Waldorf v. Dayton et al
ORDER denying 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction(Written Opinion) Signed by Chief Judge John R. Tunheim on March 27, 2017. (DML)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 17-107 (JRT/LIB)
MARK DAYTON, LORI SWANSON,
WILLIAM J. CASHMAN, RACHEL
SCHMIDT, JANELLE P. KENDALL,
KYLE TRIGGS, GEORGE LOCK, JOHN L.
SANNER and CODY VOJACEK,
individually and in their official capacities; J.
FREIHAMMER, NATE KYOLLO, and
JANE AND JOHN DOES, in their official
capacities; and JANE AND JOHN ROES,
individually as spouses or married partners
of named Defendants,
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
Christopher-James Waldorf, 56 33rd Avenue South, #132, St. Cloud, MN
56301, pro se.
Kathryn Iverson Landrum, Assistant Attorney General, MINNESOTA
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100,
St. Paul, MN 55101, for Defendants Mark Dayton, Lori Swanson, William
J. Cashman, Rachel Schmidt, and George Lock.
Cally R. Kjellberg-Nelson, QUINLIVAN & HUGHES, PA, P.O. Box
1088, St. Cloud, MN 56302, for Defendants Janelle P. Kendall, Kyle
Triggs, John L. Sanner, J. Freihammer, Nate Kyollo and Cody Vojacek.
Plaintiff Christopher-James Waldorf filed this action against a number of
Minnesota state and county employees and their spouses (collectively, “Defendants”) on
January 11, 2017.
On January 17, 2017, Waldorf filed an expedited 1 motion for
preliminary injunction seeking an order from the Court enjoining Defendants from
proceeding with his state-court prosecution for driving while intoxicated and refusal to
submit to chemical testing. Because the Court must abstain from interfering with an
ongoing state criminal proceeding and Waldorf will have an opportunity to raise his
claims in state proceedings, the Court will deny Waldorf’s motion for preliminary
This motion for preliminary injunctive relief regards Waldorf’s underlying statecourt criminal case in Stearns County, Minnesota. State v. Waldorf, Case No. 73-CR-16157 (Stearns Cty. Dist. Ct.). 2 On November 26, 2015, police arrested Waldorf for
multiple violations of state law arising out of a traffic stop, including operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20.1(1), and
refusing to submit to chemical testing, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20.2. Id. After
Waldorf entered a not-guilty plea, (Am. Compl., Ex. H at 56, Feb. 2, 2017, Docket
No. 28), the state court scheduled Waldorf’s criminal trial for January 24-25, 2017, but
Waldorf failed to appear and the state court issued an arrest warrant, (see Aff. of Kathryn
Waldorf requested expedited processing of his motion for injunctive relief due to an
impending trial date for his criminal matter in state court, originally scheduled January 24-25,
2017. Waldorf’s trial has been continued to May 10, 2017 due to Waldorf’s failure to appear at
his original trial date.
The docket in Waldorf’s state criminal
Iverson Landrum ¶ 2 & Ex. A, Feb. 17, 2017, Docket No. 37). Accordingly, police
arrested Waldorf on February 10, 2017, and released him on bond with a new trial date of
May 10, 2017. (See id.; State v. Waldorf, Case No. 73-CR-16-157.) Notably, Waldorf
asserts, pursuant to his belief that he is a “sovereign citizen,” that: (1) he is not a United
States citizen but an “alien,” “private American national,” “Executor,” and “Sole
Beneficiary” of the Christopher-James Waldorf Estate; (2) he is “foreign to the United
States and Exempt thereby;” and (3) he has the authority to “settle” the state criminal
charges against him. (Am. Compl. at 2, 7, 13; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Expedited Mot. for
Emergency Injunctive Relief at 2, Jan. 17, 2017, Docket No. 6.)
Waldorf initiated this action on January 11, 2017, and he filed an amended
complaint on February 2, 2017. (Compl., Jan. 11, 2017, Docket No. 1; Am. Compl.)
Waldorf alleges sixteen federal and state-law claims related to his traffic stop, arrest, and
subsequent prosecution for driving while intoxicated and refusal to submit to chemical
testing. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 137-203.) Waldorf filed a motion for preliminary injunctive
relief on January 17, 2017.
Waldorf asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from prosecuting his state criminal
case, arguing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his civil claims; he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief; the balance of equities tips in
his favor; and an injunction is in the public interest. Defendants argue that because the
Younger abstention doctrine precludes preliminary injunctive relief and Waldorf failed to
show he has satisfied the standard for a preliminary injunction, Waldorf’s motion
The Court considers whether the doctrine the Supreme Court articulated in
Younger v. Harris applies to this case, thus precluding the Court from enjoining the state
criminal prosecution. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine “directs
federal courts to abstain from accepting jurisdiction in cases where equitable relief is
requested and where granting such relief would interfere with pending state proceedings
in such a way as to offend principles of comity and federalism.” Night Clubs, Inc. v. City
of Fort Smith, 163 F.3d 475, 477 n.1 (8th Cir. 1998); see Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,
134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) (“When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding,
federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.”). Younger abstention is
a “prudential limitation on a court’s exercise of jurisdiction,” as opposed to an Article III
jurisdictional bar. 3005 Cedar, LLC v. City of Minneapolis, No. 09-1580, 2010 WL
455307, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2010). Abstention is proper under Younger when there
is: (1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) an important state interest implicated in
the state proceeding; and (3) an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise
constitutional challenges. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
Applying the Middlesex factors to the case at hand, first, Waldorf’s state criminal
matter is ongoing. Although Waldorf failed to appear for his initial trial date, a new trial
has been set for May 10, 2017. Waldorf argues that because Stearns County District
Court is without jurisdiction over him as a sovereign citizen and because he has already
provided for “full resolution” of his criminal matter via “settlement,” there is no ongoing
judicial proceeding. This argument is without merit; courts have repeatedly rejected
similar sovereign citizenship arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d
1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the “shop worn” argument that the defendant, as a
sovereign citizen, was “beyond the jurisdictional reach of the federal courts”); United
States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding the defendant’s arguments
that he was exempt from United States jurisdiction because he was a citizen of the
“Republic of Idaho” and not a United States citizen were “completely without merit”);
Duwenhoegger v. King, No. 10-3965, 2012 WL 1516865, at *14 (D. Minn. Feb. 13,
2012) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that because he “is not subject to the laws of
Minnesota or the United States because he is a ‘Sovereign Citizen’”), report and
recommendation adopted by Duwenhoegger v. King, 2012 WL 1529300 (D. Minn.
Apr. 30, 2012); Estate of Casmir v. New Jersey, No. 09-4004, 2009 WL 2778392, at *5
(D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2009) (“A person found within the United States cannot somehow
exempt himself or immunize himself from the application of state law or federal law by
declaring himself a non-citizen . . . .”). Accordingly, the first element of the Middlesex
test is satisfied.
Waldorf does not address the remaining elements of the Younger abstention
doctrine articulated in Middlesex. With regard to the second element, Defendants assert
that Stearns County and the State of Minnesota have an important interest in preserving
and protecting state criminal proceedings.
The Court agrees.
specifically addressed a state criminal proceeding. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41; see id. at 51-5-
52 (stating that states carry out the “important and necessary task of enforcing [criminal]
laws against socially harmful conduct that the [s]tates believe in good faith to be
punishable under [their] laws and the Constitution”).
Thus, the second Middlesex
element is satisfied.
Defendants argue that the third Middlesex element is satisfied because Waldorf
has had and will continue to have an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
challenges in his state court proceedings. Waldorf can raise constitutionality questions in
state district court, appeal those decisions to the Minnesota appellate courts, and seek
further review in the United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975) (holding Younger
abstention should have precluded federal-court intervention in state judicial proceedings
in which a litigant had not exhausted state appellate remedies); Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240, 244 (1926) (holding a defendant should “first set up and rely upon his [or her]
defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge [to] the validity of some
statute, unless it plainly appears that this course [of action] would not afford adequate
protection”); Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1144 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[A]
party cannot avoid Younger by choosing not to pursue available state appellate
remedies.”). Therefore, the third Middlesex element is satisfied.
In addition, the Court finds Younger exceptions inapplicable here. Generally, as a
matter of statute, federal courts may only enjoin state court proceedings: (1) where the
federal court is expressly authorized by Congress to do so; (2) where intervention is
necessary in aid of the court’s jurisdiction; or (3) to protect or effectuate the court’s
judgments. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 282-83
(1970) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2283). 3 A federal court may also enjoin state court criminal
actions when absolutely necessary if “there is [a] showing of bad faith, harassment, or
some other extraordinary circumstance.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435. “Extraordinary
circumstances” are present when there is “an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate
federal equitable relief,” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975), because there is
a great and immediate danger of irreparable loss, Younger, 401 U.S. at 45.
The complaint avers at least one cognizable constitutional violation related to
But the Court finds that Waldorf has not demonstrated “an
extraordinarily pressing need” for immediate relief, Kugler, 421 U.S. at 124-25, as
Waldorf can easily raise the alleged constitutional violations in state court. Waldorf has
also made no showing of bad faith or harassment. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435.
Accordingly, the Court discerns no reason to exempt this matter from Younger
Because the Younger abstention doctrine precludes preliminary injunctive relief in
this case, the Court will not address Waldorf’s remaining arguments in favor of an
injunction. See 3005 Cedar, LLC, 2010 WL 455307, at *3 (“The Court . . . considers the
question of abstention before addressing plaintiffs’ substantive motion [for a preliminary
The exceptions listed in § 2283 are inapplicable to Waldorf’s case. Here, there is no
express authority from Congress for the Court to interfere with state criminal proceedings, there
is no need to aid the Court’s jurisdiction, and the Court has no relevant judgments to protect or
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Christopher-James Waldorf’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief [Docket No. 4] is DENIED.
DATED: March 27, 2017
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Court
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