White v. Stacken et al

Filing 30

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - Plaintiff Ryan J. White's objections (Doc. No. 27 ) to Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois's May 1, 2019 Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED. Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois's May 1, 2019 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 26 ) is ADOPTED. Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 14 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims as alleged against Defendant Department of Human Services are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff"s claims as alleged against Defendants Stacken, Puffer, Halman,and Hebert are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 6/19/2019. (las)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Ryan J. White,

Civil No. 17-3773 (DWF/LIB)
Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION

Nancy Stacken, MSOP-Moose Lake Associate
Clinical Director; Peter Puffer,
MSOP-Moose Lake Clinical Director;
William Halman, Primary Therapist, Unit 1-E;
Jannine M. Hébert, MSOP-Executive Clinical
Director, sued in their Individual and Official
Capacities,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Ryan J. White’s (“Plaintiff”)
objections (Doc. No. 27 (“Obj.”)) to Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois’ May 1, 2019
Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 26 (“R&R”)) insofar as it recommends that
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted as follows: (a) Plaintiff’s claims as alleged
against Defendant, Department of Human Services, be dismissed with prejudice; and
(b) Plaintiff’s claims as alleged against Defendants Stacken, Puffer, Halman, and Hébert
be dismissed without prejudice. Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff’s objections on
May 30, 2019. (Doc. No. 28 (“Resp.”).)
The factual background for the above-entitled matter is clearly and precisely set
forth in the Report and Recommendation and is incorporated by reference for purposes of
Plaintiff’s objections. In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge found

that the Minnesota Department of Human Services (“DHS”) is an agency of the State of
Minnesota and therefore immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.1
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s
Complaint against the DHS for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ( Id. at 14.) Other
than claiming that the DHS is not a named Defendant, Plaintiff does not object to this
portion of the Report and Recommendation.
The Magistrate Judge also recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s official and
individual capacity claims against Defendants Stacken, Hébert, and Puffer because
Plaintiff failed to allege their personal involvement or direct participation in the putative
constitutional violations. (Id. at 13-14.) The Magistrate Judge explained that the
allegation that Plaintiff “drafted an after the fact letter” directed to Defendants Stacken
and Hébert “without any indication that Defendant Stacken or Defendant Hébert actually
received the letter or took any specific action based on the letter as part of the underlying
denial of the Application falls well short of the level of factual allegation needed to raise
Plaintiff’s claim of Defendants Stacken and Hébert’s personal involvement above the
speculative level.”2 (R&R at 9.) As to Defendant Puffer, the Magistrate Judge found

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The Magistrate Judge found that even liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Doc. No. 1) and construing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Plaintiff failed to
assert any factual allegation or identify any legal authority demonstrating that either the
State of Minnesota waived immunity from suit or that Congress abrogated said immunity.
(R&R at 7. )

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With respect to vicarious liability, the Magistrate Judge found that even in
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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that there were “no factual allegations describing any action of any kind” to show his
“personal involvement.” (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that he has a constitutional right to visitation that was violated
when his visitor application was denied. (Obj. at 16.) He asks the Court to rely on the
Report and Recommendation that was issued in a factually similar case, Williams v.
Johnston, et al., Civ. No. 14-369, 2015 WL 1333991, (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2015), report
and recommendation adopted by 2015 WL 1334015 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2015.). (Obj. at
17.) In Williams, the plaintiff was also a civilly committed detainee in the Minnesota
Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”) who was denied visitation with family members. Id.
at *1-2. There, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Executive Clinical Director of MSOP
contesting the denial and received a reply upholding it. Id. at *2. The Williams Court
found that the denial impinged on the plaintiff’s First Amendment right to the freedom of
association and his right to receive visitors under Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 3. Id. at
*7.
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that his claims against
Defendants Stacken and Hébert be dismissed because, as in Williams, he too wrote a
letter to MSOP officials. (Obj. at 18.) He argues that the reason he did not receive a
response was because Defendants chose to ignore his request and that, like Williams, his

(Footnote continued from previous page.)
Defendant Stacken and Hébert’s roles as supervisors, Plaintiff failed to state in any way
that they were personally involved in or directly participated in any of the alleged
unconstitutional acts plead in the Complaint. (R&R at 11.)
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rights were similarly violated. (Id. at 19.) He argues further that his allegations against
Defendant Puffer are sufficient because “he mentioned Defendant Puffer twice in the
Complaint.” (Id. at 18.)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts supporting his
claims against Defendants Stacken and Hébert, in part because Plaintiff failed to allege
that either Stacken or Hébert actually received the letter, or that they had any role in
denying his visitation application. (Resp. at 4-5.) Defendants also point out that
Plaintiff did not actually address the letter to Defendant Hébert, so Plaintiff could not
have accepted a response from her. (Id.) Similarly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
conclusory allegations and formulaic recitations of the elements of a claim are
insufficient to state a claim against Defendant Puffer. (Id.)
Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s official and
individual capacity claims against Defendant Halman because even though he
corresponded with Plaintiff over the denial, Plaintiff did not set forth any factual
allegations in his Complaint that Defendant Halman was actually involved in the
determination to deny the visitation application. (R&R at 12.) As with Defendants
Stacken, Hébert, and Puffer, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff failed to allege any
kind of personal involvement or direct participation by Defendant Halman in the alleged
constitutional violations.3 (Id. at 13-14.)

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The Magistrate Judge explained that while Plaintiff argued that Defendant
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, reiterating his position
that Defendant Halman was personally involved in the denial. (Obj. at 4.) Defendants
contend that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Halman are conclusory and fail to
plead personal involvement. (Resp. at 7.)
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record, including a review of the
arguments and submissions of counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1) and Local
Rule 72.2(b). After a careful review of Plaintiffs’ objections, the Court finds no reason
to depart from the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations. While Plaintiff does have some
right to the freedom of association, Plaintiff’s Complaint against the individuals named in
his allegations fails because he does not state how each individual was personally
involved in or directly participated in any alleged violation.4
Based upon the de novo review of the record and all of the arguments and
submissions of the parties and the Court being otherwise duly advised in the premises,
the Court hereby enters the following:

(Footnote continued from previous page.)
Halman, as Plaintiff’s primary therapist, should have played a role in granting or denying
any hypothetical visitation application, Plaintiff failed to plead any specific factual
allegation that Defendant Halman actually did play a role in the decision. (R&R at 13.)
4

Despite Plaintiff’s reliance on Williams, Williams plead sufficient factual content
to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the named defendants were liable
for the alleged misconduct. (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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ORDER
1.

Plaintiff Ryan J. White’s objections (Doc. No. [27]) to Magistrate Judge

Leo I. Brisbois’s May 1, 2019 Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED.
2.

Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois’s May 1, 2019 Report and

Recommendation (Doc. No. [26]) is ADOPTED.
3.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. [14]) is GRANTED.

4.

Plaintiff’s claims as alleged against Defendant Department of Human

Services are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
5.

Plaintiff’s claims as alleged against Defendants Stacken, Puffer, Halman,

and Hebert are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: June 19, 2019

s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge

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