Directv, Inc. v. Edison et al

Filing 85

ORDER denying 67 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Neal B. Biggers on 9/27/2012. (llw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
DIRECTV, INC.

V.

PLAINTIFF/
COUNTER-DEFENDANT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:09CV266-B-S

ROBERT EIDSON, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS/
COUNTER-PLAINTIFF

ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the court is the defendant Robert Eidson’s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment. Upon due consideration of the motion, response, and supporting and opposing
authority, the court finds that the motion is not well taken and should be denied.
Defendant Eidson is the sole owner of a commercial establishment known as Office
Sports Bar & Grill in Columbus, Mississippi. Plaintiff DirecTV alleges that defendant Eidson
willfully violated the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605, (“FCA”), in showing Week
3 of NFL Sunday Ticket on September 21, 2008, at his establishment.
The defendant moves for summary judgment asserting that this action is barred by the
statute of limitations. He asserts that the one-year limitations period set forth in Mississippi
Code Ann. § 15-1-33 is applicable to this case. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the
three-year limitations period set forth in the federal Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 507 is the
applicable period. The court agrees with the plaintiff.
Because the FCA does not specify a statute of limitations applicable to Section 605, the
court must adopt an appropriate statute of limitations from another state or federal source. “The
Supreme Court has affirmed that state law is the ‘lender of first resort,’ and that courts generally
are to adopt the closest state-law analogue.” Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 669, 671 (5th Cir.

2001). “However, in limited circumstances, the Court has countenanced the application of an
analogous federal law where application of state law would ‘frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies . . . or be at odds with the purpose or operation of federal
substantive law.’” Id.
In Prostar the Fifth Circuit was presented with this very issue, but within the context of a
Louisiana case. The court determined that a violation of the FCA was most analogous to the
Louisiana tort of conversion. Id. at 675. The court went on to find, however, that the Louisiana
statute was “‘at odds with’ the FCA’s ‘purpose or operation, or frustrate[s] or interfere[s] with
the intent behind it.’” Id. The court instead concluded “that the Copyright Act provided the
appropriate federal-law analogue to Prostar’s FCA claims” and was a “closer fit” than the
conversion law. Id. at 677.
The defendant argues that because, unlike Louisiana, Mississippi has a statute providing
for criminal and civil penalties for theft of communication services which is similar to 47 U.S.C.
§ 605, the court should apply the prescriptive period applicable to that statute, which the
defendant argues is one year as set forth in Mississippi Code Ann. § 15-1-33. The Prostar
court’s decision to look to federal law for the applicable period did not turn entirely on the
absence of a close analogy between the Louisiana statute and the FCA, however. In arriving at
its decision, the court instead appeared to be more concerned with the possible undermining of
the implementation of the FCA by the application of varying prescriptive periods throughout the
country. The court stated:
The application of state conversion law in each of the fifty states would result in
widely varying limitations periods. As Prostar notes, cable companies engage in
multistate activities and would consequently be required to make fifty separate
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decisions in their efforts to investigate and pursue cable piracy. A single federal
standard would eliminate these practical difficulties, facilitating resolution of the
national problems addressed by the FCA.
Id.
In accordance with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Prostar, this court finds that the
appropriate analogue to the FCA is the federal Copyright Act, which provides a three-year statute
of limitations. The violation of Section 605 alleged in this case occurred on September 21, 2008.
The plaintiff brought this action on October 30, 2009 – well within the limitations period.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment should be and the same is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this, the 27th day of September, 2012.

/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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