Mille Lacs Band of Objibwe et al v. County of Mille Lacs, Minnesota et al
Filing
76
ORDER overruling 73 Objection filed by Defendants Walsh and Lorge; and affirming 72 Magistrate Judge's Letter Order of July 19, 2019. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 8/22/2019. (MJC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe, a
federally recognized Indian Tribe;
Sara Rice, in her official capacity
as the Mille Lacs Band Chief of
Police; and Derrick Naumann, in
his official capacity as Sergeant of
the Mille Lacs Police Department,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 17-cv-5155-SRN-LIB
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’
OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S LETTER ORDER OF
JULY 19, 2019
County of Mille Lacs, Minnesota;
Joseph Walsh, individually and in his
official capacity as County Attorney
for Mille Lacs County; and Don Lorge,
individually and in his official
capacity as Sheriff of Mille Lacs
County,
Defendants.
Charles N. Nauen, Arielle Wagner, and David J. Zoll, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
100 Washington Ave. S., Ste. 2200, Minneapolis, MN 55401; Beth Ann Baldwin, Marc
D. Slonim, and Wyatt Golding, Ziontz Chestnut, 2101 Fourth Ave., Ste. 1230, Seattle,
WA 98121, for Plaintiffs
Courtney E. Carter and Randy V. Thompson, Nolan, Thompson, Leighton & Tataryn,
PLC, 5001 American Blvd. W., Ste. 595, Bloomington, MN 55437, for Defendant
County of Mille Lacs, Minnesota
Scott M. Flaherty and Scott G. Knudson, Briggs & Morgan, PA80 S. 8th St., Ste. 2200,
Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant Joseph Walsh
Brett D. Kelley, Douglas A. Kelley, and Steven E. Wolter, Kelley, Wolter & Scott, P.A.,
431 S. 7 St., Ste. 2530, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Defendant Don Lorge.
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on the Objection [Doc. No. 73] filed by Defendants
County Attorney Joseph Walsh and Sheriff Don Lorge to the July 19, 2019 Letter Order
[Doc. No. 72] (“the Order”) of Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois. In the Order, the
magistrate judge denied Defendants’ letter request (see Defs.’ June 20, 2019 Letter [Doc.
No. 68]) for leave to file dispositive motions prior to the September 30, 2019 close of fact
discovery.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules the Defendants’
Objection and affirms the Order.
I.
BACKGROUND
In brief, this case concerns the boundaries of the Mille Lacs Indian Reservation
and the law enforcement authority of the Mille Lacs Band within those boundaries. 1
Because the objections in question concern a procedural matter, the Court confines its
discussion to the facts necessary to explain its ruling.
The pretrial scheduling order in this case provides a deadline of September 30,
2019 for the parties to complete fact discovery. (Am. Pretrial Sched. Order [Doc. No. 60]
¶ I.) In addition, it requires the parties to contact the undersigned judge’s chambers no
later than May 1, 2020 to schedule a hearing for dispositive motions. (Id. ¶ X.)
In a June 20, 2019 letter to Magistrate Judge Brisbois, Defendants Walsh and
Lorge requested leave to file dispositive motions prior to the September 30, 2019 close of
fact discovery. (Defs.’ June 20, 2019 Letter at 1–3.) They sought to move for summary
1
A more detailed recitation of the facts in this case is found in the Court’s September 19,
2018 Order [Doc. No. 46].
2
judgment on the following issues: (1) various forms of immunity, including prosecutorial
immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and qualified immunity; (2) lack of subject
matter jurisdiction; (3) Younger abstention; and (4) that official-capacity claims against
Walsh and Lorge are redundant as a matter of law because claims against Defendant
Mille Lacs County also bind both Walsh and Lorge. (Id. at 1.) Walsh and Lorge argued
that no discovery remains as to these issues, (id.), and judicial efficiency favors the early
resolution of these issues. (Id. at 2–3.) They further asserted that the “needless burden to
the taxpayers of Mille Lacs County” resulting from “[t]he addition of the county attorney
and [county] sheriff” as defendants in the case warrants prompt resolution. (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiffs opposed the request on several grounds, and instead proposed that any
early dispositive motions be filed immediately after the close of fact discovery. (Pls.’
July 3, 2019 Letter [Doc. No. 70] at 1.) They first noted that several of the dispositive
issues that Walsh and Lorge seek to raise are intertwined with Plaintiffs’ proposed
summary judgment cross motions on certain of Defendants’ affirmative defenses. 2 (Id.)
And, Plaintiffs argued, at least some of the defenses for which Walsh and Lorge seek
early dispositive motion practice are dependent on facts that have been a focus of fact
discovery, which remains underway. (Id. at 1–2.) Thus, even if Defendants filed their
early dispositive motions, Plaintiffs asserted that they would likely seek an extension of
time in which to respond until the completion of fact discovery. (Id.)
2
Specifically, Plaintiffs propose to seek summary judgment on the following defenses:
(1) statutes of limitations, laches and waiver; (2) principles of federalism, separation of
powers, prosecutorial authority, sovereign rights of the State and its subdivisions,
constitutional rights of citizens and federal structure; (3) illegality; and (4) public policy
doctrine. (Id.)
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In addition, they asserted that they would be hard-pressed to file and respond to
early summary judgment motions in this short timeframe. (Id.) They would need time to
review Defendants’ responses to contention interrogatories prior to preparing their cross
motion, (id. at 2), and they were otherwise occupied with expert witnesses in order to
meet the September 1, 2019 expert report deadline. (Id.)
Plaintiffs further noted that Walsh and Lorge did not move to dismiss on any of
the legal grounds for which they now claim early dispositive motion practice is
warranted. (Id. at 2–3.) Finally, as a practical matter, Plaintiffs argued that given the
timeframes necessary to schedule a hearing and brief dispositive motions, it appeared
unlikely that the Court could rule on their motions before the completion of fact
discovery in any event. (Id.)
Magistrate Judge Brisbois agreed with Plaintiffs that given the “short window of
time remaining” in fact discovery, there were no material efficiencies to be gained, and
no inordinate burdens to be avoided by any party were he to permit the filing of early
dispositive motions. (Order at 2.) Moreover, he noted that allowing the completion of
fact discovery will avoid the possibility of any Rule 56(d) motions filed by Plaintiffs, by
which they might otherwise seek additional time or a deferred ruling in order to obtain
the facts necessary to respond to an early dispositive motion. (Id.)
The magistrate judge therefore denied the request without prejudice and directed
the parties to proceed with fact discovery. (Id.) He advised the parties that, once fact
discovery is completed, if either side believes that early dispositive motion practice prior
to the current May 1, 2020 scheduled-by date is advisable, the parties shall meet and
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confer in order to file a joint request for early dispositive motions, not dependent upon
the completion of expert discovery. (Id.) Magistrate Judge Brisbois further directed the
parties to seek any such relief no later than October 25, 2019. (Id.)
In their timely-filed Objection, Defendants argue that the magistrate judge’s
decision was in clear error and contrary to law. They argue that immunity is no ordinary
defense, but is “designed to prevent litigation itself, not later damages awards” and must
be resolved at the earliest opportunity. (Defs.’ Obj. at 3) (citing Myers v. Morris, 810
F.2d 1437, 1441 (8th Cir. 1987)). Likewise, Defendants argue, issues of abstention and
subject matter jurisdiction must be quickly resolved. (Id. at 4.)
II.
DISCUSSION
A district court’s review of a magistrate judge’s order on a nondispositive matter,
such as the underlying motion, is “extremely deferential.” Coons v. BNSF Ry. Co., 268 F.
Supp. 3d 983, 991 (D. Minn. 2017) (citing Reko v. Creative Promotions, Inc., 70 F. Supp.2d
1005, 1007 (D. Minn. 1999)). The Court will reverse such a ruling only if it is “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); L.R.
72.2(a).
The Court finds that Magistrate Judge Brisbois’ ruling was neither clearly erroneous,
nor contrary to law. The Court agrees with the magistrate judge that the completion of fact
discovery will lessen the prospect of a nonmoving party seeking relief from summary
judgment motions based on unavailable facts, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
Defendants sought permission to file early dispositive motions when the parties were still in
the midst of discovery. As Plaintiffs note, discovery has focused on the actions taken by
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each Defendant as it relates to the exercise of Plaintiffs’ law enforcement authority, and is
still underway. (Baldwin Decl. [Doc. No. 75] ¶¶ 2, 5.) The Court is unpersuaded by
Defendants’ argument that no additional discovery is needed concerning Defendants’
proposed early motions. To the contrary, it appears that still-pending discovery is relevant
to Defendants’ claimed immunities, the application of Younger abstention, and the alleged
redundancy of Plaintiffs’ claims. (See Pls.’ Opp’n to Obj. [Doc. No. 74] at 3; Baldwin Decl.
¶ 2(a)-(b).) Defendants have also propounded discovery requests to Plaintiffs that remain
pending. (Baldwin Decl. ¶¶ 11–12.)
Moreover, in a recent communications between the parties, Defendants informed
Plaintiffs that they would complete their document productions to Plaintiffs by mid-October
2019, with the exception of one category of documents that the Sheriff would use “best
efforts” to complete by December 1, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) The parties have since agreed to
seek an extension until February 28, 2020 to complete fact discovery. (Id.) Defendants
failed to note any of these discussions about deadline extensions in their Objections. This
need for additional time to respond to pending discovery strongly suggests that early
dispositive motion practice would not serve the interest of judicial efficiency.
Defendants cite authority ostensibly for the proposition that the refusal to permit
summary judgment on immunity defenses prior to the close of fact discovery is contrary to
law. (Defs.’ Obj. at 2–3.) But the authority on which they rely is inapposite, as it involves
the appealability of orders denying immunity on summary judgment or the refusal to rule on
immunity defenses until trial. See, e.g., Hinshaw v. Smith, 436 F.3d 997, 1002 (8th Cir.
2006) (finding denial of summary judgment motion based on immunity defense was a
6
reviewable interlocutory order); Myers, 810 F.2d at 1440 (involving interlocutory appeals of
summary judgment orders on absolute and qualified immunity); Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d
170, 173 (8th Cir. 1987) (remanding matter where district court did not rule on qualified
immunity on summary judgment); Aaron v. Shelley, 624 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2010)
(involving an interlocutory appeal of district court’s denial of summary judgment on issue
of qualified immunity); Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
denial of a claim of qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment, to the extent it
turns on a question of law, is an appealable final judgment). Here, however, the Court is
not denying Defendants the opportunity to move for summary judgment on their immunity
claims, Younger abstention, or subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the magistrate judge has
merely declined to alter the Pretrial Scheduling Order at this time to permit Defendants to
file early dispositive motions, before the close of fact discovery. His denial of the request
was without prejudice, and Defendants may certainly file their summary judgment motions
before trial.
Moreover, while Walsh and Lorge argue that questions of immunity must be
resolved now in order to avoid the burden and expense of pretrial discovery, Defendants
apparently chose not to move for dismissal on immunity grounds at the outset of the case.
Instead, they participated in the Rule 26 scheduling process, and have continued to
participate in discovery.
In addition, as Plaintiffs note, because Walsh and Lorge do not seek to dismiss
claims against Mille Lacs County, the dismissal of Walsh and Lorge on grounds of
immunity would not relieve the individual Defendants of the burden of participating in
7
discovery. The County would still be obliged to request documents and information from
them in order to respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A), or
they would be subject to third-party discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
Finally, although the parties addressed some of the merits of Defendants’ immunity
defenses, the magistrate judge did not consider these arguments in his ruling, (Order at 1,
n.1), and they are therefore not properly before this Court.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Bribois’ July
19, 2019 Order is neither contrary to law nor clearly erroneous. Defendants’ Objection is
therefore overruled.
III. ORDER
Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Objection [Doc. No. 73] to the July 19, 2019 Order is
OVERRULED; and
2. The magistrate judge’s July 19, 2019 Order [Doc. No. 72] is AFFIRMED.
Dated: August 22, 2019
s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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