Vaughan v. Carlock Nissan of Tupelo, Inc. et al

Filing 170

ORDER denying 156 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b); denying 156 Motion to Stay. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 9/21/2011. (kmc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
SANDI HATHCOTE VAUGHAN

PLAINTIFF

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 1:09cv293

CARLOCK NISSAN OF TUPELO, INC.
and CORBETT HILL

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
On August 18, 2011, this Court entered an Order [154] granting summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants as to Plaintiff’s claims for termination in violation of Mississippi public
policy, for tortious interference with employment, and for retaliation under the FLSA. The Court
denied summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the
FLSA. Currently pending before the Court now is Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Judgment as
Final and to Stay Remaining Claim [156]. After reviewing the motion and response, the Court
denies Plaintiff’s motion.
Final Judgment under Rule 54(b)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides for entry of a final judgment as to some
but not all claims in a lawsuit “if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 9, 100 S. Ct.
1460, 64 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1980). As a threshold matter, the Court exercises its sound discretion in
determining whether “there is no just reason for delay.” See Ackerman v. FDIC, 973 F.2d 1221,
1224 (5th Cir. 1992). To make this determination, the Court balances the cost and inconvenience
of piecemeal review and the danger of injustice from delay. See Road Sprinkler Fitters Local
Union v. Continental Sprinkler Co., 967 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, one factor

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the Court must consider is whether the Fifth Circuit would have to decide the same issues more
than once if there were subsequent appeals. See H & W Indus., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp.,
860 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988). Avoidance of piecemeal appeals is “[o]ne of the primary
policies behind requiring a justification for Rule 54(b) certification.” See PYCA Indus., Inc. v.
Harrison County Waste Mgmt., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996). Rule 54(b) motions are
disfavored and should be granted only when necessary to avoid injustice. Id. (citation omitted).
Indeed, such motions “should not be entered routinely as a courtesy to counsel.” Id. Rather, “[a]
district court should grant certification [in a Rule 54(b) case] only when there exists some danger
of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.” Id.
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence or justification warranting the application of
Rule 54(b). Plaintiff’s rationale as to why the Court should enter a Rule 54(b) judgment is that
The only remaining claim in this case is Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid overtime
wages pursuant to the FLSA. This claim, however, involves a minimal amount of
unpaid overtime wages. This claim has a slight amount in controversy compared
to the claims which have been dismissed . . . It would be inefficient for all parties
and the Court to conduct a trial on Plaintiff’s small remaining FLSA claim
without resolution of Plaintiff’s appeal regarding the dismissal of her other
significant claims.
Thus, Plaintiff’s justification for entry of final judgment and application of a stay pending appeal
is because Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is narrow and only worth a small monetary amount.1
Plaintiff’s only other justification for certification is that delay could present the possibility of
two trials in this case: one as to Plaintiff’s “small” FLSA claim, and another as to Plaintiff’s
other “significant” claims in the event that this Court is reversed on appeal.

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Plaintiff cites to no authority establishing that the smaller the monetary amount of a
claim, the more likely Rule 54(b) should be granted. 
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In contrast, the Defendants counter and assert that there is no danger of hardship that
could possibly be alleviated by an immediate appeal, as trial is only approximately a month away
and, once it is concluded, Plaintiff may appeal all of the issues in the case. Defendants also
contend that piecemeal appeals could result if Plaintiff’s motion is granted, as – after trial in this
case – Plaintiff can then again appeal any decision concerning her overtime wages under the
FLSA. Further, Defendants contend that all of Plaintiff’s claims stem from her employment at
Carlock Nissan of Tupelo, Inc., and her subsequent termination from Carlock’s employment in
June 2009. Thus, according to Defendants, one appeal as to all issues – after trial – will be more
efficient.
The Court agrees with the Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is
“no just reason for delay.” Discovery is complete and most of this case has already been litigated
and adjudicated. Only trial on Plaintiff’s narrow FLSA claim is left for adjudication. See Gulf
Coast Facilities Management, LLC v. BG LNG Services, LLC, 730 F. Supp. 2d 552, 567 (E.D.
La. 2010) (denying Rule 54(b) motion when discovery was complete, most of the case was
already litigated, trial was only a month away, and only a narrow issue was left for adjudication);
see also Saucier v. Coldwell Banker JME Realty, 2007 WL 2746785, at *2 (S.D. Miss. 2007)
(denying Rule 54(b) motion when trial was set to commence in less than one month, thus
reasoning that “any delay . . . [would] be minimal”). Further, as Defendants point out, the claims
in which Plaintiff wishes to immediately appeal arise from the same essential facts as the claim
remaining for adjudication before the Court. See Saucier, 2007 WL 2746785, at *2 (citing to
Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 741-42 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that piecemeal
appeals or litigation would result if certification was allowed when the claims all stemmed from
the same essential facts). Moreover, the unresolved issues pending for trial could result in a later

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appeal and, therefore, contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, there is a danger of piecemeal review in
the appellate court. See Ordemann v. Livingston, 2007 WL 1651979, at *2 (E.D. La. June 7,
2007). Rule 54(b) requests should not be granted routinely. The Court only grants certification
under Rule 54(b) when a party demonstrates some danger of hardship or injustice through delay
that would be alleviated by an immediate appeal. Pyca Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste
Water Mgmt. Dis., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996). Here, there is no suggestion that Plaintiff
will suffer hardship or injustice by waiting one month to appeal this Court’s summary judgment
rulings.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Stay Pending Appeal
Having decided to not enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), it is not necessary
for the Court to consider staying further proceedings.

SO ORDERED on this, the __21st____ day of September, 2011.

/s/ Sharion Aycock
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

2
  While Plaintiff asserts that two trials could result in this case if the Court does not enter

a final judgment under Rule 54(b) and stay the remaining claim, the same is true for almost all
cases in which a court grants in part and denies in part a summary judgment motion, and the
losing party subsequently decides to appeal after trial.

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