Esping v. Berryhill
Filing
21
ORDER denying 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment(Written Opinion) Signed by Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel on 7/11/2018. (TMA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Kevin Esping,
Civil No. 17-872 FLN
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
Nancy A. Berryhill,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
___________________________________________________
David D. Chermol and Edward C. Olson for Plaintiff.
Bahram Samie, Assistant United States Attorney, for Defendant.
___________________________________________________
Plaintiff Kevin Esping seeks judicial review of the final decision of Nancy Berryhill the
former Acting Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), who
denied his applications for disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act, and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. ECF
No. 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3),
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties have submitted
cross motions for summary judgement. See ECF Nos. 16 and 18. For the reasons set forth below,
the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. INTRODUCTION
Esping applied for disability insurance benefits on December 9, 2013, and supplemental
security income on November 7, 2013. Administrative Record [hereinafter “AR”] 19, ECF No. 15.
In both applications, Esping alleged his disability began on November 18, 2012. AR 19. Esping’s
applications were denied initially on April 1, 2014, and upon reconsideration on November 6, 2014.
Id. An administrative hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Peter Kimball on
November 19, 2015. AR 19, 38–89. The ALJ found Esping was not disabled and denied Esping’s
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on January 20, 2016.
AR 16–37. On January 25, 2017, the SSA Appeals Council denied Esping’s request for review and
finalized the ALJ’s decision. AR 1–6; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. On March 22, 2017, Esping
commenced this civil action seeking reversal of the ALJ’s decision, or in the alternative, remand for
further proceedings. ECF No. 1 at 3.
II. FINDINGS OF FACTS
A. Background
Esping was fifty-two years old, an individual closely approaching advanced age, when he
filed his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. AR
231–40; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d). Esping has at least a high school education and past relevant work
as a crew chief at the Renaissance Festival. AR 28, 30, 47–49. Esping claims the following severe
impairments prevent him from securing and maintaining competitive employment: carpal tunnel
syndrome (CTS), migraines, left and right total hip replacement, torn rotator cuff in right shoulder,
pinched nerve, herniated disc, depression, anxiety, asthma, and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD). AR 22, 259.
B. The Administrative Hearing
An administrative hearing was held on November 19, 2015. AR 38. Attorney Carrie Burton
represented Esping, who testified on his own behalf. AR 38, 40–73. Vocational Expert (“VE”)
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Beverly Solanchez, and Medical Expert (“ME”) Joseph Hornacki also testified at the hearing. AR
38, 40, 73–89.
1. VE Testimony
The VE testified that Esping’s past relevant work as a crew chief was more accurately
described as a “parts runner.” AR 81. The VE explained that a parts runner typically distributes
items, and stocks the kitchen at the renaissance festival. AR 81–82. The VE also testified that while
Esping was a supervisor that he still “did the job” himself. AR 83. The ALJ then posed the following
hypothetical to the VE:
Consider an individual of the same age, education, and vocational academic
background as the claimant and with the following restrictions: this person would
be able to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, is able
to sit for six hours out of an eight hour day, stand and/or walk for two hours out of
an eight hour day, push and pull as much as can lift and carry. There would be no
power gripping, twisting, or torqueing with either hand. There would be no
reaching overhead, bilaterally. There could be no more than frequent reaching in
all other directions. There’d be no more than frequent handling or fingering on
both sides. There’d be occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, no climbing of
ladders or scaffolds, and no balancing. And for less than one sixth of the day, the
individual would be able to stoop, kneel, croach, and crawl. There’d be no work
involving exposure to unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts and only
occasional exposure to dust, odors, fumes, and pulmonary irritants. For walking
longer distances, more than 20 feet, a cane could be used in the right hand. And
finally, the work would, in terms of understanding and remembering and carry out
instructions, the work would be limited to performing simple and routine tasks. All
right, based on those restrictions, could a hypothetical individual perform the past
work that’s been identified.
AR 84–85.
The VE responded that an individual with the residual functional capacity described in the
hypothetical would not be able to perform the past work identified in the Esping’s work history. AR
85. The VE, however, went on to identify three unskilled jobs—as defined in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”)—that existed in the national economy that Esping could, in fact,
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perform. AR 85, 87. The VE identified bench assembler, with approximately 5,000 positions
available in Minnesota; collator operator, tender, with approximately 2,000 positions available in
Minnesota; and electronics worker, with approximately 3,700 positions available in Minnesota. AR
85–87. The VE testified that each of these jobs qualified as light work, had a sit/stand option, and
did not require any overhead reaching or walking long distances. AR 86. The VE testified that all
three jobs fit within the RFC suggested in the first hypothetical. Id.
The ALJ then posed another hypothetical to the VE whereby the same individual would be
further limited to lifting no more than 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently.
AR 87. The VE opined that the second hypothetical would take the residual functional capacity
beyond light work and into the sedentary category for lifting, and thus, under that classification, the
hypothetical person could no longer perform the above three listed jobs nor Esping’s past relevant
work. Id.
2. The Commissioner’s Decision
On January 20, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision that Esping was not disabled and not entitled
to benefits. AR 16–32. In determining that Esping was not disabled, the ALJ followed the five-step
sequential process established by the SSA. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The first step in the sequential evaluation is to evaluate the claimant’s work history to see
if they are engaged in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.15071, 416.971. If the
claimant has performed substantial work activity then he is not disabled. Id. At step one, the ALJ
found that Esping had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 18, 2012, the
alleged onset date of his disability. AR 21. The ALJ also noted that Esping’s earning records
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indicated that he had earned $16,748.64 in 2012, and $0 in 2013, 2014, and 2015, further indicating
a lack of substantial gainful activity. Id.
The second step in the sequential evaluation is to determine whether the claimant has a
severe, medically-determinable impairment, or combination of impairments, that significantly limits
an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).
At step two, the ALJ found that Esping had the following severe impairments: anxiety disorder;
asthma; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); bilateral carpal tunnel release surgery in
2014; bilateral hip pain secondary to bilateral arthroplasty and tendinopathy; bilateral shoulder pain,
with the left greater than right, secondary to rotator cuff disease and status post left shoulder surgery
in December, 2012; gouty arthritis; major depressive disorder; and obesity. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(c), 416.920(c); AR 22.
The third step in the sequential evaluation requires the ALJ to determine whether the
claimant has an impairment that meets or equals one of the listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. If, at this step, the ALJ finds that the
claimant’s impairments or combination of impairments does not meet or medically equal the criteria
of a listing, nor meet the duration requirement, then the analysis must proceed to the next step. At
this step, the ALJ found that Esping did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. AR 22.
Because Esping’s impairments do not meet or equal one of the listings in Appendix 1, the
ALJ had to make an assessment of the his Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Here, the ALJ
concluded that Esping had an RFC to:
[l]ift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for 6 hours
out of an 8-hour day; stand and/or walk 2 hours out of an 8-hour day; push and pull
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as much as able to lift and carry. In addition, [Esping] is restricted to no power
gripping, twisting or torqueing with either hand; no reaching overhead bilaterally;
no more than frequent reaching in all other directions and no more than frequent
handling and fingering on both sides; occasional climbing up ramps and stairs; no
climbing of ladders or scaffolds; no balancing; for less than one-sixth of the day
[Esping] is able to stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; no work involving exposure to
unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts; only occasional exposure to dust,
odors, fumes, and pulmonary irritants; and for walking longer distances, meaning
distances greater than 20 feet, [Esping] could use a cane in the right hand. In terms
of understanding, remembering, and carrying instructions, the work is limited to
performing simple and routine tasks.
AR 24.
In the fourth and fifth steps of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant has the RFC to perform either his past relevant work or any other jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(g), 404.1520(f),
404.1560(c), 416.912(g), 416.920(g), 416.960(c). If the claimant cannot perform his past relevant
work, then the “burden shifts to the SSA to prove, first, that the claimant retains the residual
functional capacity to perform other kinds of work, and, second, that other such work exists in
substantial numbers in the national economy.” Cunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 501 (8th Cir.
2000).
At step four, the ALJ found that Esping was not able to perform his past relevant work. AR
30. This determination was based on the VE’s testimony that an individual with Esping’s RFC
would be unable to perform his past relevant work as a crew chief at the Renaissance Festival. Id.
At step five, however, the ALJ concluded that considering Esping’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that he could
perform. AR 31. But the ALJ found that Esping’s ability to perform a full range of light work was
impeded by additional limitations. Id. As a result, the ALJ sought testimony from the VE to
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determine the extent to which Esping’s limitations eroded his ability to perform light work. Id. The
VE testified that Esping could perform light work such as bench assembler, collator, operator tender,
and electronics worker because these jobs provided for a sit/stand option based on her experience
and observations. Id. The ALJ found her testimony persuasive, her explanations reasonable, and her
opinions consistent with the information contained in the DOT. Id. Moreover, the ALJ found that
the evidence in the record was not consistent with limiting Esping to sedentary work. AR 32. As
a result, the ALJ concluded that Esping was capable of making a successful adjustment to other
work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, and thus was not disabled. Id.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress has prescribed the standards by which Social Security disability benefits may be
awarded. “Disability” under the Social Security Act means the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “An individual shall be determined to be
under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner is restricted to a determination of
whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); see also Quals v. Apfel, 158 F.3d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1998); Gallus v. Callahan, 117 F.3d
1061, 1063 (8th Cir. 1997); Wilson v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 172, 175 (8th Cir. 1989). Substantial
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evidence means more than a mere scintilla; it means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richard v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 220 (1938)). In determining whether
evidence is substantial, a court must also consider whatever is in the record that fairly detracts from
its weight. See Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Cruse v. Bowen,
867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488
(1951)).
A court, however, may not reverse merely because substantial evidence would have
supported an opposite decision. See Roberts v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 2000); see also
Gaddis v. Chater, 76 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1996). “As long as substantial evidence in the record
supports the Commissioner’s decision, we may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in
the record that would have supported a contrary outcome. . . or because we would have decided the
case differently.” Roberts, 222 F.3d at 468 (citing Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000);
Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993)). “Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. Therefore, this Court’s review of the ALJ’s factual determinations
is deferential, and does not re-weigh the evidence nor review the factual record de novo. See Flynn
v. Chater, 107 F.3d 617, 620 (8th. Cir. 1997); Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th. Cir. 1996). The
Court must “defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the SSA.” Howard v. Massanari, 255
F.3d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2001).
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IV. CONCLUSION OF LAW
Esping asks the Court to reserve the ALJ’s decision, and to remand the matter for immediate
payment of benefits. ECF No. 17 at 4. According to Esping, the ALJ’s RFC determination, by
definition, limited him to sedentary work and not light work and, under Medical vocational
Guidelines, the ALJ should have found him disabled as a matter of law. Id. Additionally, Esping
argues that the ALJ committed reversible legal error when he failed to follow the SSA’s binding
Program Operational Manual System (“POMS”) Rule DI 25025.015(D). Id. The Commissioner asks
the Court to affirm the ALJ’s determination because substantial evidence on the record as a whole
supports the ALJ’s decision. See generally ECF No. 19. More specifically, the Commissioner argues
that the ALJ properly found that Esping could perform a reduced range of light exertional work, and
properly relied on the VE’s testimony that Esping could perform work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. Id.
1. The Medical Vocational Guidelines (“Grid”) and Esping’s Exertional Capacity
Esping argues that his RFC, by definition, limits him to sedentary work, and requires a
finding of disability as a matter of law. ECF No. 17 at 5. The Commissioner, in turn, argues that
Esping’s RFC actually falls in the middle of light work and sedentary work, and as such, the ALJ
was correct in relying on the VE’s testimony to conclude that Esping was capable of performing
light work with sit and stand options. See generally ECF No. 19. Because SSA regulations, and the
record as a whole, substantially supports the ALJ’s finding and the Court finds that the ALJ did not
commit legal error, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed.
In general, a claimant bears the burden of showing that he or she is disabled under the Social
Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007). If the
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Commissioner finds that the claimant cannot return to his past relevant work, however, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant retains the ability to do other kinds of work
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, and which is consistent with the claimant’s
age, education, and work experience. Coleman, 498 F.3d at 770; Holley v. Massanari, 253 F.3d
1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2001).
If an applicant’s impairments are exertional (affecting the ability to perform physical
labor), the Commissioner may carry this burden by referring to the medical
vocational guidelines or “grids,” which are fact-based generalizations about the
availability of jobs for people of varying ages, educational backgrounds, and
previous work experience, with differing degrees of exertional impairments.
Beckley v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1998); 20 C.F.R, § 404.1569; 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpt. P, App. 2, §§ 200.00–204.00. If however, the claimants exertional capacity is somewhere in
the middle of two medical-vocational guidelines, the ALJ is to use the Grid only as a framework,
and should consult a vocational source. See SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31251 at *3.
Additionally, the SSA classifies jobs in the national economy as either sedentary, light,
medium, heavy, or very heavy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. The classifications are based on the physical
exertion requirements of jobs in each classification. Id. Sedentary work is defined as “work [that]
involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like
docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” Id. In contrast, light work is defined as work involving
“lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up
to 10 pounds.” Id.
Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in [the light work] category
when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most
of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered
capable of performing a wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work . . . he or she can
also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting facts such as loss of fine
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dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
Id. “Occasionally” is defined as occurring from very little up to one-third of the time, see SSR 8310, 1983 WL 31251 at *5, and “frequently” is defined as occurring from one-third to two-third of
the time. Id. at *6.
Grid Rule 201.14 directs a conclusion of disabled for an individual closely approaching
advanced age, with a high school education, and no transferable skills, who is found to be capable
of performing sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 201.14. Conversely, Grid
Rule 202.14 directs a conclusion of not disabled if the same individual is assessed to be capable of
performing light work.1 Id. at § 202.14. Therefore, the crux of this matter is whether the ALJ erred
in his determination that Esping was capable of performing light work instead of sedentary work.
In the present case, the ALJ found that Esping could: (1) lift and carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; (2) sit for 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday; (3) stand and/or
walk 2 hours out of an 8-hour workday; and (4) push and pull as much as he was able to lift and
carry. AR 24. Based on this, the ALJ concluded that Esping could perform light work, but had
additional limitations. AR 31. The ALJ, after consulting with the VE, determined that there were
light work with sit/stand options available in the national economy for someone Esping’s age, with
his education, work experience, and RFC. AR 31–32. As such, the ALJ determined that Esping was
not disabled. AR 32.
The ALJ’s finding that Esping can carry 20 pounds occasionally, and 10 pounds frequently,
is consistent with light work. However, the limitation that Esping can only stand and/or walk for 2
hours out of an 8-hour work day is inconsistent with light work, and is more consistent with
1
The parties do not dispute this conclusion.
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someone who is capable of sedentary work. Thus, while Esping cannot perform the full range of
light work, he can perform more than just sedentary work, and accordingly, the Court finds that there
is substantial evidence that Esping’s RFC falls somewhere in the middle of light work and sedentary
work.2
SSR 83-12 provides that in situations where an individuals exertional limitations are
somewhere in the middle of two exertion classifications, the ALJ should consult a vocational source.
See Coleman v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 6407476 at * 3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2017) (providing that when
a claimants exertional RFC does not match perfectly with the definition of any one of the ranges of
work, the ALJ should use the Grid as a framework and elicit VE testimony). Therefore, we find the
ALJ properly consulted with the VE in determining whether there was light work jobs in the national
economy for someone with Esping’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. And because the
VE testified Esping would be able to perform light work of bench assembler, collator, operator
tender, and electronics worker, we find that the ALJ’s decision that Esping was not disabled is not
legal error, and is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
2. POMS DI 25025.015(D)
Esping also argues that the ALJ violated POMS DI 25025.015(D) when the ALJ applied Grid
Rule 202.14, even though Esping had a significantly reduced capacity for light work. ECF No. 17
at 11. The Commissioner in turn argues that POM DI 25025.015(D) addresses two extremes
2
Esping cites to several cases remanding where a claimant was found capable of
performing a reduced range of light work when the claimant could not stand and/or walk more
than 2 hours in an 8-hour work day. Not only are these cases not binding on this Court, the only
case in this circuit which has considered facts similar to ours has found that the ALJ’s error was
harmless, and the VE’s testimony provided substantial evidence that the claimant was not
disabled. See Coleman, 2017 WL 6407476 at * 6.
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situations, neither of which is present in this case, and the ALJ was correct in relying on the
testimony of the VE and determining that Esping was not disabled.. ECF No. 19 at 13.
“Although POMS guidelines do not have legal force, and do not bind the Commissioner, [the
Eighth Circuit] has instructed that an ALJ consider the POMS guidelines.” Shontos v. Barnhart, 328
F.3d 418, 424 (8th Cir. 2003). POM DI 25025.015(D) provides:
[d]etermining whether a claimant is disabled is a more difficult judgment when his
or her exertional capacity falls in the middle of two rules and the rules direct
opposite conclusions. In this situation apply the:
•
•
higher-numbered rule and find the claimant not
disabled if you conclude the claimant has a
slightly reduced capacity for the higher level of
exertion; or
lower-numbered rule and find claimant disabled
if you conclude the claimant has a significantly
reduced capacity for the higher level of exertion.
NOTE: Use the information about the sedentary, light and medium occupational
bases found in the Medical-Vocational Quick Reference Guide in DI 25001.001 to
assist you with this adjudicative judgment.
POM DI 25025.015(D) does not address the situation when a claimant’s reduced capacity is neither
slightly reduced, nor significantly reduced, but somewhere in the middle, as in this case. As
discussed above, Esping’s limitations are consistent with both light work (lifting more than 20
pounds), and sedentary work (standing and/or walking 2 hours in an 8-hour work day), putting
Esping’s exertional capacity somewhere in the middle. AR 24. In this situation, POMS DI
25025.015(D) does not provide guidance to the ALJ. See Coleman, 2017 WL 6407476 at * 8
(quoting Sankhar v. Coleman, 2015 WL 5664285 at * 7 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2015)). Instead, SSR 83-12
informs the ALJ’s decision, which provides that in situations where the exertional capacity is
somewhere in the middle of two Grid Rules that the ALJ should consult with a vocational source.
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See SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253 at *2–3. Therefore, because the ALJ properly sought VE testimony,
the ALJ did not violate POM DI 25025.015(D).
Additionally, Esping argues that remand is warranted because the ALJ violated POMS DI
25025.015(D) by failing to provide an explanation of why he applied light work Grid Rule 202.14,
rather than sedentary work Grid Rule 201.14. See ECF No. 17 at 12. The Commissioner asserts that
the only obligation under POMS DI 25025.015(D) is that the ALJ explain the basis for his
conclusion, which he has, and thus remand is not warranted. See ECF No. 19 at 13.
POMS DI 25025.015(D) states that the ALJ is to “[a]lways explain the basis of [his]
conclusions” and “[i]f necessary, use the assistance of a Vocational Specialist to determine which
rule most closely approximates the claimant’s RFC and vocational factors . . . .” Here, the ALJ
explained that Esping was not able to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of light
work because his ability to do so was impeded by additional limitations. AR 31. Reasoning in part
that:
If the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light
work, a finding of “not disabled” would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule
202.14. However, the claimant’s ability to perform all or substantially all of the
requirements of this level of work has been impeded by additional limitations. [Thus]
[t]o determine the extent to which these limitations erode the unskilled light
occupational base, I asked [the VE] whether jobs exist in the national economy for
an individual with the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity.
Id. The ALJ then went on to discuss the VE’s testimony, whereby the VE testified that Esping could
perform the light work jobs of bench assembler, collator, operator tender, and electronics work
because they provided for a sit/stand option. Id. The ALJ then stated that he found the VE’s
explanations reasonable, and her testimony persuasive and consistent with the DOT. Id. Finally the
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ALJ concluded that there was work in significant numbers in the national economy for someone
with Esping’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, and as such Esping
was not disabled. AR 31–32. Based on this, the Court finds that the ALJ complied with POMS DI
25025.015(D), and no additional explanation was necessary.
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
If the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record, this Court cannot
reverse simply because “substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a
contrary outcome . . . or because we would have decided the case differently.” Roberts, 222 F.3d at
468 (citing Craig, 212 F.3d at 436). Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that
Esping is not disabled, and the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit any legal error. Accordingly,
the Commissioner’s decision denying Esping’s benefits is affirmed.
Based upon the foregoing and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Esping’s Motion for Summary Judgement (ECF No. 16) is DENIED;
2.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement (ECF No. 18) is
GRANTED;
3.
The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED and the case is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGEMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: July 11, 2018
s/Franklin L. Noel
FRANKLIN L. NOEL
United States Magistrate Judge
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