Kuikka v. Berryhill

Filing 21

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS: denying 16 Todd Mark Kuikka's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 19 Nancy A. Berryhill's Motion for Summary Judgment. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. (Written Opinion) Signed by Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer on 3/15/2018. (JMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Todd Mark Kuikka,

Case No. 17-cv-374 (HB)
Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER

Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant.

Karl E. Osterhout, Osterhout Disability Law LLC, 521 Cedar Way, Suite 200, Oakmont,
PA 15139 and Edward C. Olson, Attorney at Law, 331 Second Avenue South, Suite 420,
Minneapolis, MN 55401, for Plaintiff Todd Mark Kuikka
Bahram Samie and Ann M. Bildtsen, United States Attorney’s Office, 300 South Fourth
Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill

HILDY BOWBEER, United States Magistrate Judge1
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Todd Mark Kuikka seeks judicial review
of a final decision by the Acting Commissioner of Social Security denying his application
for social security disability insurance benefits (DIB). The matter is now before the
Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment [Doc. Nos. 16, 19]. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Kuikka’s motion for summary judgment and

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The parties have consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all
proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment.

grant the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.
I.

Procedural Background
Kuikka applied for DIB benefits on April 30, 2015, alleging a disability which

began on November 5, 2011. (R. 25.) His applications were denied initially on July 29,
2015, and were again denied after reconsideration on November 25, 2015. (Id.) Kuikka
then requested a hearing to review the denial of his benefit claims. (Id..) An
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) convened a hearing on May 13, 2016, at which
vocational expert Robert Brezinski testified. (Id.) Assessing Kuikka’s claims under the
five-step sequential evaluation procedure outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ
issued a written decision on June 22, 2016, in which he determined that Kuikka was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. 20-31.)
At step one, the ALJ determined that Kuikka had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the alleged onset date of November 5, 2011. (R. 22.) At step two,
the ALJ determined that Kuikka had severe impairments from mild degenerative joint
disease in the AC joint of his right shoulder, posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), antisocial and narcissistic personality disorder, and history of alcohol abuse in remission.
(Id.) The ALJ found at the third step, however, that no impairment or combination of
impairments met or equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. part 404,
subpart P, appendix 1. (R. 23-24.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Kuikka retained
the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform medium work which does not involve
work at unprotected heights or near hazards and does not require more than occasional
overhead work on the right. (R. 25.) The ALJ further specified that Kuikka has the RFC
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to do routine, repetitive simple work, not requiring any public contact or more than brief
and superficial contacts with coworkers and supervisors. (R. 25.) Additionally, the work
must be low stress, not requiring more than routine changes in the work process or
setting. (Id.) Based on his assessment of Kuikka’s limitations, the ALJ then concluded
that Kuikka could not perform either of his past jobs as an explosive ordinance disposal
worker or a photofinishing worker. (R. 29.) The ALJ then proceeded to step five and
concluded that Kuikka could make a successful adjustment to work as a warehouse
worker, polishing machine operator, or printed circuit board assembler. (R. 30.)
Therefore, because Kuikka was able to work in certain positions available in the
American economy, the ALJ deemed Kuikka not disabled. (R. 31.) The Appeals
Council denied Kuikka’s request for review, which made the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. (R. 6.)
Kuikka then initiated this action for judicial review of the Commissioner’s
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Kuikka asserts the medical opinions of Dr.
Sandra Crossett, Ms. Jean Bjerke, and Mr. Gary Simpson establish that his PTSD,
traumatic brain injuries and depression cause him to suffer marked to extreme
impairments, yet the RFC vastly understates the specific limitations associated with his
mental health issues. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 13 [Doc. No. 17].) Further,
Kuikka argues the ALJ erred in discounting the medical source opinions because she did
not provide good reasons for doing so. (Id. at 15.) In particular, Kuikka faults the ALJ
for failing to acknowledge that the opinions of Dr. Crossett, as an examining source, and
Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson, as treating sources, are entitled to greater weight. (Id. at
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17-19.) Additionally, Kuikka asserts the ALJ gave legally deficient and factually
inaccurate rationales for rejecting the medical source opinions. (Id. at 19-27.) In light of
the improperly discounted medical source opinions, Kuikka asserts the RFC is not
supported by substantial evidence because it ignores severe mental impairments suffered
by Kuikka which prevent him from performing basic work activities.
II.

Medical Background
The Court has reviewed the entire administrative record, giving particular

attention to the facts and records cited by the parties. The Court will recount the facts of
record only to the extent they are helpful for context or necessary for resolution of the
specific issues presented in the parties’ motions.
Kuikka is a veteran of the U.S. Air Force who was medically discharged after
having served fourteen years in various roles, including as an explosive ordinance
disposal team leader and forensic analyst. (R. 4428.) Kuikka served multiple tours in
Iraq, Afghanistan and other combat zones around the world. (R. 4428.) The Veterans
Benefits Administration has assessed Kuikka as 80% disabled as a result of injuries
stemming from his service. (Id.)
Since his discharge, Kuikka has suffered from an inability to sleep due to
nightmares. His nightmares have their origins in two specific incidents he experienced in
combat, one involving the bombing of an elementary school and the other involving the
death of a child who approached Kuikka’s convoy in a combat zone. (R. 4428-29.)
Kuikka and his wife explained during a diagnostic assessment that after three nights
without sleep, he would spiral out of control by “‘living in his head’ and not
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communicating, isolating himself and [experiencing] paranoia about what is going on
around him.” (R. 4428.) When he was unable to obtain relief from flashbacks and
nightmares, Kuikka would find solace in alcohol and drink to excess so that he “would
not remember the nightmares.” (R. 4429.) In the Summer of 2014, Kuikka experienced
unrelenting flashbacks and nightmares triggered by Fourth of July fireworks and the reroofing of a neighbor’s house. (Id.) Kuikka’s reliance on alcohol during this period
became particularly pronounced. (Id.) He was in and out of the St. Cloud Veterans
Hospital psychiatric ward, and in August 2014, psychiatrist Dr. Brown recommended he
be civilly committed. (Id.) Kuikka was not ultimately committed, but he did attend the
Stadter Center in North Dakota for three and a half weeks, where his medications were
altered to allow him to sleep. (Id.)
With the help of new medication, Kuikka reported being able to “turn down the
volume” of his nightmares so he could “endure them without losing [his] mind.” (R.
4429.) He then attended Fergus Falls Community Action Recovery Enterprises for the
first two months of 2015, after which he participated in an after care plan. (Id.) Each
week, the Tri County Crisis Response team visited him twice in his home, with social
worker Gary Simpson as team lead. (Id.) He also underwent individual and marriage
counseling at Lutheran Social Services with social worker Jean Bjerke. (Id.) These
resources helped Kuikka adopt a strict household routine and structure, and he has been
able to stay sober and respond to his nightmares, irritability and outbursts in a healthier
way. (Id.)

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III.

Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is limited to determining

whether substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the decision. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838, 841
(8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971)), meaning that less
than a preponderance of the evidence is needed to meet the standard. Krogmeier v.
Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002). The Court must examine “evidence that
detracts from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence that supports it.” Id.
(citing Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000)). The Court may not reverse the
ALJ’s decision simply because substantial evidence would support a different outcome or
the Court would have decided the case differently. Id. (citing Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d
1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993)). In other words, if it is possible to reach two inconsistent
positions from the evidence, and one of those positions is that of the Commissioner, the
Court must affirm the decision. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992).
A claimant has the burden to prove disability. See Roth v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 279,
282 (8th Cir. 1995). To meet the definition of disability for DIB purposes, the claimant
must establish that she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The same standard applies to SSI
claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The disability, not just the impairment, must
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have lasted or be expected to last for at least twelve months. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d
590, 594 (8th Cir. 1993).
In reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of a disability claim, the Court assesses
whether the disability determination is supported by substantial evidence at each step of
the Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
At the first step, the Commissioner determines if the claimant is working, i.e. “engaging
in substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is
engaging in substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled and the analysis ends there. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At step two, the Commissioner assesses whether the claimant has
a medically determinable impairment that is “severe,” meaning it limits his ability to
perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant’s impairment or
set of impairments are not severe, the claimant is not disabled. Id. At step three, the
Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s impairment qualifies as a “listed
impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). A listed impairment is one that per se
qualifies a claimant for disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the claimant’s impairment
is not listed, however, the ALJ then proceeds to assess the claimant’s RFC based on “all
the relevant medical and other evidence in [the] record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). At
step four, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s RFC and determines if the claimant
is able to meet the demands of the job he or she held prior to the outset of the impairment.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant is capable of working in his former job, the
claimant is not disabled. Id.
Lastly, at step five, the Commissioner assesses whether the claimant is able to
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adjust to any other work, taking into account his RFC, age, education and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is able to do other work, he is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). Unlike the previous steps where the claimant has
the burden of proof, at this last step the Commissioner has the burden of proving the
claimant is not disabled due to the availability of other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b)(3).
In particular, the ALJ must show that other work exists in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can do the work given his RFC, age, education, and
work experience. Id.
IV.

Discussion
Kuikka argues the ALJ erred in assessing his RFC which resulted in the denial of

his disability claim. A residual functional capacity assessment is an administrative
determination regarding the extent to which a claimant is capable of performing workrelated activities given the claimant’s impairments. Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043
(8th Cir. 2007). The Commissioner determines the claimant’s RFC by conducting “a
function-by-function assessment based upon all of the relevant evidence of an
individual's ability to do work-related activities,” SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474-01
(July 2, 1996), and the end product measures the “most [the claimant] can still do despite
[his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
Here, Kuikka argues the ALJ committed three errors in assessing his RFC. First,
Kuikka argues the ALJ improperly gave little weight to the opinion of Kuikka’s
examining psychologist Dr. Crossett regarding Kuikka’s mental limitations. Second,
Kuikka argues the ALJ erred when she gave no weight to the opinions of treating
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therapists Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson. Third, Kuikka argues the ALJ erred when she
gave significant weight to the non-examining psychologists employed by the Social
Security Administration. As a result of these errors, Kuikka asserts he was denied his
disability claim based on the flawed RFC assessment which did not account for all of the
practical effects of his mental limitations, namely his need to decompress after periods of
heightened anxiety and an inability to understand or carry out work instructions or make
work related decisions. Further, Kuikka argues that the vocational testimony provided at
the disability hearing was based on a flawed RFC and thus does not constitute substantial
evidence supporting the denial of benefits. Therefore, Kuikka argues the Court should
enter judgment under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), reversing the Commissioner’s
final decision with a remand for a hearing.
A.

Whether the ALJ erred by not considering the treating/examining
relationship and specialization of the medical source opinions

Kuikka argues the ALJ failed to consider a number of the required factors when
assigning weight to the opinions of Dr. Sandra Crossett, Jean Bjerke, and Gary Simpson.
Kuikka saw Dr. Crossett, a licensed psychologist, at the Family Visions clinic in
September 2015 to undergo diagnostic assessment and obtain a medical summary report.
He treated with Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson, both licensed clinical social workers,
beginning in early 2015. Kuikka first asserts the ALJ did not give appropriate
consideration to the fact that Dr. Crossett was an examining medical source or that Ms.
Bjerke and Mr. Simpson were treating medical sources. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at
17-18). The opinion of an examining medical source is entitled to more weight than an
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opinion from a medical source who has not examined the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(1). Relatedly, the medical opinion of a treating source is generally entitled
to controlling weight, provided it is well-supported and not inconsistent with the record.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The ALJ may assign less than controlling weight to the
opinion of a treating source, but must supply good reasons for doing so. Id. Kuikka
contends the ALJ failed to discuss or even acknowledge how the treating or examining
relationships of the medical sources entered into her decision regarding the appropriate
weight to assign their opinions. (Pl. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 17.)
Second, Kuikka claims the ALJ did not account for the specialized credentials of
these medical opinion sources when assigning weight to their opinions. (Pl.’s Mem.
Supp. Summ. J. at 18.) An ALJ must give more weight to the medical opinion of a
specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the medical
opinion of a source who is not a specialist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5). Kuikka asserts
Dr. Crossett’s opinion was entitled to additional weight because she was a psychologist,
and that Ms. Bjerke’s and Mr. Simpson’s opinions were entitled to additional weight
because they were trained social workers. Kuikka argues the ALJ erred because her
opinion does not indicate that she gave their opinions the weight to which they were due
in light of their specializations.
The Commissioner counters that Kuikka asks the Court to hold the ALJ to a
standard not required by the governing regulations. (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 4
[Doc. No. 20].) “[T]he regulations do not strictly require the ALJ to explicitly discuss
each factor under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).” Mapson v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-1257
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(SRN/BRT), 2015 WL 5313498, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2015) (internal brackets
omitted). Rather, when assigning weight to a medical opinion, the ALJ should explain
her decision regarding the weight given to a medical opinion to “allow[] a claimant or
subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator's reasoning.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2).
“While it may [be] preferable for the ALJ to discuss a [medical opinion] in more depth,”
the conclusions drawn from a medical opinion are valid if “there is substantial evidence
in the record supporting the ALJ’s finding.” Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1065
(8th Cir. 2012). The Commissioner disputes that Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson count as
treating medical sources whose opinions are entitled to deference under the regulations,
but argues that in any event, the ALJ provided sound bases for assigning no weight to the
opinions of Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson and little weight to the opinion of Dr. Crossett.
After a careful review of the record, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err by
failing to explicitly account for how the treating/examining relationship or specialization
of the medical sources factored into her decision. The regulations require that an ALJ
account for the examining/treating relationship between the medical source and the
claimant, as well as the extent to which the medical source’s specialization warrants
assigning additional weight to his or her opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), (5).
The regulations do not require, however, that an ALJ exhaustively analyze how each of
the relevant criteria in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) factored into her decision. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(f)(2). Instead, the regulations require the ALJ to supply a sound basis for the
weight she assigns to medical source opinions such that a “claimant or subsequent
reviewer [may] follow the adjudicator's reasoning.” Id. Here, the ALJ’s description was
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sufficient to indicate that she took into account the treating/examining relationship of the
medical sources, as well as their specialties. For example, when describing Dr. Crossett’s
opinion, the ALJ noted that she was a PhD who had conducted a mental status
examination of Kuikka. (R. 27.) With respect to the treating therapists, the ALJ
explicitly mentioned that Ms. Bjerke administered therapy to Kuikka, and indirectly
indicated that Mr. Simpson provided therapy to Kuikka by referencing his treatment
notes. (R. 27-28.) The ALJ also specifically noted the credentials of Ms. Bjerke and Mr.
Simpson as licensed social workers. On these facts, the Court finds that the ALJ was
cognizant of and took into account the examining/treating relationship and specialization
of the medical sources. Whether the ALJ actually supplied sound bases for assigning less
or no weight to their opinions is a matter the Court will consider below.
B.

Whether the ALJ erred when she gave little weight to the opinions of
examining source Dr. Crossett

In September 2015, Kuikka made multiple visits to the Family Visions counseling
and therapy clinic to undergo diagnostic assessments and obtain a medical summary
report. (R. 4428.) Dr. Crossett conducted the assessments and prepared the report for
use in connection with Kuikka’s DIB reconsideration claim. (Id.) Another aim of the
diagnostic assessment was to understand Kuikka’s depleted memory, which Dr. Crossett
noted had not been assessed by any providers in the past, to discover if he suffered
diminished cognitive capacity from the multiple blasts he experienced during his military
service. (R. 4430.)

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On examination, Dr. Crossett reported that Kuikka had normal appearance and
hygiene, was cooperative but tense, exhibited no unusual movements or psychomotor
changes, had normal speech, was anxious but very controlled, had a thought process that
was goal-directed and logical, and had good insight and judgment. (Id.) However, she
also reported that his short term memory was not intact. (Id.) Dr. Crossett relied on a
number of evaluations tools to prepare her medical summary report, including a PHQ-9
patient health questionnaire, a General Anxiety Disorder 7 Item Assessment (GAD-7),
the Alaska Screening Tool for Traumatic Brain Injury, and the Woodcock-Johnson Test
for Cognitive Ability. (R. 4430.)
On the PHQ-9 assessment, Kuikka obtained a score of 14 which, according to Dr.
Crossett, indicated severe concerns that made “work, care of home and getting along with
people very difficult.” (R. 4430.) His DAG-7 assessment returned a score of 13, raising
moderate to severe concerns regarding Kuikka’s anxiety. (Id.) In connection, Dr.
Crossett noted that Kuikka’s anxiety made him unable to stop or control his worrying
several days a week, and that “more than half of the days he feels nervous or anxious,
worries too much, has trouble relaxing and becomes irritable easily.” (Id.) The Alaska
Screening Tool assessment indicated that Kuikka experienced three combat-related head
injuries caused by blasts, which together culminated in lingering physical and mental
deficits. (R. 4431.) Lastly, with respect to the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Cognitive
Ability, Dr. Crossett reported mixed positive and negative results. On the one hand,
Kuikka’s processing and memory for concept formation and verbal abilities fell in the
high to superior range at the 95th percent and 94th percentile respectively. (Id.) He also
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scored well in verbal ability (82nd percentile) and thinking ability (75th percentile). (Id.)
On the other hand, Kuikka’s auditory learning capacity placed him in the 27th percentile,
which Dr. Crossett noted to be a full standard deviation from his overall ability and a
significant difference from his previous scores. (Id.) Kuikka also had lower marks in
visual matching, scoring in the 38th percentile. (Id.)
In her decision, the ALJ noted Dr. Crossett had concluded Kuikka showed
evidence of neurocognitive deficit secondary to traumatic brain injury; that he suffered
from marked restrictions in several areas, including understanding, remembering, and
carrying out short simple instructions and making simple work-related decisions; and that
had extreme limitations in interacting with others and responding appropriately to work
pressures or changes in work setting. (R. 27.) However, the ALJ determined Dr.
Crossett’s opinions were entitled to little weight for several reasons. First, Dr. Crossett
was not Kuikka’s treating physician and only saw him for the limited purpose of assisting
him to obtain DIB benefits. (R. 27.) Second, the ALJ observed that Dr. Crossett had
made unsubstantiated claims about the Veterans Affairs Medical Center’s unwillingness
to treat Kuikka and other similarly situated individuals, casting doubt on Dr. Crossett’s
impartiality. (R. 27, 4429.) Third, the ALJ determined that Dr. Crossett’s opinion was
both internally and externally inconsistent. (R. 27.) In particular, she noted that Dr.
Crossett’s own testing did not document limitations at the severe to extreme level.
Additionally, the ALJ determined that evaluations done at the VA and evidence of
Kuikka’s extensive activities did not track with the reported marked to extreme

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limitations. (Id.) In light of these factors, the ALJ gave Dr. Crossett’s opinion little
weight.
Kuikka argues the ALJ’s explanation for her decision to reject Dr. Crossett’s
opinions regarding his limitations was inadequate. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mem. Summ. J. at
15.) Regardless of its source, the ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion against the
factors prescribed in the regulations to decide the weight to which it is entitled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c). In particular, the ALJ must consider whether the opinion is provided by
an examining medical source, which is entitled to more weight than an opinion from a
medical source who has not examined the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). The
ALJ must also consider whether the medical opinion is supported by the evidence in the
record, is consistent with the record as a whole, or is deserving of additional weight given
the specialization of the opinion maker. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)-(5). Here, Kuikka
argues the ALJ failed to give greater weight to Dr. Crossett’s opinion in light of her
familiarity with the medical history, medical test results, and examination results. (Pl.’s
Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 19); see also, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (supportability
factors). Additionally, Kuikka argues that Dr. Crossett’s medical opinion was neither
internally nor externally inconsistent, particularly when her opinions are considered
against consistent findings in the medical opinions provided by Ms. Bjerke and Ms.
Simpson. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 17, 23-25.)
The Commissioner counters the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion
evidence of Dr. Crossett, and that Kuikka is essentially asking the Court to impermissibly
reweigh the evidence and substitute its views for those of the ALJ. (Def.’s Mem. Supp.
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Summ. J. at 4 [Doc. No. 20].) In particular, the Commissioner argues the ALJ supplied
two valid reasons at the outset for discounting Dr. Crossett’s opinion. First, Dr. Crossett
had an incentive to overstate Kuikka’s symptoms because the acknowledged principal
purpose of the evaluation was to assist Kuikka in his DIB reconsideration claim. (R. 27,
4428.) Second, Dr. Crossett improperly editorialized about the St. Cloud Veterans
Affairs Health Care System in her opinion when she claimed it had denied treatment to
Kuikka by pushing its responsibilities onto the county—a statement the ALJ
characterized as unsubstantiated and suggestive that Dr. Crossett was not impartial in her
evaluation. (R. 27, 4429.)
Regarding the substance of Dr. Crossett’s opinion, the Commissioner argues the
ALJ appropriately discounted the opinion based on its internal inconsistencies. (Def.’s
Memo. Supp. Summ. J. at 7-9.) An ALJ may properly assign little weight to a medical
source opinion “because of its internal inconsistencies.” Anderson v. Barnhart, 344 F.3d
809, 813 (8th Cir. 2003). Internal inconsistencies occur when a medical source provides
descriptions of the claimant’s abilities that conflict with her ultimate conclusions.
Lehnartz v. Barnhart, 142 F. App'x 939, 941 (8th Cir. 2005). Here, the Commissioner
argues that Dr. Crossett’s test results paint a much different picture regarding Kuikka’s
mental abilities than the conclusions she drew regarding his marked to severe mental
impairments. Thus, the Commissioner argues the ALJ correctly determined that Dr.
Crossett’s opinion was internally inconsistent because it was not supported by her own
testing. (R. 27.)

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The Commissioner additionally argues the ALJ correctly discounted Dr. Crossett’s
opinion based on external inconsistencies with the record as a whole. “The ALJ may
reject the conclusions of any medical expert . . . if they are inconsistent with the record as
a whole.” Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir.2007). An opinion may be
inconsistent with the record if it ascribes limitations to the claimant that are belied by the
claimant’s daily activities. Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2017).
Here, the Commissioner argues the ALJ correctly concluded that Dr. Crossett’s opinion
did not account for Kuikka’s extensive daily activities.
After a detailed review of the record and pertinent regulations, the Court finds that
the ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to Dr. Crossett’s opinion. At the outset, the
Court notes the regulations require an ALJ to supply a “good reason” for the weight
given to a treating source's medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). However,
“there is no similar expectation of furnishing a ‘good reason’ with regard to opinions of
non-treating medical experts.” Marier v. Colvin, No. CV 14-3169 (BRT), 2015 WL
12778773, at *15 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2015). Moreover, even though examining source
opinions are better trusted than those supplied by non-examining sources, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(1), an ALJ may discount them based on inconsistencies with the record as a
whole. See Tindell v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 2006); Hedrington v.
Colvin, No. CIV. 14-1048 DWF/LIB, 2015 WL 5472733, at *17 (D. Minn. Sept. 17,
2015); Martin v. Astrue, No. CIV. 08-4704(DWF/JJK, 2009 WL 2982938, at *1 (D.
Minn. Sept. 14, 2009. Here, Kuikka asks the Court to treat Dr. Crossett’s opinion as if it
were supplied by a treating source. But the record indicates that Dr. Crossett was not a
17

treating source, but rather an examining source that authored a medical summary report.
Therefore, Kuikka’s argument that the ALJ needed to have supplied a good reason for
discounting Dr. Crossett’s opinion in line with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2) and SSR 96-2P is misplaced.
Nevertheless, the Court finds the ALJ did supply good reasons for discounting Dr.
Crossett’s opinions. Assessing the weight given to Dr. Crossett’s opinion under the
general terms of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), which applies to all medical opinions, the ALJ
explained that she gave little weight to Dr. Crossett’s opinions because they conflicted
with her own test results and were inconsistent with the record as a whole. Dr. Crossett
recorded in her medical summary report that Kuikka achieved high scores on the
Woodcock-Johnson Test of Cognitive Ability in four different areas of cognitive
functioning, ranging from the 95th percentile to the 75th percentile. (R. 4431.) Further,
the markedly lower scores in auditory learning and visual matching, although subpar, do
not support the conclusion that he had “severely limited” or “no useful” cognitive ability.
R. 4436.) The Court also finds substantial evidence elsewhere in the record to support
the ALJ’s conclusion that Kuikka functioned at a higher level than Dr. Crossett indicated
in her opinion. For example, Kuikka wrote a book detailing his experiences transitioning
back into civilian life after retiring from the military, promoted the book in personal
appearances and over the radio, was actively involved with his church, volunteered in his
community, regularly painted and sketched drawings in his home art studio, and
occasionally even sold his art to buyers. (R. 38-72.) Therefore, the Court finds the
record of Kuikka’s daily activities, as well as the noted internal inconsistencies in the
18

medical summary report, provide substantial evidence to support assigning little weight
to Dr. Crossett’s opinion.
C.

Whether the ALJ erred when she gave no weight to the opinions of
treating therapists Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson

Beginning in March of 2015, Kuikka began seeing licensed social worker Jean
Bjerke for counseling to help him cope with the mental health issues he experienced as he
adjusted to civilian life. (R. 2150.) At her initial assessment, Ms. Bjerke determined that
Kuikka suffered from PTSD, major depression, and anxiety and noted that he exhibited
the following symptoms: depressed and anxious mood, delayed onset sleep subject to
interruption and/or early awakening, decreased interest in activities, reduced energy,
worry and restlessness, hypervigilance, and panic attacks. (R. 2154.) She further noted
that Kuikka’s panic attacks were especially difficult when in crowds or around noise and
that his panic attacks caused him to feel of helpless and guilty. (R. 2155.) Based on her
initial assessment, Ms. Bjerke concluded that Kuikka’s PTSD-induced anxiety, anger and
impulsiveness prevented him from working. (R. 2158.)
Over the course of the year that followed, Kuikka regularly attended therapy with
Ms. Bjerke on a weekly or biweekly basis at Lutheran Social Services in St. Cloud. 2 (R.

2

Kuikka attended twenty four different therapy sessions on the following dates: March
10, 2015 (R. 2192), March 17, 2015 (R. 2190), March 23, 2015 (R. 2188), March 30,
2015 (R. 2186), April 7, 2015 (R. 2184), April 14, 2015 (R. 2182), April 21, 2015 (R.
2180), May 4, 2015 (R. 2178), May 19, 2015 (R. 2176), June 15, 2015 (R. 2172), June
22, 2015 (R. 2170), June 26, 2015 (R. 2174), July 14, 2015 (R. 2168), July 20, 2015 (R.
2166, 4417), August 4, 2015 (R. 2163, 4418), August 17, 2015 (R. 4419), August 21,
2015 (R. 4420), October 13, 2015 (R. 4421), October 27, 2015 (R. 4422), November 30,
19

2150-2193, 4415-4427.) After approximately six months of therapy, Ms. Bjerke
completed a medical source statement in which she assessed Kuikka’s work-related
abilities. (R. 2748.) In it, she opined that Kuikka was moderately restricted in his ability
to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions. (R. 2748.) She also stated
that Kuikka was moderately restricted in his ability to make judgments on simple workrelated decisions. (Id.) With respect to Kuikka’s ability to interact with others at work,
Ms. Bjerke concluded that Kuikka had marked limitations in his ability to respond
appropriately to work pressures or respond to changes in a work setting. (R. 2748.) A
few months later, Ms. Bjerke sent a letter to Kuikka’s disability application
representative, Bartholomew Paytner, to supplement her opinion. (R. 4288.) In her
letter, she explained that Kuikka continued to struggle to manage his severe symptoms of
depression and PTSD and that Kuikka’s ongoing symptoms “significantly limit his ability
to function on a daily basis and are chronic in nature.” (Id.)
From March through May of 2015, Kuikka also regularly visited with licensed
social worker Gary Simpson during twice weekly in-home visits as part of the Four
County Crisis Response Team. (R. 4290.) The visits often involved rehab sessions,
where Mr. Simpson would check in with Kuikka about his alcohol use and discuss coping
mechanisms to head off potential urges to drink. (R. 4290-4308.) Mr. Simpson also
discussed Kuikka’s PTSD symptoms, life stressors, daily activities and progress in
therapy with Ms. Bjerke. (Id.) On August 10, 2015, Mr. Simpson completed a medical
2015 (R. 4423), December 28, 2015 (R. 4424), January 22, 2016 (R. 4425), February 8,
2016 (R. 4426), February 22, 2016 (R. 4427).
20

source statement in which he assessed Kuikka’s work related abilities. (R. 2197-2198.)
In it, Mr. Simpson opined that Kuikka had marked restrictions in his ability to
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, and in his ability to respond
appropriately to work pressures or changes in a work setting. (Id.)
In assessing Kuikka’s RFC, the ALJ considered the opinions of Ms. Bjerke and
Mr. Simpson but ultimately determined that neither was entitled to any weight due to
internal inconsistencies. (R. 27-28.) In particular, the ALJ noted that Ms. Bjerke’s
treatment notes “reflect activity consistent with no more than moderate limitations.” (R.
27.) As support, the ALJ highlighted various portions of Ms. Bjerke’s treatment notes
that indicated Kuikka maintained a fairly active lifestyle, such as working around the
house, installing a white picket fence at his home, meeting with attorneys, writing a book,
participating in speaking engagements to promote that book, and celebrating holidays
with his family. (R. 27.) The ALJ additionally pointed out that, according to Ms.
Bjerke’s treatment notes, Kuikka had shown “moderate progress” over the course of
treatment in his ability to handle stressors. (R. 27-28.) With respect to Mr. Simpson’s
opinions, the ALJ concluded that his assessment that Kuikka suffered from marked
restrictions in several areas conflicted with statements in his treatment notes, i.e. that
Kuikka was generally doing well, his PTSD symptoms were manageable, and he was
able to maintain an active social life. (Id.)
Kuikka argues that Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson are treating sources whose
opinions are entitled to at least substantial weight, and that the ALJ erred when she
rejected both of their opinions based on her finding that Kuikka’s fairly active lifestyle
21

contradicted a finding of marked limitations. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mem. Summ. J. at 2023.) In social security cases, the opinion of a treating medical source is generally
afforded controlling weight.3 Chesser v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 2017).
If the ALJ assigns less than controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source, “the
ALJ must give good reasons for doing so.” Id. Good reasons for assigning less weight
exist when the treating professional’s opinions are themselves inconsistent, Cruze v.
Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1324–25 (8th Cir. 1996), or are inconsistent with the record on the
whole, Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir.2006). However, when a treating
professional “renders inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of such
opinions,” an ALJ may discount or even disregard the opinion entirely. Prosch v. Apfel,
201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2000) (referencing Cruze, 85 F.3d at 1324–25).
Here, Kuikka makes two arguments for why ALJ incorrectly concluded that his
daily activities contradict a finding of marked limitations. First, Kuikka stresses that his
writing and art activities are coping mechanisms to help him deal with his PTSD
symptoms, not evidence of an active lifestyle. To the contrary, Kuikka asserts, these
activities actually provide evidence of the marked limitations noted by Ms. Bjerke and
Mr. Simpson, because they show he needs time out from daily activities to respond to
3

The requirement to give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician or
medical professional unless it is contradicted by substantial evidence is oftentimes
referred to as the Treating Physician Rule. Harvey McCormick, Social Security Claims
and Procedures § 8:103 (6th ed. 2017). On March 27, 2017, the Social Security
Administration rescinded the Treating Physician Rule with respect to social security
disability appeals filed after the date of publication. SSR 96-2P, 61 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Mar.
27, 2017). Here, because Kuikka applied for disability on April 30, 2015, the Treating
Physician Rule applies.
22

symptoms of his PTSD and anxiety. Second, Kuikka argues the ALJ focused her
decision on the activities he is able to engage in but ignored the significant list of
activities his PTSD and anxiety prevent him from doing, e.g. going shopping, paying the
bills, completing household tasks in a reasonable amount of time, maintaining a regular
sleep schedule, or sustaining normal energy levels throughout each day of a given week.
The Commissioner responds that Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson are “other sources”
under the Social Security regulations, and that the ALJ properly disregarded their
opinions based on inconsistencies found in their treatment notes. The Court agrees. As
licensed clinical social workers, Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Johnson are “other sources.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1502; Isham v. Colvin, No. CIV. 13-2377 JRT/SER, 2015 WL 691411, at
*23 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2015). They are not “acceptable medical sources” and therefore
cannot be “treating sources,” and their opinions are not medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(a)(1), (c)(2). Evidence provided by “other sources” must be considered by the
ALJ as it may “present evidence of the severity of the claimant's impairment and the
effect of the impairment on the claimant's ability to work,” Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d
881, 886 (8th Cir. 2006); however, “the ALJ is permitted to discount such evidence if it is
inconsistent with the evidence in the record.” Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 967 (8th
Cir. 2015).
Furthermore, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2), the ALJ explained her
rationale for giving no weight to Ms. Bjerke’s and Mr. Simpson’s opinions, namely, that
she found them to be inconsistent with their respective treatment notes. The ALJ then
proceeded to highlight portions of the treatment notes that were inconsistent with both
23

therapists’ conclusions regarding Kuikka’s marked mental limitations, such as the active
role Kuikka played in his church and veterans community, the considerable time he spent
making art and writing a book, his efforts to promote the book, and the contributions he
was able to make at home.
Although it may be possible to draw two different conclusions from these facts
regarding the extent to which Kuikka maintains an active lifestyle, the Court may not
reverse an ALJ decision based on its own assessment regarding which conclusion is
correct. Rather, the Court’s review is limited and deferential, and it must uphold an
ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See Ostronski v. Chater, 94
F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1996). On these facts, the Court finds the ALJ supplied enough
support for a reasonable mind to conclude that Kuikka maintains a relatively active
lifestyle and that his daily activities are inconsistent with the marked mental limitations
assessed by Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision to assign no
weight to the opinions is support by substantial evidence.
D.

Whether the ALJ erred when she gave significant weight to the
opinions of the agency’s non-examining psychological consultants

Kuikka argues the ALJ erred when she assigned significant weight to the opinions
of the non-examining state agency psychological consultants. “State agency
psychological consultants are highly qualified psychologists who are also experts in
Social Security disability evaluation.” Lilja v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-540 (TNL), 2017
WL 1183977, at *24 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2017) (internal quotations omitted). However,
because state agency psychological consultants are non-examining sources, the weight an
24

ALJ gives to their opinions “depends on the degree to which they provided supporting
explanations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). Kuikka argues the psychological
consultants’ opinions are not deserving of significant weight because the consultants did
not have access to the entire record. (R. 74-76, 94-100.) For instance, the psychological
consultants reviewed Kuikka’s record before some or all of Ms. Bjerke's medical source
statements were available. (Compare R. 74-76, 94-100 (dates of agency psychologists’
review) with R. 2748-2750, 4288-89 (dates of Ms Bjerke’s medical source statements)).
Kuikka claims that other records postdating the psychological consultants’ opinions also
demonstrate his debilitating symptoms from PTSD and depression. Therefore, because
the psychological consultants were unable to review later added evidence, Kuikka asserts
they did not have all that they needed to make a complete and accurate assessment of his
condition and their opinions should be discounted to reflect that.
Kuikka also argues the ALJ erred by relying too heavily on the psychological
consultants’ opinions when determining his RFC. Psychological consultants’ opinions do
not by themselves constitute substantial evidence. Harvey v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 1013,
1016 (8th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, if a psychological consultant’s opinion supplies the
only evidence to support an RFC assessment, the RFC is not supported by substantial
evidence. Dixon v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 997, 1002 (8th Cir. 2003). While his argument
on this point is not well-developed, Kuikka appears to argue that the psychological
consultants’ opinions, which contradict the opinions of medical professionals who
examined and/or treated him, provide the only evidence in the record to support the RFC,
and that therefore, the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence.
25

After evaluating the evidence in the record, the Court finds the ALJ properly
weighed the psychological consultants’ opinions. As an initial matter, the Court notes
that an ALJ may embrace a state agency psychological consultant’s opinion even if it was
made before the record was fully developed. Dang Chang v. Berryhill, No. 15-CV-4496
(ADM/HB), 2017 WL 762006, at *13 (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2017), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 15-CV-4496 (ADM/HB), 2017 WL 758925 (D. Minn.
Feb. 27, 2017). An ALJ may also assign significant weight to the opinion of a state
agency medical consultant who did not have access to all of the records, so long as the
ALJ conducts an independent review of the evidence and takes into account the portions
of the record the consultant had not considered. Perry v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-1185
(JNE/TNL), 2014 WL 4113015, at *57-58 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2014) (internal quotations
omitted). Here, the ALJ gave careful consideration to evidence in the record that was
added after the psychological consultants’ opinions were rendered, namely by conducting
a detailed review of Ms. Bjerke’s medical source opinion and treatment notes. The ALJ
also considered the psychological consultants’ opinions against the record as a whole,
explaining that she found their opinions to be “consistent with . . . the overall clinical
findings and signs of mental illness; the claimant’s course of and response to mental
health treatment; and the claimant’s daily and other activities.” (R. 28.) On these facts,
the Court finds that the ALJ fully considered all evidence in the record and, in light of
that evidence, permissibly concluded the psychological consultants’ opinions were
entitled to significant weight.

26

The Court additionally finds that the ALJ did not rely too heavily on the
psychological consultants’ opinions when assessing Kuikka’s RFC. Contrary to
Kuikka’s assertion, state agency psychologists’ opinions are not automatically
undermined by the fact that they conflict with opinions provided by examining sources.
It is the ALJ’s task to resolve conflicting medical opinions. Delka v. Barnhart, 102 F.
App'x 513, 514 (8th Cir. 2004). In doing so, an ALJ may assign a state agency
psychologist’s opinion greater weight than an examining source opinion when the
psychologist’s opinion is better supported by evidence in the record. Ponder v. Colvin,
770 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir. 2014). In this case, the ALJ independently reviewed the
state agency psychologists’ opinions as well as the opinions provided by examining
sources Dr. Crossett, Ms. Bjerke, and Mr. Simpson. She determined the examining
source opinions were entitled to little or no weight based on their inconsistencies, which
the regulations identify as a valid reason to discount medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(4). By contrast, she concluded the state agency psychologists’ opinions
were entitled to significant weight because they were supported by the overall clinical
findings, the evidence of the effective treatment, and the record of daily activities. (R.
28.) In other words, the ALJ thoroughly assessed each medical opinion in the record as
the regulations require and properly determined the state agency psychologists’ opinions
were entitled to significant weight. For that reason, the Court concludes the ALJ gave
appropriate weight to the psychological consultants’ opinions when assessing Kuikka’s
RFC even though they conflicted with the examining source opinions.

27

The Court also finds no basis to conclude that the ALJ relied solely on the
psychological consultants’ opinions to assess Kuikka’s RFC. An ALJ may rely on a
psychological consultants’ opinion as part of a broader body of evidence supporting her
decision. Harvey, 368 F.3d at 1016; Thiele v. Astrue, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1047 (D.
Minn. 2012). The ALJ specifically described the broad array of evidence in the record on
which she relied to assess Kuikka’s capabilities. (R. 25-27.) For instance, she recounted
Kuikka’s course of treatment and stated that his positive outcomes provide support for
her RFC assessment. (R. 26.) In particular, she noted that Kuikka has been helped by
medication, coping skills, and therapy. (R. 26-27.) The ALJ also explained the records
from Kuikka’s mental health case management files demonstrate he maintained a fairly
active lifestyle which undermine claims of work-related restrictions beyond those
identified in the RFC; Kuikka kept busy reading, writing, painting, working on his book,
doing yoga, and exercising. (R. 27.) The ALJ further highlighted Kuikka’s Veterans
Administration compensation and pension examination files, which recorded that Kuikka
was only moderately impaired by his psychiatric condition and that he was likely
employable. (Id.) Those same records also indicated that Kuikka functioned in the
average to above-average range in terms of intelligence and that his psychiatric prognosis
would improve if Kuikka abstained from alcohol and stayed consistent with his therapy.
(Id.) All told, the decision demonstrates the ALJ did not solely rely on the psychological
consultants’ opinions when assessing Kuikka’s RFC but rather viewed it as one part of
the broader record. Further, the ALJ supplied a sufficient rationale for the RFC she
assessed. Therefore, the Court finds substantial evidence supports Kuikka’s RFC.
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E.

Whether the ALJ erred when she failed to acknowledge Kuikka’s
strong work history when assessing his credibility

Kuikka argues the ALJ’s assessment of the credibility of Kuikka’s subjective
complaints was deficient because it failed to acknowledge or discuss Kuikka’s strong
work history, which shows he was continuously employed from the time he was 18 years
old until his alleged disability onset date, and earned income in 79 out of 80 possible
quarters since 1992. According to Kuikka, such a steady track record is a highly relevant
factor that the ALJ should have discussed in her decision when assessing his credibility.
An ALJ must consider the following Polaski factors when evaluating a claimant's
credibility: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, intensity, and frequency of
pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of medication; (5) any functional restrictions; (6) the claimant's work history; and
(7) the absence of objective medical evidence to support the claimant's complaints.
Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2011) (referencing Polaski v. Heckler, 739
F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984). However, an ALJ need not explicitly discuss each
Polaski factor in her decision. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir.2005).
Further, the Court must defer to an ALJ’s credibility determination about a claimant’s
subjective complaints when the ALJ “explicitly discredits a claimant's testimony and
gives a good reason for doing so.” Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 968 (8th Cir.2010).
Here, the ALJ discounted Kuikka’s subjective complaints based on “significant
inconsistencies in the record as a whole.” (R. 25.) She then proceeded to identify those
inconsistencies throughout her opinion, highlighting in particular that Kuikka’s treatment
29

record and daily activities did not support limitations beyond those reflected in the RFC.
(R. 26-29.) Moreover, Kuikka’s assertion that the ALJ did not acknowledge or discuss
his strong work history is incorrect. Specifically, the ALJ noted that “the claimant
worked steadily in the past, which is to his credit.” (R. 29.) However, in context of his
prior work history, the ALJ noted Kuikka was now working in his art studio, promoting
his book, and being supported by VA disability benefits—all of which indicated “he may
not have economic incentive to return to work.” (Id.) Therefore, the Court concludes the
ALJ did not fail to consider Kuikka’s work history when assessing his credibility, and
that she provided a sufficient basis for discounting his subjective complaints.
V.

Conclusion
In sum, the Court finds the disability determination to be supported by substantial

evidence. The ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Crossett’s opinion is wellsupported by the record. As an examining source, Dr. Crossett’s opinion was entitled to
more deference than a non-examining source opinion; however, the ALJ appropriately
concluded Dr. Crossett’s opinion was at least partially unreliable based on internal
inconsistencies and contradictions with the record as a whole. The ALJ’s decision to give
no weight to Ms. Bjerke’s and Mr. Simpson’s opinions is also well-supported by the
record. Ms. Bjerke and Mr. Simpson are “other sources” under the Social Security
regulations, and their opinions are not entitled to treating source deference. Nevertheless,
the ALJ dedicated a portion of her decision to explaining their internal inconsistencies to
justify the weight she assigned them, and noted in particular the active role Kuikka
played in his church and veterans community, the time he spent making art and writing a
30

book, his efforts to promote the book, the time he enjoyed with his family and the
contributions he was able to make at home. Additionally, the ALJ provided ample
explanation in her decision about her consideration of the state agency psychologists’
opinions in the context of the record as a whole, and appropriately assigned their opinions
significant weight. Finally, the ALJ did not err by failing to account for Kuikka’s strong
work history when weighing his credibility. In fact, the ALJ explicitly accounted for it in
her decision while providing a sound basis for discounting his subjective complaints.
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Todd Mark Kuikka’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 16] is DENIED;
2. Nancy A. Berryhill’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 19] is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: March 15, 2018
s/ Hildy Bowbeer
HILDY BOWBEER
United States Magistrate Judge

31