Hampton v. North Mississippi Medical Center et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 28 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 5/6/2013. (dm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
CORTAVIOUS HAMPTON
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:11-CV-244-SA-SAA
NORTH MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [25]. Because
judgment as a matter of law is due in favor of Defendant, the Court GRANTS that motion.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Cortavious Hampton, proceeding pro se, filed the present action against North
Mississippi Medical Center and Tupelo Behavioral Health, alleging that he was illegally
kidnapped and held against his will by North Mississippi Medical Center.1
Specifically,
Hampton’s complaint avers that Defendant is liable for “providing false information,”
“intentionally misleading” Plaintiff, “assault,” and “fail[ing] to release” Plaintiff. The civil cover
sheet, filed contemporaneously with Plaintiff’s complaint, indicates that Plaintiff’s causes of
action against Defendant arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 245.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s federal claims fail as a
matter of law, and that Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing any state law claims based on his
failure to include reference to specific state law causes of action in his complaint or civil cover
sheet. Alternatively, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s state-law claims fail based on a series of
judicial admissions in discovery. In response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff filed only a
medication history and a hospital discharge summary.
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Tupelo Behavioral Health has since been dismissed as an erroneously named separate defendant. See Order [24].
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct 2548.
The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (citation omitted).
In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant,
“but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist,
the Court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”
Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000).
However, conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002);
SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1997); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
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Discussion and Analysis
Section 1983 Claim
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must first show a violation of the
Constitution or of federal law, and then show that the violation was committed by someone
acting under color of state law. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-50, 108 S. Ct. 2250,
101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1995); see
also Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-32, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982) (noting
that for a private defendant, the conduct “that forms the basis of the claimed constitutional
deprivation must constitute state action under color of law.”). Where, as here, the defendant is a
private actor, ostensibly private conduct may be deemed actionable for purposes of Section 1983
only where the conduct may be “fairly attributable to State.” Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d
234, 242 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Lugar v, 457 U.S. at 937).
As reiterated in Bass, the Supreme Court has set forth a number of tests to determine
whether seemingly private conduct may be charged as state action. Id. at 241-42. Whether
private conduct may be fairly attributed to the state is an individualized inquiry. Morris, 277
F.3d at 748 (reiterating that inquiry is “highly circumstantial and far from precise.”) (quoting
Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athl. Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295-96, 121 S. Ct.
924, 924, 148 L. Ed. 2d 807 (2001)). However, private conduct has before been deemed state
action under the public function test, the state compulsion test, the nexus test, and the joint action
test. Id. (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936, 102 S. Ct. 2744). Under the public function test, a
private actor may be deemed a state actor when that entity performs a function that has been
“traditionally the exclusive province of the state.” Bass, 180 F.3d at 242. Under the state
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compulsion or coercion test, significant encouragement or coerciveness may convert private
conduct into state action. Id. Finally, under the nexus or joint action test, state action may be
discerned where the government has “insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with a
private actor and the exercise becomes a joint enterprise. Id.
In the case at hand, North Mississippi Medical Center is a private corporation, organized
under the laws of the State of Delaware. Plaintiff has not produced any argument or facts
supporting a theory of state attribution. As set forth in Bass, a private hospital is not transformed
into a state actor merely by statutory regulation, nor does it become a state actor even when
participating in the civil commitment of an individual. 180 F.3d at 242-43 (citing Daigle v.
Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1348-49 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding no state action
despite statutory regulation and public funding); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1127 (11th
Cir. 1992) (finding no state action based on participation in civil commitment)). As such,
Plaintiff has not shown Defendant acted under color of state law, and his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
must be dismissed.
18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 245
Additionally, Plaintiff seeks recovery under both 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 245. Both of
those statutes provide penalties for either preventing or entering into a conspiracy to prevent
other persons from exercising certain federally protected rights. Those statutes, however, are
exclusively criminal in nature and provide no civil remedies. See Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281
F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1960) (disregarding claim allegedly arising under 18 U.S.C. § 241 in a
civil action); Kelly v. Rockefeller, 69 F. App’x 414, 415-16 (10th Cir. 2003) (affirming district
court’s dismissal of civil claims under 18 U.S.C. § 245 on the basis that it provided no civil
remedy and explicitly reserved right of prosecution to government).
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As Plaintiff has not
provided any further authority providing for extension of civil liability under these statutes,
Plaintiff’s claims under §§ 241 and 245 must therefore also be dismissed.
Supplemental State-Law Claims
In regard to Plaintiff’s potential state-law based causes of action, Defendant contends that
they need not be considered because the complaint does not expressly assert claims under state
law. According to Defendant, the complaint lodges allegations that might well correspond to
state-law torts, but such correspondence does not necessarily reveal Plaintiff’s intent to pursue
causes of action under state law. Defendant argues that the fact that Plaintiff indicated on the
civil filing sheet that the nature of his claims were “civil rights” related and that he indicated his
claims arose under federal law dispositively shows that Plaintiff has chosen not to assert any
state-law claims.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), however, a complaint must include only
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and it need
only “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). Additionally, a
pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be construed liberally.
Pena v. United States, 122 F.3d 3, 4
(5th Cir. 1997). This Court therefore will consider Plaintiff’s potential state-law claims despite
his failure to specifically denominate them as state-law based “causes of action.”
In the alternative, however, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has judicially admitted that
North Mississippi Medical Center is not liable to Plaintiff, relying on a series of Requests for
Admission, lodged pursuant to Rule 36(a), to which Plaintiff failed to respond. Those requests
were propounded as follows:
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Request No. 3
Admit that the health care services provided to the plaintiff by
NMMC and its employees and agents were appropriate in all
respects and in accord with all applicable standards of care.
Request No. 4
Admit that NMMC and its employees and agents were not
negligent in any fashion and did, in fact, provide proper health care
services, consistent with all applicable standards of care to the
plaintiff.
Request No. 5
Admit that the allegation of liability set forth in the Complaint in
this case against NMMC are without merit and untrue.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a), a matter is deemed admitted unless the
party to whom the request is directed responds within thirty days. See also Dukes v. South
Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1985). Such an admission is “conclusively
established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b). In both form and substance, a Rule 36 admission is “comparable to an
admission in pleadings or a stipulation drafted by counsel for use at trial, rather than to an
evidentiary admission of a party.” Am. Auto. Assoc. v. AAA Legal Clinic, 930 F.2d 1117, 1120
(5th Cir. 1991). That principle applies with equal force to “those admissions made affirmatively
and those established by default, even if the matters admitted relate to material facts that defeat a
party’s claim.” Id.
In the case at hand, the aforementioned requests for admission were served on the
Plaintiff by United States mail May 23, 2012. Approximately ten months have since elapsed and
Plaintiff has not responded to those requests or sought leave of court to withdraw those
admissions. Further, Plaintiff failed in any way to rebut those admissions in responding to
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, instead merely filing various hospital records.
Plaintiff has thus admitted that his claims are without merit and there remain no genuine disputes
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of material fact regarding his state-law based claims. Summary judgment is therefore due to be
granted to those claims as well.
Conclusion
Because Defendant has shown that there is no remaining genuine dispute of material fact
and judgment as a matter of law is due in its favor, North Mississippi Medical Center’s Motion
for Summary Judgment [25] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this the 6th day of May, 2013.
/s/ Sharion Aycock_________
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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