Lawrence v. Kijakazi

Filing 14

ORDER: The R&R 11 is accepted; plaintiff's objection 13 is overruled; plaintiff's request for relief 8 is denied; defendant's request for relief 10 is granted; the Commissioner's decision is affirmed; this matter is dismissed with prejudice. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Katherine M. Menendez on 8/30/2024. (BJP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jennifer L.,

Case No. 23-cv-1822 (KMM/TNL)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Jennifer L. filed this case seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of her application for disability benefits. On June 27, 2024, United
States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
recommending that Plaintiff’s request for relief be denied, the Commissioner’s request for
relief be granted, and the decision denying the application for benefits be affirmed. Plaintiff
filed timely objections to the R&R on July 3, 2024. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); D. Minn. LR
72.2(b)(1).
The Court reviews de novo any portion of the R&R to which specific objections are
made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b). In the absence of objections, the Court
reviews the R&R for clear error. Nur v. Olmsted County, 563 F. Supp. 3d 946, 949 (D.
Minn. 2021) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 f.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
In the R&R, Judge Leung thoroughly addressed Plaintiff’s two arguments for why
the ALJ erred. First, Judge Leung considered Plaintiff’s arguments that the Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) assigned to her case erred in considering the opinion evidence from
mental healthcare professionals who acted as consultative examiners. Both consultative
examiners indicated that Plaintiff’s interactions with others should be limited to encounters
that are both occasional and superficial. However, in articulating the Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ found only that Plaintiff would be limited to
occasional interactions with coworkers and the public as well as occasional contact with
supervisors. The RFC did not include any superficial interaction limitation. Contrary to
Plaintiff’s argument, Judge Leung found that the ALJ did not err by omitting a limitation
to superficial interactions from the RFC. Second, Judge Leung found no error in the ALJ’s
assessment of Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects
of her symptoms.1 In her objection to the R&R, Plaintiff challenges only the first of these
conclusions concerning the alleged distinction between superficial and occasional
contacts.
Plaintiff argues that because the opinions all included the superficial-interaction
limitation and the ALJ found the opinions persuasive, the ALJ should have included the
superficial-interaction limitation in the RFC. Plaintiff asserts that the terms “occasional”
and “superficial” are materially different, because the former addresses the quantity of
interactions, while the latter addresses their quality. Given that distinction, Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ erred in her RFC finding because it does not account for limitations

Plaintiff does not object to the R&R’s conclusions regarding this second issue, so the Court’s
review is limited to whether the R&R is clearly erroneous. Having reviewed the R&R and the
record in this matter, the Court finds no clear error.
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on the quality of interactions she can tolerate. Doc. 13 at 5–6. Plaintiff raised these same
arguments in her request for relief, and Judge Leung addressed them in the R&R.
Judge Leung found that while Plaintiff pointed to district court decisions agreeing
that there is a material distinction between limitations for superficial contact and those for
occasional interactions, recent Eighth Circuit cases have rejected the argument that an ALJ
commits reversible error under these circumstances by failing to include a superficial
limitation in the RFC finding. R&R 11–16. Specifically, Judge Leung found that both Wyatt
v. Kijakazi, No. 23-1559, 2023 WL 6629761 (8th Cit. Oct. 12, 2023) (per curiam), and Lane
v. O’Malley, No. 23-1432, 2024 WL 302395 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2024) (per curiam),
addressed the same argument Plaintiff raises in this case. The R&R explains that in Wyatt,
“the Eighth Circuit held that the ALJ ‘did not err in declining to include more restrictive
limitations regarding interactions with coworkers and supervisors in [the claimant’s]
residual functional capacity,’” and the ALJ had no obligation to parrot the limitations
included in medical opinions, even those she found persuasive. R&R 13 (quoting Wyatt,
2023 WL 6629761, at *1). Further Judge Leung noted that, in Lane,
[The claimant argued that] because the terms [occasional and
superficial] are different—the former being about quantity and
the latter about quality—omitting the psychologists’ limitation
renders the [vocational] expert’s conclusion unreliable and the
ALJ’s decision without substantial evidence.’ The Eighth
Circuit ‘reject[ed] this manufactured inconsistency,’ noting
that ‘[n]othing in the reference to ‘occasional’ interactions
conflicts with th[e] opinion of the psychologists that the
claimant could relate to others superficially, work in small
groups, and maintain at least minimal relationships with
others].”
R&R 13–14 (quoting Lane, 2024 WL 302395, at *1).
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Objecting to the R&R, Plaintiff argues that Judge Leung mistakenly relied on Wyatt
and Lane. She contends that neither “support[s] a finding that the terms ‘superficial’ and
‘occasional’ are indistinguishable and can be merged together under the term ‘occasional’
without any explanation.” Doc. 13 at 7. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that in each case, the
ALJ accounted for the claimant’s limitations in the quality of workplace interactions by
excluding teamwork and tandem work from the RFC. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s
RFC assessment in this case does not similarly account for any limitations in the quality of
Plaintiff’s interactions with others in the workplace. Therefore, she contends, neither Wyatt
nor Lane is applicable, and the ALJ erred in the omission of the superficial-interaction
limitation. Id. at 8.
The Court disagrees and finds that Judge Leung correctly applied Wyatt and Lane
in rejecting Plaintiff’s position. First, Wyatt applies the principle that an RFC determination
is not erroneous simply because the ALJ does not adopt, word-for-word, the limitations set
forth in a medical opinion that the ALJ finds persuasive. Rather the focus is on whether
substantial evidence supports the RFC. Wyatt, 2023 WL 6629761, at *1 (“The ALJ was not
required to adopt the exact limitations set forth in the opinions she found persuasive, and
substantial evidence supported the RFC findings regarding Wyatt’s abilities to interact with
others in the workplace.”); see also Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016)
(explaining that “there is no requirement than an RFC finding be supported by a specific
medical opinion”). Although Wyatt was unpublished, its holding is entirely consistent with
the Eighth Circuit’s prior observation that “[e]ven though the RFC assessment draws from
medical sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the
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Commissioner.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619–20 (8th Cir. 2007). Conversely, it would
be inconsistent with multi-faceted nature of the RFC inquiry to require the ALJ to adopt
verbatim the specific limitations contained in any medical opinion. Yet that is, in essence,
what the Plaintiff asks the Court to do.
Second, Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Lane ignores its explicit rejection of the
argument Plaintiff makes in this case. True, in the final line of its brief analysis, the Lane
court observed that the ALJ in that case had, in fact, addressed the quality of workplace
interactions in the RFC. 2024 WL 302395, at *1 (“And the ALJ, considering the entire
record, addressed the quality of Lane’s workplace interactions: no team, tandem, or publicfacing work.”). However, that observation follows the court’s characterization of the
supposed inconsistency between the RFC and the medical opinions as “manufactured.” Id.
The Lane court could not have been much more direct in finding that “[n]othing in the
[RFC’s] reference to ‘occasional’ interactions conflict[ed] with [the] opinion” of the
reviewing psychologists that the claimant “could relate to others superficially.” Id. Nor
does the opinion suggest that such a “manufactured” inconsistency can only be overcome
where the RFC finding includes specific qualitative restrictions on workplace interactions.
Like Wyatt and Lane, other courts have declined to find that ALJs erred in
comparable circumstances. See Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267, 275 (6th
Cir. 2015) (finding ALJ’s statement that plaintiff could “occasional[ly] interact[] with the
public” “accounted” for the consultant’s opinion that the claimant was limited in public
interactions and could “relate to a few familiar others on a superficial basis”); Shaibi v.
Berryhill, 888 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding “no obvious inconsistency” between
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medical expert testimony that plaintiff could “relate to others on a superficial work basis”
and the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff was able to engage in “occasional interaction” with
others as a result); Reynolds v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2022) (suggesting that
“the distinction . . . between ‘occasional’ and ‘superficial’ [with respect to interactions]
may not matter for purposes of the RFC analysis”); but see Jason L. v. O’Malley, Civ. No.
23-184 (JWB/JFD), 2024 WL 965240, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2024) (distinguishing Wyatt
and Lane, sustaining claimant’s objection, rejecting R&R, and ordering remand where the
ALJ did not explain the rationale for excluding a superficial-interaction limitation found in
psychological consultant’s opinion the ALJ found to be persuasive).
Third, the relevant psychologists’ opinions that Plaintiff can only tolerate “brief and
superficial” interactions do not plainly conflict with the RFC determination that Plaintiff
should be limited to “occasional” interactions with coworkers and the public. “Superficial”
is not a defined term in the Social Security regulations or other sources (e.g., the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles, Social Security Rulings, and the HALLEX manual). See Amber L.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:21-cv-00202, 2022 WL 2948952, at *6 (S.D. Ohio
July 26, 2022), R&R adopted, No. 3:21-cv-99292, 2022 WL 3226351 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10,
2022); see also Sasha M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-cv-2101, 2023 WL 1793536, at
*9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2023) (“‘Superficial’ social interaction has no regulatory
definition.”), R&R adopted, No. 2:22-cv-2101, 2023 WL 6383450 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29,
2023). The psychologists in this case did not elaborate on what they meant by “superficial”
interactions in a way that is clearly inconsistent with the ALJ’s limitation to “occasional”
interactions in Plaintiff’s RFC. See Sasha M., 2023 WL 1793536, at *9 (“And while the
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state agency psychologists opined Plaintiff should be limited to superficial interactions,
neither defined what ‘superficial’ meant. Accordingly, precisely how the RFC’s limitations
differ from superficial interaction limitations—if they do at all—is unclear.”).
Further, the Court’s comparison of the consultants’ opinions and the relevant
portions of the RFC determination reveals no obvious inconsistency, and Plaintiff has not
explained exactly what that inconsistency might be in this case. See Stephen D. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-746, 2024 WL 2204735, at *8 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2024)
(“Stephen has not even really shown that psychological experts conclude that ‘superficial
interactions’ and ‘occasional interactions’ conflict.”). Here, in the relevant portion of the
RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following abilities:
She can carry out simple instructions with acceptable
persistence and pace. Simple instructions are those that can be
learned in thirty days or less. She can tolerate occasional
interaction with coworkers and the public. [She] is able to
tolerate training, taking instructions, and supervisory
interactions with supervisors but is otherwise limited to
occasional contact with supervisors. She can tolerate
occasional changes in [a] simple work setting and follow
employer set goals.
Tr. 37. One consultative examiner opined that Plaintiff had the capacity for “responding
appropriately to brief and superficial contact with coworkers and supervisors. . . .” Tr. 667.
A state agency psychological consultant opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited
in her abilities to interact appropriately with the public, that she could ask simple questions
or request assistance, and maintain socially appropriate behaviors. However, she had
moderate limitations in the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to
supervisor criticism and in getting along with coworkers or peers. Though her ability to
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tolerate supervision was reduced, it was adequate for ordinary levels of supervision. And
though she had a reduced ability to cope with co-workers, it was adequate for brief and
superficial contact. Tr. 91–92. The second consultative examiner who saw Plaintiff on
reconsideration found that Plaintiff could have superficial contact with supervisors and
coworkers. Tr. 830, 837. And a second consultant agreed with the findings of the first
consultant. Tr. 109. Plaintiff contends that the Court should reject the R&R and remand
this matter to the agency because the ALJ in this case did not limit “Plaintiff’s ability to
perform teamwork or to work in tandem with tasks” in the same way that the claimants
were restricted in Wyatt and Lane. But as the foregoing discussion and the R&R show, none
of the medical opinions actually stated that superficial limitations required Plaintiff to be
shielded from tandem work or teamwork or the like. Therefore, the Court finds that the
ALJ’s references to occasional interactions with supervisors and coworkers does not
conflict with the psychological opinion evidence.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Court should remand this case because the ALJ
failed to provide adequate explanation for why the ALJ omitted the superficial-interaction
limitation despite finding the opinions persuasive. District court decisions, most of which
pre-date the Eighth Circuit’s decisions in Wyatt and Lane, have ordered remand in cases
where an ALJ has not specifically explained the rationale for declining to adopt a

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superficial-interaction limitation.2 However, Wyatt and Lane reject the proposition an ALJ
is required to include both occasional- and superficial-interaction limitations in an RFC
simply because medical opinions found to be persuasive use both terms. In Wyatt, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, which had rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that the ALJ was required to give such an explanation. John W. v. Kijakazi, No.
22-cv-2612 (PAM/TNL), 2023 WL 2540566, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2023) (finding,
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1), that “an ALJ is not required to articulate how she
considered each medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding from one medical
source individually”) (cleaned up). In addition, the Eighth Circuit has held that an ALJ is
not required “to mechanically list and reject every possible limitation.” Nash v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 907 F.3d 1086, 1090–91 (8th Cir. 2018); see also Austin v. Kijakazi, 52
F.4th 723, 729 (8th Cir. 2022) (explaining that an ALJ is “free to accept some, but not all,
of a medical opinion” and “is not required to explicitly reconcile every conflicting shred of
medical evidence”) (cleaned up).
Moreover, looking at the ALJ’s decision as a whole, she adequately explained the
rationale for the non-exertional limitations she included in Plaintiff’s RFC, and as
articulated in the R&R, those limitations are supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ

E.g., Troy L.M. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-199 (TNL), 2022 WL 4540107 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2022);
Christine F. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2048 (NEB/LIB), 2022 WL 3648674 (D. Minn. July 27 2022),
R&R accepted, No. 21-cv-2048 (NEB/LIB), 2022 WL 3647808 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2022) (no
objections); Sara R. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-1271 (KMM/TNL), 2023 WL 4564421 (D. Minn. June
28, 2023), R&R accepted, No. 22-cv-1271 (KMM/TNL), 2023 WL 4561312 (D. Minn. July 17,
2023) (no objections). See also Jason L., 2024 WL 965420, at *2 (post-Wyatt and post-Lane
decision remanding for lack of adequate explanation).
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acknowledged Plaintiff’s statements about difficulty getting along with others and her
reports of depression and anxiety, but the ALJ also observed that records showed Plaintiff
was cooperative, friendly, and maintained appropriate eye contact during psychological
evaluations. Tr. 35, 39. Further, the ALJ observed that although she sometimes showed
limited insight and judgment, Plaintiff’s thought process was organized and coherent, she
showed average intelligence, and normal attention and concentration abilities despite some
difficulties. Tr. 39–40. The ALJ acknowledged how her mood abnormalities could limit her
cognitive functioning and her issues with limited memory on standardized testing. Tr. 40.
As a result, the ALJ found she could carry out simple instructions (those that can be learned
in thirty days or less) with acceptable persistence and pace; she could tolerate occasional
interaction with coworkers and the public; and she can tolerate training, taking instructions,
and supervisory interactions with supervisors, but is otherwise limited to occasional contact
with supervisors. Tr. 40. In her objections, Plaintiff does not claim that these findings were
unsupported by substantial evidence or that the ALJ’s opinion failed to adequately explain
the rationale for these aspects of the decision. The Court finds that remand is not warranted
for further explanation of the ALJ’s decision not to specifically include a superficialinteraction limitation.
Based on the discussion above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
1. The Report and Recommendation, Doc. 11, is ACCEPTED;
2. Plaintiff’s Objection, Doc. 13, is OVERRULED;
3. Plaintiff’s request for relief, Doc. 8, is DENIED;
4. The Commissioner’s request for relief, Doc. 10, is GRANTED;
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5. The Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits is
AFFIRMED; and
6. This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
Date: August 30, 2024

s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States District Judge

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