Duenes v. MN Prairie County Alliance et al

Filing 106

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Dismissing for Lack of Jurisdiction. 1. Defendant Jennifer Hages Motion to Dismiss and Seek Attorneys Fees 48 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: a.Defendant Jennifer Hages Mot ion to Dimiss is GRANTED; and b.Defendant Jennifer Hages Motion for Attorneys Fees is DENIED.2.Defendant Mary Ulrichs Amended Motion to Dismiss 91 is GRANTED;3.Defendants Sheri Devroy, Billie Frantesl, Jane Hardwick, MN Prairie County A lliance, and Erin Smiths Amended Motion to Dismiss 94 is GRANTED;4.Defendant Barbara Carlsons Amended Motion to Dismiss 98 is GRANTED;5.Defendant Brooklynn Fredericksens Motion to Dismiss 102 is GRANTED;6.Plaintiffs Amended Complaint 82 is DISMISSED with prejudice. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge John R. Tunheim on 3/12/2025. (KKM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JASON DUENES,
Civil No. 24-272 (JRT/SGE)
Plaintiff,
v.
MINNESOTA PRAIRIE COUNTY ALLIANCE;
JANE HARDWICK; ERIN SMITH; SHERI
DEVROY; BROOKLYNN FREDERICKSEN;
BARBARA CARLSON; JENNIFER HAGE;
MARY ULRICH; DOES; JON HUEMOELLER;
BILLIE FRANTESL; and FERNBROOK,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Defendants.

Jason Duenes, 440 South Halladay Street, Good Thunder, MN 56037, pro se
Plaintiff.
James R. Andreen, ERSTAD & RIEMER, P.A., 7301 Ohms Lane, Suite 400,
Minneapolis, MN 55439, for Defendants Minnesota Prairie County Alliance,
Jane Hardwick, Erin Smith, Sheri Devroy, and Billie Frantesl.
Kirsten J. Hansen, STICH ANGELL KREIDLER & UNKE, P.A., 3601 Minnesota
Drive, Suite 450, Minneapolis, MN 55435, for Defendant Brooklynn
Fredericksen.
Brittany R. King-Asamoa, GISLASON & HUNTER LLP, 111 South Second
Street, Suite 500, Mankato, MN 56001, for Defendant Barbara Carlson.
Joe Heinrichs, PATTON HOVERSTEN & BERG, 2099 Hadley Hills Drive
Northeast, Rochester, MN 55906, for Defendant Jennifer Hage.
Vicki A. Hruby, JARDINE LOGAN & O’BRIEN PLLP, 8519 Eagle Point
Boulevard, Suite 100, Lake Elmo, MN 55042, for Defendant Mary Ulrich.

Plaintiff Jason Duenes and his former partner Defendant Jennifer Hage share one
child, J.B.D., who became the center of a lengthy custody dispute. A state court granted
Hage sole legal and physical custody of J.B.D. in 2019, which Duenes alleges violated his
constitutional rights. Duenes now seeks redress in this Court from those alleged wrongs.
But because his claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment, the
Court does not have jurisdiction and must dismiss the action with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
I.

FACTS
Plaintiff Jason Duenes brought this action against many defendants alleging

various constitutional violations after he lost custody of J.B.D. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 1, Aug.
12, 2024, Docket No. 82.) Duenes and Hages clearly had and still have a tumultuous
relationship. (Id. ¶¶ 33–41.) They also had previous custody disputes and allegations of
mistreatment of their shared child. (Id. ¶¶ 43–62.) But because those facts are largely
irrelevant for the motions pending before the Court, the Court will focus its discussion
primarily on the specific facts of the custody dispute at issue.
The instant custody dispute began on February 1, 2018, after Defendant Erin Smith
received credible allegations of sexual abuse by Duenes against Hage’s other child
resulting in Smith placing J.B.D. on a 72-hour protective hold. (Id. ¶ 66.) J.B.D. was placed
in the care of Hage. (Id. ¶¶ 72–77.) On February 6, 2018, Defendant Minnesota Prairie
County Alliance (“MN Prairie”) filed a Child in need of Protective Services (“CHIPS”)
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petition, and a Steele County Judge, Joseph A. Bueltel, determined at an emergency
protective hearing that the petition established “a prima facia showing that a juvenile
protection matter exists” regarding J.B.D. (Id. ¶ 90; Decl. Vicki A. Hruby (“Hruby Decl.”) ¶
3, Ex. 1,1 Ex. 3 ¶ 9, June 27, 2024, Docket No. 37.) Instead of trial, Duenes admitted that
J.B.D. was in need of protection services. (Am. Compl. ¶ 99; Hruby Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 5 ¶ 13.)
Judge Bueltel then ordered J.B.D. to remain in the custody of MN Prairie but placed with
Hage. (Hruby Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 5 at Order ¶ 2.) Duenes then faced a trial to terminate his
parental rights, but instead of proceeding to trial, Duenes consented to the permanent
transfer of physical and legal custody of J.B.D. to Hage. (Id., Ex. 7 ¶ 7; Am. Compl. ¶ 147.)
On September 23, 2022, Judge Bueltel modified the custody order to reinstate Duenes’s
full legal and physical custody of J.B.D. (Am. Compl. ¶ 149, Ex. A at Order ¶ 2.)
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Duenes filed a complaint against many different organizations and individuals2

who played a role in the CHIPS proceedings. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–14, Feb. 1, 2024, Docket No.
1.) Duenes brought four claims under 42. U.S.C. § 1983, including two Monell Claims.

1 The Court may take judicial notice of the juvenile proceedings.

Stutzka v. McCarville,

420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy, 200 F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th
Cir. 1999)).
2 Specifically, Duenes’s complaint named MN Prairie, Jane Hardwick (Executive Director
of MN Prairie), Erin Smith and Sheri Devroy (MN Prairie employees) (collectively “MN Prairie
Defendants”), Barbara Carlson (substance abuse counselor), Brooklynn Fredericksen (Fernbrook
Family Center therapist), Mary Ulrich (Steele County Sherriff’s Deputy), Jennifer Hage (J.B.D.’s
mother), and other unknown defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–14.)

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(Compl. ¶¶ 88–142.) All Defendants moved to dismiss. (Def. Fredericksen’s Mot. Dismiss,
May 16, 2024, Docket No. 17; MN Prairie Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, Def. Ulrich’s Mot. Dismiss,
Def. Hage’s Mot. Dismiss, Def. Carlson’s Mot. Dismiss, June 27, 2024, Docket Nos. 31, 33,
48, 57.) In response, Duenes filed an amended complaint, adding various factual
allegations and adding additional defendants Fernbrook Family Center, Jon Huemoeller
(Fernbrook Family Center owner), and Billie Frantesl (MN Prairie employee). (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 8, 11, 16–17.) Duenes also added a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) alleging that all
Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive Duenes of his constitutional rights. (Id.
¶¶ 232–34.) All Defendants except Hage renewed their motions to dismiss. (Def. Ulrich’s
Am. Mot. Dismiss, MN Prairie Defs.’ Am. Mot. Dismiss, Aug. 26, 2024, Docket Nos. 91, 94;
Def. Carlson’s Am. Mot. Dismiss, Def. Fredericksen’s Am. Mot. Dismiss, Aug. 27, 2024,
Docket Nos. 98, 102.)
Broadly, Duenes alleged misconduct by Defendants, including, among other
allegations, that relevant evidence was not considered, that parties engaged in
manipulation, and that evidence was fabricated. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81–84, 99, 106–08, 111,
124, 127.) Duenes also alleges that the Defendants conspired to deprive Duenes of his
constitutional rights, namely his “continued care, custody, and control of his son.” (Id. ¶¶
233–34.)

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DISCUSSION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the

Court considers all facts alleged in the complaint as true to determine if the complaint
states a “claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588
F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, drawing all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Ashley Cnty., v. Pfizer, Inc., 552
F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). Although the Court accepts the complaint’s factual
allegations as true and construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). In other words, a complaint “does not need
detailed factual allegations” but must include “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements” to meet the plausibility standard. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court may consider the allegations in the
complaint as well as “those materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.”
Schriener v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 774 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2014). The Court may also
consider matters of public record and exhibits attached to the pleadings, as long as those
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documents do not conflict with the complaint. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d
1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
II.

ANALYSIS
Duenes Amended Complaint raises many confusing factual allegations under

various provisions of the Constitution. However, because the Court does not have
jurisdiction to consider this Amended Complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the
Court need not delve into those specific allegations.
Put very simply, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception
of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
challenges to state court judgments.” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not
limited to claims identical to those address in the state court judgment but also to claims
that are “inextricably intertwined.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 287 n.1 (2005). Claims are inextricably intertwined “if the federal claims can succeed
only to the extent the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Scheffler v. City
of Blaine, 821 F. App’x 653, 655 (8th Cir. 2020).
Here, the harms Duenes alleges arise from the ultimate decision by the state court
to transfer custody of J.B.D. to Hage. While Duenes argues that he does not seek to
overrule the state judgment, (given that custody of J.B.D. has since been returned to him)
he seeks money damages for the harms of the original state judgment. If the Court were
to provide Duenes with the relief he seeks, the Court would necessarily need to question
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the original custody decision, and thus his claims are inextricably intertwined with the
state court proceedings.

Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests the Court of

jurisdiction, the Court is without authority to decide this case and the Amended
Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, Defendant Jennifer Hage seeks attorney’s fees. (Def. Hage’s Mot.
Dismiss at 1.) Hage cites the frivolity of the action as the basis for fees without further
explanation. (Id.) Presumably, Hage is asking the Court to impose sanctions on Duenes
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c). However, Hage did not follow the procedure
required by Rule 11(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (“A motion for sanctions must be made
separately from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly
violates Rule 11(b).”). Hage’s request is combined with her motion to dismiss and
includes no specificity as to the alleged sanctionable conduct. Nonetheless, the Court will
only impose sanctions as necessary to deter similar conduct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Here,
the Court finds that dismissal of Duenes’s action with prejudice is sufficiently deterrent,
so sanctions would be inappropriate even under a properly filed motion. The Court will
deny Hage’s request for attorney’s fees.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant Jennifer Hage’s Motion to Dismiss and Seek Attorney’s Fees [Docket
No. 48] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
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a. Defendant Jennifer Hage’s Motion to Dimiss is GRANTED; and
b. Defendant Jennifer Hage’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is DENIED.
2. Defendant Mary Ulrich’s Amended Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 91] is
GRANTED;
3. Defendants Sheri Devroy, Billie Frantesl, Jane Hardwick, MN Prairie County
Alliance, and Erin Smith’s Amended Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 94] is
GRANTED;
4. Defendant Barbara Carlson’s Amended Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 98] is
GRANTED;
5. Defendant Brooklynn Fredericksen’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 102] is
GRANTED;
6. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Docket No. 82] is DISMISSED with prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

DATED: March 12, 2025
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.

JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge

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