Tiegland v. Berryhill

Filing 21

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Written Opinion) Signed by Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson on 8/30/2019. (DMM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Shane T.,

Civ. No. 18-634 (BRT)
Plaintiff,

v.

MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER

Andrew M. Saul, 1
Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

Mac Schneider, Esq., Schneider Schneider & Schneider, counsel for Plaintiff.
Linda H. Green, Esq., United States Attorney’s Office, counsel for Defendant.

BECKY R. THORSON, United States Magistrate Judge.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his application for
Social Security disability insurance benefits. This matter is before the Court on the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, in accordance with D. Minn. LR 7.2(c)(1).
(Doc. Nos. 15, 17.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and
denied in part, and Defendant’s motion is denied.

1

On June 17, 2019, Andrew M. Saul was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social
Security and is substituted as the proper Defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a high-school graduate, is married, and has step-children. (Tr. 31, 32,
195.) 2 Between 1999 and 2014, Plaintiff worked as an auto mechanic and then as a
“breakdown mechanic” who repaired malfunctioning machinery at Marvin Windows and
Doors. (Tr. 32–34, 228–29.) He left the Marvin Windows job in late 2014 on the advice
of his doctor. (Tr. 34.) Plaintiff had reported worsening pain in his lower back and knees,
along with blurred vision and limited mobility. (Tr. 34–37, 210.) At age forty-three,
Plaintiff applied for benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on May 11, 2015,
alleging a disability onset date of December 1, 2014. (Tr. 71–72.)
In a decision dated February 28, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and
denied Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ proceeded through the five-step
evaluation process provided in the Social Security regulations. 3 At issue on this appeal
are the ALJ’s findings at step two and steps four/five as they relate to Plaintiff’s Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following
severe impairments: “(1) Seronegative Spondyloarthropathy; (2) Chronic Pain Syndrome;

2

Throughout this Order, the abbreviation “Tr.” is used to reference the
Administrative Record. (Doc. No. 12.)
3

See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)
(“During the five-step process, the ALJ considers (1) whether the claimant is gainfully
employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3) whether the impairment
meets the criteria of any Social Security Income listings, (4) whether the impairment
prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work, and (5) whether the
impairment necessarily prevents the claimant from doing any other work.”).
2

(3) Obesity; and (4) Coronary Artery Disease (CAD).” (Tr. 12.) The ALJ then addressed
several impairments that she found to be non-severe (including Plaintiff’s visual
impairments), but did not address Plaintiff’s alleged osteoarthritis. 4 Later in the disability
analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work, with
several lifting, carrying, walking, and climbing limitations. (Tr. 14.) Key to Plaintiff’s
arguments on appeal are that the ALJ did not include a limitation for “occasional
handling and fingering,” or a limitation that would relate to Plaintiff’s visual
impairments. At step four, after consulting with a vocational expert, the ALJ found that a
person with Plaintiff’s RFC was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 18.) At
step five, however, the ALJ concluded that a person with Plaintiff’s RFC was able to
work in certain other representative occupations that exist in sufficient regional and
national markets and therefore found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 18–19.)
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s failure to assess his osteoarthritis as
severe or non-severe at step two requires remand. He also argues that, related to his
osteoarthritis, the ALJ further failed to make findings regarding Plaintiff’s ability to
handle and finger when determining Plaintiff’s RFC, and erred when evaluating the
weight given to treating physician Dr. Anderson’s opinion that Plaintiff could only
occasionally do “handling and fingering.” 5 Plaintiff argues that if proper weight is given

4

Plaintiff argued in his brief to the ALJ that his “severe osteoarthritis . . . results in
significant limitations with regard to the ability to handle, finger, and feel.” (Tr. 269.)
5

Dr. Anderson first treated Plaintiff on January 16, 2015, and the administrative
record indicates at least twelve documented visits. (Tr. 328–32, 381–84, 386–89, 465–69,
474–76, 483–95, 498–501, 505–07, 511–18.)
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to that opinion, then, as the vocational expert testified, a person with Plaintiff’s
limitations would not be able to perform the unskilled sedentary jobs identified by the
ALJ at step five. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that his visual
impairments were not severe at step two and by not including a limitation in his RFC that
would properly address his visual impairments.
ANALYSIS
I.

Standard of Review
Congress has established the standards by which Social Security disability

insurance benefits may be awarded. The SSA must find a claimant disabled if the
claimant is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant’s impairments must be “of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The claimant bears the
burden of proving that he is entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Social
Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). Once the claimant has demonstrated that he
cannot perform past work due to a disability, “the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner to prove, first that the claimant retains the [RFC] to do other kinds of
work, and, second that other work exists in substantial numbers in the national economy

4

that the claimant is able to do.” Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
The Commissioner’s decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533,
536 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,
1154 (2019) (citations omitted); accord Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir.
2003). This standard “allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions.”
Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). If it is
possible to draw inconsistent conclusions from the record, and one of those conclusions
represents the ALJ’s findings, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. McNamara v. Astrue,
590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010); Pearsall v. Massanarri, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.
2001) (stating that the court must affirm even if it would have weighed the evidence
differently); Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000) (concluding substantial
evidence in the record supporting a contrary outcome was not enough to warrant
reversal).
II.

Step-Two Arguments
At step two, the Social Security Administration considers “the medical severity of

[a claimant’s] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An impairment must meet
a twelve-month durational requirement to be considered severe. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1509; see also David G. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-3671 (HB), 2018 WL 4572981, at *1,
n.2 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2018). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight
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abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to
do basic work activities.” Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). The
claimant bears the burden of establishing that a given impairment is severe. Id. at 707–08
(citing Mittlestedt v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2000)).
A. Step Two – Osteoarthritis
The ALJ did not discuss osteoarthritis as being either severe or non-severe at step
two of the evaluation process. Plaintiff argues that this was reversible error. “[S]everal
district courts in the Eighth Circuit, including the District of Minnesota, have concluded
that an ALJ’s failure to find that an impairment is severe at step two is harmless error
where the ALJ otherwise finds another severe impairment exists and addresses any
functional limitations caused by the overlooked impairment when determining the
individual’s RFC.” Misty G. v. Berryhill, No. 18-cv-00587-KMM, 2019 WL 1318355, at
*3 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2019) (citing cases). 6 The functional limitation that Plaintiff
argues should be considered based on Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis is his ability to handle and
finger. A “step two error cannot be dismissed as harmless if the RFC finding omits the
claimant’s relevant functional limitations, and a remand would be necessary to correct the
analysis.” Misty G., 2019 WL 1318355, at *4. Here, the ALJ’s RFC finding did omit the
limitation for “occasional handling and fingering” as opined by Plaintiff’s treating

6

But see Tonya S.G. v. Berryhill, No. CIV. 17-5021-JLV, 2018 WL 4441467, at *6
(D.S.D. Sept. 17, 2018) (rejecting the argument that an error at step two can be harmless);
Stewart v. Astrue, No. 09-cv-3170, 2011 WL 338794, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2011)
(citing Nicola v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2007) for a per se rule of reversal where
there is an error at step two); Lamorte v. Astrue, No. 3:08-cv-03040, 2009 WL 3698004,
at *4 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 2, 2009) (same).
6

physician. As explained further below, a remand is necessary to provide good reasons for
discounting Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to handle
and finger. Accordingly, the Court cannot dismiss the step-two error—assuming it was an
error to not consider osteoarthritis—as harmless error. Instead, because a remand will
require full consideration of Plaintiff’s functional manipulative limitations, any step-two
error regarding Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis will be corrected at that time.
B. Step Two – Vision Impairments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s dismissal of his vision impairments as non-severe at
step two was error. Unlike Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis, the ALJ did discuss Plaintiff’s vision
impairments during his step-two analysis:
The claimant has been diagnosed with ocular hypertension and glaucoma.
Exh. 5F, p. 4. He also has a history of dacryocystitis, and has undergone
surgeries therefore. He underwent a dacryocystorhinostomy (DCR) in 2012,
with tube removal six months later; left eye DCR in 2014, with tube
removal in December 2014; and bilateral DCR in February 2015. Exh. 3F,
p. 20; Exh. 5F, p. 11. However, the claimant’s eye exams have been fairly
normal, with full fields and visual acuity ranging from 20/20-20/30. Exh.
2F, p. 10; Exh. 14F, p. 44. While the claimant sometimes has symptoms,
these generally appear to be intermittent, and in light of the ongoing and
recurring normalcy of his eye exams, the undersigned concludes that the
claimant’s visual impairments are not severe.
(Tr. 13.) 7 In addition to the records noted by the ALJ, in March 2015, Plaintiff’s treating
physician stated after Plaintiff’s surgery that he had not had significant eye watering.
(Tr. 332.) In October 2016, another doctor noted that Plaintiff’s vision could be corrected

7

Plaintiff recorded a 20/25 in his right eye and a 20/20 in his left eye during a
December 2014 eye exam. (Tr. 313.) In his two most recent eye exams (“visual acuity
tests”), Plaintiff first recorded 20/25 (right) and 20/25 (left), and then 20/30 (right) and
20/40 (left). (Tr. 502, 508.)
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with glasses and that Plaintiff reported his vision was still cloudy “at times” and he had
some mucus in his eyes in the morning hours. (Tr. 508.) These records are at odds with
the treating physician’s notation that Plaintiff’s vision was “constantly blurred.”
(Tr. 456.) 8
While Plaintiff testified that he did have some ongoing problems, he also testified
that he could see well enough to sort coins, that he still drove, used a computer, and spent
most of his day watching television. (Tr. 42, 50.) He stated that reading is hard for him
(Tr. 42), but when he looked at a keyboard, he could tell the difference between the
letters. (Tr. 58.) Plaintiff did have a chronic eye infection, but the record reflects his tube
removal surgeries in December 2014 and March 2015 helped his eye health. (Tr. 278,
284, 335, 343–44, 508.) And while Plaintiff at times mentioned itching in his eyes, there
is no evidence indicating this was severe. The ALJ may disbelieve Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. Strongson v. Barnhart,
361 F.3d 1066, 1070–72 (8th Cir. 2004). And, as stated above, “[a]n impairment is not
severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the
claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707.
Here, there is evidence in the record indicating Plaintiff had problems with his eyesight,
and sometimes it was worse than others; but there is also substantial evidence in the
record supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s visual impairments were non-

8

Two reviewing physicians authored Disability Determinations, and both
recognized Plaintiff’s glaucoma issues and past eye surgeries. (Tr. 74–76, 86–90.)
Nonetheless, both physicians answered “No” to the “Does the individual have visual
limitations?” question. (Id.)
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severe. If it is possible to draw inconsistent conclusions from the record, and one of those
conclusions represents the ALJ’s findings, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed.
McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010); Pearsall v. Massanarri, 274
F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the court must affirm even if it would have
weighed the evidence differently). Therefore, the Court will not disturb the ALJ’s steptwo findings regarding Plaintiff’s vision impairments.
III.

RFC Arguments

The ALJ’s RFC determination is “an assessment of what [Plaintiff] can and cannot
do, not what he does and does not suffer from.” Mitchell v. Astrue, 256 F. App’x 770,
772 (6th Cir. 2007); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (stating that a claimant’s
“residual functional capacity is the most [he] can still do despite [his] limitations”);
Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir. 2011) (defining RFC as “the most a
claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental limitations”) (quotations
omitted). The ALJ is required to “determine the claimant’s RFC based on all relevant
evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and
claimant’s own descriptions of [his] limitations.” Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131
(8th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). “Because a claimant’s RFC is a medical question, an
ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant’s
ability to function in the workplace.” Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir.
2012) (quotations omitted).
Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s RFC included performing sedentary
work except only with the following limitations:
9

[T]he claimant can lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and less that 10
pounds frequently; can sit for 6 out of 8 hours; can stand or walk for 2 out
of 8 hours; can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can never climb ropes,
ladders, and scaffolds; can occasionally balance, kneel, stoop, crouch, and
crawl; and cannot tolerate exposure to unprotected heights and moving
mechanical parts.
(Tr. 14.)
A. Handling and Fingering
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to make any findings regarding Plaintiff’s
ability to handle and finger as part of the RFC finding. This is incorrect. Although the
ALJ did not provide a specific analysis regarding Plaintiff’s ability to handle and finger,
the ALJ did acknowledge that Plaintiff had “soft tissue swelling in the hands and wrists”
and he had “7-10 pounds of grip strength.” (Tr. 16.) In addition, the ALJ did mention
Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Anderson’s opinion that Plaintiff could “occasionally
handle, finger and feel.” (Tr. 17.) Therefore, this argument made by Plaintiff fails.
Plaintiff next contends, however, that the ALJ’s RFC determination, which did not
include a limitation for handling and fingering, was not supported by substantial evidence
in the record. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to give
controlling weight to Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Anderson, who opined that
Plaintiff was limited to “occasional handling and fingering.” (Tr. 456.) Plaintiff asserts
Dr. Anderson’s opinion was “well-supported by objective grip testing and consistent with
other evidence of record.” (Doc. No. 16, Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. 7–8 (citing
Tr. 277, 280, 284, 316).)

10

The SSA regulations generally give treating physicians’ opinions greater weight
than non-treating sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Walker v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 911 F.3d 550, 553 (8th Cir. 2018). Treating physicians’ opinions “receive
controlling weight if they are well-supported by the medical evidence and are ‘not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Walker, 911 F.3d
at 553 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2)). Regardless of the weight an
ALJ assigns an opinion, they “must give good reasons for doing so.” Id.; see also SSR
96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996) (stating that notice of denial “must contain
specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source’s medical opinion”). “Good
reasons” for lesser weight include internal inconsistency and other physicians’ opinions
offering better medical evidentiary support. Reece v. Colvin, 834 F.3d 904, 909 (8th Cir.
2016).
Here, the ALJ gave Dr. Anderson’s opinion “little weight,” stating that it was “not
consistent with Dr. Anderson’s exam findings, nor the exam findings of other providers.
It is not consistent with the claimant’s objective diagnostic studies, which have generally
revealed mild abnormalities.” (Tr. 17.) The ALJ did not elaborate further. She did not
state which of the exam findings were inconsistent, nor did she indicate what other
providers she was referring to. She also did not indicate which diagnostic studies she was
referring to that revealed mild abnormalities, or even which abnormalities she was

11

referring to, leaving the reader questioning whether she was referring to manipulative
functioning, or some other abnormality that Dr. Anderson referred to. 9
The ALJ also stated that Dr. Anderson’s “opinion is not clearly explained or
supported by persuasive rationale.” (Tr. 17.) An ALJ may assign little weight to a treating
physician’s opinion if the opinion is conclusory. Thomas v. Berryhill, 881 F.3d 672, 675
(8th Cir. 2018). A conclusory opinion is one that is “not supported by medical diagnoses
based on objective evidence.” Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2003)
(citing Bates v. Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)). However, when a physician’s
opinion is conclusory, the ALJ should examine the underlying medical record to
determine whether it supports the conclusory opinion. Despain v. Berryhill, 926 F.3d
1024, 1028 (8th Cir. 2019). If it does, the conclusory opinion “may still be entitled to
controlling weight.” Id. In this case, the ALJ provided no explanation, beyond general
statements, for why the underlying medical record does not support Dr. Anderson’s
opinion.
Without more, the ALJ has not provided a good reason for affording
Dr. Anderson’s opinion little weight. An ALJ must explain, “with some specificity, why
he has rejected the treating physician’s opinion.” Walker, 911 F.3d at 553. Here, the ALJ
did not do so. “Failure to provide a good reason for discrediting a treating physician’s
opinion is grounds for remand.” Harles-Wilson v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-02758 (FLN),

9

In his response, the Commissioner points to diagnostic studies of Plaintiff’s right
knee, pelvis, and lumbar spine. (Doc. No. 18, Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.
12.) The Court finds these inapposite, as none of them relate to Plaintiff’s ability to
handle or finger.
12

2018 WL 1525728, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2018) (citation omitted); see also Mai V. v.
Berryhill, No. 17-cv-04347 (ECT/DTS), 2019 WL 1281889, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 20,
2019); Ording v. Colvin, No. 11-2296 (MJD/LIB), 2013 WL 2139498, at *3 (D. Minn.
Apr. 29, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 2139497 (D. Minn.
May 15, 2013) (remanding because an ALJ improperly discounted the medical opinions
of a treating physician without sufficient reasons); Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 452–53
(8th Cir. 2000) (reversing in part because the ALJ failed to give good reasons for
rejecting a treating physician’s opinion). Therefore, the Court remands this matter to the
Commissioner to evaluate Dr. Anderson’s opinion and provide good reasons, with some
specificity, for the weight accorded to this treating physician’s opinion. The ALJ should
then reconsider the RFC conclusion and determinations at steps four and five. 10
B. Vision Impairments
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ also erred by failing to make any findings with
regard to his vision limitations when determining his RFC. This assertion is incorrect.
The ALJ did acknowledge that Plaintiff “has scarring in his eye and blurry vision,” and
that he “has problems reading.” (Tr. 15.) As stated above, substantial evidence in the
record supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s vision impairments are non-

10

The vocational expert testified that an individual with the RFC as determined by
the ALJ would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as
jewelry repairer, lens inserter, and final assembler. (Tr. 19, 60–61.) The vocational expert
also testified that if the limitation of occasional handling and fingering were added to that
RFC, it would preclude those jobs. (Tr. 62–63.) This is consistent with Social Security
Ruling 96-9p, which states that “[m]ost unskilled sedentary jobs require good use of both
hands and the fingers; i.e., bilateral manual dexterity.” 1996 WL 374185, at *8 (July 2,
1996).
13

severe. Although an ALJ should consider both severe and non-severe impairments when
determining a claimant’s RFC, if the record does not support limitations from the nonsevere impairment, the ALJ need not account for the impairment. See Hilkemeyer v.
Barnhart, 380 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding the “ALJ’s decision not to
incorporate [the] mild pulmonary dysfunction in the RFC, as well as in the hypothetical
posed to the VE, was not error because the record [did] not suggest there were any
limitations caused by this nonsevere impairment”). Here, it is evident that the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s vision impairments because he asked the vocational expert a
hypothetical that included limitations relating to vision impairments. 11 And, substantial
evidence in the record indicated that Plaintiff’s eye problems were not continuous, could
be treated with glasses, and that they had improved. Therefore, the ALJ did not err by not
including a limitation in the RFC that would relate to Plaintiff’s vision impairments.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and submissions herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 15) is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART;
2.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 17) is DENIED;

and

11

The vocational expert testified that if he added a limitation where the person
would be unable to read ordinary book print or newsprint to the hypothetical, but would
be able to see small objects or small parts, the person would still be able to do the
assembly jobs identified. (Tr. 61.)
14

3.

This matter be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four), consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion and Order. On remand, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, the ALJ should
evaluate Dr. Anderson’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations, and in
particular his opinion relating to Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations, and give good
reasons for the weight accorded to this treating physician’s opinion. The ALJ should then
reconsider the RFC determination and conclusions at steps four and five.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Date: August 30, 2019

s/ Becky R. Thorson_________
BECKY R. THORSON
United States Magistrate Judge

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