Henderson v. Garnett et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 65 Judgment. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 8/22/12. (cr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
DEVELLE HENDERSON
vs.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:11cv141-SA-DAS
SGT. CHAD GARNETT, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Develle Henderson, a Mississippi prisoner proceeding pro se, brings a lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or
malicious prosecution against Sergeant Chad Garnett1 and Chief of Police David Lindley2
(“Defendants”), of the Starkville Police Department. Defendants have filed a motion for
summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s claims must fail as a matter of law.3 Upon
consideration of the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendants are
entitled to the grant of their summary judgment motion, for the reasons that follow.
Background
On November 23, 2009, Plaintiff was arrested for the alleged kidnapping and robbery of
Steven Matthew Francis. The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s arrest occurred on November 21,
2009. Late in the evening on that date, Plaintiff knocked on the door of Francis’ apartment. (See
Defs. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A). Francis happened to be at home with his fiancee at the time. (See
1
Defendant Garnett is currently employed as Chief Deputy with the Oktibbeha County
Sheriff’s Department. (See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Mem., n.1).
2
There is inconsistency in the filings as to whether the Chief of Police spells his last
name as “Linley” or “Lindley.” Because the motion for summary judgment and response
identify the spelling as “Lindley,” the Court adopts same and uses this spelling throughout.
3
Doc. entry no. 53.
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id.). Plaintiff identified himself to Francis as “Tyrone” and asked Francis for $20 to help
Plaintiff’s daughter, whom he alleged suffered from asthma. (See id.). Francis stated that
Plaintiff was extremely nervous and fidgety, and that he kept his left hand in his jacket pocket
throughout their conversation. (See id.). There was a bulge in the pocket, and Francis thought
Plaintiff might have a gun. (See id., Ex. D). Francis gave Plaintiff $20, and immediately
thereafter, Plaintiff asked Francis to give him a ride to the hospital. (See id.). Francis stated that
he became worried about his and his fiancee’s safety, so he agreed to take Plaintiff to the
hospital. (See id.).
Once in the vehicle, Plaintiff asked Francis to make a stop at a couple of convenience
stores, which were closed. (See id.). Francis states that he became fearful and realized that he
was “trapped” until Plaintiff decided to get out of the car. (See id.). When they passed a store
that was still open, Francis stopped the vehicle to allow Plaintiff to go inside. (See id.). Plaintiff
returned to the vehicle, having bought a pack of cigarettes, and he eventually directed Francis to
take him to a rundown apartment complex. (See id.). Francis left him there and returned to his
own apartment complex. (See id.). Francis stated that he felt as though he had “been marked”
and no longer felt safe in his home. (See id.). Francis informed his landlord of what had
happened, and the landlord advised him to contact Sergeant Chad Garnett, who asked Plaintiff to
do a photographic lineup with six individuals. (See id.). On November 23, 2009, Francis
identified Plaintiff from the lineup as the man he knew as “Tyrone.” (See also id. at Ex. B, Ex.
D).
Plaintiff was arrested by the Starkville Police Department on November 21, 2009, on an
unrelated forgery charge. (See id., Ex. C, 10-11). He was arrested on charges of kidnapping and
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robbery on November 23, 2009, while still in custody on the forgery charge. (See id.). On
January 15, 2010, an Oktibbeha County Grand Jury refused to indict Plaintiff on either
kidnapping or robbery charges. (See Defs. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. F). Plaintiff filed the instant
lawsuit on June 17, 2011, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by Sergeant
Garnett and Chief Lindley. Plaintiff admits that he lied to Francis in order to get money to feed
Plaintiff’s cocaine addiction. (See id., Ex. C, 35-36). Plaintiff notes, however, that he never
forced Francis to give him money or take him anywhere, and that Francis could have “escaped”
while Plaintiff was in the convenience store if Francis was really that fearful. (See id. at 38-39).
Plaintiff maintains that he was only arrested because Sergeant Garnett had a “personal vendetta”
against him. (See id. at 37).
Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a
matter of law because probable cause existed to arrest him. Defendants otherwise assert Plaintiff
cannot prove municipal liability or overcome the qualified immunity defense asserted by
Defendants. Plaintiff has responded to the motion, asserting that Defendants’ answer, some of
the pre-discovery core disclosures in this case, and Defendants’ witness list suggest that both
Sergeant Garnett and Chief Lindley have personal knowledge of the events giving rise to this
lawsuit.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper where the moving party shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate to the Court
that there is an “absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
3
317, 323 (1986). A factual issue is “material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of
the action.” Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Group, Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir.
2007). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nomoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In
reviewing the evidence, the Court is to believe the nonmovant’s evidence and “all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, however, the nonmovant
cannot defeat it by making “conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions.”
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). If the nonmovant
cannot demonstrate “the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Discussion and Analysis
The Claims: False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and/or Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff’s lawsuit is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a remedy for
individuals who have suffered the deprivation of a constitutional right because of the actions of
someone operating “under color of state law.” Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th
Cir. 1994). To prevail on a claim of false arrest or imprisonment under § 1983, Plaintiff must
show that there was no probable cause to arrest him for kidnapping and robbery on November
23, 2009. See Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Probable
cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances within an arresting officer’s knowledge are
sufficient that a reasonable person would believe that an offense has been or is being committed.
4
United States v. Bustamante-Saenz, 894 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1990).
In this case, Francis gave a victim’s statement in which he stated that he felt threatened to
accommodate Plaintiff’s requests for money and transportation, and that he felt “trapped” by
Plaintiff’s behavior. Francis’ statement and positive identification of Plaintiff provided Sergeant
Garnett with probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See, e.g., United States v. Burbridge, 252 F.3d
775, 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that “[a]n ordinary citizen’s eyewitness account of criminal
activity and identification of a perpetrator is normally sufficient to supply probable cause”);
Simmons v. McElveen, 846 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that eyewitness statement
alone is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause); see also Mingo v. State, 944 So. 2d 18
(Miss. 2006) (finding statements of victim and defendant’s own corroboration more than
sufficient to establish probable cause for defendant’s arrest). Because probable cause existed for
the arrest, there is no cause of action for false arrest under § 1983. See Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134
F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the illegality of an arrest “hinges on the absence of
probable cause”).
Additionally, Petitioner’s claim for malicious prosecution is not cognizable in § 1983.
See Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that there is no
“freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution”). To the extent that
such a claim could be asserted under State law and met the requirements of the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act4, the claim is defeated by the existence of probable cause to initiate charges. See,
e.g., McClinton v. Delta Pride Catfish, Inc., 792 So.2d 96, 973 (Miss. 2001) (recognizing “want
of probable cause” as requisite element for malicious prosecution claim under Mississippi law).
4
Defendants specifically assert that Plaintiff has failed to adhere to the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1, et seq.
5
Therefore, no constitutional violation occurred in this case, and Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Alternatively, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot
establish municipal liability in this cause, nor does he defeat the defense of qualified immunity
asserted by Defendants.
Official Capacity: Municipal Liability
Plaintiff does not state whether the instant suit was intended to proceed against
Defendants in their personal or official capacities. In such cases, courts are to inquire into the
substance of the claims, the relief sought, and the course of the proceeding to make the
determination. See Forside v. Miss. State Univ., No. 101cv438-DD, 2002 WL 31992181, 5 n.2
(N.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2002). Defendants assert that Plaintiff intended to sue them in their official
capacities, as he used their official titles and address to initiate suit, and the acts complained of
occurred while Defendants were acting within the scope of their duties for the Starkville Police
Department. Plaintiff did not object to Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff intended to sue them
in their official capacities, and the Court finds Defendants’ argument supported by the
proceedings in this case. See United States ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 363 F.3d
398, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that the course of proceedings indicated that defendant was
sued in his official capacity because the plaintiff never challenged that assertion in defendant’s
motion to dismiss).
Suit against Defendants in their official capacities is essentially a suit against the City of
Starkville. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official capacity suits . . .
generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
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is an agent.”).5 Because the doctrine of respondeat superior is not recognized in § 1983 actions,
cities are not liable for constitutional violations of their employees unless those violations were
the direct result of a municipal custom or policy. See, e.g., City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 385 (1989); see also Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding
that municipality may be held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of
its duly constituted legislative body or those officials whose acts may be fairly said to be those of
the municipality). Proof of three elements is required for Plaintiff to show municipal liability
under § 1983: a policy maker, an official policy, and a violation of constitutional rights whose
“moving force” is the policy or custom. Hampton Co. Nat. Sur., LLC v. Tunica County, Miss.,
543 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has not asserted any municipal policy that was the moving force behind the
alleged deprivation of his right not to be wrongfully arrested, imprisoned, or prosecuted. The
Court previously found that Plaintiff had failed to allege any policy by the Starkville Police
Department or the City of Starkville that caused his alleged constitutional deprivations. (See
doc. entry no. 21; doc. entry no. 41). As Police Chief, Chief Lindley’s actions do constitute City
policy. See Taylor v. Town of DeKalb, Miss, Civ. Action No. 4:06cv124STL-LRA, 2009 WL
174823, 4 (S. D. Miss. June 19, 2009) (citations omitted); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 21-21-1
(“The marshal or chief of police shall be the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality
and shall have control and supervision of all police officers employed by said municipality.”).
However, Plaintiff has made no allegation that Chief Lindley was in any way involved in his
5
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b), the capacity of an entity to sue or be sued is determined by
state law. Under Mississippi law, a police department is not a separate legal entity with the
capacity to be sued. See, e.g., Stewart v. Jackson Co., Miss., No. 1:07cv1270WJG-JMR, 2008
WL 4287112, 1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 16, 2008) (citations omitted).
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arrest or prosecution for robbery and kidnapping. Because Plaintiff has not alleged any
involvement by Chief Lindley in the events at issue, his actions cannot constitute a policy under
which to attach municipal liability. See Kholer v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1115 (5th Cir. 2006)
(finding that a plaintiff suing police chief must show his personal involvement in the
constitutional violation or a sufficient causal connection between his conduct and the violation).
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a municipal policy led to any constitutional
deprivation in this case.
Personal Capacity: Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to protect government officials from personal
liability for claims against them in their individual capacities “insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This is a two-step inquiry. See
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, the question is whether Plaintiff has alleged
facts that demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional right. Id. If a constitutional violation
has been established, then the Court determines whether the conduct was objectively reasonable
in light of the clearly established law at the time. See id. The Fifth Circuit has reiterated the
Supreme Court’s sentiment that courts should “not deny immunity unless ‘existing precedent
[has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Morgan v. Swanson, 659
F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
In this case, no constitutional violation occurred. However, even if one did occur,
Defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of the established law. Here, Plaintiff
was arrested upon the sworn victim statement of an individual who contacted the Starkville
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Police Department alleging that he felt threatened by Plaintiff’s actions and forced to comply
with Plaintiff’s demands. Because a reasonable officer could have reasonably, even if
mistakenly, concluded that Plaintiff committed a crime, Defendants are otherwise entitled to
immunity. See Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000).
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. entry no. 53) is
GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All pending motions are
DENIED. A final judgment in accordance with this order will issue this day.
SO ORDERED this the 22nd day of August, 2012.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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