Garrison v. Minnesota Department of Revenue of the State of Minnesota et al

Filing 190

ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: The March 8, 2019 R&R of United States Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer 174 is ADOPTED. Defendants' motion for summary judgment 127 is GRANTED. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright on 9/17/2019. (RJE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Peter Garrison,

Case No. 16-cv-2866 (WMW/HB)
Plaintiff,
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

v.
Minnesota Department of Revenue et al.,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the March 8, 2019 Report and Recommendation
(R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer.

(Dkt. 174.)

The R&R

recommends granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Peter Garrison
filed timely objections to the R&R.1 For the reasons addressed below, the Court overrules
Garrison’s objections, adopts the R&R, and grants Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
BACKGROUND2
Garrison is an employee of the Minnesota Department of Revenue (MDOR). His
allegations in this employment discrimination lawsuit relate to a three-year period from

1

Objections to the R&R were due on March 25, 2019. See LR 72.2(b)(1); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(d). Garrison filed objections to the R&R on March 25, 2019, and supplemental
objections on April 2, 2019. The Court is not required to consider untimely submissions
filed by a party without having obtained permission to do so. However, as Defendants
received an opportunity to, and did in fact, respond to the supplemental objections, the
Court has considered Garrison’s supplemental objections.
2

The R&R includes a detailed review of the factual and procedural background that
need not be repeated at length here.

about 2012 until early 2015, during which Defendant Linda Craigie supervised Garrison in
MDOR’s Out-of-State Unit.

Garrison’s complaint3

describes multiple negative

interactions with Craigie, which Garrison attributes to Craigie’s racial bias. Garrison
alleges that he was suspended multiple times without cause and ultimately demoted with a
commensurate reduction in salary.
After Garrison filed a charge of race discrimination with the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Garrison’s union filed grievances on his behalf.
MDOR held a grievance meeting at which Garrison and two union representatives were
present, and the parties discussed settlement options. Garrison requested rescission of the
disciplinary actions against him and assignment to a new supervisor. Over the next six
weeks, the parties negotiated revisions to the settlement agreement, some of which were
proposed by Garrison and incorporated into the final agreement. Pursuant to the final
settlement agreement, Garrison was reassigned to an office in Arden Hills, Minnesota, with
a new supervisor, the length of his suspension was reduced, and he was reimbursed for lost
wages attributable to the suspension reduction. The final agreement also provided that
Garrison:
fully and completely releases [MDOR] and the State of Minnesota,
and all of their past and present agents, representatives, officers, and
employees, in their official and individual capacities, from any and all
claims, differences, demands, rights, and causes of action with respect
to all of the above-described matters in dispute between the parties[.]

3

Any reference to Garrison’s complaint in this Order is to Garrison’s second
amended complaint, which is the operative pleading.
2

Garrison, along with his union representatives, and Defendant Kathy Zieminski, MDOR’s
Human Resources Director, executed the settlement agreement in March 2015.
Garrison commenced this action in August 2016 against MDOR and three of its
employees—Craigie, Zieminski, and Pam Evans (MDOR’s Director of the Sales and Use
Tax Division). Garrison’s second amended complaint includes the following remaining
claims: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Craigie, in her individual capacity, for
Craigie’s alleged violation of Garrison’s right to equal protection, (2) claims against
MDOR and Craigie, in her official capacity, for race discrimination and maintaining a
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, and (3) a retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) against Craigie and
Evans in their official capacities.
ANALYSIS
The R&R recommends granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
all of the remaining counts. The R&R concludes that Garrison released all but one of his
claims as part of the settlement agreement he executed with MDOR. Further, the R&R
also concludes that, because Garrison has failed to present evidence raising a genuine issue
of material fact as to any of his remaining claims, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment as to all of Garrison’s claims, including his claim that Defendants retaliated
against him through their implementation of the settlement agreement.
A district court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which specific
objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In doing so, the district court “may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
3

magistrate judge.” Id.; accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); LR 72.2(b)(3). Garrison first
objects to the R&R’s conclusion that the release of his claims is valid and enforceable.
Garrison also objects to the R&R’s conclusion that he has failed to provide evidence raising
a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the remaining claims.4
Under Minnesota law, a settlement agreement is a contract. State ex rel. Humphrey
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 713 N.W.2d 350, 355 (Minn. 2006). Because the law
encourages settlement of disputes, agreements settling disputes are generally presumed
valid, including those that involve the release of claims. Sorensen v. Coast-to-Coast Stores
(Cent. Org.), Inc., 353 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). A release of claims is
invalid only when the party challenging the release demonstrates that the agreement was
executed under circumstances establishing either that the party did not intend to release
claims or that insufficient consideration supports the agreement. Id.
The R&R concludes that the factual record “clearly demonstrates that Garrison
entered the [settlement] agreement[] intentionally, willingly, and for sufficient and
negotiated consideration.” As to Garrison’s intent, the language in the release is clear and
uncomplicated and Garrison was represented by two union representatives during
negotiations preceding the execution of the settlement agreement who also were parties to

4

The Court liberally construes Garrison’s filings, as he is appearing pro se before the
Court. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But many of Garrison’s objections
either do not address the issues in the R&R or address issues that were not raised before
the magistrate judge. For this reason, the Court’s legal analysis and conclusions pertain to
Garrison’s objections only to the extent that they challenge the factual characterizations,
reasoning, and conclusions of the R&R. See Hammann v. 1-800 Ideas.com, Inc., 455 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 947–48 (D. Minn. 2006) (“A party cannot, in [its] objections to an R&R,
raise arguments that were not clearly presented to the magistrate judge.”).
4

the final agreement. See generally Sorenson, 353 N.W.2d at 669 (identifying factors
supporting the validity of a release such as the clarity and simplicity of language in the
release and whether a party was represented). And, as the R&R concludes, the record is
“devoid” of any evidence that would raise a genuine issue of material fact that Garrison’s
execution of the agreement was the product of coercion or duress. See generally id. at 670
(stating that duress caused by economic coercion may show the absence of intent to release
claims).
The R&R also concludes that Garrison received sufficient consideration in support
of the release of his claims. It is not clear, under Minnesota law, whether consideration
supporting a release of claims must be “adequate” or whether the parties merely must have
exchanged “something of value” between them. See Chappell v. Butterfield-Odin Sch.
Dist. No. 836, 673 F. Supp. 2d 818, 830–31 (D. Minn. 2009) (discussing the lack of clarity
in Minnesota law). The R&R concludes, however, that consideration was sufficient under
either legal standard. In exchange for entering the settlement agreement and releasing his
claims, Garrison was transferred to a new supervisor and received a reduction in the length
of his suspension. Both concessions represent “something of value,” and both were critical
to the parties’ settlement agreement, as Garrison was entitled to neither concession but for
the settlement agreement.
Garrison now challenges the sufficiency of consideration. Specifically, Garrison
argues that, to be a valid settlement agreement, “it would have been necessary for
[Garrison] to receive consideration on that day” (emphasis added) and the revisions to the
settlement agreement made in response to changes proposed by Garrison are “conditions
5

precedent”—not consideration for Garrison’s waiver of rights under the agreement. Both
arguments are without merit. Garrison cites no legal support for his proposition that a
promisor must receive consideration either simultaneously with the execution of the
contract or at least on the same day that the contract is executed.5 Nor has the Court’s
research located any.
Garrison’s second argument, even if legally sound, fails to defeat the R&R’s
conclusion that consideration was sufficient. This Court’s de novo review of the record
establishes that Garrison sought reassignment to a new supervisor and rescission of
disciplinary action against him. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Garrison was
transferred to a different MDOR unit where he was assigned a new supervisor. MDOR
also reduced the length of Garrison’s disciplinary suspension, reimbursed Garrison for lost
wages and accruals, and converted Garrison’s disciplinary demotion to a voluntary
demotion. Nothing in Garrison’s objections to the R&R contradicts these facts.
The consideration that supports the settlement agreement, including the release of
the parties’ claims, is sufficient. The settlement agreement is valid. Defendants, therefore,
are entitled to summary judgment as to Garrison’s equal protection claim (Count I), Title
VII claim (Count II), and retaliation claim (Count III) as it pertains to any retaliation that

5

Garrison’s objections are unclear as to which “day” he is referring to. Presumably
he means the day that the settlement agreement was executed.

6

occurred prior to the execution of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Court
overrules Garrison’s objections and adopts this aspect of the R&R.6
ORDER
Based on the R&R, the foregoing analysis, and all of the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff Peter Garrison’s objections to the March 8, 2019 R&R, (Dkts. 175,
176), are OVERRULED.

2.

The March 8, 2019 R&R of United States Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer,
(Dkt. 174), is ADOPTED.

3.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 127), is GRANTED.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: September 17, 2019

s/Wilhelmina M. Wright
Wilhelmina M. Wright
United States District Judge

6

Garrison’s valid release of claims entitles Defendants to summary judgment on all
of Garrison’s claims, except to the extent he argues that MDOR’s actions to implement the
terms of the settlement agreement, including reassigning Garrison to Minnesota and reducing his salary, were retaliation for his complaints of discrimination. The R&R concludes
that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any such claim because Garrison has
not introduced any evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to
his retaliation claim.
Because Garrison does not specifically object to this aspect of the R&R, the Court
reviews it for clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee’s note (“When no
timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the
face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d
793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Having carefully reviewed this portion of the R&R,
the Court finds no clear error.
7