Benson v. Johnson Piper et al

Filing 94

ORDER denying 89 Motion to Alter/Amend/Supplement Pleadings. (Written Opinion) Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 11/6/2019. (EB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Michael D. Benson,

Case No. 17-cv-266 (DWF/TNL)
Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER

Emily Johnson Piper, Comm. of the Dept. of
Human Services, et al.,
Defendants.

Michael D. Benson, MSOP, 1111 Highway 73, Moose Lake, MN 55767 (pro se Plaintiff); and
Ralph John Detrick, Assistant Attorney General, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, 445
Minnesota Street, Suite 1100, St. Paul, MN 55101-2128 (for Defendants).

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Michael D. Benson’s Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 89). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2019, the Court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order in this matter, setting forth
certain deadlines. (See generally Pretrial Sch. Order, ECF No. 80.) In relevant part, the Pretrial
Scheduling Order provided that motions to amend the pleadings or add parties were due by June
14, 2019. (Pretrial Sch. Order ¶ 2.) Fact discovery closed in this matter on September 13, 2019.
(Pretrial Sch. Order ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff filed the instant motion more than three months after the deadline for motions to
amend the pleadings and approximately two weeks after discovery closed. (See generally ECF
Nos. 89-90.) Plaintiff seeks leave to (1) add additional defendants allegedly involved in the events
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at issue that he became aware of during discovery; (2) augment factual allegations regarding
alleged infringement of his religious freedom and replead a previously dismissed claim under the
First Amendment; and (3) bring claims against Dr. Jennifer Tippett based on a 2017 Sexual
Violence Risk Assessment she performed on him and her testimony during a 2018 hearing to
determine whether he should be discharged from his civil commitment.1
II. ANALYSIS
As stated above, Plaintiff’s motion to amend comes well after the deadline for amending
the pleadings set forth in Pretrial Scheduling Order. “Rule 16(b)’s good-cause standard governs
when a party seeks leave to amend a pleading outside of the time period established by a scheduling
order, not the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a).” Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d
709, 716 (8th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Plaintiff must show good cause in order to be given leave
to amend. Kmak v. Am. Century Cos., 873 F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 2017); see Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”). The
primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence in attempting to meet the scheduling
order’s deadline. Kmak, 873 F.3d at 1034; Harris v. FedEx Nat’l LTL, Inc., 760 F.3d 780, 786
(8th Cir. 2014). Courts “focus in the first instance (and usually solely) on the diligence of the
party” seeking the modification. Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 948 (8th Cir.
2012) (quotation omitted); accord Harris, 760 F.3d at 786. “The ‘good cause’ standard is an
exacting one, for it demands a demonstration that the existing schedule cannot reasonably be met
despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Khoday v. Symantec Corp., No. 11-cv180 (JRT/TNL), 2013 WL 12141434, at *2 (D. Minn. May 15, 2013) (quotation omitted).

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To the extent Plaintiff’s motion to amend seeks leave to dismiss certain defendants from this litigation, the Court
takes no action. Indeed, there is no action for the Court to take. These defendants are no longer part of this
litigation by operation of the district court’s Order Adopting Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 76), dated
March 22, 2019.

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It bears emphasizing that
[t]he good cause standard is not applied to an untimely motion to
amend out of a devotion to formalism; rather, it is designed to foster
timely and efficient resolution of disputes and ensure accessibility
to the courts. Allowing a party to bring a motion to amend outside
the applicable scheduling order’s deadline without showing that the
party diligently tried but was unable to comply with that deadline
would potentially undermine these fundamental principles of our
civil justice system.
Target Corp. v. LCH Pavement Consultants, LLC, 960 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 2013);
see Sherman, 532 F.3d at 716 (“To permit district courts to consider motions to amend pleadings
under Rule 15(a) without regard to Rule 16(b) would render scheduling orders meaningless and
effectively read Rule 16(b) and its good cause requirement out of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” (quotation omitted)).
Plaintiff did not reference the expired deadline or Rule 16(b)’s good-cause standard in his
motion. Nor has Plaintiff provided any explanation as to why the motion was filed after the
deadline or otherwise attempted to show good cause for the late filing. This failure alone warrants
denial of his motion to amend. See Harris, 760 F.3d at 786 (“A district court acts within its
discretion in denying a motion to amend which made no attempt to show good cause.” (quotation
omitted)). To the extent Plaintiff’s complaints over Defendants’ discovery responses could be
construed as trying to show good cause, Plaintiff does not connect any purported discovery
deficiencies with the timing of his motion. 2
Further, based on what the Court is able to glean from the motion itself, Plaintiff was not
diligent in attempting to meet the June 14 deadline with respect to the proposed amendments. As
for Plaintiff’s proposed First Amendment claim and claims against Dr. Tippet, the events forming

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Moreover, as the Court has already explained on at least two occasions in another matter currently be litigated by
Plaintiff, this is not the proper way to address discovery disputes. Benson v. Fischer, No. 16-cv-509 (DWF/TNL)
(Order at 1 n.1, May 16, 2019, ECF No. 77), (Order at 18-19, Aug. 6, 2019, ECF No. 81).

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the basis of these claims took place between 2016 and 2018. These facts were therefore known to
Plaintiff and in his possession well before the deadline to amend the pleadings. Notably, Plaintiff
had nearly three months between the dismissal of his First Amendment claim and the deadline for
motions to amend the pleadings in which he could have sought leave to amend. Plaintiff has not
proffered any explanation as to why he failed to do so. See Hartis, 694 F.3d at 948 (“Where there
has been no change in the law, no newly discovered facts, or any other changed circumstance after
the scheduling deadline for amending pleadings, then we may conclude that the moving party has
failed to show good cause.” (quotation omitted)); see also Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 589
(8th Cir. 2003).
Similarly, as for the additional defendants allegedly involved in the events at issue, Plaintiff
has proffered no explanation as to why he did not seek leave to amend to add these individuals
sooner. Plaintiff states that he discovered the identities of these individuals through discovery.
Defendants state that they served responses to Plaintiff’s interrogatories by mail on June 10,
approximately four days before the deadline for amending the pleadings. The exact date on which
Plaintiff received Defendants’ responses is not clear from the record. Nevertheless, there is no
explanation apparent in the record as to why Plaintiff waited so long to seek leave to amend to add
these individuals once he became aware of their possible involvement. See Target Corp., 960 F.
Supp. 2d at 1007 (“In other words, just because Target did not know certain information until later
does not necessarily constitute good cause for allowing it leave to amend the complaint after the
deadline.”); see also Freeman, 349 F.3d at 589. Further, fact discovery has closed. Permitting
Plaintiff to add defendants at this stage of the proceedings would result in additional discovery and
increased delay, prejudicing Defendants.

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Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for filing his motion to amend
outside the deadline set forth in the Pretrial Scheduling Order, the motion is denied.
III. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 89) is DENIED.
2. All prior consistent orders remain in full force and effect.
3. Failure to comply with any provision of this Order or any other prior consistent order
shall subject the non-complying party, non-complying counsel and/or the party such
counsel represents to any and all appropriate remedies, sanctions and the like, including
without limitation: assessment of costs, fines and attorneys’ fees and disbursements;
waiver of rights to object; exclusion or limitation of witnesses, testimony, exhibits, and
other evidence; striking of pleadings; complete or partial dismissal with prejudice;
entry of whole or partial default judgment; and/or any other relief that this Court may
from time to time deem appropriate.

Date: November

6

, 2019

s/ Tony N. Leung
Tony N. Leung
United States Magistrate Judge
District of Minnesota

Benson v. Johnson Piper et al.
Case No. 17-cv-266 (DWF/TNL)

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