Gamble et al v. Minnesota State-Operated Services et al

Filing 103

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, overruling in part and sustaining in part Defendants' Objections to the R&R 81 ; overruling Plaintiffs' Objections to the R&R 94 ; adopting in part and rejecting in part the Magi strate Judge's Report and Recommendation 80 ; granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 38 . (Written Opinion). Signed by Chief Judge John R. Tunheim on 09/28/2017. (JMK) cc: Pro Se Plaintiffs. Modified text on 9/28/2017 (MMP).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
DAVID LE ROY GAMBLE, JR., CYRUS
P. GLADDEN, II, DAVID J. JANNETTA,
JERRAD W. WAILAND, and
CLARENCE A. WASHINGTON,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 16-2720 (JRT/KMM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER ON REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

v.
MINNESOTA STATE-OPERATED
SERVICES, MINNESOTA STATE
INDUSTRIES, MINNESOTA SEX
OFFENDER PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES, STATE OF
MINNESOTA, EMILY JOHNSON PIPER,
SHELBY RICHARDSON, JOHN AND
JANE DOES 1-20, LUCINDA JESSON,
DENNIS BENSON, NANCY A.
JOHNSTON, SHIRLEY JACOBSON, and
CHARLIE HOFFMAN,
Defendants.

David Le Roy Gamble, Jr., Jerrad W. Wailand, and Clarence A.
Washington, St. Peter Regional Treatment Center, 100 Freeman Drive, St.
Peter, MN 56082, Cyrus P. Gladden, II and David J. Jannetta, Minnesota
Sex Offender Program, 1111 Highway 73, Moose Lake, MN 55767, pro se
plaintiffs.
Kathryn I. Landrum, MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
OFFICE, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100, St. Paul, MN 55101, for
defendants.

Five individuals currently in the custody of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
(“MSOP”) and participating in MSOP’s “Patient Pay Program” (“the Program”) brought

this action against numerous state-entity and individual Defendants, asserting claims for
both statutory and constitutional violations related to the Program. Defendants moved to
dismiss all claims. Now before the Court are Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ objections to
the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United States Magistrate Judge Katherine
M. Menendez on Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Because the Court will find that

Plaintiffs state a plausible claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) but not a
procedural due-process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will sustain in
part and overrule in part the objections. Accordingly, the Court will adopt in part and
reject in part the R&R, and grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are five individuals civilly confined by the state of Minnesota pursuant
to the MSOP. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12-16, June 14, 2017, Docket No. 79.) Plaintiffs
voluntarily participate in the Patient Pay Program – an MSOP-administered vocational
work program for detainees. (Id. ¶¶ 12-16, 94.) To be admitted into the Program,
volunteers must complete a W-9 form and indicate on it that they are independent
contractors. (Id. ¶¶ 119-121.) Until recently, MSOP required volunteers to perform two
hours of unpaid work “as a pre-condition of being hired.” (Id. ¶ 116.) Plaintiffs allege
that, in administering the Program, “MSOP exercises sole control over all aspects of the
work relationship.” (Id. ¶ 57(o).) For example, Plaintiffs allege that MSOP dictates
workers’ hours, furnishes all required tools and materials, and “specifies the exact duties
to be performed.” (Id. ¶ 57.) MSOP allegedly does not provide many of Plaintiffs’
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“basic needs.” (Id. ¶ 72.) For example, Plaintiffs allege that they must purchase clothes
(including work clothes), shoes, medical care, and medical supplies and devices. (Id.
¶ 72.) Plaintiffs also allege that all MSOP detainees – irrespective of their participation
in the Program – must repay the state for the cost of their care according to their ability to
pay.

(Id. ¶ 75; see Minn. Stat. § 246B.07.)

Accordingly, MSOP detainees receive

monthly bills for the cost of their commitment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 76.)
MSOP originally set the gross wages of the Program’s workers at the statemandated minimum, according to the Amended Complaint. (Id. ¶ 95.) In September
2009, however, MSOP allegedly began to withhold up to fifty percent of workers’ wages
(See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95-105) pursuant to a state law that gives the Commissioner of the
Minnesota Department of Human Services “the authority to retain up to 50 percent of any
payments made to an individual participating in the vocational work program for the
purpose of reducing state costs associated with operating the Minnesota sex offender
program.” Minn. Stat. § 246B.06 subd. 6. Plaintiffs allege that MSOP uses the withheld
wages to help defray losses from the operation of MSOP’s “industry shops.” (Id. ¶¶ 96,
98.) Plaintiffs further allege that MSOP has continued to withhold fifty percent of
Plaintiffs’ wages, that the withholding is a “permanent confiscation,” and that their
withheld wages are not credited toward their obligation to reimburse the state for the cost
of their care. (Id. ¶¶ 76, 95, 102.)
Plaintiffs filed this action in August 2016 against several state-entity and
individual defendants. (See Compl., Aug. 12, 2016, Docket No. 1; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-32;
R&R at 2 & n.2, July 5, 2017, Docket No. 80.) Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of
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the FLSA and the Rehabilitation Act, along with claims for violations of their Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 125-154; see R&R at 4-5.)

Defendants moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

(Mot. to Dismiss, Dec. 22, 2016, Docket No. 38.)

The magistrate judge

submitted an R&R on Defendants’ motion, recommending that the Court (1) deny
Defendants’ motion with respect to both Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim against the state-entity
defendants and Plaintiffs’ procedural due-process claim seeking prospective injunctive
relief against the individual defendants in their official capacities; and (2) grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss all other claims, for reasons including sovereign
immunity, qualified immunity, mootness, and failure to state a claim. (R&R at 4-5.)
Plaintiffs and Defendants both filed objections to the R&R. (Defs.’ Obj. to R&R, July
19, 2017, Docket No. 81; Pls.’ Obj. to R&R, Aug. 4, 2017, Docket No. 94.) The Court
will deny Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim, but grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to all other claims.

DISCUSSION

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
After a magistrate judge files an R&R, a party may file “specific written

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2);
accord D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(1). “The objections should specify the portions of the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which objections are made and provide
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a basis for those objections.” Mayer v. Walvatne, No. 07-1958, 2008 WL 4527774, at *2
(D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2008).

For dispositive motions, the Court reviews de novo a

“properly objected to” portion of an R&R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord D. Minn. LR
72.2(b)(3). “Objections which are not specific but merely repeat arguments presented to
and considered by a magistrate judge are not entitled to de novo review, but rather are
reviewed for clear error.” Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1012,
1017 (D. Minn. 2015).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers
all facts alleged in the complaint as true to determine if the complaint states a claim for
“relief that is plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594
(8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Although the Court
accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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II.

DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO THE R&R
Defendants object to the R&R to the extent that the magistrate judge found that

Plaintiffs plausibly stated under Rule 12(b)(6) both an FLSA claim and a procedural dueprocess claim. The Court will overrule Defendants’ objections with respect to Plaintiffs’
FLSA claim. The Court will sustain Defendants’ objections with respect to Plaintiffs’
procedural due-process claim.

A.

Plaintiffs’ FLSA Claim

The FLSA affords employees a minimum wage. 28 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 214, 215.
In determining whether a plaintiff is an “employee” under the FLSA, courts evaluate the
“economic reality” of the parties’ relationship based on the totality of the circumstances.
Barnett v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, Inc., No. 98-3625, 1999 WL 110547, at *1 (8th
Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); see Karlson v. Action Process Serv. & Private Investigations, LLC,
860 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 2017). The fact that an employer does not provide an
employee her “basic needs” weighs in favor of finding an employer-employee
relationship; the employee needs a minimum wage to purchase those basic needs. See 29
U.S.C. § 202(a); Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 205-206 (11th Cir. 1997); cf. Cody
v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1048 (D.S.D. 1984), aff’d, 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1986), on
reh’g, 830 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1987).
The magistrate judge found that Plaintiffs plausibly allege that they are employees.
Defendants object, arguing that Plaintiffs are not employees under the “economic reality”

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test because the Magistrate’s analysis of whether Plaintiffs are afforded their basic needs
is both factually and legally incorrect. 1
After a de novo review, the Court will overrule Defendants objections and adopt
the R&R with respect to Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim. The Court, like the magistrate judge,
finds that Martin v. Benson properly analyzed the MSOP’s scheme and operation for
evaluating a portion of the economic reality of Program participants. 827 F. Supp. 2d
1022 (D. Minn. 2011). But unlike the plaintiffs in Martin, Plaintiffs here plausibly allege
that MSOP does not provide Plaintiffs their basic needs. One of the FLSA’s statutory
purposes is to provide employees “the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 9
(1st Cir. 1992) (finding Massachusetts civil-detainees not employees under the FLSA
because they “are cared for . . . by the state” in the same way that prisoners are).
Plaintiffs allege that they must pay for various items, such as work clothing, shoes,
medical care, and medical supplies and devices. Moreover, MSOP detainees must repay
the state for the cost of their care according to their ability to pay, suggesting that
Defendants do not provide Plaintiffs’ basic needs. Minn. Stat. § 246B.07. Furthermore,
MSOP allegedly withholds some portion of Plaintiffs’ wages to help defray losses from
the operation of MSOP’s “industry shops,” not to help offset Plaintiffs’ obligation to
reimburse the state for the cost of their care. These facts suggest that Plaintiffs may
1

Defendants do not object to the R&R’s rejection of Defendants’ argument “that MSOP
detainees are categorically beyond the reach of the FLSA because they are essentially prisoners.”
(R&R at 8.) Thus, the Court will adopt that portion of the R&R.

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properly be considered employees and thus may be entitled to relief on their FLSA claim.
Accordingly, the Court will overrule Defendants’ objections and adopt the Report and
Recommendation with respect to Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim.

B.

Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due-Process Claim

Plaintiffs allege that MSOP’s withholding of up to half of Plaintiffs’ wages
violates their procedural due-process rights. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 131-133.) To prevail on a
procedural due-process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the
government has interfered with a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) that the
procedures attendant to the interference were constitutionally insufficient. Taylor v.
Armontrout, 894 F.2d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 1989).
The magistrate judge found that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a procedural dueprocess claim.

Defendants make two objections.

First, Defendants argue that the

magistrate judge erred in failing to apply Jennings v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994 (8th Cir.
1995) and McMaster v. Minnesota, 819 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Minn. 1993), aff’d, 30 F.3d
976 (8th Cir. 1994).

Second, Defendants argue that Minn. Stat. § 246B.06 subd. 6

provides Plaintiffs with sufficient notice and makes any procedural due-process
requirement futile.
The Court will sustain Defendants’ objection, reject the R&R with respect to
Plaintiffs’ procedural due-process claim, and dismiss Plaintiffs’ procedural due-process
claim. Although Plaintiffs plausibly allege that they have a protected property interest,

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the Court finds that Minn. Stat. § 246B.06 subd. 6 renders any procedures attendant to
that interest futile.
Plaintiffs plausibly allege the existence of a protected property interest. Jennings
holds that there is no protected property interest if the statute creating the property
interest simultaneously gives a decision-maker “discretionary authority in implementing
it.” 70 F.3d at 996. McMaster too relies on the state-created characteristic of the
property interest as the reason for finding no protected property interest. 819 F. Supp. at
1442 n.7. Here, the source of the alleged property right is the FLSA – not Minnesota
law. Thus, the authority under state law for MSOP to withhold up to half of Plaintiffs’
wages does not eliminate the existence of a protected property interest established by
federal law.
Plaintiffs do not, however, plausibly allege constitutionally insufficient procedures
attendant to MSOP’s withholding of half of their wages. At its core, the Due Process
Clause affords notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333-34 (1976).

“[T]he remedy mandated by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment is ‘an opportunity to refute the charge.’” Codd v. Velger, 429
U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972)). The purpose of the notice and hearing “is to provide the person an opportunity
to clear his [or her] name.” Id. (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 n.12.) “[I]f the hearing
mandated by the Due Process Clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must be some
factual dispute.” Id. Accordingly, there is no procedural due-process claim when there is
“no dispute of fact that a pre-deprivation or post-deprivation hearing would resolve.”
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Mickelson v. Cty. of Ramsey, 823 F.3d 918, 932 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
1578 (2017).
Here, additional procedures attendant to MSOP’s withholding of up to half of
Plaintiffs’ wages would not resolve any factual disputes.

Minnesota law gives the

Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services “the authority to retain
up to 50 percent of any payments made to an individual participating in the vocational
work program for the purpose of reducing state costs associated with operating the
Minnesota sex offender program.” Minn. Stat. § 246B.06 subd. 6. This authority is
independent of any facts that Plaintiffs could plausibly raise in any pre- or postdeprivation hearing. See id. Although the magistrate judge correctly noted the lack of
clarity in the law regarding wage-garnishment in custodial settings generally (R&R at 1314), Minn. Stat. § 246B.06 subd. 6 does not give rise to any plausible factual disputes that
additional procedures could resolve. See Mickelson, 823 F.3d at 932; In re DNA Ex Post
Facto Issues, 561 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2009); Cook v. Lehman, No. 97-36175, 1999
WL 638647 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999). Accordingly, the Court will sustain Defendants’
objection, reject in part the R&R, and dismiss Plaintiffs’ procedural due-process claim. 2

2

The Court’s finding that Plaintiffs fail to allege a procedural due-process claim for
MSOP’s wage-withholding pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 246B.06 subd. 6 does not, however,
foreclose Plaintiffs from arguing that their post-withholding net wages must meet the FLSA
minimum.

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III.

PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO THE R&R

A.

Plaintiffs’ Sovereign-Immunity Objection

Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss Counts II through
V to the extent that those counts seek damages from the individual defendants in their
individual capacities. Plaintiffs argue that sovereign immunity does not prevent Plaintiffs
from seeking damages from the individual defendants in their individual capacities.
The magistrate judge did not recommend dismissal on sovereign-immunity
grounds of Counts II through V to the extent that those counts seek damages from the
individual defendants in their individual capacities.

Rather, the magistrate judge

correctly found that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts II through V to
the extent that those counts seek (1) damages or injunctive relief against the state-entity
defendants and (2) damages from the individual defendants in their official capacities.
(R&R at 7.) The magistrate judge also correctly found that sovereign immunity does not
bar Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts II through V to the extent that those counts seek
prospective injunctive relief against the individual defendants in their official capacities.
(R&R at 6-7.) The Court therefore will overrule Plaintiffs’ objection and adopt the R&R
with respect to Defendants’ sovereign-immunity defenses. 3
3

Plaintiffs also ask the Court to amend the R&R to acknowledge that Plaintiffs can seek
injunctive relief against the individual defendants in their official capacities and damages from
them in their personal capacities. (Pls.’ Obj. to R&R at 6-7.) The R&R is clear that sovereign
immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims for damages against the individual defendants in their
personal capacities. (R&R at 4-7.) Other defenses, however, do. For example, the Court will
find that qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts III and IV against the individual
(Footnote continued on next page.)

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B.

Plaintiffs’ FLSA Objection

Although Plaintiffs agree with the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim, Plaintiffs object to that portion of
the report. Specifically, Plaintiffs object to the report’s purported failure to consider
Plaintiffs’ arguments that they qualify for FLSA coverage either (1) under 29 U.S.C.
§§ 203(d), 203(r), 213, and 214; or (2) under 29 C.F.R. § 525 because they are “patientworkers.”
Plaintiffs are not patient-workers. In Martin, the court carefully considered the
statutory and regulatory portions of the FLSA applicable to the Program, including the
statutes, regulations, and case law that Plaintiffs cite to here. See Martin, 827 F. Supp. 2d
at 1026-27. For example, Martin held that Program participants are not patient-workers
because there is a difference under Minnesota law between individuals committed as
sexually dangerous persons and individuals committed as mentally ill and dangerous. Id.
Martin also carefully analyzed Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973),
which held that patient-workers are employees under the FLSA. Souder, 367 F. Supp. at
811-15. But because Plaintiffs are not patient-workers, Souder is inapplicable here. The
R&R – by adopting a portion of Martin’s reasoning – addressed Plaintiffs’ statutory and
_____________________________
(Footnote continued.)

defendants in their personal capacities. The Court will not address – and the magistrate judge
did not address – whether qualified immunity attaches to Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts II and V
against the individual defendants in their personal capacities because the Court will dismiss
Counts II and V for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (See R&R at 18 n.10.)

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regulatory arguments. (R&R at 8-9.) The Court will adopt the R&R with respect to
Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim, and the Court will overrule Plaintiffs’ objection.

C.

Plaintiffs’ Mootness Objection

Plaintiffs purport to object to the magistrate judge’s finding that Counts II, III, and
V should be dismissed as moot.

But Plaintiffs do not object to the court’s

recommendation that the claims in Counts II, III, and V that seek injunctive relief against
former state officials should be dismissed as moot. The R&R does not recommend
dismissal of Counts II, III, and V against the former officials to the extent that Counts II,
III, and V seek damages. (R&R at 19.) Rather, it only recommends dismissing as moot
Counts II, III, and V to the extent that those claims seek injunctive relief against the
former officials. (Id.) The Court therefore will overrule Plaintiffs’ objection and adopt
the R&R with respect to the finding that Counts II, III, and V are moot as to the extent
that those counts seek injunctive relief against the former officials.

D.

Plaintiffs’ Objection Regarding Their Equal-Protection Claim

Plaintiffs object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that Plaintiffs’ equalprotection claim (Count II) be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government is generally required to
treat similarly situated people alike. Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.
1994). In assessing an equal-protection claim, the Court must first address whether
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they were treated differently than others who were
similarly situated. Id. “Absent a threshold showing that [they are] similarly situated to
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those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, [Plaintiffs do] not have a viable equal
protection claim.” Id.
Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that they are being treated differently from others
similarly situated. Minnesota holds MSOP detainees pursuant to a different statutory
framework than, for example, those who are deemed “mentally ill and dangerous to the
public.”

Compare Minn. Stat. §§ 246B.05, 246B.06, with Minn. Stat. § 253B.

Moreover, courts have regularly held that these different statuses, established under
different statutory schemes, show that individuals at “one facility . . . are not considered
to be ‘similarly situated’” to those at other facilities. Beaulieu v. Ludeman, No. 07-1535,
2008 WL 2498241, at *21 (D. Minn. June 18, 2008).
Plaintiffs argue that their similarity to patient-workers, for example, is in the
similarity of their employment status, not in the manner in which they are detained. But
the statutory schemes that create the differences in detention status necessarily create
differences in employment status, as discussed above with respect to Plaintiffs’
objections to the FLSA-portion of the R&R. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 525, with Minn. Stat.
§ 246B.06. The Court will therefore overrule Plaintiffs’ objection and adopt the portion
of the R&R finding that Plaintiffs’ equal-protection claim (Count II) should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.

E.

Plaintiffs’ Objections Regarding Their Thirteenth Amendment and
Substantive Due-Process Claims

Plaintiffs also object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that Plaintiffs’
Thirteenth Amendment claim (Count IV) and substantive due-process claim (Count V)
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should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
“those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery.” Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S.
328, 332 (1916). Even prison-mandated work by inmates “is not the sort of involuntary
servitude which violates Thirteenth Amendment rights.” Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709,
719 (8th Cir. 1964). Likewise, the theory of substantive due process is “reserved for truly
egregious and extraordinary cases.” Myers v. Scott Cty., 868 F.2d 1017, 1018 (8th Cir.
1989). A complaint can allege a violation of substantive due process by alleging (1)
behavior that infringes a “fundamental” liberty interest without narrowly tailoring that
interference to serve a compelling state interest; or (2) conduct that is so outrageous that
it shocks the conscience or otherwise offends our judicial notions of fairness. Weiler v.
Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02
(1993); Wiemer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989)).
Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that Defendants’ requirements to (1) perform two
hours of unpaid work before being hired into the Program and (2) submit W-9 forms that
identify them as independent contractors, violates either the Thirteenth Amendment or
substantive due process. To begin with, the Program is voluntary. Neither the W-9 form
nor the two-hour, pre-work requirement approaches the kind of slavery-like conditions
that predated the Thirteenth Amendment. Furthermore, Plaintiffs cite no authority – nor
can the Court find any – to suggest that either the W-9 or pre-work requirement infringes
on any fundamental right or shocks the conscience. The Court will therefore overrule
Plaintiffs’ objections and adopt the portion of the R&R recommending that Plaintiffs’

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Thirteenth Amendment claim (Count IV) and substantive due-process claim (Count V) be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.

F.

Plaintiffs’ Qualified-Immunity Objection

Plaintiffs object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that Counts III and IV
that seek damages from the individual defendants in their personal capacities should be
dismissed as barred by qualified immunity. The R&R is clear that qualified immunity
does not attach to the state-entity defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim.
(R&R at 18-19.)
Even though the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a procedural due-process
claim in Count III, the Court will nevertheless adopt the portion of the R&R finding that
qualified immunity bars the claims in Count III to the extent that those claims seek
damages from the individual defendants in their personal capacities. As discussed above
and in the R&R, the case law regarding the required procedures for withholding of
detainees’ wages is unclear. (R&R at 13-14.) That lack of clarity necessarily requires
the Court to find that any procedural due-process right violated by the Defendants’
withholding of Plaintiffs’ wages is not clearly established. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 739 (2002).
With respect to Plaintiffs’ substantive due-process claim in Count IV (and to the
extent that Claim IV includes FLSA-related claims), here too Plaintiffs fail to allege facts
that would plausibly show that their substantive due-process rights or FLSA rights were
clearly established. See Martin, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1022. Plaintiffs also have not pointed to
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any allegations that the Defendants “were plainly incompetent or knowingly violated the
law.” (R&R at 18-19.) The Court will therefore adopt the portion of the R&R finding
that qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’ substantive due-process claim in Count IV for
damages from the individual defendants in their personal capacities. 4

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
Defendants’ Objections to the R&R [Docket No. 81] are OVERRULED in part and
SUSTAINED in part, Plaintiffs’ Objections to the R&R [Docket No. 94] are
OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Docket No.
80] is ADOPTED in part and REJECTED in part. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 38] the Amended
Complaint [Docket No. 79] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:
1.

Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to Count I.

2.

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts II through VI, as

follows:
a.

Counts II through V against the state entity defendants, the damages

claims in Counts II through V against the individual defendants in their official

4

The Court will also adopt the R&R with respect to Plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claim
(Count VI), overrule Plaintiffs’ objection, and dismiss that claim. Plaintiffs’ objection to the
portion of the R&R recommending dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claim makes no
specific objections and refers the Court to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’
motion to dismiss. Having reviewed these “merely repeat[ed] arguments,” the Court will find
that the Magistrate did not commit clear error in recommending dismissal of Plaintiffs’
Rehabilitation Act claim. Montgomery, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 1017.

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capacities, and the Rehabilitation Act claim against the State of Minnesota are
DISMISSED without prejudice because the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over those claims due to sovereign immunity.
b.

The claims in Counts II through V for prospective injunctive relief

from the individual defendants in their official capacities and damages from the
individual defendants in their personal capacities are DISMISSED with
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
c.

Count VI against Minnesota State-Operated Services, Minnesota

State Industries, MSOP, and Minnesota Department of Human Services is
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
d.

The claims in Counts III and IV for damages from the individual

defendants in their personal capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice as barred
by qualified immunity.
e.

The claims in Counts II, III, and V for prospective injunctive relief

from Lucinda Jesson, Dennis Benson, and Shelby Richardson are DISMISSED
without prejudice as moot.
DATED: September 28, 2017
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.

_______s/John R. Tunheim________
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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