Kapacs v. City of Minneapolis, The et al

Filing 107

ORDER denying 94 Motion for TRO; denying 102 Motion for Extension of Time (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 11/5/2018. (KML)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Margots Kapacs,

Case No. 17-cv-2291 (SRN/BRT)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

City of Minneapolis, et al.,
Defendants.

Margots Kapacs, 3 Essencline Road, London, W92LS, England, pro se.
Burt T. Osborne, Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office, 350 South 5th Street, Room 210,
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415.

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Margots Kapacs’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 94] and Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time
to File an Appeal [Doc. No. 102]. For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies both
of Plaintiff’s motions.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is the owner and operator of Minnehaha Lofts, LLC. (Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) of Nov. 2, 2017 at 1.) In June 2015, Defendant City of
Minneapolis (the “City”) revoked Plaintiff’s rental license for a duplex property he owns,
located at 3324 23rd Avenue South, Minneapolis, Minnesota, after Plaintiff allegedly
failed to respond to the City’s numerous attempts to inspect the property. (Id.) In late
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2015 and early 2016, the City denied Plaintiff’s applications for rental licenses at other
Minneapolis properties because a City rental ordinance, § 244.1910(13)(b), prohibits new
rental license applications from being granted if an applicant had a license revoked within
the preceding year. (Id. at 2.) On October 20, 2015, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
concluded that Plaintiff failed to timely appeal the City’s rental license revocation, and
the revocation stood as final. (Id.)
Plaintiff then filed suit in the Hennepin County, Minnesota, District Court,
challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of a City rental ordinance, § 244.1840(3).
(Id.) By August 31, 2016, the Hennepin County District Court dismissed all but one of
Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed several appeals before the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, contesting the City’s rental license revocation, the City’s denial of his rental
application for a property, and the Hennepin County District Court’s dismissal of his
claims. (Id.) However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the City’s rental license
revocation, application denial, and the Hennepin County District Court’s dismissal of his
claims. (Id.)
In addition to state court litigation, Plaintiff has filed multiple suits in the District
of Minnesota, seeking federal review. See e.g., Kapacs v. City of Minneapolis Regulatory
Service, et al., 16-cv-2540 (PJS/BRT) (seeking review of Plaintiff’s state court claims
stemming from the City’s rental license revocation and application denial); Kapacs v.
State of Minnesota, et al., 17-cv-3615 (WMW/HB) (seeking review of Plaintiff’s
divorce); Kapacs v. State of Minnesota, et al., 17-cv-2291 (SRN/BRT) (seeking review of
alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
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II.

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
In his most recent suit in the District of Minnesota, Plaintiff filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order on July 12, 2017. [Doc. No. 6]. After a thorough review, the
magistrate judge recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order
be denied. (R&R of Nov. 2, 2017 [Doc. No. 66].) This Court adopted the R&R of
November 2, 2017 and denied Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order. [Doc.
No. 73]. However, on May 1, 2018, Plaintiff again filed another motion for a temporary
restraining order. (Mot. for Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 94].) Because this
Court has already denied Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, (Order
Adopting R&R of Nov. 2, 2017 [Doc. No. 73]), Plaintiff cannot succeed on this renewed
motion.
III.

Motion for an Extension of Time to File an Appeal
Plaintiff also filed an appeal In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) to the Eighth Circuit on

November 28, 2017. [Doc. No. 78]. In that appeal, Plaintiff alleged that this Court
wrongly denied Plaintiff appointment of legal representation and a preliminary
injunction. (Id.) Although Plaintiff could have proceeded IFP on his appeal without
further authorization, this Court granted his IFP petition to appeal for clarity. [Doc. No.
84]. However, Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed by the Eighth Circuit on May 24, 2018.
[Doc. No. 100].
Now, Plaintiff requests an extension of time to file another appeal to the Eighth
Circuit regarding the grant of “summary judgment.” (Mot. for Extension of Time at 2.)
Because a motion filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed, United States v.
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Sellner, 773 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2014), this Court assumes that Plaintiff is attempting
to appeal the grant of Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. No. 38].
Plaintiff contends that if he files a notice of appeal within the time constraints, the
“Court[’s] resources [will be] wasted,” because Plaintiff’s original appeal, filed on
November 28, 2017, is currently pending. (Mot. for Extension of Time at 3.) In addition,
Plaintiff argues that good cause exists for this Court to grant an extension of time to file
an appeal due to his long work hours and simultaneous divorce proceeding. (Id.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) allows a district court to grant a motion for
extension of time to file a notice of appeal if the moving party can show good cause.
Gibbons v. United States, 317 F.3d 852, 954 (8th Cir. 2003). Good cause can only be
established when “the need for an extension is . . . occasioned by something that is not
within the control of the movant.” Id. at n.3 (citation omitted).
Under this standard, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his Motion for Extension of Time
to File an Appeal. First, Plaintiff’s previous appeal was dismissed by the Eighth Circuit
on May 24, 2018. Thus, a pending appeal is not a factor that can be considered in
connection to Plaintiff’s request for additional time.
Second, Plaintiff’s reasons for requesting an extension of time are not considered
“good cause” as they are all within Plaintiff’s control. Miller v. Minnesota, No. CIV.086555(JRT/JJG), 2009 WL 3062012, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2009). Although this Court
is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s schedule as he is proceeding pro se, Magistrate Judge Noel
did provide Plaintiff with a warning over a year ago that “future requests for time

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extensions will be viewed with disfavor.” (Order Grant Mot. for Extension of Time to
File Resp./Reply at 1.)
III.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 94] is DENIED;
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to File an Appeal [Doc. No. 102] is
DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: November 5, 2018

s/ Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge

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