Rudolph v. MEnD Correctional Care, PLLC et al

Filing 93

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright on 11/24/2020. (RJE)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Craig Casler (as Trustee for the Heirs and
Next-of-Kin of Abby Rudolph, deceased),

Case No. 18-cv-1020 (WMW/LIB)

Plaintiff,
v.
MEnD Correctional Care, PLLC, et al.,

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION AND
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the September 28, 2020 Report and
Recommendation (R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois. (Dkt. 90.)
The R&R recommends granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Defendants filed timely objections to the R&R, and Plaintiff filed a
timely response. For the reasons addressed below, the Court overrules Defendants’
objections, adopts the R&R, and grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
BACKGROUND1
This case arises out of the death of Abby Rudolph while Rudolph was in the
custody of Clay County Jail located in Clay County, Minnesota. Rudolph entered the
custody of Clay County Jail on October 30, 2016. Fewer than 96 hours later, Rudolph
died while in custody. Plaintiff Craig Casler, the trustee for the heirs and next-of-kin of

1

The R&R includes a detailed review of the factual and procedural background that
need not be repeated at length here.

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Rudolph, seeks damages for Rudolph’s allegedly wrongful death. As relevant to the
pending objections to the R&R, Defendants are correctional officers who worked at the
Clay County Jail while Rudolph was in custody and either directly interacted with
Rudolph or acquired knowledge about Rudolph’s medical need.2
ANALYSIS
A district court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which specific
objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In doing so, the district court “may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” Id.; accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); LR 72.2(b)(3). Here, Defendants
object to the R&R’s qualified-immunity recommendations. The Court addresses each
objection in turn.
I.

Defendants’ Objections

Defendants object to the R&R’s conclusion that they are not entitled to qualified
immunity. In order to abrogate qualified immunity, a plaintiff must prove that the facts
alleged, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate (1) a
violation of a constitutional right and (2) that the right at issue was “clearly established”
at the time of a defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
2

Defendants MEnD Correctional Care, PLLC, and Nurse Michelle Pender settled
with Casler and, therefore, are no longer parties to this lawsuit. The R&R recommends
dismissing Defendants Julie Savat, Amy Rood, Ryan Magnuson, Amber Nelson, Raynor
Blum, Nancy Livingood, Ashley Johnson, Anastacia Hermes, Richard Stetz, Brianna
Then, Kari White-Tuton, Joel Torkelson, Tiffany Larson, Justin Roberts, and Clay
County, Minnesota. No parties object to this portion of the R&R. The Court, therefore,
adopts this aspect of the R&R. Subsequent references to “Defendants” in this Order
pertain to the remaining Defendants, Deborah Benson, Jana Bartness, Anthony Hanson,
Cassie Olson, Devin Lien, and Lucas Heck.  

2

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(2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); accord Wilson v. Lamp, 901
F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2018). Here, Defendants object to the R&R’s recommendations
as to both aspects of the qualified-immunity analysis.
A.

Violation of a Constitutional Right

Defendants object to the R&R’s analysis of the first element of qualified immunity,
which requires a plaintiff to set forth a violation of a constitutional right. Casler alleges
that Defendants violated Rudolph’s substantive-due-process rights by acting with
deliberate indifference to Rudolph’s serious medical need. A deliberate-indifference
claim has an objective and a subjective component. “The objective component requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate an objectively serious medical need.” Thompson v. King, 730
F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The subjective

component requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant actually knew of, but
deliberately disregarded, such need.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because it
is not clear whether Defendants object to the R&R’s analysis of the objective component
or the subjective component of the deliberate-indifference claim, the Court addresses
each component of the deliberate-indifference analysis.
1.

Objectively Serious Medical Need

The R&R concludes that Casler has demonstrated an objectively serious medical
need because Rudolph’s medical need was so obvious that even a layperson would
recognize it. An objectively serious medical need is one that is either “supported by
medical evidence, such as a physician’s diagnosis, or is so obvious that even a layperson
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Bailey v. Feltmann, 810

3

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F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that
Defendants object to this aspect of the R&R’s analysis, Defendants appear to argue that
the R&R’s analysis is conducted “in a vacuum” without considering Defendants’
background knowledge. See Jones v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 512 F.3d 478, 481–82 (8th
Cir. 2008).
The R&R addresses in detail the facts that give rise to a conclusion that each
remaining Defendant individually observed circumstances that would lead a layperson to
recognize that Rudolph had an objectively serious medical need. Defendants do not
challenge the evidentiary basis for these facts.

Although Defendants recite facts

pertaining to each Defendant in their objections, Defendants fail to establish how those
facts, or the law, contradict or otherwise undermine the R&R’s determination that
Rudolph had an objectively serious medical need that would be obvious to a layperson.
Therefore, to the extent that Defendants object to the R&R’s determination that Rudolph
has demonstrated an objectively serious medical need that was so obvious that even a
layperson would recognize it, Defendants’ objections are overruled.3

3

For a need to be obvious, the law does not require that a particular layperson in
fact recognized that there was an objectively serious medical need. See Bailey, 810 F.3d
at 594. Here, however, laypersons not only could recognize that Rudolph had a serious
medical need, but laypersons—specifically, other inmates—did recognize that Rudolph
had a serious medical need. And after doing so, these individuals expressed their
concerns about Rudolph’s serious medical need to at least one correctional officer. This
circumstance offers additional support for the R&R’s conclusion that Rudolph suffered
from an objectively serious medical need.

4

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2.

Subjective Knowledge of a Serious Medical Need

The R&R also concludes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether each remaining Defendant had subjective knowledge of Rudolph’s serious
medical need, thereby precluding summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. Because
Defendants object to what some of them knew about Rudolph’s medical need,
Defendants appear to object to the R&R’s analysis of whether Defendants had subjective
knowledge as to Rudolph’s serious medical need.4
In particular, Defendants argue that the R&R “focuses entirely on the thoughts of
third-party actors” and “treats the remaining [Defendants] as one person,” thereby failing
to analyze the issue of whether qualified immunity applies as to each Defendant
individually. 5 Defendants also contend that “[t]he R&R collapses each aspect of the
deliberate indifference analysis into . . . whether Rudolph’s medical need was obvious.”
But a review of the R&R demonstrates otherwise. After analyzing each individual
Defendant’s conduct, the R&R ultimately determines that there is a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether each individual Defendant had subjective knowledge of

4

Although Defendants recite certain facts about their conduct, Defendants do not
persuasively argue, nor does this Court conclude, that the R&R failed to include legally
relevant facts.

5

Defendants’ misconstruction of the R&R’s analysis appears to arise from a
misreading of the R&R. For instance, Defendants argue that “[t]he R&R concludes
Hanson ‘observed Ms. Rudolph repeatedly vomiting on at least seven occasions.’ ” But
this argument is inconsistent with the R&R’s statement: “As discussed above, Defendants
Benson, Bartness, Hanson, Olson, Lien, and Heck observed Ms. Rudolph repeatedly
vomiting on at least seven occasions.” (Emphasis added.) The R&R did not fail to
analyze Defendants’ conduct and knowledge on an individual basis; and Defendants’
objections to the contrary, including as specifically applied to Hanson, lack merit.

5

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Rudolph’s objectively serious medical need. Therefore, Defendants’ objection to this
aspect of the R&R’s qualified-immunity analysis is overruled.
Defendants also object to the R&R’s analysis, contending that “[a]bsent from the
R&R is a recognition [that] the remaining Defendants, whose conduct occurred on
November 1, must be analyzed in light of the events that occurred on November 1.” But
Defendants’ objection is not supported by the record. It is apparent from the record that,
while some of the Defendants’ actions occurred on November 1, 2016, at least two
defendants—Cassie Olson and Devin Lien—interacted with Rudolph on November 3,
2016. Moreover, Defendants fail to establish why a “recognition” of this sort is legally
relevant or how such recognition would change the R&R’s analysis. A non-specific
objection to an R&R is reviewed for clear error and is not reviewed de novo. See
Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017 (D. Minn. 2015).
Having carefully reviewed the R&R and finding no clear error, the Court overrules
Defendants’ objection.
Defendants also summarily object to the fact that the R&R did not determine that
Defendants acted reasonably in response to Rudolph’s objectively serious medical need.
As this argument was both presented to and considered by the magistrate judge, it is
reviewed for clear error. See id. (observing that objections to an R&R that “are not
specific but merely repeat arguments presented to and considered by a magistrate judge
are not entitled to de novo review, but rather are reviewed for clear error”). Having

6

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carefully reviewed the R&R and finding no clear error, Defendants’ objection on this
basis is overruled.6
The R&R correctly concludes that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to
whether Defendants were subjectively aware of Rudolph’s objectively serious medical
need. And for this reason, summary judgment in Defendants’ favor as to the issue of
qualified immunity is unwarranted. Consequently, Defendants’ objections to the contrary
are overruled.
B.

Clearly Established Constitutional Right

Defendants next object to the R&R’s conclusion that Plaintiff satisfied his burden
of setting forth a clearly established constitutional right. To avoid the application of
qualified immunity, a plaintiff must allege facts that defendants’ conduct violated a
constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time of the defendants’ alleged
misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). A clearly
established right is one in which existing legal precedent has placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011);
accord Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2019). Although courts are
cautioned against defining “clearly established law” with an excessive degree of
generality, Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742, “a general constitutional rule already identified in
the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.”
6

Defendants also argue that “[t]he R&R incorrectly concludes [that] medical staff’s
ability to access [the jail summary log] is disputed.” But in the following sentence,
Defendants appear to concede that this fact is indeed disputed by arguing that the
“dispute is immaterial.” Therefore, Defendants have not, in fact, objected to whether the
medical staff’s access to the jail summary log is disputed.

7

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Taylor v. Riojas, No. 19-1261 (per curiam), __ S. Ct. __, 2020 WL 6385693, at *1 (2020)
(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)) (reversing application of qualified
immunity to jail officials in a challenge under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution).

As such “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates

established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. The
critical determination is “whether the state of the law” when defendants engaged in the
conduct at issue provided “fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was
unconstitutional.” Id.
When Defendants allegedly committed the constitutional violations, long-standing
Supreme Court precedent established “that a prison official may be held liable . . . if [the
official] knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 845,
847 (1994). “The constitutional right to protection from substantial risks, which includes
the right to medical care, was clearly established at the time of [plaintiff’s] detention.”
Stefan v. Olson, 497 F. App’x 568, 579–580 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In
Thompson v. King, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit observed
that “[t]he Supreme Court has declared that it is unconstitutional for prison officials to act
deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs.” 730 F.3d at 750 (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)). Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has
concluded that “a reasonable officer would know that it is unlawful to delay medical
treatment for a detainee exhibiting obvious signs of medical distress.” Gordon v.
Frank, 454 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir. 2006). As it is unlawful to delay medical treatment

8

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for a detainee exhibiting obvious signs of medical distress, Gordon, 454 F.3d at 863,
surely it is unlawful to delay medical treatment for so long that such treatment either
never occurs or is provided at the brink of death.

Such are the allegations here.

Therefore, long-standing precedent from both the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Eighth Circuit clearly establishes that Defendants cannot act with deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need without violating the United States Constitution.
Although Defendants argue that the R&R “entirely ignores the context,”
Defendants neither identify what “context” the R&R’s analysis omits or why such
“context” is legally required. As a matter of law, an analysis of whether Defendants
acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires an examination of
each Defendant’s subjective knowledge of the objectively serious medical need. See
Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2009). One’s subjective knowledge is
informed, at least in part, by the context presented to that individual. Therefore, the
R&R’s analysis of whether Defendants subjectively knew of Rudolph’s serious medical
need, belies Defendants’ contention that the R&R’s analysis “entirely ignores the
context.”7 Accordingly, this aspect of Defendants’ objections is overruled.
Defendants also rely on Ivey v. Audrain County, 968 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2020), in
which the Eighth Circuit concluded that the law had not clearly established what an
officer should do when a detainee exhibits obvious signs of medical distress but
7

Defendants argued to the magistrate judge that Rudolph lacked a clearly
established right to “specific medical treatment in response to an unknown medical risk.”
As the R&R observes, Defendants misconstrue Plaintiff’s allegation. In reality,
Plaintiff’s allegation is that Rudolph had a constitutional right to “adequate medical care”
based on symptoms that were readily known to Defendants.

9

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affirmatively declines medical assistance. 968 F.3d at 849–50. But Ivey is factually
distinguishable. The correctional officers in Ivey asked the plaintiff whether he needed
medical attention and, even after the plaintiff declined, correctional officers notified a
nurse who examined plaintiff later that same morning. Id. at 847–48. Here, there is no
evidence that Rudolph declined an offer of medical treatment. Moreover, no correctional
officer summoned medical staff to meet with Rudolph, regardless of her answer. Ivey
does not govern this Court’s analysis because the critical facts of Ivey are meaningfully
different.8
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants’ conduct
shocks the conscience. Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires a
showing of culpability equal to the criminal law standard of recklessness. See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 835–37 (discussing the origin of the term “deliberate indifference”); see also
McRaven, 577 F.3d at 982. Such culpability in a custodial setting often is deemed to
inherently shock the conscience. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850–
53 (1998).

Moreover, the Eighth Circuit repeatedly has addressed claims alleging

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs without separately analyzing whether
such alleged deliberate indifference shocks the conscience. See, e.g., Hall v. Ramsey
Cnty., 801 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2015); Thompson, 730 F.3d at 746–47; McRaven, 577
F.3d at 979–80; see also Orlowski v. Milwaukee Cnty., 872 F.3d 417, 423–24 (7th Cir.
8

Defendants discount the precedential value of the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in
McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2009), on the ground that it “lacks nuance.”
But Defendants fail to identify any misapplication of McRaven by the magistrate judge in
this case. Moreover, Defendants’ analysis ignores the principle that this Court may not
disregard Eighth Circuit precedent.

10

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2017). Plaintiff need not separately demonstrate that Defendants’ conduct shocks the
conscience.9 Accordingly, Defendants’ objections to the contrary are overruled.
In summary, Defendants’ objections to the R&R’s analysis as to the existence of a
clearly established constitutional right are overruled. The R&R’s recommendation as to
this issue is adopted.
II.

Clear-Error Review

As Defendants do not specifically object to any other aspect of the R&R, the Court
reviews the remainder of the R&R for clear error. See Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793,
795 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee’s
note (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”). Having
carefully performed this review, the Court finds no clear error. For this reason, the Court
adopts the remainder of the R&R.

9

Defendants also argue that Awnings v. Fullerton, 912 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2019),
requires Plaintiff to establish that Defendants’ conduct shocks the conscience. But in
Awnings, the Eighth Circuit suggested that the plaintiff had not demonstrated an
objectively serious medical need. 912 F.3d at 1102 (describing plaintiff’s injury as “a
small laceration,” noting that the “examining physician post-arrest declared Awnings fit
for incarceration,” and remarking that “a chest X-ray showed no fractured ribs or lung
damages”). In the absence of an objectively serious medical need, there could not have
been deliberate indifference to that need. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that
the defendant’s conduct did not shock the conscience does not establish that a court must
conduct such an evaluation in addition to the applicable deliberate-indifference analysis.
Thus, Awnings is inapposite.

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ORDER
Based on the R&R, the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendants’ objections to the September 28, 2020 R&R, (Dkt. 91), are

OVERRULED.
2.

The September 28, 2020 R&R, (Dkt. 90), is ADOPTED.

3.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 55), is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
a. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 55), is GRANTED as
to Defendants Julie Savat, Amy Rood, Ryan Magnuson, Amber Nelson,
Raynor Blum, Nancy Livingood, Ashley Johnson, Anastacia Hermes,
Richard Stetz, Brianna Then, Kari White-Tuton, Joel Torkelson, Justin
Roberts, Tiffany Larson, and Clay County, Minnesota, and these
Defendants are DISMISSED from this case; and
b. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 55), is DENIED as to
Counts I and II as alleged against Defendants Deborah Benson, Jana
Bartness, Anthony Hanson, Cassie Olson, Devin Lien, and Lucas Heck.

Dated: November 24, 2020

s/Wilhelmina M. Wright
Wilhelmina M. Wright
United States District Judge

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