Muse v. Sessions et al
Filing
22
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. See Order for details. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on 9/18/2018. (CLG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
ABDULLAHI YASIN MUSE,
Case No. 18‐CV‐0054 (PJS/LIB)
Petitioner,
v.
ORDER
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney
General; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security;
THOMAS HOMAN, Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
PETER BERG, Director, St. Paul Field
Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and KURT FREITAG,
Freeborn County Sheriff,
Respondents.
John R. Bruning, KIM HUNTER LAW, PLLC, for the petitioner.
Ana H. Voss and Ann M. Bildtsen, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, and
David John Walker, FREEBORN COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, for the
respondents.
This is a habeas action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by plaintiff Abdullahi
Yasin Muse, a removable alien who has now been held in custody by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for over 14 months. In a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) dated April 12, 2018, Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois recommended that
Muse’s petition be granted. Respondents Jefferson Sessions, Kirstjen Nielsen, Thomas
Homan, and Peter Berg (collectively “the government”) object to the R&R.
Because the issues raised by Muse’s petition and the government’s objection are
complex and difficult, the Court held a hearing on the government’s objection, which
unfortunately could not be scheduled until August 14, 2018. Based on a de novo review
of the R&R, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Court now overrules the
government’s objection, adopts the R&R to the extent that it is consistent with this
order, and requires that Muse be provided with a bond hearing before an immigration
judge (“IJ”) no later than October 15, 2018.
I. BACKGROUND
Muse, a native of Somalia, came to the United States in 1995 as a refugee and
soon became a lawful permanent resident. ECF No. 1 at 7; ECF No. 9 at 1. In 2013,
Muse was convicted of theft by obtaining services without payment, ECF No. 7‐2 at 2,
and two years later he was convicted of financial transaction card fraud, ECF No. 7‐3 at
2. Muse concedes that he has been “convicted of two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,” and thus that he
is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). See ECF No. 16 at 3.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings
against Muse and, on July 5, 2017, ICE agents took him into custody under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c). ECF No. 7 at 2. Muse sought cancellation of removal and other relief in
immigration proceedings. Muse initially prevailed before the IJ, who granted his
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request for cancellation of removal. ECF No. 1‐2 at 2‐3. But the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) reversed the IJ’s decision and remanded for consideration of Muse’s
remaining claims. ECF No. 14‐1 at 3. On August 10th, 2018, the IJ rejected Muse’s
remaining claims, denied all relief, and ordered him removed. ECF No. 20‐1 at 2, 23.
Muse has appealed the IJ’s decision. ECF No. 21. Muse remains detained.
In this habeas proceeding, Muse contends that his lengthy detention without
being afforded a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
ECF No. 1 at 25‐26. The Court agrees and consequently will order that Muse be
afforded a bond hearing to determine whether continued detention is warranted.1
II. ANALYSIS
Section 1226(c) requires the detention of aliens such as Muse who have been
convicted of specific offenses that render them removable. Such aliens must be
“detained pending a decision on whether [they are] to be removed from the United
1
Muse has also brought various statutory claims. ECF No. 1 at 22‐25. As both
parties acknowledge, however, the Court lacks jurisdiction over those claims. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). The Court therefore dismisses those claims without prejudice.
In addition to bringing a claim under the Due Process Clause, Muse has brought
a claim under the Fourth Amendment. The Court has jurisdiction over both of Muse’s
constitutional claims. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). But because the Court
is granting relief on Muse’s due‐process claim, the Court will dismiss Muse’s Fourth
Amendment claim as moot. Neither party has argued—and the Court is unaware of
any authority suggesting—that Muse is entitled to broader relief under the Fourth
Amendment than under the Due Process Clause.
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States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In Demore, the Supreme Court held that the government
may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, detain removable aliens under § 1226(c)
for the “brief period necessary” for removal proceedings to run their course. 538 U.S.
at 513.
Constitutional difficulties arise, however, when detention under § 1226(c) ceases
to be “brief.” The Supreme Court has warned that indefinite detention during removal
proceedings would raise “serious constitutional concerns.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 682 (2001). Cognizant of those concerns, several federal courts of appeals—citing
the canon of constitutional avoidance—construed § 1226(c) to include a reasonableness
limitation on the length of time that an alien could be detained. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan,
819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016), withdrawn, Reid v. Donelan, No. 14‐1270, 2018 WL 4000993
(1st Cir. May 11, 2018); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016), vacated,
Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 890 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2018); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060
(9th Cir. 2015), overruled by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Lora v. Shanahan,
804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, vacated, Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018).
Earlier this year, however, the Supreme Court rejected these efforts. In Jennings,
the Court held that the language of § 1226(c) clearly mandates that certain removable
aliens be detained for the entire duration of removal proceedings and that the canon of
constitutional avoidance cannot be used to alter the terms of such a clear statute. 138 S.
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Ct. at 846‐48. The Court expressed no view on the constitutional question that the lower
courts had tried to avoid: What limitations does the Due Process Clause place on
detention under § 1226(c)? That question is now before this Court.
Both parties agree that the Due Process Clause imposes some limitations on
detention under § 1226(c). The parties could hardly argue otherwise. The Supreme
Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause protects aliens who are present
within the United States, including those who are subject to removal. See Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 693 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.”) Every federal court of appeals to have addressed the issue after Demore
has recognized that the Due Process Clause restricts how long the government may
detain an alien under § 1226(c). See Reid, 819 F.3d at 494 (“Because of the limited nature
of the holding in Demore, every federal court of appeals to examine § 1226(c) has
recognized that the Due Process Clause imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’
limitation upon the duration of detention that can be considered justifiable under that
statute.”).
The parties disagree, however, about whether Muse’s ongoing detention violates
the Due Process Clause. The government contends that the Due Process Clause permits
detention of an alien for the entire duration of removal proceedings so long as the
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government acts in good faith and does not engage in dilatory conduct.2 Absent bad‐
faith conduct, the government argues, the length of detention carries no independent
constitutional significance. In the government’s view, only in ”extraordinary cases”
would the Due Process Clause require that an alien be released (or be afforded a bond
hearing) prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings. ECF No. 13 at 10.
The government’s position is difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Demore. In upholding the constitutionality of mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c), the Supreme Court took care to note that such detention is for only a “very
limited” and “brief” period of time. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529 n.12, 513. Woven
throughout Demore are repeated references to the brevity of detention under § 1226(c).
Id. at 526 (describing the Court’s “longstanding view that the Government may
constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their
removal proceedings” (emphasis added)); id. at 529 (explaining that most detentions
under § 1226(c) last for “less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in
2
The government also concedes that the detention must serve § 1226(c)’s
purposes. But the government believes that detention virtually always furthers the
purposes of § 1226(c), which are to prevent removable aliens from fleeing or posing a
threat to the community. See Chavez‐Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469,
475 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing “the statute’s goals” as “ensuring participation in the
removal process, and protecting the community from the danger that [the removable
alien] poses”); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing the
“statute’s purposes” as “ensuring that an alien attends removal proceedings and that
his release will not pose a danger to the community”).
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Zadvydas”). The Court distinguished the detention of an alien during the pendency of
removal proceedings under § 1226(c) (the detention that was at issue in Demore and that
is at issue here) from the detention of an alien after a final order of removal has been
entered under § 1231 (the detention that was at issue in Zadvydas). The Court explained
that, while § 1231 detention was potentially limitless—because removal may be
practically impossible if, say, no country will accept the alien—§ 1226(c) detention lasts
for a “much shorter duration.” Id. at 528. Indeed, the Court emphasized that § 1226(c)
detention “lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is
invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to
appeal.” Id. at 530.
Zadvydas similarly undermines the government’s argument. In Zadvydas, the
Supreme Court construed § 1231(a)(6) “to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’
limitation, the application of which is subject to federal‐court review.” 533 U.S. at 682.
The Court held that it is presumptively unreasonable to keep an alien subject to a final
removal order in custody for more than six months. Id. at 701. The Court read such a
limitation into § 1231(a)(6) to avoid the “serious constitutional concerns” that would
result if § 1231(a)(6) were construed to permit indefinite detention. Id. at 682.
In this case, the government distinguishes Zadvydas by pointing to the distinction
made by the Supreme Court in Demore: that § 1231 detention may be indefinite and
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even permanent, whereas § 1226(c) detention must terminate at some point (typically
within a couple of months). The government is correct that § 1226(c) detention has a
definite end point: the conclusion of removal proceedings. But as detention drags on
beyond the time frame contemplated in Demore and begins to resemble the indefinite
detention addressed in Zadvydas, the constitutional issues that concerned the Supreme
Court in Zadvydas become more salient. See Sajous v. Decker, No. 18‐2447, 2018 WL
2357266, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) (“[A]lthough the language of § 1226 technically
ascribes an end point to all detention under the section by authorizing detention only
until ‘a decision on whether the alien is to be removed’ is reached, such detention in
reality could, for some detained aliens, become potentially indefinite.” (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) (citation omitted)).
For these reasons, the Court rejects the government’s argument that the Due
Process Clause imposes no limitation on the length of § 1226(c) detention when the
government has not engaged in dilatory tactics. Instead, the Court follows the lead of
virtually every court that has addressed the issue following Jennings—including two
judges of this District—and holds that a due‐process challenge to § 1226(c) detention
must be resolved by closely examining the facts of the particular case to determine
whether the detention is reasonable. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
No. 17‐CV‐5055 (DWF/DTS), 2018 WL 2392205, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2018), Report and
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Recommendation adopted, No. 17‐CV‐5055 (DWF/DTS), 2018 WL 2390132 (D. Minn.
May 25, 2018); Tindi v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 17‐CV‐3663 (DSD/DTS), 2018
WL 704314, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2018).
Courts taking this approach have used several factors to guide them in
identifying the point at which “continued detention becomes unreasonable and the
Executive Branch’s implementation of § 1226(c) becomes unconstitutional unless the
Government has justified its actions at a hearing inquiring into whether continued
detention is consistent with the law’s purposes of preventing flight and dangers to the
community.” Diop, 656 F.3d at 232. Among those factors are (1) the total length of
detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of
detention; (4) delays of the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays of
the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the
removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. Cf. Reid, 819 F.3d at 500‐01.3
3
The Reid factors “represent a reasonable framework for balancing the due
process interests at stake” even though they were “originally adopted in the context of
reading an implicit reasonableness limitation into § 1226(c),” Portillo v. Hott, No. 1:18‐
470, 2018 WL 3237898, at *7‐9 (E.D. Va. July 3, 2018), and even though the First Circuit
withdrew the Reid decision after the Supreme Court decided Jennings, 2018 WL 4000993.
Some courts also compare the length of the § 1226(c) detention with the length of
the sentences imposed for the “predicate” convictions that rendered the detainee
removable. E.g., Reid v. Donelan, 991 F. Supp. 2d 275, 281 (D. Mass. 2014). The Court
does not find this factor particularly helpful. Section 1226(c) detention and criminal
incarceration are different types of custody imposed for different reasons by different
(continued...)
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In this case, most of these factors support Muse’s argument that his continued
detention—without a bond hearing at which an IJ could consider whether he is a
danger to the community or likely to flee—would violate the Due Process Clause:
First, courts consider the length of detention. Aliens detained under § 1226(c) are
“immediately and unconditionally” deprived “of all liberty without any hearing.”
Fuller v. Gonzales, No. 3:04‐2039, 2005 WL 818614, at *5 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2005). How
long this deprivation has lasted is critical to the due‐process inquiry. As noted, Demore
expressed the understanding that detention under § 1226(c) would be brief, and this
assumption was “key to [the Court’s] conclusion that the law complied with due
process.” Chavez‐Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 474. Without question, then, “continued detention
without inquiry into its necessity becomes more and more suspect” as detention
continues past the time frame described in Demore. Diop, 656 F.3d at 234.
3
(...continued)
sovereigns. The Court cannot understand why the length of a sentence imposed on an
alien years ago by, say, the State of Minnesota to punish him for a predicate offense has
any bearing on whether the alien’s current civil detention by the federal government
under § 1226(c) is constitutional. Why, for example, should it be permissible to detain
an alien who was sentenced to 12 months for theft longer than an alien who was
sentenced to three months for theft?
In any event, consideration of this factor would only strengthen the Court’s
conclusion that Muse’s continued detention without a bail hearing would be
unconstitutional. Muse was sentenced to two days in jail for one of his convictions and
45 days in jail for the other, whereas he has been detained for over 14 months under
§ 1226(c). See ECF No. 7‐2 at 5 (confinement of two days for theft of services); ECF
No. 7‐3 at 4 (confinement of forty‐five days for financial transaction card fraud).
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The length of Muse’s detention strongly favors granting relief. Over 14 months
have passed since ICE first took Muse into custody. See ECF No. 7 at 2. He still has not
received any individualized determination regarding whether he is a danger to the
community or likely to flee. Muse’s detention has now lasted over twice as long as the
detention at issue in Demore. Much shorter detentions have been found unreasonable
under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *1, *7 (eight
months); Jarpa v. Mumford, 211 F. Supp. 3d 706, 710, 717 n.6 (D. Md. 2016) (ten months);
Gordon v. Shanahan, No. 15‐261, 2015 WL 1176706, *3‐4 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 2015) (eight
months). As detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of
permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing. See, e.g., Vega v. Doll, No. 3:17‐
01440, 2018 WL 3765431, at *10‐13 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2018), Report and Recommendation
adopted, No. 3:17‐01440, 2018 WL 3756755 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2018) (twenty months);
Portillo, 2018 WL 3237898, at *7‐9 (fourteen months); Gjergji v. Johnson, No. 3:15‐1217,
2016 WL 3552718, at *9 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2016) (eighteen months); Bautista v. Sabol, 862
F. Supp. 2d 375, 381‐82 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (over twenty‐five months).
True, a few courts have upheld § 1226(c) detentions that lasted more than a year.
See, e.g., Dryden v. Green, No. 18‐2686, 2018 WL 3062909, at *5 (D.N.J. June 21, 2018)
(finding no due‐process violation for detention lasting “just over a year”); Maynard v.
Hendrix, No. 11‐0605, 2011 WL 6176202, at *1‐2, *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2011) (holding that an
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18‐month detention did not violate the implicit reasonableness requirement in
§ 1226(c)). But Muse’s circumstances are materially different from those cases. In
Dryden, the court held that the alien’s nearly 13‐month detention did not violate the Due
Process Clause because “the majority of the delay in [the alien’s] immigration results
[was] directly attributable to [his] own delay in acquiring counsel and ultimately filing
his petition for relief[.]” 2018 WL 3062909, at *5. And in Maynard, the court held that
the alien’s 18‐month detention was not unreasonably prolonged because delays in the
removal proceedings were “attributable almost exclusively to [the alien’s] repeated
requests for adjournments.” 2011 WL 6176202, at *4. By contrast, Muse has not
engaged in any dilatory conduct. He has merely “raised a colorable claim against
deportation” and “vigorously contest[ed] removal[,]” as is his right. Reid, 991 F. Supp.
2d at 282.
Second, courts consider how long the detention is likely to continue in the
absence of judicial relief. In estimating when detention will end, courts take into
account the anticipated duration of all removal proceedings, including administrative
and judicial appeals. Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The entire process,
not merely the original deportation hearing, is subject to the constitutional requirement
of reasonability.”).
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This factor too strongly supports granting relief. Muse could easily be detained
another 18 months or more. The IJ denied Muse’s remaining claims for relief on
August 10, 2018. ECF No. 20‐1 at 2. Muse has just appealed that decision to the BIA.
ECF No. 21. The DHS’s appeal of the IJ’s initial determination was not resolved by the
BIA until almost five months after the IJ issued her decision. See ECF No. 1‐2 at 13‐15
(notice of appeal filed on November 16, 2017); ECF No. 14‐1 at 1 (BIA opinion filed on
April 10, 2018). If Muse loses his administrative appeal, he will undoubtedly seek
review in the Eighth Circuit, and it may be another year before he gets a decision.
Third, courts consider the conditions of the alien’s detention. Aliens held under
§ 1226(c) are subject to civil detention rather than criminal incarceration. Chavez‐
Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 478. The more that the conditions under which the alien is being
held resemble penal confinement, the stronger his argument that he is entitled to a bond
hearing. See id. And “[a]s the length of the detention grows, the weight given to this
aspect of his detention increases.” Id.
Currently, ICE is housing Muse in a county jail alongside inmates who are
serving criminal sentences. ECF No. 1 at 8, 13; ECF No. 9 at 2. The government
concedes—as it must—that ICE is detaining Muse under conditions that are
indistinguishable from penal confinement.4 This factor also weighs in Muse’s favor.
4
Muse claims that he has been denied access to prescribed medical treatment and
(continued...)
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Fourth, courts consider the nature and extent of any delays in the removal
proceedings caused by the alien. An alien should not be punished for raising legitimate
defenses to removal. See Ly, 351 F.3d at 272 (“An alien who would not normally be
subject to indefinite detention cannot be so detained merely because he seeks to explore
avenues of relief that the law makes available to him.”). Courts should, however, be
“sensitive to the possibility that dilatory tactics by the removable alien may serve not
only to put off the final day of deportation, but also to compel a determination that the
alien must be released because of the length of his incarceration.” Id. If courts did not
take into account the alien’s role in delaying removal proceedings, they “would
encourage deportable criminal aliens to raise frivolous objections and string out the
proceedings in the hopes that a federal court will find the delay ‘unreasonable’ and
order their release.” Id.
The government has not argued—and no evidence suggests—that Muse has
engaged in any dilatory tactics. He has merely raised non‐frivolous arguments in
support of his position. (Indeed, he initially prevailed before the IJ.) He has also
complied with all deadlines, and he had not sought delays. This factor, too, weighs in
Muse’s favor.
4
(...continued)
mental‐health resources. ECF No. 1 at 5‐6. The Court does not address this issue
because no record has been developed regarding Muse’s access to medical care.
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Fifth, courts consider the nature and extent of any delays in the removal
proceedings caused by the government. “Continued detention will also appear more
unreasonable when the delay in proceedings was caused by the immigration court or
other non‐ICE government officials.” Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *11.
Like Muse, the government has not engaged in any dilatory tactics. Like Muse,
the government has merely made non‐frivolous arguments in support of its position.
(Indeed, the government prevailed in its appeal to the BIA.) And like Muse, the
government has complied with all deadlines and not sought delays. Moreover, both the
IJ and the BIA have been reasonably prompt in issuing decisions. This factor weighs in
the government’s favor.
Finally, courts consider the likelihood that the proceedings will culminate in a
final removal order. The more likely that the alien will be removed, the longer the
detention that will be deemed reasonable. Id.
This factor does not weigh in either party’s favor. The fact that the IJ (after being
reversed by the BIA) has ordered that Muse be removed certainly does not help Muse.
But Muse has appealed that decision to the BIA. Neither party has said much about the
arguments that Muse and the government made before the IJ—or will make before the
BIA—and thus the Court does not have a sufficient basis to determine whether Muse is
likely to be removed.
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In sum, four of these factors weigh in favor of Muse (a couple strongly), one
weighs in favor of the government, and one is neutral. The Court therefore finds that
continuing to detain Muse without affording him a bond hearing would violate his
rights under the Due Process Clause.
The Court will order that an IJ conduct a bond hearing no later than October 15,
2018. (The delay is necessary to allow the parties to prepare for the hearing and to give
the IJ a reasonable amount of time to schedule the hearing.) At that hearing, the parties
must be allowed to present evidence and argument about whether Muse is a danger to
the community and whether Muse is likely to flee if he is not detained. Such a hearing
will protect both Muse’s rights under the Due Process Clause and the government’s
legitimate interest in detaining a removable alien when such detention is necessary to
serve the purposes of § 1226(c). See Portillo, 2018 WL 3237898, at *8 (“Moreover, the
government’s interest in guarding against [the alien’s] flight can be substantially
protected even if [the alien] is given an individualized bond hearing and released on
bond because a critical factor that the IJ will be forced to consider is whether [the alien]
is a flight risk and whether there are conditions of release that could reasonably secure
his future appearance.”).
At oral argument, both parties discussed issues regarding the standard and
burden of proof at the bond hearing. This issue was not briefed by the parties,
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however, and Court believes that the IJ should have the first opportunity to address
such matters. Nothing in this order is intended to suggest what standard of proof
(preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, or something else) will apply at the bond hearing. And nothing in
this order is intended to suggest whether it is Muse or the government who must meet
that burden. Those matters are left for the IJ to determine in the first instance.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
the Court OVERRULES respondents’ objection [ECF No. 13] and ADOPTS the R&R
[ECF No. 9] to the extent that it is consistent with this order. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
THAT:
1.
Muse’s application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1] is GRANTED IN PART with respect to Count V (the Due
Process claim).
2.
No later than October 15, 2018, an immigration judge must provide Muse
with a bond hearing. At this hearing, the immigration judge must make
an individualized determination regarding whether detention is necessary
to protect the community or to prevent Muse from fleeing.
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3.
Counts I, II, and III of the petition are dismissed without prejudice for lack
of jurisdiction, and Count IV of the petition is dismissed without prejudice
because it is moot.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: September 18, 2018
s/Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge
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