Cieslack v. Prairie Island Indian Community

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 29 is GRANTED; and 2. This matter is DISMISSED with prejudice. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. (Written Opinion) Signed by The Hon. Paul A. Magnuson on 6/11/2018. (LLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Austin Cieslack,

Civ. No. 17-2338 (PAM/SER)
Plaintiff,

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Chris Easly, Tasha Jurans, Bob Thomson,
Leslie Keplin, Courtney Langer, Kelsey
Metcalfe, and Clinton Pitonak,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

For the

following reasons, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
In late 2015, Plaintiff Austin Cieslack lost his Wisconsin driver’s license at
Treasure Island Casino, a casino owned and operated by the Prairie Island Indian
Community and located near Red Wing, Minnesota. (2d Am. Compl. (Docket No. 25)
¶ 17.) In 2017, Cieslack discovered that the Casino was using his license as part of newemployee training. (Id. ¶ 20.) He claims that this use constitutes both a violation of the
Drivers Privacy and Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq, and the tort of
invasion of privacy.
Cieslack initially sued the tribe and seven of its employees. After Defendants filed
a motion to dismiss, Cieslack amended his pleadings to remove the tribe as a Defendant,
because it is immune from suit. The remaining Defendants are the Casino’s human

resources director, three individuals who “facilitated orientation” for new hires, and three
individuals who worked in security for the Casino. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-12.)
Defendants raise several different bases for dismissal of the Second Amended
Complaint. First, Defendants contend that because, the Second Amended Complaint
does not specify whether the employees are being sued in their official or individual
capacities, the Court should presume the suit is against them in their official capacities
and dismiss it under sovereign immunity principles. If the suit is against them in their
individual capacities, Defendants argue that qualified immunity applies to protect them
from suit. And even if immunity does not mandate dismissal, Defendants assert that
Cieslack has not stated a claim for either a violation of the DPPA or invasion of privacy.
Five months after Defendants filed this Motion, Cieslack moved to amend his Complaint
yet again, to clarify that the suit is brought against the Defendants in their individual
capacities. (Docket No. 42.)
DISCUSSION
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need only
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim
bears facial plausibility when it allows the Court “to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When
evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept plausible
factual allegations as true. Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 676 F.3d 655, 660 (8th
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Cir. 2012). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient to support a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Cieslack does not dispute that any claims against Defendants in their official
capacities are barred by sovereign immunity. As noted, he seeks to amend his pleadings
“to resolve any ambiguity that might exist” as to whether Defendants are sued in their
official or individual capacities. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. (Docket No. 37) at 5 n.1.) Because it
is now clear that his claims are against Defendants in their individual capacities,
dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity is not appropriate.
A.

DPPA
The DPPA provides for a civil cause of action to an individual whose “personal

information [] from a motor vehicle record” has been disclosed “for a purpose not
permitted.”

18 U.S.C. § 2724(a).

The statute defines “personal information” as

“information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social
security number, driver identification number, name, address . . . , telephone number, and
medical or disability information.” Id. § 2725(3). A “motor vehicle record” is “any
record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator’s permit, motor vehicle title, motor
vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicles.” Id.
§ 2725(1).
The DPPA is a “regulatory scheme that restricts the States’ ability to disclose a
driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent,” and it “generally prohibits
any state DMV, or officer, employee, or contractor thereof” from disclosing a driver’s
personal information from DMV records. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 144 (2000). It
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also “regulates the resale and redisclosure of drivers’ personal information by private
persons who have obtained that information from a state DMV.” Id. at 146. Thus, as the
Supreme Court held, the DPPA was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority
because it “regulates the States as the owners of data bases.” Id. at 151.
Here, even taking Cieslack’s allegations as true, the disclosure of his driver’s
license in the manner alleged did not violate the DPPA. First, the driver’s license is not a
“motor vehicle record” as that is defined by the DPPA. See Siegler v. Best Buy Co.,
2012 WL 12895397, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012) (“[B]ecause the record must ‘pertain
to’ the driver’s license, the ‘record’ must be different than the license.”). And second,
Defendants did not obtain Cieslack’s license from the Wisconsin DMV. See Siegler v.
Best Buy Co., 519 F. App’x 604, 605 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that the DPPA “was
intended to prohibit only the disclosure or redisclosure of information originating from
state department of motor vehicle [] records”) (emphasis omitted).
It is understandable that Cieslack is angry that the Casino was showing his driver’s
license to new employees. And, as Cieslack argued at the hearing, surely the Casino
employees knew that doing so was wrong. But not every wrong is actionable under
federal law. His DPPA claim must be dismissed.
B.

Invasion of Privacy
Cieslack’s invasion-of-privacy claim is one for publication of private facts. (Am.

Compl. Count II.) But a claim for publication of private facts requires that the private
information be made public “by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many
persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public
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knowledge.” Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Minn.
2003) (quotation omitted). The “publication” required for the tort of publication of
private facts is “a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.” Id.
(quotation omitted). The disclosure here, even if to 50 or 100 new employees, is not sure
to reach the public. Cieslack has not stated a claim for publication of private facts.
C.

Qualified Immunity
Having determined that Cieslack has failed to state any claim on which relief can

be granted, the Court need not reach Defendants’ alternative argument that they are
protected from suit by qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Cieslack has failed to state a claim for a violation of the DPPA or for publication
of private facts. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 29) is GRANTED; and

2.

This matter is DISMISSED with prejudice.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: June 11, 2018

s/ Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge

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