Glover v. City of St. Paul Police et al

Filing 73

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by City of St. Paul Police, Nicole A. Spears, Charles Ankney, Benjamin Buchin, Anthony Dean (Written Opinion) Signed by Chief Judge John R. Tunheim on 7/6/2020.(HAZ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
WILBERT GLOVER,
Civil No. 18-223 (JRT/KMM)

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
OBJECTIONS, ADOPTING THE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION,
AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
CITY OF SAINT PAUL POLICE
DEPARTMENT, CHARLES ANKNEY,
BENJAMIN BUCHIN, NICOLE SPEARS, AND
ANTHONY DEAN,
Defendants.

Wilbert Glover, 435 University Avenue East, Saint Paul, Minnesota 55130,
pro se plaintiff.
Kyle Citta and Stephen J. Christie, Assistant Saint Paul City Attorneys, SAINT
PAUL CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15 West Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 750, Saint
Paul, Minnesota 55102, for defendants.
Plaintiff Wilbert Glover seeks $5,700,000 in damages for alleged violations of his
rights under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) Minn. Stat. § 363A.01; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the Magistrate Judge issued a
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court grant the Motion. On de
novo review, the Court concludes that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Glover
and that the alleged use of racial epithets during the arrest does not constitute a violation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court will overrule Glover’s Objections, adopt
the R&R, and grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

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BACKGROUND
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 24, 2015, Saint Paul police officers responded to a 911 call reporting

a possible kidnapping victim. (Aff. of Jonathan Finnegan (“Finnegan Aff.”) ¶ 2, Ex. B. at 8,
Nov. 8, 2019, Docket No. 40.) The victim, D.N.B., still with handcuffs on his ankles and
one wrist, had knocked on a door and explained that he’d been kidnapped. (Finnegan
Aff., Ex. B at 8.) D.N.B reported he was attacked by an unknown man on a street in North
Minneapolis five days earlier, became unconscious, and awoke in an unknown house
where he was handcuffed, chained to a pole on a wall, and repeatedly sexually assaulted.
(Id. at 9–10.) D.N.B. reported that earlier that day, he heard the assailant leave the house
and was able to free himself from some of the restraints and exit through a ground-floor
bathroom window in the back of the house. (Id. at 9–11.) Prior to his escape, D.N.B.
pulled on a fuse box in the basement which cut power to the house. (Id. at 10.) Although
D.N.B. was blindfolded and never saw the assailant, he reported that his voice sounded
like that of a white or black male between 40 and 50 years old. (Id.) D.N.B. reported only
one person being involved in the kidnapping. (Id.)

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Sergeant Nicole Spears coordinated the police investigation and instructed Officers
Charles Ankney, Benjamin Buchin, and Anthony Dean 1 to search the neighborhood for a
house with an open or broken bathroom window. (Aff. of Nicole A. Spears ¶ 2, Ex. D.
at 18, Nov. 8, 2019, Docket No. 40.) Buchin discovered a house consistent with D.N.B.’s
report; it had an open ground-floor bathroom window with a damaged screen and an
exterior electric meter indicating that no power was being drawn. (Aff. of Benjamin
Buchin (“Buchin Aff.”) ¶ 2, Ex. F at 27, Nov. 8, 2019, Docket No. 40.) The mailbox at this
house contained mail addressed to Wilbert Glover. (Id.) A neighbor told Dean they had
seen a black male in his forties or fifties who drove a purple Cadillac. (Aff. of Anthony
Dean (“Dean Aff.”) ¶ 2, Ex. J at 19, Nov. 8, 2019, Docket No. 40.) Another neighbor
reported seeing a black male in his forties raking leaves in the front lawn of the home.
(Id. at 19–20.)
Spears, Ankney, Buchin, and Dean were waiting for a search warrant while in front
of the house when Buchin observed a gray Cadillac sedan turn onto the street at a nearby
corner, stop halfway through the turn, and quickly pull over. (Buchin Aff., Ex. F at 27.)
Buchin ran the license plate and learned it was registered to Wilbert Glover. (Id.) Spears,
Ankney, Buchin, and Dean approached the vehicle to investigate. (Id.) They asked Glover

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In his Complaint, Glover refers to Officer Anthony Dean as “Dean Anthony.” The R&R
refers to him as both “Officer Dean” and “Officer Anthony” in different sections. Based
on Spear’s report, this Opinion will refer to him as “Dean.”
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for his driver’s license and he had trouble locating it, repeatedly reaching under the
driver’s seat. (Id.) They also asked Glover to step out of his vehicle and questioned him
on why he was in the area. (Id. at 27–28.) Glover stated that he did not live in the area
and provided vague, incomplete, and contradictory information about a female friend he
claimed to be visiting. (Id. at 28.)
Glover appeared to match the general description of the resident who lived at the
house. (Dean Aff., Ex. J at 19.) He was a 55-year-old black male with greying black hair, a
receding hair line, and a goatee. (Id. at 8–9.) A neighbor could not positively identify
Glover at the scene because she thought the man that she remembered was bald with
darker skin. (Id. at 20.)

The neighbor also stated she had never spoken with Glover

before. (Id.) Although lacking positive identification, Spears directed Buchin to transport
Glover to police headquarters for questioning. (Buchin Aff., Ex. F at 28.) Glover was
placed in the back of Buchin’s squad car as other officers remained in the neighborhood
or arrived at headquarters on their own. (Id.)
Glover alleges that Spears, Ankney, Buchin, and Dean approached his vehicle with
guns drawn, saying “That’s the n***** defendant show your hands nasty n*****
perpetrator.” (Compl. ¶ 7, Jan. 25, 2018, Docket No. 1.) Glover also alleges that Dean
used racial epithets, saying “this the n***** he is lying” and calling him “drug dealer nasty
n*****.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) He alleges that while he was being arrested, officers stated “n*****,
show your hand,” and that multiple officers drove him to the police headquarters,

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referring to him as a “nasty n***** perpetrator” as they drove. (Id. at ¶ 7-C.) Glover
claims that when they reached police headquarters, Buchin called him several derogatory
names and failed to read him his Miranda warnings before questioning. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
Lastly, he claims that Spears called him “nasty n***** Glover perpetrator” numerous
times and told him that he should be killed in jail. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 25, 2018, Glover filed a Complaint against Spears, Ankney, Buchin,

Dean, and the City of Saint Paul Police Department, seeking $5,700,000 in damages for
the alleged violations of his rights under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (2) Minn. Stat. § 363A.01,
and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. at 5.) On November 8, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment requesting that Glover’s claims be dismissed with prejudice.
(Mot. for Summ. J., Nov. 8, 2019, Docket No. 37.) On February 18, 2020, the Magistrate
Judge filed an R&R which granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed
Glover’s federal claims with prejudice, and dismissed Glover’s state claims without
prejudice. (R&R at 13, Feb. 18, 2020, Docket No. 68.) On March 6, 2020, Glover filed his
Objections to the R&R. (Obj. to R&R, Mar. 6, 2020, Docket No. 69.)
DISCUSSION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon the filing of an R&R by a Magistrate Judge, “a party may serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”
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Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2); accord D. Minn. Local R. 72.2(b)(1). “The district judge must determine de
novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord D. Minn. Local R. 72.2(b)(3).
Here, the Magistrate Judge issued a recommendation on a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the
suit, and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Additionally, when doing so, the Court must remember
that materials “filed pro se [are] ‘to be liberally construed.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

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II. PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
Glover objects to the R&R’s conclusion that he failed to demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact regarding his claims in two main respects. 2 First, he argues that
there was a lack of probable cause for his arrest because there was “no evidence of
abduction or any sexual assault.” (Obj. to R.&.R. at 1, Mar. 6, 2020, Docket No. 69.) In
support of this claim, Glover refers to the testimony of an Officer Himes, given in an earlier
state criminal proceeding, that when executing the search warrant, “there may have been
lights on in the basement” of the house. (Id. at 3.) Glover also claims that Defendants
lacked probable cause to arrest him because they have since put forward more than two
different stories in their documentation of events. (Id. at 2.) Second, Glover asserts that
discovery would present material facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendants used racist epithets during his arrest. (Id. at 4.)
III.

LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE
A state court’s finding that probable cause existed at the time of an arrest bars a

criminal defendant from later challenging the evidence to establish probable cause in a
subsequent civil action. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104–05 (1980); Crumley v. City
of Saint Paul, Minn., 324 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2003). Glover has already challenged

2

Glover also asserts that the Minnesota Department of Human Rights misquoted a
statement of his in a document. Because it has no bearing on this case, the Court will not
address this assertion.
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whether probable cause existed on these facts and both the state trial and appellate
courts concluded that there was probable cause for arrest. See State v. Glover, A17-483,
2018 WL 2293266 at *2–3 (Minn. App. May 21, 2018). Therefore, the Court will overrule
Glover’s probable-cause objection.
IV.

USE OF RACIST EPITHETS
Glover asserts that discovery would present material facts from which a

reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants used racist epithets during his arrest.
However, the Eighth Circuit has held that the use of such epithets during an arrest does
not rise to the level of a § 1983 violation without some showing of force or injury. Turner
v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 2015). The Court recognizes the reprehensible nature
of the alleged language and use of racist epithets. Even if proven true, however, the use
of racist epithets would be insufficient to support Glover’s § 1983 claim because he has
not alleged facts demonstrating force or injury. Therefore, the Court will overrule
Glover’s racist-epithet objection.
V. MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Under the federal supplemental-jurisdiction statute, the Court may dismiss statelaw claims when all other claims over which it had original jurisdiction have been
dismissed. 28 USC §1367(c)(3). The Court will do so here. Glover may opt to refile in
state court within the period of limitations as tolled by § 1367. See 28 USC § 1367(d)
(“[t]he period of limitations for any claim . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and
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for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling
period.”); see also Artis v. District of Colombia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 598 (2018) (clarifying that
the 30-day period in § 1367(d) is not just a grace period but continues the stopped clock
on the statute of limitations).
CONCLUSION
Because Glover is barred from contesting the state-court finding that probable
cause existed for his arrest, and because he does not allege sufficient facts demonstrating
force or injury in addition to the use of racist epithets by officers during his arrest, the
Court will Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Glover’s federal claims. The
Court will also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Glover’s remaining statelaw claims.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Objections [Docket No. 69] are OVERRULED;

2.

The Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 68] is ADOPTED; and

3.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 37] is GRANTED:
a. Plaintiff’s federal claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
b. Plaintiff’s Minnesota Human Rights Act claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
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LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

DATED: July 6, 2020
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.

______

______
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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