Benson v. Johnson Piper et al
Filing
150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Plaintiff Michael D. Benson's pro se Rule 60 Motion to Vacate this Court's order and judgment adopting Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung's July 29, 2020 Report and Recommendation ([Doc. No. 148]) is respectfully DENIED. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 7/8/2021. (las)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Michael D. Benson,
Civil No. 17-266 (DWF/TNL)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
Jodi Harpstead1, Comm. of the Dept.
of Human Services, et al.,
Defendants.
Michael D. Benson, pro se.
Ralph John Detrick, Assistant Attorney General, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office,
counsel for Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Michael D. Benson’s (“Benson”) pro
se Rule 60 Motion to Vacate this Court’s order and judgment adopting Magistrate Judge
Tony N. Leung’s July 29, 2020 Report and Recommendation.2 (Doc. No. 148
1
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Jodi Harpstead, in her official capacity as the
current commissioner of the Department of Human Services, is automatically substituted
for former commissioner Emily Johnson Piper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2
The Court grants deference to Benson as a pro se litigant and construes his Motion
liberally. United States v. Sellner, 773 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
(“Motion”).) Defendants oppose Benson’s Motion. (Doc. No. 149 (“Def. Opp.”).) For
the reasons set for the below, the Court respectfully denies Benson’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
The factual background for the above-entitled matter is clearly and precisely set
forth in the July 29, 2020 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 141 (“Report and
Recommendation”)) and is incorporated by reference herein. In brief, Benson is
involuntarily committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”). In January
2017, Benson brought this action against officers and employees of the Minnesota
Department of Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting numerous violations of
his civil rights. (See generally, Doc. No. 1.) After dispositive motion practice, Benson’s
remaining claims included a First Amendment Retaliation claim, a Fourth Amendment
claim based on unclothed visual body searches, and a Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process claim based on placement in the MSOP’s High Security Area (“HSA”).
(Report and Recommendation at 31-48.)
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims in
November 2019. (Doc. Nos. 95.) On July 29, 2020, the Magistrate Judge recommended
that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and that Benson’s claims be
dismissed. (Report and Recommendation at 49.) Benson did not file an objection to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that his claims be dismissed. This Court adopted the
Report and Recommendation in its entirety on August 19, 2020 and entered judgment the
next day. (Doc. Nos. 145 (“Order”), 147 (“Judgment”).) Benson did not file an appeal.
2
Benson now moves this Court to vacate its Order and Judgment pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 based on the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Karsjens v. Lourey,
988 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2021).3 (See generally Motion.) He claims that the Judgment
should be vacated because Karsjens changed the law by making the “shocks the
conscience” standard inapplicable to his claims. (Id.) Benson asserts that he consistently
argued that the “shocks the conscience” standard was inappropriate, and that Karsjens
shows that he was correct.4 (Id. at 3-9.)
DISCUSSION
Rule 60(b) enumerates specific circumstances in which a party in a civil case may
receive relief from final judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The reasons include mistake,
newly discovered evidence, and fraud, among others. Id. The Rule concludes with a
catchall provision which provides that a court may lift judgment for “any other reason
3
In Karsjens, the Eighth Circuit found that because civilly committed individuals
may not be subject to punishment, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
claims alleging punitive conditions of confinement should not be addressed under the
“shocks the conscience” standard. 988 F.3d at 1053-54. The Eighth Circuit directed that
the appropriate standard for such claims is to determine whether the conditions were
“‘imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether [they were] but an incident of some
other legitimate governmental purpose’” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538
(1979).) Henceforth, the Court refers to this standard as the Bell standard.
4
Benson appears to conflate the “deliberate indifference” standard with the Bell
standard. (See, e.g., Motion at 10.) While Karsjens did find that the “deliberate
indifference” standard should be applied to claims of inadequate medical care, it directed
that claims related to punitive conditions of confinement be addressed under the Bell
standard. Karsjens, 988 F.3d at 1054. Here, Benson’s only claim analogous to the
punitive conditions of confinement claims in Karsjens is his Fourteenth Amendment
claim based on his HSA placements. As discussed below, the Magistrate Judge already
addressed this claim under the Bell standard.
3
that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). “Rule 60(b) vests wide discretion in the
courts,” but “relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in extraordinary circumstances.”
Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“In determining whether extraordinary circumstances are present, a court may consider a
wide range of factors.” Id. at 778. Still, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is “exceedingly rare
as it requires an ‘intrusion into the sanctity of final judgment.’” Doe v. Tsai, Civ.
No. 08-1198 (DWF/AJB), 2010 WL 11643581, *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2010) (quoting In
re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 868 (8th
Cir. 2007). “The rule attempts to strike a proper balance between the conflicting
principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be done.”
Harley v. Zoesch, 413 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Benson does not specify the provision of Rule 60(b) under which he seeks relief.
Because his Motion stems from his claim that Karsjens changed the law applicable to his
case, the Court construes his Motion under the catchall provision in Rule 60(b)(6). See
Kansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Kroger Associates, 194 F.3d 922, 925 (8th
Cir. 1999) (construing claim that change in law warranted relief from judgment under
Rule 60(b)(6)).
Defendants argue that Benson’s Motion should be denied because “any change in
the law effected by Karsjens is not an exceptional circumstance warranting relief under
Rule 60(b)(6).” (Def. Opp. at 3-6.) Defendants also argue that even if a change in law
were an exceptional circumstance, Karsjens has no bearing on the judgment in this case
4
because the Magistrate Judge did not apply the “shocks the conscience” standard to any
of Benson’s claims. (Id. at 6.) The Court agrees.
As discussed above, motions granted under Rule 60(b) are exceedingly rare, and
those under Rule 60(b)(6) require a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Buck,
137 S. Ct. at 778.5 Here, Benson correctly points out a change in law with respect to the
standard applicable to Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims alleging
punitive conditions of confinement. The Court finds that this reason alone though, is
insufficiently extraordinary to vacate its Judgment. “Generally, a change in the law that
would have governed the dispute, had the dispute not already been decided, is not by
itself an extraordinary circumstance.” Kansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 194 F.3d at 925.
This is because “[s]ociety’s powerful countervailing interest in the finality of judgments
simply requires that each case have an end, though the law continues to evolve.”6 Id.
Moreover, even if a change in law were sufficiently extraordinary under
Rule 60(b)(6), the Court finds that the decision in Karsjens would not affect the
Judgment in this case because the Magistrate Judge did not dismiss any of his claims
5
The Eighth Circuit has held that Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available “only
where exceptional circumstances have denied the moving party a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his claim and have prevented the moving party from receiving adequate
redress.” Harley,413 F.3d at 871. Here, the record reflects that Benson had ample
opportunity to litigate his claims fully and fairly.
6
Importantly, Rule 60(b) is not intended to substitute for a timely appeal. United
States v. Mosbrucker, 340 F.3d 664, 665 (8th Cir. 2003). Benson did not object to the
Report and Recommendation dismissing his claims, nor file a timely appeal. He may not
now rely on Rule 60(b) to advance arguments he fully litigated, lost on the merits, and
declined to appeal.
5
under the “shocks the conscience” standard. (See generally, Report and
Recommendation.) As noted above, Benson’s only claim analogous to the punitive
conditions of confinement claims in Karsjens is his Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim based on his HSA placements. Importantly, Magistrate Judge Leung already
addressed this claim under the Bell standard and dismissed it because he found that the
placements were reasonably related to the legitimate governmental of maintaining
security and order at the MSOP. (Report and Recommendation at 38-42.) Thus, the
Court finds that the recent Karsjens decision has no impact on the Judgment in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that a change in law is an
insufficiently extraordinary reason to vacate Benson’s sentence under Rule 60(b)(6).
Even if it were, the Court finds that the relevant change in law does not affect Benson’s
case because his Fourteenth Amendment claim was already dismissed under the correct
standard. Therefore, Benson’s motion is respectfully denied.
ORDER
Based on the files, record, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated
above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Michael D. Benson’s pro se Rule 60
Motion to Vacate this Court’s order and judgment adopting Magistrate Judge Tony N.
Leung’s July 29, 2020 Report and Recommendation ([Doc. No. 148]) is respectfully
DENIED.
Dated: July 8, 2021
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?