Murphy et al v. Minnesota Department of Human Services et al

Filing 151

ORDER. 1. Defendant's appeal (Doc. No. 79 ) of Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson's Order and Opinion on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Defendant's Motion to Compel is OVERRULED. 2. Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson's August 21, 2017 Order and Opinion on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Defendants Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 78 ) is AFFIRMED consistent with this Order. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 11/22/2017. (BJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Tenner Murphy, by his Guardians Kay and
Richard Murphy; Marrie Bottelson; Dionne
Swanson; and on behalf of others similarly
situated,

Civil No. 16-2623 (DWF/BRT)

Plaintiffs,
v.

ORDER

Emily Johnson Piper in her Capacity
as Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Human Services,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s appeal of Magistrate Judge
Becky R. Thorson’s August 21, 2017 Order and Opinion on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel
and Defendant’s Motion to Compel (“Order”) (Doc. No. 78). Plaintiffs filed a response
to Defendant’s objections on September 19, 2017. (Doc. No. 91.)
DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standard
The Court must modify or set aside any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s order

found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a); Local Rule 72.2(a). This is an “extremely deferential” standard. Reko v.
Creative Promotions, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007 (D. Minn. 1999). “A finding is
‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on

the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Chakales v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 79 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Chase v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 926 F.2d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1991)). “A
magistrate judge’s ruling is contrary to law when it either fails to apply or misapplies
pertinent statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Coons v. BNSF Ry. Co., Civ.
No. 15-4282 (WMW/TNL), --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 3382311, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug.
7, 2017) (citing Edeh v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1043 (D.
Minn. 2010)).
II.

The Magistrate Judge’s Order and Defendant’s Objections
Magistrate Judge Thorson’s August 21, 2017 Order addressed Motions to Compel

by Plaintiffs and Defendant, granting in part and denying in part both motions. (See Doc.
Nos. 59, 65, 78.) Only Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel is at issue in this appeal.
Defendant objects to the August 21, 2017 Order and asks the Court to reverse the
Order to the extent it obligates Defendant to gather responsive information to Plaintiffs’
interrogatories contained in case management files from 87 lead agencies tasked with
administering the State’s Waiver Services program. 1 In particular, Defendant challenges
the Order with respect to Interrogatories 5, 6(c), 8, and 17. According to Defendant,
“[t]he Order is clearly erroneous because it fails the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality test in
which the court never engaged and rests on a misinterpretation of the law.” (Doc. No. 79
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Defendant asserts that she “does not read the Order that broadly but is filing [her]
Objection in an abundance of caution to preserve the objection, to the extent the
Magistrate Judge interprets the Order to require Defendants to contact 87 counties to
obtain answers to interrogatories.” (Doc. No. 79 at 2 n.3.)
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at 2.) Defendant asserts two fundamental objections. First, Defendant argues that the
discovery ordered by the Magistrate Judge is not proportional under Rule 26(b)(1).
Defendant asserts that responding to the interrogatories at issue “would require a
subjective, substantive review of each case management file, which would require a great
deal of time and resources.” (Id. at 5.) Second, Defendant argues that the Magistrate
Judge committed clear error in requiring Defendant to obtain data from lead agencies
since “case management records are not in Defendant’s control and are not otherwise
‘reasonably available’ to Defendant.” (Id.)
In contrast, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge did not clearly err “in
compelling Defendant to make efforts to obtain information to supplement Defendant’s
interrogatory responses that are proportional to the needs of the case.” (Doc. No. 91 at
4.) First, Plaintiffs argue that the issues involved in the disputed interrogatories are of
central importance to their case. Second, Plaintiffs suggest that Defendant should have
access to the information in question and emphasize that Defendant must “make efforts to
obtain” responsive information. (Id. at 6 (quoting Doc. No. 78 at 13).) In short, Plaintiffs
argue that Defendant has not met her burden to demonstrate that the Magistrate Judge’s
Order merits reversal.
The Court outlines each disputed interrogatory and the parties’ specific arguments,
below. 2

2

The parties briefed the underlying Motions to Compel and Defendant’s Appeal of
Magistrate Judge Thorson’s August 21, 2017 Order prior to the Court’s September 29,
2017 Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification. Some of the parties’
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
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A.

Interrogatory No. 5: “Identify how many providers are authorized to
provide person-centered planning services and how many of those
providers specifically help individuals develop person-centered transition
plans.”

The Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel with respect to
Interrogatory No. 5 and ordered “Defendant to identify the number of providers she
knows of who provide person-centered planning services and how many of those
providers specifically help individuals develop person-centered transition plans.” (Doc.
No. 78 at 15.) The Magistrate Judge also stated that “[i]f, after sufficient inquiry,
Defendant lacks necessary information to make a full, fair, and specific answer to an
interrogatory, she must state so under oath and Defendant must also set forth in detail the
efforts made to obtain the information.” (Id.)
Defendant asserts that it does not have data concerning providers who are
“authorized” to provide person-centered planning services because the term “authorized”
has no meaning in this context. Defendant contends that she has provided available
information and explains that answering whether person-centered planners help to
develop transition plans would require case-management-level review. Plaintiff argues
that the Magistrate Judge did not err in directing Defendant to supplement her response to

(Footnote Continued From Previous Page)
arguments, therefore, are no longer relevant as the case is no longer simply asserted on
behalf of three individuals residing in Hennepin County. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 79 at 2, 8-9;
Doc. No. 91 at 1-2.) Rather, this case now pertains to claims on behalf of the following
certified class: “All individuals age 18 and older who are eligible for and have received a
Disability Waiver, live in a licensed Community Residential Setting, and have not been
given the choice and opportunity to reside in the most integrated residential setting
appropriate to their needs.” (Doc. No. 99 at 35.)
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Interrogatory No. 5 because “Defendant had not done her due diligence to obtain this
information.” (Doc. No. 91 at 10.)
B.

Interrogatory No. 6(c): “For each person identified in part b of this
interrogatory [individuals for each lead agency who have moved from a
corporate foster care facility to an alternative setting], explain and
describe in detail how the transition and move occurred.”

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel with respect to Interrogatory No. 6 was granted in
part and denied in part. Concerning how the transitions for identified individuals
occurred, the Magistrate Judge ordered Defendant to “make efforts to obtain the desired
information.” (Doc. No. 78 at 17.) The Magistrate Judge also ordered that “[i]f
Defendant lacks necessary information to make a full, fair, and specific answer to an
interrogatory, she must state so under oath and Defendant must also set forth in detail the
efforts made to obtain the information.” (Id.) In addition, the Magistrate Judge directed
that such a statement must specify why the information sought is not available in records
maintained by Defendant pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 431.17.
In light of the number of individuals identified in part (b) of Interrogatory No. 6,
Defendant asserts that “Defendant would have to review individual case-management
records of 704 Waiver recipients to answer this question.” (Doc. No. 79 at 3.) In
contrast, Plaintiff suggests that “Defendant need only review, or ask lead agencies and/or
case managers to review, portions of the case management files related to transition.”
(Doc. No. 91 at 10.)

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C.

Interrogatory No. 8: “Identify all individuals receiving Disability
Waivers and living in a corporate foster care facility who want to move
into an alternative to foster care setting and explain how you identified
these individuals.”

The Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel with respect to
Interrogatory No. 8. For responsive information already provided, the Magistrate Judge
directed Defendant to clarify if that response was complete. If not, the Magistrate Judge
directed that “Defendant must make efforts to obtain the complete desired information.”
(Doc. No. 78 at 18.) The Magistrate Judge stated that “[i]f Defendant lacks necessary
information to make a full, fair, and specific answer to an interrogatory, she must state so
under oath and Defendant must also set forth in detail the efforts made to obtain the
information.” (Id.) The Magistrate Judge also ordered that such a statement must specify
why the information sought is not available in records maintained by Defendant pursuant
to 42 C.F.R. § 431.17.
Defendant argues that she has provided data in her possession in answering this
interrogatory. Defendant asserts that “[t]o the extent a person may have told his or her
case manager that they want to move, and that information is in the case management
records, but it has not been communicated to Defendant, Defendant does not have this
data.” (Doc. No. 79 at 3.) According to Defendant, a complete review of case
management files needed to identify all individuals who have expressed a desire to move
would be overly burdensome. Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in
concluding otherwise because “[i]t is burdensome on its face to have to review thousands
of individual case management files, comprised of millions of pages of documents, to

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identify all individuals who want to move out of corporate foster care.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant could supplement their responses to Interrogatory No. 8
without reviewing complete case management files. Plaintiffs propose that Defendant
could review only those pages relevant to the inquiry or, alternatively, inquire directly of
lead agencies to develop responses.
D.

Interrogatory No. 17: “For persons identified in Interrogatory 4(d)
identify how many are living in the most integrated setting.”

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel with respect to Interrogatory No. 17 was granted as
outlined in the Magistrate Judge’s Order. The Magistrate Judge considered Defendant’s
assertion “that she does not have individual level case management data on waiver
recipients because case-management is processed and administered by lead agencies.”
(Doc. No. 78 at 19.) Even if Defendant did not have such “data,” however, the
Magistrate Judge ordered that “Defendant must make efforts to obtain the desired
information and answer the question about the number of people disclosed in
Interrogatory No. 4(d) who are living in the most integrated setting.” (Id. at 20.)
Defendant asserts that responding to this Interrogatory would require an individual
consideration of the case management files for 23,258 identified individuals. With
respect to Interrogatory No. 17, Plaintiffs contend that if Defendant cannot identify
information pertaining to whether individuals are living in the most integrated setting,
“that is an admission that Defendant has failed to ‘administer services, programs, and
activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities’ as required by the ADA.” (Id. at 7 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)).)

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Plaintiffs argue they “are entitled to a response and to know what Defendant knows.”
(Id.)
III.

Analysis
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, “[p]arties may obtain discovery

regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In evaluating the proper
scope of permissible discovery under this rule, the court should “consider[] the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. Information that meets these requirements is
discoverable even if it would not be admissible in evidence. Id.
In responding to interrogatories, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 requires an
entity to “furnish the information available to [it]” through an agent or officer. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 33(b)(1)(B). Specifically, it must “provide information that is available to it and
can be produced without undue labor and expense.” Lindholm v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
Civ. No. 3:15-CV-03003-RAL, 2016 WL 452315, at *5 (D.S.D. Feb. 5, 2016) (quoting
Miller v. Pruneda, 236 F.R.D. 277, 282 (N.D. W. Va. 2004)). However, an interrogatory
may not demand “extensive investigations or . . . complex research.” Miller, 236 F.R.D.
at 282 (citation omitted). An individual defendant named in her official capacity must
answer interrogatories directed at the government entity “using all reasonably obtainable
information within [her] possession, custody or control, including records maintained by
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[the relevant government entity].” See Tyler v. Suffolk Cty., 256 F.R.D. 34, 37-38 (D.
Mass. 2009).
In raising an objection to an interrogatory, the objecting party has the burden to
demonstrate “that the information sought is not reasonably available to it.” Lindholm,
2016 WL 452315, at *5 (citing 8B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2174 (3d ed. 2010)). “If the answering party lacks necessary information to
make a full, fair and specific answer to an interrogatory, it should so state under oath and
should set forth in detail the efforts made to obtain the information.” Id. (quoting Essex
Builders Grp., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins., 230 F.R.D. 682, 685 (M.D. Fla. 2005)).
The Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Thorson’s Order is neither clearly
erroneous nor contrary to law. Notably, the Order does not specify that Defendants must
contact the 87 lead agencies to obtain information from case management files in order to
answer each interrogatory. Rather, the Order specifies that Defendant must make efforts
to obtain information and state under oath what efforts were undertaken if Defendant
determines she is unable to answer the questions posed with information that is available
to her. 3 The Court declines to conclude that requiring Defendant to reach out to lead

3

The Magistrate Judge specifically ordered with respect to Interrogatories No. 5,
6(c), and 8, that “[i]f Defendant lacks necessary information to make a full, fair, and
specific answer to an interrogatory, she must state so under oath and Defendant must also
set forth in detail the efforts made to obtain the information.” (See Doc. No. 78 at 17; see
also id. at 15, 18.) The Court concludes that this requirement should apply equally to all
interrogatories posed to Defendant, including Interrogatory No. 17. Although the
Magistrate Judge did not specifically state this requirement with respect to Interrogatory
No. 17, the Court determines that the Order should be interpreted to impose this
requirement for each interrogatory at issue.
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agencies to answer interrogatories would in all circumstances be unreasonable or beyond
the scope of what is permitted under the relevant discovery rules. If Defendant
determines that information from lead agencies is not reasonably available to her, she
must articulate why that is the case with respect to the particular information being
requested.
The Magistrate Judge’s Order directs Defendant to adequately answer Plaintiff’s
interrogatories pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33, and the discovery ordered
is both relevant and proportional under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Giving
proper deference to the Magistrate Judge’s August 21, 2017 Order and for the reasons
stated, the Court denies Defendant’s appeal and affirms Magistrate Judge Becky R.
Thorson’s August 21, 2017 Order in all respects.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Defendant’s appeal (Doc. No. [79]) of Magistrate Judge Becky R.

Thorson’s Order and Opinion on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel and Defendant’s Motion
to Compel is OVERRULED.
2.

Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson’s August 21, 2017 Order and Opinion

on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel and Defendant’s Motion to Compel (Doc. No. [78]) is
AFFIRMED consistent with this Order.

Dated: November 22, 2017

s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge

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