Iglesias De Castro et al v. Castro et al
Filing
98
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Plaintiffs' Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) (Doc. No. 82 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. No. 1 ) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 4/23/2021. (las)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Maria Luisa Iglesias De Castro,
Maria Irene Castro Iglesias,
Maria de la Concepcion Castro Iglesias,
and Maria Luisa Castro Iglesias,
Civil No. 18-1449 (DWF/ECW)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
Maria Regina Castro, and
Pedro Jose Caraballo
Defendants.
Gerald H. Fornwald, Esq., Winthrop & Weinstine, counsel for Plaintiffs.
Ken D. Schueler, Esq., Brenda Benitez, Esq., and Dustin Collen Jones, Esq., Dunlap &
Seeger, P.A., counsel for Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Maria Luisa Iglesias De Castro, Maria
Irene Castro Iglesias, Maria de la Concepcion Castro, and Maria Luisa Castro Iglesias’s
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). (Doc. No. 82 (“Motion”).) Defendants Maria
Regina Castro and Pedro Jose Castro (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the Motion
unless the Court conditions the voluntary dismissal on payment of Defendants’ attorney
fees, costs, and disbursements. (Doc. No. 94 (“Def. Opp.”).) For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion without conditions.
BACKGROUND
The factual background of the above-entitled matter is clearly and concisely set
forth in the Court’s November 16, 2018 Order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss
and is incorporated by reference herein. (See Doc. No. 28.) Briefly, in May 2018,
Plaintiffs sued Defendants, who are their relatives, for civil theft, conversion, and unjust
enrichment to recover monies allegedly stolen from them.1 (See generally Doc. No. 1
(“Compl.”).)
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims in July 2018. (Doc. No. 9.) The
Court denied Defendants’ motion in November 2018. (Doc. No. 28.) The parties
commenced written discovery in early 2019; however, a variety of disputes impeded the
process. (See Doc. No. 78.) In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic further impacted the
proceedings.2 (Id.) In January 2021, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright ordered
that the parties complete fact discovery by March 31, 2021.3 (Id.)
On March 3, 2021, prior to their depositions, Plaintiffs sought to voluntarily
dismiss their Complaint with prejudice. (Doc. No. 85 ¶ 10.) This action followed.
Plaintiffs assert that “[a]fter nearly three years of litigation, the last year of which has
languished due to Defendants’ demands that Plaintiffs travel to the United States for their
1
The parties are involved in a separate lawsuit in Spain (“Spanish Lawsuit”). (See
Doc. Nos. 96 ¶ 7; Doc. No. 92 ¶ 18.)
2
Three of the Plaintiffs live in Spain and the Fourth lives in Venezuela. (Doc.
No. 78 at 2.) Defendants sought to depose Plaintiffs in person. (Id. at 5-6.)
3
Magistrate Judge Wright also ordered that Defendants could depose Plaintiffs by
videoconference. (Id. at 13-15.)
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depositions during a global pandemic, Plaintiffs are mentally, emotionally, and
financially exhausted . . . and are willing to walk away from their claims rather than
pursue them further.” (Doc. No. 84 (“Pl. Memo.”) at 1-2.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs ask the Court to dismiss their Complaint with prejudice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ request for
voluntary dismissal with prejudice unless dismissal is contingent on payment of
Defendants’ fees, costs, and disbursements.4
I.
Rule 41
Rule 41(a)(2) provides that “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request
only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
A court is not required to dismiss a claim upon request. Instead, the Eighth Circuit has
instructed courts to take a variety of factors into account: “a court should consider
factors such as whether the party has presented a proper explanation for its desire to
dismiss; whether a dismissal would result in a waste of judicial time and effort; and
whether a dismissal will prejudice the defendants.” Thatcher v. Hanover Ins. Grp., Inc.,
659 F.3d 1212, 1213-14 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm.,
Inc., 187 F.3d 941, 950 (8th Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, “it is inappropriate for a plaintiff
to use voluntary dismissal as an avenue for seeking a more favorable forum.” Id. at 1214
4
While Defendants assert that they oppose Plaintiffs’ Motion only if the Court
declines to award Defendants’ attorney’s fees, costs, and disbursements, Defendants also
argue that Plaintiffs’ explanation for dismissal is improper.
3
(citing Cahalan v. Rohan, 423 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2005)). It is error for a district
court to dismiss an action without first addressing whether the motion is an improper
forum-shopping measure. Id. at 215.
The purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is “primarily to prevent voluntary dismissals which
unfairly affect the other side.” Paulucci v. City of Duluth, 826 F.2d 780, 782 (8th Cir.
1987). The party opposing voluntary dismissal “must be able to demonstrate some plain
legal prejudice flowing to [it] as a result of the dismissal.” Hoffmann v. Alside, Inc., 596
F.2d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). “Courts generally will grant dismissals
where the only prejudice the defendant will suffer is that resulting from a subsequent
lawsuit.” Paulucci, 826 F.2d at 782. When a plaintiff seeks dismissal of its own claims
with prejudice, the request is typically granted. Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac.&
Pro. § 2367 at 551 (3d ed. 2008).
Plaintiffs, one of whom is 86 years old, assert that the health, emotional, and
economic toll of this lawsuit has proven too great for them to continue pursuit of their
claims.5 (Pl. Memo. at 6-7; see also Doc. No. 95 (“Reply”) at 8-11.) Plaintiffs further
assert that their request for voluntary dismissal is appropriate because it will not result in
a waste of judicial time and effort when their request is for dismissal with prejudice.
(Pl. Memo. at 7; Reply at 7.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants will not suffer
prejudice if the Court grants their Motion because Plaintiffs moved to dismiss prior to
incurring the considerable cost of conducting depositions, Defendants have no
5
Plaintiffs specifically cite ill health, a family tragedy, and limited financial
recourses in part due to the Spanish lawsuit. (Pl. Memo. at 6-7; Reply at 8-11.)
4
counterclaims or pending motions, and dismissal with prejudice will prevent any future
litigation on these matters in American courts. (Pl. Memo. at 7-8; Reply at 7-8.)
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ stated reasons for seeking voluntary dismissal are
belied by Plaintiffs’ continued pursuit of the Spanish Lawsuit, and that Plaintiffs are lying
to the Court to avoid being exposed as frauds who pursued baseless claims. (Def. Opp.
At 8-11.) Defendants also argue that because they have no assurance that Plaintiffs will
forego the Spanish Lawsuit or commence a separate lawsuit in Venezuela, Plaintiffs’
Motion is “functionally” a request for dismissal without prejudice and they remain
subject to ongoing, multiplicative litigation with Plaintiffs. (Id. at 7-8.)
After a careful review of the parties’ submissions, including their supporting
declarations and affidavits, their respective oral arguments, and all other records and
proceedings before it, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ stated reasons for seeking
voluntary dismissal of their claims are not improper or an attempt to defraud the Court.
Moreover, because Plaintiffs request dismissal with prejudice, the Court finds that
dismissal will not waste judicial time or resources and that the Motion is not an attempt to
gain a more favorable forum. Finally, the Court finds that Defendants will suffer no legal
prejudice from dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs’ claims.6 Thus, the Court grants
Plaintiffs’ Motion.
6
Defendants do not specify how dismissal with prejudice will cause them to suffer
prejudice in foreign litigation and the Court declines to speculate. Even if Defendants did
present a specific argument, the Court has already stated that “[it] does not believe that
Rule 41(a)(2) permits the Court to look to the potential actions of litigants not before this
Court.” Ferrari v. Best Buy Co., Inc., Civ. No. 14-2956 (DWF/FLN), 2016 WL 5508818,
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II.
Attorney Fees
A court may condition a voluntary dismissal on the payment of attorney fees.
Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1984). However, the Eighth
Circuit does not require a district court to award attorney fees, especially when a case has
not progressed much beyond initial stages. Mullen v. Heinkel Filtering Sys., Inc., 770
F.3d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 2014). Additionally, there is no Eighth Circuit precedent for an
attorney-fee condition when dismissal is with prejudice.
Other Circuits have similarly held that an attorney-fee condition is appropriate
only when a case is dismissed without prejudice. Cauley v. Wilson, 754 F.2d 769, 771
(7th Cir.1985) (“Fees are not awarded [under Rule 41(a)(2)] when a plaintiff obtains a
dismissal with prejudice because the defendant cannot be made to defend again.”
(internal quotations omitted)); Smoot v. Fox, 353 F.2d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 1965) (holding
that attorney fees are not proper under Rule 41(a)(2) where the dismissal is with
prejudice).
At least three Circuits, though, have observed that in certain exceptional
circumstances, attorney fees may be proper in dismissals with prejudice. See, e.g.,
Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122 at 134-35 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that an award of
attorney’s fees and costs is “not ordinarily paired with a dismissal with prejudice” absent
exceptional circumstances); AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir.
1997) (“[W]e continue to adhere to the rule that a defendant may not recover attorneys’
at *5 (D.Minn. Sept. 28, 2016). Here, Defendants have presented no potential legal
prejudice resulting from dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims. Hoffmann, 596 F.2d 822 at 823.
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fees when a plaintiff dismisses an action with prejudice absent exceptional
circumstances.”); Carroll v. E One Inc., 893 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2018) (“We conclude,
in step with our colleagues on the Second and Tenth Circuits, that although attorneys’
fees and costs should not typically be awarded in a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal with
prejudice, exceptional circumstances may sometimes warrant granting such an award.”)
For example, fees might be appropriate “when a litigant makes a repeated practice of
bringing claims and then dismissing them with prejudice after inflicting substantial
litigation costs on the opposing party and the judicial system.” Aerotech Inc., 110 F.3d
1523 at 1528.
As discussed above, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Motion is functionally a
dismissal without prejudice because Defendants remain subject to foreign litigation.
(Def. Opp. at 7-8.) Defendants thus contend that their request for attorney’s fees, costs,
and disbursements is an appropriate condition of dismissal. (Id.) Defendants further
argue that the condition is appropriate because they are entitled to redress for the harm
they suffered from this lawsuit when Plaintiffs lacked a good-faith basis to assert their
claims. (Def. Memo. at 9-11.) Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs’ “pretextual reasons
for dismissal is sufficiently vexatious” for the Court to condition dismissal with prejudice
on payment of Defendants’ attorney’s fees. (Id. at 11.) The Court disagrees.
First, the Court declines to construe Plaintiffs’ Motion as a request for dismissal
without prejudice. The Court recognizes Defendants’ frustration that they remain subject
to the Spanish Lawsuit; however, the Court does not find current or future foreign
7
litigation relevant to a Rule 41(a)(2) analysis.7 Moreover, there is no Eighth Circuit
precedent for imposing attorney’s fees and costs as a condition for voluntary dismissal
with prejudice. While other Circuits have considered the condition under exceptional
circumstances, the Court finds that no such circumstances exist here. As discussed
above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that Plaintiffs’ stated reasons for dismissal are
improper or an attempt to defraud the Court. Moreover, the Court finds no indication that
Plaintiffs vexatiously inflicted substantial litigation costs on Defendants or the judicial
system. Without Eighth Circuit precedent or exceptional circumstances, the Court
declines to condition Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice on payment of
Defendants’ attorney’s fees, costs, or disbursements.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary
dismissal with prejudice without condition.
7
Even if the Court were to construe Plaintiffs’ Motion as a dismissal without
prejudice, it would still find that a fee award is inappropriate. While this case
commenced nearly three years ago, it was largely delayed for at least one year because of
a worldwide pandemic. The other two years were consumed by Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, which the Court denied, and other disputes over discovery. Moreover, Plaintiffs
moved to voluntarily dismiss their claims prior to incurring the costs of depositions.
Finally, as discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs present a proper explanation
for dismissal. In short, based on the time and effort of the parties, and the stage to which
this case progressed, the Court finds that awarding attorney fees and costs is
inappropriate whether or not dismissal is with prejudice. Mullen,770 F.3d at 729.
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ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) (Doc. No. [82]) is GRANTED.
2.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. No. [1]) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: April 23, 2021
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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