Borup v. The CJS Solutions Group, LLC

Filing 137

ORDER denying 108 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 108) is DENIED without prejudice.(Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Paul A. Magnuson on 10/1/2019. (JEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Timothy C. Borup,

Civ. No. 18-1647 (PAM/DTS)
Plaintiff,

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The CJS Solutions Group, LLC
d/b/a The HCI Group,
Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. For the following reasons, the Motion is denied without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
In May 2017, Plaintiff Timothy Borup worked for Defendant The CJS Solutions
Group d/b/a The HCI Group (“HCI”).

Borup was assigned to the Mayo Clinic in

Rochester, Minnesota. His job was to assist physicians, nurses, and other healthcare
providers with the transition to a new patient-management system called Epic. At the time,
Borup had just finished medical school and was living in Columbus, Ohio. He flew to
Rochester on May 4, 2017, and flew from Rochester to Grand Rapids, Michigan (where he
had recently purchased property) on May 26, 2017. Between May 4 and May 26, he stayed
at a hotel near the clinic and worked from 7 am to 7 pm Monday through Friday.
This litigation seeks to resolve the issue of whether Borup and other temporary
workers HCI employed at the Mayo Clinic in May 2017 were “employees” within the
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). For purposes of this Motion, however,
HCI asks the Court to assume that the workers were employees under the FLSA. Thus, the

only issue to be resolved here is whether the time Borup spent traveling to and from
Rochester is compensable time under the FLSA. If, however, the Court or the jury
ultimately determines that Borup was not an employee, then the issue of his travel time is
moot.
DISCUSSION
Federal jurisdiction is limited by Article III of the Constitution, which restricts the
Court’s power to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III § 2. Implicit in this
limitation is the idea that a federal court should not rule on hypothetical questions. Indeed,
“the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that the federal
courts will not give advisory opinions.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (quotation
omitted).
The question presented here, albeit an important one to the parties and one that
might hasten the informal resolution of the litigation, is not an issue that is yet ripe for
decision. In the context of a motion for partial summary judgment, the parties request a
ruling as to whether Borup and the other individuals who have opted into this litigation are
due compensation for travel time, assuming they are employees. But the issue of whether
they are actually employees, which is a dispositive threshold issue, has not yet been
presented to the Court. HCI asks the Court for a judgment “setting forth what the parties’
rights would be if” Borup is an employee. Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., No.
13CV314, 2015 WL 1735423, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2015) (emphasis omitted). This
“places the Court in the untenable position of being asked to render an advisory opinion on
a hypothetical determination of critical facts.” Boden v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc., No.
16CV49, 2018 WL 4855210, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2018).
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“Rule 56 [is not] a vehicle for obtaining rulings on issues that may never have to be
addressed.” Marshall Contractors, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 91, 93 (D.R.I.
1993). The Court thus declines the parties’ invitation to issue an advisory opinion on the
issue presented here.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 108) is DENIED without prejudice.

Dated: October 1, 2019

s/ Paul A. Magnuson
PAUL A. MAGNUSON
United States District Court Judge

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