Alexander v. Medpoint, LLC

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 83 Order on Motion in Limine. Signed by Glen H. Davidson on 1/7/2014. (dlh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

ABERDEEN DIVISION

PLAINTIFF

MARGARET ALEXANDER

CNIL ACTION NO. 1:II-CV-00256-GHD

v.
MEDPOINT PROFESSIONAL STAFFING, LLC

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is a trial brief [71] filed by Defendant MedPoint Professional
Staffing, LLC ("Defendant").

In the brief, Defendant contends that Plaintiff should be

collaterally estopped from arguing to the jury that she was terminated for any other reason than
cause, as the issue of Plaintiff's termination has been litigated in a separate proceeding concerning
Plaintiff's qualifications for unemployment benefits through the Mississippi Department of
Employment Security (the "MDES,,).l Upon due consideration of this issue, the Court finds that
collateral estoppel does not apply to Plaintiff's retaliation claim under Title VII and 42 U.S.c. §
1981.

A. Factual and Procedural Background
One day after Plaintiff was terminated from her job with Defendant, Plaintiff sought
unemployment benefits through the MDES. The claims adjuster assigned to her case denied her
claim for benefits, stating in his decision:

An investigation reveals you were discharged for unauthorized
absenteeism when you took off work a week after the employer
had denied your request to do so. Your actions are in violation of
company policy and are grounds for termination. The reason for
your discharge is considered misconduct connected with your
work.
You are disqualified from receiving Unemployment
Insurance benefits ....

I

The MDES was previously called the Mississippi Employment Security Commission (the "MESC").

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MDES Notice of Nonmonetary Detennination Decision [71-2] at 1. Plaintiff appealed the denial
to the MDES Administrative Law Judge, who held that "[b]ased on the totality of the record, the
claimant was tenninated for misconduct connected with her work and the decision is affinned."
MDES ALJ Decision [71-3] at 3. Subsequently, the Board of Review concluded that "after
careful review and consideration of all the evidence, the Board of Review adopts the Findings of
Fact and Opinion ofthe Administrative Law Judge and hereby affinns the decision." MDES Bd.
of Review Decision [71-4] at 1. Plaintiff then appealed to the Circuit Court of Monroe County,
Mississippi. On September 11, 2012, Judge Funderburk affinned the decision of the Board of
Review, finding that "the decision of the Board of Review of the [MDES] was supported by
substantial evidence, was not arbitrary, and contains no errors of law and that the same should be
AFFIRMED." See Monroe Cnty. Cir. Ct. Order [71-5] at 1. Plaintiff did not appeal the decision
of the Monroe County Circuit Court, thus allowing that judgment to become final.
On December 12, 20 11, Plaintiff initiated the instant suit against Defendant, alleging race
discrimination and retaliation for filing an EEOC charge in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §
1981. On February 12, 2013, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment [45] on Plaintiffs
claims. In an Order [56] and memorandum opinion [57] dated July 22,2013, this Court granted
summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiffs race discrimination claims, but sustained
Plaintiffs retaliation claims.

In the amended pretrial Order [70], which was entered on

September 3, 2013, Defendant claims in its summary of the facts that Plaintiff was "tenninated
for taking unapproved leave with full notice of the likely consequences of her act. The Circuit
Court of Monroe County affinned the ruling of the [MDES] that [Plaintiff] was tenninated for
cause, which the [D]efendant claims acts as collateral estoppel on that issue." Am. Pretrial Order
[70] at 4. Included in the contested issues of law is the following: "[t]he effect of the Circuit

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Court of Monroe County, Mississippi in affinning the ruling of the [MDES] that [Plaintiff] was
fired for cause." Id. at 5

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7.

That same day, Defendant filed the present trial brief [71]

requesting that all factual detenninations decided by the Administrative Law Judge with respect
to Plaintiff s tennination be read to the jury as conclusive and established facts and that the jury
not be pennitted to decide any issues regarding the legality of Plaintiff's tennination. The Court
continued the trial so that the parties could fully brief the issue for the Court's consideration.
Plaintiff has now filed a response, Defendant has filed a reply, and the matter is ripe for review.

B. Analysis and Discussion
As stated above, Defendant asks this Court to find that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped
from asserting that she was tenninated for any reason other than work-related misconduct based
on the finding of the MDES and the Circuit Court of Monroe County. The factors in question
are central to Plaintiff s retaliation claims, and thus, the detennination of whether the
tennination-for-cause finding of the MDES and the Circuit Court of Monroe County should be
accepted as part of the instant case is properly addressed prior to the upcoming trial.
"The federal courts must give an agency's fact finding the same preclusive effect that
they would a decision of a state court, when the state agency is acting in a judicial capacity and
gives the parties a fair opportunity to litigate." Stafford v. True Temper Sports, 123 F.3d 291,
294 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Univ. ofTenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 92 L. Ed.
2d 635 (1986».

"As far as Mississippi is concerned, the decisions of [the MDES] have

preclusive weight in Mississippi courts, are appealable through the Mississippi court system, and
even have the potential for review by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 295 (citing MISS.
CODE ANN. § 71-5-531). "State administrative proceedings which are reviewed by a state court
have preclusive effect and a federal court can apply state rules of issue preclusion in detennining

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whether a matter litigated in state court may be relitigated in federal court." Id. (citing Marrese
v. Amer. Acad. Ortho. Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 84 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1985)).
Thus, in the case sub judice, the ruling of the Circuit Court of Monroe County, as a judicially
reviewed decision of the MDES and a final judgment, can have preclusive weight in this Court,
because it is entitled to "the same full faith and credit in every court within United States ... as
[it has] by law or usage in the courts of such State ...." See 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, otherwise known as collateral estoppel, a litigant
is "precluded from relitigating in the present suit specific questions actually litigated and
determined by and essential to the judgment in the prior suit, even though a different cause of
action is the subject ofthe present suit." Channel v. Loyacono, 954 So. 2d 415, 425
2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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(Miss.

Collateral estoppel is "an unusual

exception to the general rule that all fact questions should be litigated fully in each case" and is
"neither mandatory nor mechanically applied." Marcum v. Miss. Valley Gas Co., 672 So. 2d
730, 733 (Miss. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff should be collaterally estopped from arguing to the
jury that she was terminated for any other reason than cause and cites in support Stafford v. True
Temper Sports. In True Temper, a case initially brought in this Court, the plaintiff sued his

former employer for retaliation under ERISA, inter alia. The undersigned granted summary
judgment in favor of the employer, Plaintiff appealed the ruling, and the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision, finding that the state agency's findings in the unemployment
benefits denial had preclusive effect in True Temper.
True Temper and the instant case have many similarities. In True Temper, the plaintiff

had sought unemployment benefits through the then-Mississippi Employment Security

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Commission (the "MESC"); the MESC claims examiner had denied Plaintiffs claim for
benefits; the MESC Board of Review had concluded that the plaintiff had been terminated for
misconduct; the plaintiff had appealed the denial of unemployment benefits to the Circuit Court
of Lee County; the Circuit Court of Lee County had affirmed the MESC's ruling; and the
plaintiff had then asserted a retaliation claim against his employer in this Court.
However, the key distinction between True Temper and the instant case is that the
plaintiff in True Temper asserted his retaliation claim under ERISA, and the Plaintiff in the
instant case asserts her retaliation claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Fifth Circuit
pointed out in True Temper, as had this Court in its opinion, that "the instant case is not one of
those exceptional cases [fitting into the exception whereby Congress has manifested its intent
that state administrative decisions have no preclusive effect] because ERISA is not governed by
any scheme enforced by the EEOC or any like agency, and hence, collateral estoppel can be
applied." True Temper, 123 F.3d at 294.
Collateral estoppel does not apply to state administrative decisions where Congress has
provided for a detailed administrative remedy, such as Title VII. Cox v. DeSoto County, Miss.,
564 F.3d at 748-49 (citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110-14,
111 S. Ct. 2166, 115 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1991)). Accord Wright v. Custom Ecology, Inc., No.
3:11CV760 DPJ-FKB, 2013 WL 1703738, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 19, 2013); Finnie v. Lee

County, Miss., 907 F. Supp. 2d 750, 761 n.13 (N.D. Miss. 2012); Moore v. Shearer-Richardson
Mem. Nursing Home, 1:10CVI70B-S, 2012 WL 1066340, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 2012);
Smith v. Koch Foods ofMiss., LLC, 3:09CV668 DPJ-FKB, 2011 WL 2415336, at *2 n.l (S.D.
Miss. June 13, 2011). Although in this case the Circuit Court of Monroe County affirmed the
MDES's denial of benefits, the court's scope of review of the MDES's ruling was quite limited.

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"Absent fraud, the findings of fact of the Board of Review [of the MDES] are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence." Brown v. MDES, 29 So. 3d 766, 769

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7) (Miss. 2010)

(citation omitted). "A rebuttable presumption exists in favor of the administrative agency, and
the challenging party has the burden of proving otherwise." Sprouse v. MESC, 639 So. 2d 901,
902 (Miss. 1994). In addition, this Court is not required to apply collateral estoppel even if it is
warranted. As stated above, collateral estoppel is "neither mandatory nor mechanically applied."

See Marcum, 672 So. 2d at 733. Further, the purposes served by collateral estoppel, such as
protecting parties from multiple lawsuits and the possibility of inconsistent decisions and the
conservation of judicial resources, do not justify applying the doctrine in this case. See Lytle v.

Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 553, 110 S. Ct. 1331, 108 L. .Ed. 2d 504 (1990) (internal
citation omitted). Allowing Plaintiff to go to trial on her retaliation claims would not "dissipate
judicial resources in needless litigation over previously resolved issues."

See id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffhas brought but one case asserting Title VII and

§ 1981 retaliation claims, and the limited nature of the scope of the Circuit Court of Monroe
County's review of the MDES's denial of Plaintiffs unemployment benefits further convinces
this Court that the MDES proceeding and this Title VII and § 1981 proceeding are separate and
preclusive effect should not be given to the termination-for-cause finding in the administrative
proceeding. See generally Thomas v. Louisiana, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 406 F. App'x 890, 895
(5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff should not be collaterally estopped from
asserting that she was tenninated for a reason other than cause. Plaintiff s retaliation claims are
asserted under the auspices of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Congress has manifested an intent
that state administrative rulings not have preclusive effect in such cases, and the Circuit Court of

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Monroe County's scope of review of the MDES decision was quite limited.

For all these

reasons, this Court finds that the MDES's finding and subsequent affirmance of the Circuit Court
of Monroe County that Plaintiff was terminated for work-related misconduct does not have
preclusive effect in the instant case.
C. Conclusion

In sum, Defendant's request for collateral estoppel is DENIED, and Plaintiff shall
proceed to trial on her Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation claims.
An order in aC59ldance with this opinion shall issue this day.

7z

THIS, the _

day ofJanuary, 2014.

SENIOR JUDGE

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