material. See, e.g.,
DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2013). 7
When a copyright is registered within five years of the material’s first publication,
there is a presumption that the copyright is valid and the information contained in the
registration certificate is accurate. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). This presumption shifts the
burden to the defendant to prove invalidity. Progressive Lighting, Inc. v. Lowe’s Home
Centers, Inc., 549 F. App’x 913, 918 (11th Cir. 2013). Here, however, Haddley received
his registration certificate in 2014, more than five years after he first published Scanning
Enabler in 2007. (Am. Compl. ¶ 38, Ex. A.) As a result, Haddley bears the burden of
showing that the copyright is valid and that the information contained in the certificate is
Defendants argue that Haddley’s registration certificate incorrectly identifies
himself as the author of Scanning Enabler. Defendants’ argument is premised on the
The Court notes that 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) provides a specific procedure for
situations when a party claims that a registration certificate is invalid (a procedure the
parties have failed to discuss and seemingly ignored). Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b), “In any
case in which inaccurate information [in the registration certificate] is alleged, the court
shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court whether the inaccurate
information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse
registration.” The purpose of the provision is to prevent courts from invalidating
copyrights without receiving input from the Register—the very thing that Defendants
invited the Court to do here. Despite the mandatory provision, courts can still determine
the timing of when it will contact the Register. DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v.
Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts can demand that the party
seeking invalidation first establish that the other preconditions to invalidity are satisfied
before obtaining the Register’s advice on materiality.”). Here, the Court will wait to
contact the Register until there is a showing that ownership information was inaccurate
and that Haddley provided the information with knowledge of the inaccuracy.
Work-for-Hire doctrine, which provides that generally an employer owns the copyrights
for the materials that its employees create. See generally Melville B. Nimmer & David
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 5.03 (2016). In response, Haddley argues that even if
he were an employee of Blue Duck Pty.—an entity that he solely owned—Blue Duck
Pty. and he could have agreed that he would be the owner of the copyright.
In addressing whether Haddley owns the copyright for Scanning Enabler, the
Court must first determine whether Australian or U.S. law applies. As a general matter,
the law governing the substantive rights of the copyright holder is drawn from the
country where the infringement took place. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian
Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1998). The law governing ownership, however, is
drawn from the country with the most significant relationship. Id. at 91; see also
Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Initial ownership
of a copyrighted work is determined by the laws in the work’s country of origin.”). Here,
because the work was first published in Australia to a person then domiciled in Australia,
Australia “is the appropriate source of law to determine the issues of ownership.” See
Itar-Tass Russian News Agency, 153 F.3d at 90 (“Since the works at issue were created
by Russian nationals and first published in Russia, Russian law is the appropriate source
of law to determine issues of ownership of rights.”).
The parties provided only limited briefing on Australia’s copyright-ownership law,
but Defendants cite to the Australian Copyright Council as authoritative. (Defs.’ MTD
Memo. at 13.) According to the Australian Copyright Council, an employer will own the
copyright for the software developed by an employee during the course of the employee’s
usual duties. Australian Copyright Council, Software & Apps, G050v12 (Dec. 2014), at
3. Parties, however, can designate by agreement who owns the copyright. Australian
Copyright Council, Ownership of Copyright, G058v08 (Nov. 2014), at 1-2; see also
Australian Copyright Council, Software & Apps, G050v12 (Dec. 2014), at 3 (“In most
cases there will be an agreement . . . setting out who owns copyright in the material.”);
Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Short Guide to Copyright, at 7
(“All copyright ownership rules (except those that relate to moral rights) may be varied
by agreement.”). Thus, Haddley and the Australian entity that he solely owned could
have agreed that Haddley would retain the copyright for Scanning Enabler. See Jules
Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Can. Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding
that the owner of a “one-man shop” could decide whether he or the entity owned the
copyright). Because Haddley could have retained ownership in the copyright, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff has adequately plead standing to bring his claims for copyright
infringement. 8 Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Plaintiff still has the burden of demonstrating that an agreement existed between
Haddley and Blue Duck Pty., Ltd regarding the copyright ownership of Scanning
Enabler. If Plaintiff fails to demonstrate such an agreement existed, the Court will
reexamine whether Haddley’s registration certificate is invalid because of a material
misstatement. See Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1156 (noting that the district court allowed
the case to proceed despite questions of fact regarding the registration certificate, but left
open the opportunity to revisit the issue if the plaintiff failed to “perfect standing prior to
the close” of the plaintiffs’ case in chief).
Motion to Consolidate
Plaintiff moves to consolidate this case with the Isanti Matter. Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 42(a), courts have broad discretion to consolidate pending actions that
involve a common question of fact or law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); see also Doe YZ v.
Shattuck–St. Mary’s Sch., Civ. No. 15-1151, 2016 WL 6594077, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 4,
2016). The party seeking consolidation bears the burden of showing that consolidation
promotes judicial convenience and economy. Shattuck–St. Mary’s Sch., 2016 WL
6594077, at *1. But even if consolidation would promote judicial economy,
consolidation is inappropriate when it unfairly prejudices a party. Id.
Here, Plaintiff argues that common issues of fact and law exist between the two
cases. Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the Isanti Defendants are in a different
factual and legal position than the Defendants in this case. In addition, Defendants argue
that the Isanti Defendants will be prejudiced because the parties have completed
discovery in the Isanti Matter and that case is ripe for summary judgment.
The Court concludes that common issues of fact and law exist between this case
and the Isanti Matter. The underlying facts of this case focus on NCT’s use and
replacement of Scanning Enabler in its CaseWorks product. The exact same facts
underlie Haddley’s claims in the Isanti Matter, where Haddley alleges that the Isanti
Defendants exceeded the contracted-for number of licenses of Scanning Enabler.
Moreover, both matters focus on whether the defendants infringed Haddley’s copyrights.
The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that the two cases are legally or
factually distinct. Indeed, Defendants have moved to dismiss a claim in this case on the
basis that Haddley is bringing the exact same claim in the Isanti Matter. (See Defs.’
MTD Memo. at 25 (“Plaintiff includes the County of Isanti Defendants as defendants in
Count 3 . . . even though he has already made the same claims against them in the first
Having concluded that the two cases involve common issues of fact and law, the
Court also finds that judicial economy would be furthered by consolidating the two cases.
Plaintiff has brought similar claims against overlapping defendants in two separate
matters. Litigating the matters separately would waste limited judicial resources. As a
result, the Court concludes that judicial economy would be promoted by consolidating
the two matters.
Despite finding that judicial economy will be promoted, the Court must also
examine whether a party will be prejudiced by the consolidation. Defendants argue that
consolidation will cause prejudice because the Isanti Matter has completed discovery
while this case has only started. But Defendants cannot avoid consolidation simply
because discovery is concluded, especially when much of the discovery will be
overlapping. See 9A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2382 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2017) (“Actions pending at
different stages of discovery may be consolidated, although any savings of time and
expense well may be diminished.”); see also Doc. No. 62, Tr. at 39 ([Plaintiff’s Counsel]:
“We won’t have to do any more discovery with the [Isanti] Defendants, so they can just
sit and wait for the rest of the discovery to complete as to the rest of the case.”). In
addition, the Isanti Defendants are defendants in both actions, and the parties are
represented by the same respective counsel in both actions. See Shattuck–St. Mary’s
Sch., 2016 WL 6594077, at *2 (noting that consolidation was appropriate in part because
counsel for both matters were the same). The Court therefore concludes that Defendants
will not be unfairly prejudiced by consolidating the matters.
Thus, consolidating the Isanti Matter and this case is appropriate. Accordingly,
Plaintiff is instructed to file a consolidated complaint not inconsistent with this order
within thirty days of this order.
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in
the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the
light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th
Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory
allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th
Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged, Westcott v.
City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). A court deciding a motion to
dismiss may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced
by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall
Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must
contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id. at 555. As the Supreme Court reiterated, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” will not pass muster
under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). In sum, this standard “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Defendants move to dismiss Count 2 for the County Defendants. Count 2 is a
claim based on the creation and use of a replacement product for Scanning Enabler.
Specific to the County Defendants, Plaintiff’s claim is premised on the County
Defendants’ downloading and use of the replacement product. “Plaintiffs must satisfy
two requirements to present a prima facie case of direct infringement: (1) they must
show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that
the alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders
under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th
Cir. 2001); accord Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2004).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that NCT, Mulcrone, and dataBridge infringed on Haddley’s
copyright by creating a replacement product for Scanning Enabler. (Am. Compl.
¶ 161-65.) One of the rights of a copyright owner is the right to create derivative
products. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2); see also Mulcahy, 386 F.3d at 852 (“One who violates the
copyright owner’s right to create derivative works is an infringer.”). Haddley goes on to
allege that the County Defendants infringed Plaintiff’s copyright by using the
replacement product. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 167-68.) But merely buying an infringing product
is not actionable. Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir.
1952). Because Plaintiff’s claim in Count 2 against the County Defendants is premised
merely on purchasing an infringing product, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Thus, the
Court dismisses Count 2 against the County Defendants.
Defendants also move to dismiss Count 3 for the Isanti Defendants on the basis
that Haddley has already brought the same claim against them in the Isanti Matter.
Because the Court has ordered Plaintiff to file a consolidated complaint, the Court
determines that Defendants’ motion on this issue is moot. The Court therefore denies
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 3 for the Isanti Defendants.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately plead
standing to pursue his copyright infringement claims, but the Court will revisit the issue
if Plaintiff fails to prove that he is the owner of the copyright. The Court grants
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2 for the County Defendants, and the Court denies
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 3 for the Isanti Defendants. The Court grants
Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate.
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. ) is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART consistent with the memorandum above.
Count 2 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. No. ) is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as to the County Defendants—the Minnesota counties of Kittson,
Mahnomen, Marshall, Norman, Polk, Red Lake, Roseau, Kandiyohi, Rice, Scott, Stearns,
Washington, Becker, Clay, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, Steele, and Waseca.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate (Doc. No. ) is GRANTED.
This matter and Haddley v. Isanti et al., Civil No. 15-2106 (DWF/LIB) are
consolidated for all purposes under case number: Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB).
Plaintiff shall file a consolidated complaint for the two matters consistent
with this order within thirty days of this order.
The caption for Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB) will remain the same.
Upon the filing of the consolidated amended complaint in Civil
No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB), the parties shall file a dismissal document in Civil No. 15-2106
All pending matters, including discovery, in Civil No. 15-2106 (DWF/LIB)
are STAYED unless the parties jointly stipulate to the matters continuing.
Dated: April 25, 2017
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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