Stewart v. City of Minneapolis

Filing 30

ORDER denying 21 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Written Opinion) Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 8/21/2017. (DLO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 17-226(DSD/TNL)
Laurence Stewart,
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

City of Minneapolis,
Defendant.
Brian T. Rochel, Esq., Douglas L. Micko, Esq. and Teske,
Micko, Katz, Kitzer & Rochel, PLLP, 222 South Ninth Street,
Suite 4050, Minneapolis, MN 55402, counsel for plaintiff.
Ivan M. Ludmer, Esq., Gregory P. Sautter, Esq., Office of the
City Attorney, 350 South Fifth Street, City Hall, Room 210,
Minneapolis, MN 55415, counsel for defendant.

This matter is before the court upon the motion for judgment
on the pleadings by defendant City of Minneapolis.

Based on a

review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the
following reasons, the court denies the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, but orders plaintiff Laurence Stewart to join the
International Union of Operating Engineers Local #49 (Union) as a
defendant in this action.

BACKGROUND
This employment action arises out of the City’s termination of
Stewart’s

employment.

construction

and

The

City

maintenance

hired

laborer.

Stewart
Compl.

in

2000

¶

22.

as

a

Soon

thereafter, he became an automotive mechanic.
October 2009, Stewart was injured on the job.

Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 24.

In

He was

cleared by his doctor to return to work the following year.

Id.

The City has a three-phase return-to-work policy for employees
returning from injuries (Policy), which is part of its collective
bargaining agreement with the Union (CBA).
Ex. 1, Attachment C.

Id. ¶ 6; Ludmer Decl.

Under the first phase of the Policy, once an

employee is cleared by a doctor to return to work, the City has
thirty days in which to place him into a temporary or “light duty”
position that conforms to his physical restrictions.

Compl. ¶ 8.

After thirty days, the employee moves into the second phase during
which he continues with “light duty” as appropriate.

Id. ¶ 9.

If

the employee’s injuries are ultimately deemed permanent or the
employee reaches “maximum medical improvement” as defined by the
workers’ compensation system, the employee transitions to the third
phase of the Policy, which is referred to as the “Job Bank
Program.”

Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.

The CBA established the general

provisions of the Job Bank Program. Ludmer Decl. Ex. 1, Attachment
C, at 2-5.

Employees are permitted to participate in the Job Bank

Program for 120 days during which time they can apply, with
coaching and placement assistance, for open positions with the
City.

Id. at 2; Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14.

If the employee has not found

alternative employment with the City within the 120-day period, the
City automatically terminates his employment.

2

Compl. ¶ 16; Ludmer

Decl. Ex. 1, Attachment C, at 5.
Stewart returned to work under the first phase of the Policy
on

November

22,

2010.

Compl.

¶

25.

Because

his

physical

restrictions precluded him from working as a mechanic, he worked as
an office support specialist.

Id. ¶¶ 24-25.

On May 6, 2013, the

City determined that Stewart was permanently disabled and thus
eligible to participate in the Job Bank Program.

Id. ¶ 28.

While

in the Job Bank Program, Stewart applied and interviewed for
several positions, but he did not receive a job offer during the
120-day period.

Id. ¶ 30.

consistent with the Policy.

On October 9, 2013, he was terminated
Id. ¶ 31.

On January 4, 2017, Stewart filed this putative class action
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) in Hennepin County.1

Stewart specifically

alleges that the Policy violates the MHRA and ADA by precluding the
City from engaging in an “interactive process to assess possible
reasonable

accommodations”

accommodations”

and

or

requiring

providing

it

to

“any

automatically

reasonable
terminate

employees after 120 days “without any inquiry or assessment of
accommodating an employee’s disability.”

Id. ¶ 45; see also id. ¶

55.

Stewart seeks damages as well as injunctive relief enjoining

the

City

from

“continuing

its

1

Return

to

Work

Stewart alleges that he exhausted his
remedies before filing this suit. Compl. ¶ 32.
3

Policy

and/or

administrative

directing [the City] to amend its Policy to be in compliance with
state and federal laws.”
this

court

and

now

Compl. at 10.

moves

for

The City timely removed to

judgment

on

the

pleadings

for

Stewart’s failure to join the Union as a required party.

DISCUSSION
The City argues that the Union is a required party pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) and that this case should
be dismissed if Stewart persists in his refusal to join the Union.
The court agrees that the Union is a required party to this action,
but disagrees that dismissal is an appropriate remedy at this
time.2
Joinder of any person subject to service of process whose
presence will not destroy a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is
required if:
(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot
accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and is so situated
that disposing of the action in the person’s
absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or
impede the person’s ability to protect
the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double,

2

The sole basis for the Rule 12(c) motion is that Stewart
has failed to join the Union as a necessary party.
4

multiple,
or
otherwise
inconsistent
obligations because of the interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).3
Stewart alleges the City has failed to do certain things to
accommodate disabled employees as required by the MHRA and ADA.
Despite arguing that he is challenging the City’s implementation of
the Policy rather than the Policy itself, the complaint establishes
otherwise:
•

Under the Policy, the City does not assess whether an
employee could perform the essential functions of their
pre-injury job with reasonable accommodation, as required
by the MHRA and ADA. Compl. ¶ 13.

•

The Policy does not provide for an interactive process
allowing the City to conduct an assessment regarding
potential reasonable accommodation(s) for disabled
employees. Id. ¶ 17.

•

The Policy provides that under no circumstances may an
employee remain in the Job Bank for more than 120 days.
Id. ¶ 19.

•

The Policy does not provide for any individualized
assessment regarding a specific employee’s need to remain
in the Job Bank for longer than 120 days. Id. ¶ 20.

•

The Policy specifically prohibits this City from
conducting individual assessments or engaging in any
interactive process, stating that there shall be “no
exception” to its provisions “without the approval of the
Oversight Committee.” Id. ¶ 21.

Thus, by challenging the Policy, Stewart is also challenging the

3

Stewart does not argue that joining the Union would defeat
the court’s jurisdiction.
5

CBA, which established the Policy and which the City is obligated
to follow.

Allowing Stewart to proceed without the Union’s

involvement, first, would prevent the court from according Stewart
his requested relief.

In addition to damages, Stewart seeks an

injunction enjoining the City from implementing the Policy in its
current form.

Ordering such relief, should Stewart prevail, would

also directly affect the CBA and prejudice the Union’s rights
thereunder.

The court will not effectively vitiate or rewrite a

contract, in whole or part, without the involvement of all parties
to that contract.

For the same reason, the court also finds that

proceeding without the Union would impede its ability to protect
its rights under the CBA.

See In re U.S. v. Hall, 825 F. Supp.

1422, 1428 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that an absent party to the
challenged contract is a required party because “the validity of
the contracts would be directly affected by the judgment”), aff’d,
U.S. ex rel Hall v. Creative Games Tech., Inc., 27 F.3d 572 (Table)
(8th Cir. 1994); see also Nat’l Org. for Women (NOW), St. Paul
Chapter v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 73 F.R.D. 467, 469 (D. Minn. 1977)
(joining unions to action under Rule 19(a) where portions of the
collective bargaining agreements were alleged to be unlawful).
Failing

to

join

the

Union

would

also

subject

the

City

to

inconsistent obligations and possibly liability vis-à-vis the
Union.

For example, because the CBA contractually obligates the

City to do certain things in a prescribed way, a court order to the

6

contrary could subject the City to suit by the Union.

As a result,

the court concludes that the Union is a required party and orders
that it be joined to this action pursuant to Rule 19(a)(2).

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
1.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings [ECF No. 21] is

denied; and
2.

Stewart shall join the International Union of Operating

Engineers Local #49 as a party to this action within ten days of
the date of this Order.

Dated: August 21, 2017
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court

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