Estate of Robbie Lashay Lewis Stacks, et al v. Prentiss County, Mississippi, et al
Filing
47
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 46 Order on Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge Glen H. Davidson on 3/18/13. (rel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
ESTATE OF ROBBIE LASHAY LEWIS STACKS and
MATTHEW STACKS, Individually and on Behalf of the
Other Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Robert Lashay
Lewis Stacks
v.
PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-00032-GHD-DAS
PRENTISS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI;
CITY OF BOONEVILLE, MISSISSIPPI;
And MARCELLA ALVARADO, CODY FARRAR,
JOSH HUGHES, NENA ISBELL, JO CAROL KNIGHT,
ELIZABETH LINDSEY, DENNIS PEAKS, and
NICOLE TAYLOR, in their individual capacities
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss [34].
Upon due
consideration, the Court finds the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
A. Overview
Plaintiffs bring this action against Prentiss County; Prentiss County Jail ("Prentiss
County Jail" or the "Jail"); and several individuals who were employed as jailers at Prentiss
County Jail at the time of the alleged events: Marcella Alvarado, Cody Farrar, Josh Hughes,
Nena Isbell, Jo Carol Knight, Elizabeth Lindsey, Dennis Peaks, and Nicole Taylor (collectively,
the "Individual Defendants"). Plaintiffs seek damages in connection with the suicide of the
Decedent Robbie Lashay Lewis Stacks (the "Decedent") while incarcerated at the Jail. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants violated the Decedent's Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to adequate medical and mental health care and the prevention of suicide. I
I Although Plaintiffs fail to explicitly mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the complaint, they plead the elements
of a Section 1983 cause of action, that is, that there was a deprivation of the Decedent's Eighth Amendment and
1
Because the motion to dismiss [34] presently before the Court is brought by the
Individual Defendants concerning the claims asserted against them, the Court will cabin its
examination of the facts and subsequent analysis to these claims. The Court notes that all the
Individual Defendants request dismissal of the claims on qualified immunity grounds, but
Defendants Cody Farrar, Dennis Peaks, Nicole Taylor, Josh Hughes, and Nena Isbell
additionally seek dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 2 The
Court also notes that this motion to dismiss [34] is before the Court at an early stage in the
litigation when the parties have not yet had the benefit of engaging in discovery on the merits.
B. Summary Judgment Standard
"The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid
claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed true and are viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff." Lone Star Fund V (U.S.). L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.
2010) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). Of
course, the complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
The court must not evaluate the likelihood of the claim's success, but instead ascertain whether
the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible. Lone Star Fund, 594 F.3d at
387 (citingAshcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).
"If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). Because in considering the motion to dismiss the Court has
Fourteenth Amendment rights by persons acting under color of state law. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330-31,106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986); Evans v. City ofMarlin, Tex., 986 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1993).
2 Because the Court finds that qualified immunity should be granted to Defendants Cody Farrar, Dennis
Peaks, Nicole Taylor, Josh Hughes, and Nena Isbell, the Court need not reach the failure-to-state-a-claim issue.
2
reviewed the parties' attached matters outside the pleadings which this Court shall not exclude
including an autopsy report attached to the motion and an affidavit and shift reports attached to
the reply-the motion shall be considered a motion for summary judgment brought pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322,106 S. Ct. 2548,91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Weaver v.
CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). The rule "mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at triaL" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.
Ct. 2548.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the
court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
Under Rule 56(a), the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and by
. . . affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,'
designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for triaL' " Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct.
2548; Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001); Willis v. Roche
Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995).
Where, as here, the parties dispute the facts, the Court must view the facts and draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
3
378, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "However, a
nonmovant may not overcome the summary judgment standard with conc1usional allegations,
unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence." McClure v. Boles, No.
11-41345, 2012 WL 5285103, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hathaway v.
Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)). With all the foregoing in mind, the Court turns to
the alleged facts.
C. Alleged Facts
On February 1, 2009, the Decedent was booked into the Jail on charges of contempt of
court, careless driving, and driving without a license. On the following day, the Decedent was
sentenced to a fine and a thirty-day suspended sentence on condition that she pay an additional
fine for contempt of court. Because the Decedent was unable to pay her fines, she was placed on
the Booneville Police Department Work Program, which allows an inmate to work outside the
jail setting for the purpose of paying off fines to the City of Booneville.
Plaintiffs allege that jail personnel subjected the Decedent to sometimes arbitrary and
wrongful discipline during her incarceration at the jail which prevented her from being able to
participate in the work program. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Decedent and "almost all
of the other female arrestees and inmates" were regularly kept in lockdown for approximately
twenty-three hours a day and allowed to spend the remaining hour outside their cells for the
purpose of bathing. Pis.' Compl. [1]
~
22. Plaintiffs aver that lockdown was administered as a
punishment "for imagined, trivial[,] or insignificant reasons" and that "[t]he extensive and
mostly arbitrary use of lockdown by jail personnel exacerbated tensions in [the Jail] and
increased the desperation of the female arrestees and inmates." /d.
~
23. Although Defendants
dispute most of Plaintiffs' allegations, Defendant the City of Booneville concedes that the
4
Decedent was placed on lockdown, and that while on lockdown the Decedent was no longer able
to report to the work program to payoff her fines. Plaintiffs claim that the Decedent "became
increasingly depressed and despondent"; expressed to the jailers (including Defendant Marcella
Alvarado) and other inmates and arrestees that she was suicidal; and showed them that she had
cut her wrists on a metal table.
Id.
~
24.
Plaintiffs further allege that in response to the
Decedent's vocalized suicidal ideations, Defendant Alvarado placed the Decedent in the isolation
chambe~ for several hours and then returned the Decedent to her cell. Plaintiffs aver that over
the following day or so the Decedent continued to tell jailers, arrestees, and inmates that she
wanted to kill herself and asked to be left alone in the isolation chamber continuously; although
she was placed in the isolation chamber for several hours a day, she was always returned to her
cell, despite her pleas to remain in the isolation chamber-where she would lack the means to
kill herself. Plaintiffs aver that despite the Decedent's repeated vocalizing of suicidal ideation
and showing physical evidence of a desire to kill herself, jail personnel made no note or report
concerning this and did not put the Decedent on suicide watch or take measures to get the
Decedent medically evaluated or treated.
Plaintiffs aver that when the Decedent refused to come out of her cell to get her lunch
tray, Defendant Elizabeth Lindsey told the arrestees and inmates that she was not the Decedent's
maid and that she would not "taze" the Decedent, but would "beat the hell out of her"; Defendant
Lindsey then "slammed [the Decedent's] cell door shut." Id.
~
28. Plaintiffs aver that although
the Decedent repeatedly voiced her despair to Defendant Lindsey that "she had lost everything,
including her family and her home, and had nothing more to live for" and that she desired to kill
herself, Defendant Lindsey "ignored [the Decedent] and stated, 'I have bigger fish to fry.''' Id.
~
29. Plaintiffs allege that after repeatedly requesting to be put in the isolation chamber, the
3
The isolation chamber is also known as the "drunk tank."
5
Decedent was placed in the isolation chamber for a while, but that eventually Defendant Lindsey
returned the Decedent to her cell, despite the Decedent's repeated pleas to be allowed to remain
in the isolation chamber. ld.
~
31. Plaintiffs aver that the Decedent again requested to be placed
in the isolation chamber after eating dinner in her cell, and Defendant Jo Carol Knight ignored
her request and slammed the Decedent's cell door shut. ld.
~
32. Plaintiffs allege that at the start
of the next shift Defendant Nena Isbell conducted a cell check and head count; the Decedent
came to her cell window to greet Defendant Isbell (which the Decedent never did); and no one
checked on the Decedent again.
Plaintiffs allege that "[a]pproximately thirty minutes to one hour later[ ] [the Decedent]
called out to one of the other women to read a verse from the Bible," and "[i]mmediately
thereafter, [the Decedent] could be heard coughing in her cell." ld.
~
35. After the Decedent
failed to respond to the arrestees and inmates, jail personnel were called to assist the Decedent.
Defendants Isbell and Josh Hughes responded to the call for help and found the Decedent
hanging in her cell; the two jailers got the Decedent down and allowed two females to come out
of their cells to perform CPR on the Decedent until emergency medical personnel could arrive.
"[The Decedent]'s skin had turned blue, her lips were purple[,] and she had soiled herself when
the females began performing CPR." ld.
~
38. Her breath and pulse returned after CPR was
administered. Autopsy Report [35-2] at 4. Plaintiffs allege that approximately fifteen minutes
after CPR was administered to the Decedent, the paramedics arrived.
The Decedent was
transported to a hospital, where she remained on life support for several days. The Decedent
died after life support was withdrawn as a result of "[c]omplications of hanging with near
asphyxia." Pl.'s Compl. [1]
~
39; Autopsy Report [35-2] at 1. The Decedent was twenty-five
years old.
6
D. Discussion and Analysis
The Individual Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiffs' claims. In evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, the Court considers (1) whether
the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.
Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129
S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009); Jacobs v. W Felkiana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 393
(5th Cir. 2000). Courts have discretion to determine which of these questions to address first.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S. Ct. 808.
a. Qualified Immunity: First Prong
First, the Court notes that the Individual Defendants concede that the first prong in the
qualified immunity analysis is satisfied, that is, that Plaintiffs have alleged that the Decedent's
Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the Individual Defendants
denied her adequate medical care and failed to take measures to prevent her suicide. 4
In
conceding this first prong, the Individual Defendants have conceded much.
4
The Fifth Circuit has stated:
Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners . . . look to different constitutional
provisions for their respective rights to basic needs such as medical care and
safety. The constitutional rights of a convicted state prisoner spring from the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and, with a
relatively limited reach, from substantive due process. The constitutional rights
of a pretrial detainee, on the other hand, flow from both the procedural and
substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.... The State
cannot punish a pretrial detainee. ... Since the State does punish convicted
prisoners, but cannot punish pretrial detainees, a pretrial detainee's due process
rights are said to be at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections
available to a convicted prisoner.
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted; emphases in original). Although a distinction is drawn between the rights of pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners, "no constitutionally relevant difference exists between the rights of pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners to be secure in their basic human needs." [d. at 647. "The deliberate-indifference standard
applies when determining whether a jail official's episodic act or omission violated a [an inmate's constitutional]
7
To adequately allege a constitutional violation against an individual defendant, a plaintiff
must establish that the official(s) acted with subjective deliberate indifference to the inmate's
health or safety. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999); see
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-38, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002) (internal
citation omitted). "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104,97 S. Ct. 285,50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). "Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet." Gobert v.
Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The
Court "may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm
is obvious." See Hope, 536 U.S. at 737-38, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825,842, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994». A jail official is deliberately indifferent to
an inmate's medical needs and suicide prevention needs in violation of the inmate's
constitutional rights if the official was subjectively aware of the risk and disregarded the risk by
cannot punish a pretrial detainee. ... Since the State does punish convicted
prisoners, but cannot punish pretrial detainees, a pretrial detainee's due process
rights are said to be at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections
available to a convicted prisoner.
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted; emphases in original). Although a distinction is drawn between the rights of pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners, "no constitutionally relevant difference exists between the rights of pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners to be secure in their basic human needs." Jd. at 647. "The deliberate-indifference standard
applies when determining whether a jail official's episodic act or omission violated a [an inmate's constitutional]
right to medical care and to be secure from harm, including self-inflicted harm." Kane ex rei. Kane v. County of
Hardeman, Tex., 254 F.3d 1081,2001 WL 564126, at *1 (5th Cir. May 17, 2001) (per curiam) (citing Hare, 74 F.3d
at 647-48); see Jacobs, 228 F.3d at 393.
In the case sub judice, the Decedent was convicted on charges of contempt of court, careless driving, and
driving without a license. Her sentence was suspended, and she was incarcerated at the Jail for the purpose of
paying off her [mes through the Jail's work program. Although the Decedent perhaps was not a typical convicted
prisoner, she was convicted and required to pay [mes that she could not have otherwise paid without participation in
the Jail's work program. For all intents and purposes, she was a convicted prisoner. Thus, the Court will apply the
Eighth Amendment's subjective deliberate-indifference standard in evaluating the claim.
8
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S. Ct. 1970.
The jail official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." ld. at 837, 114 S.
Ct. 1970; see also Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. "The nature of that risk-whether it is substantial or
not-in any given case is ultimately a question of context and is susceptible to evaluations of
contemporary standards of decency." Morgan v. Hubert, 459 F. App'x 321, 326 (5th Cir. Jan.
20, 2012) (citing Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted»). "[T]he plaintiff must show that the officials 'refused to treat him, ignored his
complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.'" Domino v. Tex. Dep't of
Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236,
1238 (5th Cir. 1985». "A [jail official] is deliberately indifferent if he intentionally denies or
delays access to medical care." Walker v. Butler, 967 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S. Ct. 285). If the jail official tries to facilitate treatment, but the
official's efforts are unsuccessful, the official is not necessarily deliberately indifferent. See
Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; Treen, 759 F.2d at1238. "[R]esponding to an inmate's complaints 'by
referring the matter for further investigation' or taking other appropriate administrative action
fulfills an official's protective duties under the Eighth Amendment." Longoria v. Tex.,473 F.3d
586,594 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503,526 (5th Cir. 2004».
As stated above, the Individual Defendants concede that Plaintiffs have satisfied this
difficult standard by sufficiently alleging that the Individual Defendants acted with subjective
deliberate indifference to the Decedent's constitutional rights to adequate medical care and
9
suicide prevention-that is, that the officials were subjectively aware of the risk of the
Decedent's suicide and disregarded the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.
The Court now considers whether Plaintiffs have overcome the second prong in the qualified
immunity analysis.
b. Qualified Immunity: Second Prong
Because it is undisputed that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the Individual
Defendants' subjective deliberate indifference to the Decedent's constitutional rights to medical
care and suicide prevention, the Court turns to the second prong, which has two elements: (i)
whether the alleged constitutional violation was clearly established at the time of the alleged
misconduct, and (ii) whether the Individual Defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable in
light of the then clearly established law. See Ateberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245,256
(5th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
(i)
Clearly Established Element
To satisfy the first element of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis,
Plaintiffs must show that the alleged constitutional violation was clearly established at the time
of the alleged misconduct. For a right to be clearly established, "the contours of the right must
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right." Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted»; see
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (official qualifiedly immune unless
"every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [the lawY'). Qualified
immunity "ensure[ s] that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is
unlawful." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206, 121 S. Ct. 2151. In other words, even if the officials
10
involved participated in constitutionally impennissible conduct, the officials "may nevertheless
be shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate 'clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Hope, 536
U.S. at 739 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396
(1982) (internal quotation marks omitted». "This does not require that the exact same action
must previously have been held unconstitutional, but only that, in light of pre-existing law, the
unlawfulness must have been apparent." Johnson v. Epps, 479 F. App'x 583, 591 (5th Cir. June
21,2012) (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034).
Although the original aim of the Eighth Amendment was to prohibit cruel and unusual
punishment, case law has extended its parameters to encompass "broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency." Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 47S,
483 (Sth Cir. 2004) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102, 97 S. Ct. 285) (internal citation omitted).
Thus, officials have certain duties under the Eighth Amendment, including "provid[ing] humane
conditions of confinement"; "ensur[ing] that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care"; and "tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates."
Farmer, S11 U.S. at 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For
example, reasonable officials should understand that (1) deliberate indifference to an inmate's
potential health risk of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke can fonn the basis of an Eighth
Amendment claim, see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 2S, 35, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22
(1993); (2) deliberate indifference to an inmate's threat to personal safety from exposed
electrical wiring, deficient firefighting measures, and the mingling of inmates with serious
contagious diseases with other prison inmates can fonn the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim,
see Gates v. Collier, SOl F.2d 1291 (Sth Cir. 1974), cited with approval in Rhodes v. Chapman,
11
452 U.S. 337,352 n.17, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981); (3) deliberate indifference to an
inmate's exposure to a serious communicable disease can fonn the basis of an Eighth
Amendment claim--even if the inmate does not manifest symptoms of the disease, see Helling,
509 U.S. at 33, 113 S. Ct. 2475; (3) deliberate indifference to an inmate's health by being aware
of the inmate's serious injury but not providing pain relief medication to the inmate when
instructed to do so can fonn the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim, see Chapman v. Johnson,
339 F. App'x 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); and (4) deliberate indifference to an
inmate's health by requiring him to remain on his bunk almost twenty-four hours a day for
several days in a row in high temperatures can fonn the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim,
see Valigura v. Mendoza, 265 F. App'x 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Certainly, the
failure to provide adequate protection against a prisoner's known suicidal impulses can fonn the
basis of an Eighth Amendment claim. See Evans v. City ofMarlin, 986 F .2d 104, 107 (5th Cir.
1993) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs allege that the Individual Defendants failed to provide
adequate protection against the Decedent's known suicidal impulses in that they did not (1) make
a notation report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, (2) put the Decedent on suicide watch, (3)
have the Decedent evaluated by trained personnel, or (4) seek any kind of medical intervention
for her.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the second element by showing that the
alleged constitutional violation was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.
(ii)
Objectively Reasonable Element
To satisfy the second element of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis,
Plaintiffs must show that the Individual Defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable in
light of the then clearly established law. The Court notes, again, that the Individual Defendants
concede that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that despite the Individual Defendants'
12
subjective awareness of the risk of the Decedent's suicide, the Individual Defendants failed to
take reasonable measures to abate that risk.
Also, Plaintiffs have shown that the alleged
constitutional violation was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. The
Individual Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs
have not shown that the Individual Defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable.
Plaintiffs allege that the Individual Defendants failed to act objectively reasonable,
because they did not (1) make a notation report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, (2) put the
Decedent on suicide watch, (3) have the Decedent evaluated by trained personnel, or (4) seek
any kind of medical intervention for her. The Court recognizes much overlap in Plaintiffs'
allegations with respect to each of the Individual Defendants. However, the Court also notes that
"no interest is harmed by considering the officers' actions separately. Separate consideration
does not require courts to conduct a separate analysis for each officer in those cases where their
actions are materially indistinguishable, it merely requires them to consider each officer's
actions." See Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417,422 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).
With this standard in mind, the Court examines the alleged actions of each Individual Defendant.
The Court finds that the record, although sparse at this stage of the litigation, contains competent
evidence that raises genuine disputes of material fact concerning the objective reasonableness of
the acts of Defendants Marcella Alvarado, Jo Carol Knight, and Elizabeth Lindsey.
Marcella Alvarado
Many of Plaintiffs' allegations concern Defendant Alvarado, a jailer at the Prentiss
County Jail. Plaintiffs allege that the Decedent told Defendant Alvarado that she was suicidal
and showed Defendant Alvarado cuts on her wrists from trying to cut herself on a metal table.
PIs.' CompI. [1]
~
24. Plaintiffs further aver that despite the Decedent's vocalization of her
13
suicidal ideations and showing physical evidence of a desire to kill herself, Defendant Alvarado
acted objectively unreasonably by failing to make any notation or report of the Decedent's
suicidal ideation, failing to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and failing to have the
Decedent evaluated by trained personnel. See id.
~
25.
Instead, Plaintiffs allege Defendant
Alvarado placed the Decedent alone in the isolation chamber for several hours until the Decedent
was returned to her cell. Id.
~
26. Plaintiffs further allege that despite the Decedent's ensuing
requests to be placed in the isolation chamber and her further vocalized ideations of her intent to
commit suicide, Defendant Alvarado failed to take action to help the Decedent. The Individual
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not shown that all officers would have known in Defendant
Alvarado's situation that their actions amounted to a constitutional violation. The Court finds
that, taking Plaintiffs allegations as true, genuine disputes of fact exist concerning whether
Defendant Alvarado's conduct was objectively reasonable. Therefore, because genuine disputes
of material fact exist which must be resolved before the Court can determine whether Defendant
Alvarado is immune from suit, the motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Defendant
Alvarado on grounds of evidence sufficiency. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313,116
S. Ct. 834,133 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1996); Hunter v. Bishop, 51 F. App'x 482, 2002 WL 31318797, at
*1 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
Cody Farrar
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Farrar, another jailer at the Prentiss County Jail, had
direct personal contact with the Decedent and had personal knowledge of her suicidal ideations
and requests for help, yet acted objectively unreasonably by failing to make any notation or
report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, failing to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and
failing to have the Decedent evaluated by trained personnel. See id.
14
~
40.
The Individual
Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to assert that
Defendant Farrar actions were objectively unreasonable. The Court finds this argument to be
well taken. The Court thus finds that immunity should be granted as to Defendant Farrar.
Josh Hughes
With respect to Defendant Hughes, another jailer at the Prentiss County Jail, Plaintiffs
allege that the inmates and arrestees called for help when the Decedent failed to respond to them,
and Defendant Hughes, along with Defendant Isbell, responded to the call for help and found the
Decedent hanging in her cell; got the Decedent down; and let two females out of their cells to
perform CPR until the emergency medical personnel could arrive. ld.
~
37. Plaintiffs aver that
despite the Decedent's vocalizations of her suicidal ideations and showing physical evidence of a
desire to kill herself, Defendant Hughes acted objectively unreasonably by failing to make any
notation or report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, failing to place the Decedent on suicide
watch, and failing to have the Decedent evaluated by trained personnel.
The Individual
Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to assert that
Defendant Farrar actions were objectively unreasonable. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have
failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact with respect to the objective reasonableness of Defendant
Hughes's actions. Thus, qualified immunity should be granted as to Defendant Hughes.
Nena Isbell
With respect to Defendant Isbell, another jailer at the Prentiss County Jail, Plaintiffs
allege that at the start of her shift Defendant Isbell conducted a cell check and head count and the
Decedent came to her cell window, which she never did, and greeted Defendant Isbell. ld.
~
34.
Plaintiffs further allege that the Decedent was not checked on again until after she had hung
herself. ld.
Plaintiffs next allege that the inmates and arrestees called for help when the
15
Decedent failed to respond to them, and Defendant Isbell, along with Defendant Hughes,
responded to the call for help and found the Decedent hanging in her cell; got the Decedent
down; and let two females out of their cells to perform CPR until the emergency medical
personnel could arrive. Id.
~
37. Plaintiffs aver that despite the Decedent's vocalizations of her
suicidal ideations and showing physical evidence of a desire to kill herself, Defendant Isbell
acted objectively unreasonably by failing to make any notation or report of the Decedent's
suicidal ideation, failing to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and failing to have the
Decedent evaluated by trained personnel. The Individual Defendants argue, inter alia, that
Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to assert that Defendant Isbell's actions were objectively
unreasonable. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact with
respect to the objective reasonableness of Defendant Isbell's actions. Thus, qualified immunity
should be granted as to Defendant Isbell.
Jo Carol Knight
With respect to Defendant Knight, Plaintiffs allege that the Decedent repeatedly
requested to be placed in the isolation chamber, but all her requests were ignored by Defendant
Knight. Id.
~
32. Plaintiffs further allege that Knight at one point slammed the Decedent's cell
door shut. Id. Plaintiffs aver that despite the Decedent's vocalizations of her suicidal ideations
and showing physical evidence of a desire to kill herself, Defendant Knight acted objectively
unreasonably by failing to make any notation or report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation,
failing to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and failing to have the Decedent evaluated by
trained personnel. The Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not shown that all
officers would have known in Defendant Knight's situation that their actions amounted to a
constitutional violation. The Court finds that, taking Plaintiffs allegations as true, genuine
16
disputes of fact exist concernmg whether Defendant Knight's conduct was objectively
reasonable. Therefore, because genuine disputes of material fact exist which must be resolved
before the Court can determine whether Defendant Knight is immune from suit, the motion to
dismiss is denied with respect to Defendant Knight on grounds of evidence sufficiency. See
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S. Ct. 834, 133 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1996); Hunter v.
Bishop, 51 F. App'x 482, 2002 WL 31318797, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
Elizabeth Lindsey
Most of Plaintiffs' allegations concern Defendant Lindsey, another jailer at the Prentiss
County Jail. Plaintiffs allege that when the Decedent refused to come out of her cell to get her
lunch tray, Defendant Lindsey told the arrestees and inmates that she was not the Decedent's
maid, and that although she would not taze the Decedent, she would beat the hell out of her;
Plaintiffs then allege that Defendant Lindsey slammed the Decedent's cell door shut. !d.
~
28.
Plaintiffs aver that the Decedent continued to beg to be placed in the isolation chamber, but was
ignored. Plaintiffs claim that when the Decedent told Defendant Lindsey that she was trying to
kill herself by cutting her wrists, showed Defendant Lindsey her wrists, and told her that "she
had lost everything, including her family and her home, and had nothing more to live for,"
Defendant Lindsey ignored the Decedent and told her she had bigger fish to fry. ld.
~
29. After
more begging to be placed in the isolation chamber, Plaintiffs claim that "another verbal
confrontation" occurred with Defendant Lindsey, and the Decedent was placed in the isolation
chamber. ld.
~
30. Plaintiffs then allege that the Decedent remained in the isolation chamber for
several hours until Defendant Lindsey "moved [her] out." ld.
~
31. Plaintiffs allege that the
Decedent asked Defendant Lindsey what she had done wrong and begged to be left alone in the
isolation chamber, but despite her pleas, the Decedent was returned to her celL ld. Plaintiffs
17
further aver that despite the Decedent's vocalization of her suicidal ideations and showing
physical evidence of a desire to kill herself, Defendant Lindsey acted objectively unreasonably
by failing to make any notation or report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, failing to place the
Decedent on suicide watch, and failing to have the Decedent evaluated by trained personnel.
The Individual Defendants attach Defendant Lindsey's affidavit and her shift notes to
their reply; Defendant Lindsey's account of the facts somewhat differs from Plaintiffs' version.
Defendant Lindsey states that she gave the Decedent fifteen days on lockdown because the
Decedent was "flashing notes and her breasts to the male inmates" in Zone 3. Lindsey Aff. [45
1]
~
5. Defendant Lindsey maintains that she made the statement that she "had bigger fish to
fry" in reference to these incidents, not in response to the Decedent's talk of suicide. [d.
~
5.
Defendant Lindsey further states that she was informed that the Decedent was banging her head
on the wall, and after she went to talk to her about it, the Decedent stated that it was unfair that
she was put on lockdown when the other inmates who were doing the same thing did not get put
on lockdown; Defendant Lindsey told her she did not catch them doing anything and could not
prove they did anything. [d.
~
6; Lindsey Shift Report [45-1] at 6. Defendant Lindsey further
states that the Decedent told Defendants Lindsey, Isbell, and Stewart that if she was going down,
so was the whole zone. Lindsey Shift Report [45-1] at 5. Defendant Lindsey states that the
Decedent showed her "the red welts" on the inside of her forearm from elbow to wrist that she
had from "rub [bing] them on a table," but "the skin was not broken." Lindsey Aff. [45-1]
~
7.
Defendant Lindsey maintains that "[i]t did not occur to me that [the Decedent] had any desire to
kill herself because it would have been impossible to do so by rubbing her forearm on that table."
[d. However, Defendant Lindsey states that the Decedent told her "I want to cut myself' and
that she wanted to be alone; Defendant Lindsey told her the only way she could be alone was to
18
go to the isolation chamber; the Decedent agreed to go to the isolation chamber; and Defendant
Lindsey escorted her to it. Id.
~
8-9; Lindsey Shift Report [45-1] at 6. Defendant Lindsey states
that she talked to the Decedent about what was bothering her, and the Decedent said that the
other female inmates were saying bad things to her, but did not specify what things they were
saying, just that it did not matter because the inmates were not going to stop saying bad things to
her. Lindsey Shift Report [45-1] at 7. Defendant Lindsey then states that she took the Decedent
her supper in the isolation chamber; later, the Decedent smiled and told Defendant Lindsey that
she had eaten all her food; Defendant Lindsey told her that was good; and the Decedent had
calmed down. Lindsey Aff. [45-1]
~
10. At some point, another inmate had to be placed in the
isolation chamber; thus, the Decedent was escorted back to her cell to make room for the other
inmate in the isolation chamber.
Id.
Defendant Lindsey states: "A little while later, [the
Decedent] called me to tell me that it hurt to breathe"; Defendant Lindsey told the Decedent to
slow her breathing down and asked her if she was okay; the Decedent said that she was. Id.
~
11.
Defendant Lindsey states that she wrote on the "Pass on Information" sheet to keep a watch on
the Decedent because of her complaint about her difficulty breathing, and then Defendant
Lindsey's shift ended. Id.
~
12. Defendant Lindsey maintains that the Decedent "never told me
that she wanted to commit suicide or kill herself' and she "never heard from any other officers or
inmates that [the Decedent] wanted to commit suicide or kill herself." Id.
~
13.
The Court finds that there are rich disputes of material fact concerning the objective
reasonableness of Defendant Lindsey's actions.
The Court notes with particular interest
Defendant Lindsey's statement that she made a notation to keep a watch on the Decedent
because of her stated difficulty breathing, given the Individual Defendants' concession that
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Individual Defendants were subjectively aware of the
19
risk that Decedent would commit suicide yet failed to take reasonable measures to abate that risk.
Plaintiffs and the Individual Defendants dispute much of what transpired between the Decedent
and Defendant Lindsey, and this fact-by-fact discrepancy precludes summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds for Defendant Lindsey. Although the Individual Defendants have
attached an affidavit of Defendant Lindsey's account of the facts and Plaintiffs have not attached
a comparable affidavit, the Court notes that the only comparable affidavit would contain the
Decedent's version of the facts-which is obviously impossible to obtain. Although the Court
does not have the benefit of Decedent's affidavit, the Court does have the benefit of Plaintiffs'
verified complaint, which is competent summary judgment evidence. See King v. Dogan, 31
F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994). At this stage in the litigation, summary judgment is not proper as
to Defendant Lindsey.
The Court finds that, taking Plaintiffs allegations as true, genuine
disputes of fact exist concerning whether Defendant Lindsey's conduct was objectively
reasonable. Therefore, because genuine disputes of material fact exist which must be resolved
before the Court can determine whether Defendant Lindsey is immune from suit, the motion to
dismiss is denied with respect to Defendant Lindsey on grounds of evidence sufficiency. See
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S. Ct. 834, 133 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1996); Hunter v.
Bishop, 51 F. App'x 482, 2002 WL 31318797, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
Dennis Peaks
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Peaks, another jailer at the Prentiss County Jail, had
direct personal contact with the Decedent and had personal knowledge of her suicidal ideations
and requests for help, yet acted objectively unreasonably by failing to make any notation or
report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, failing to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and
failing to have the Decedent evaluated by trained personnel. See PIs.' Compl. [1]
20
~
40. The
Individual Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to assert
that Defendant Peaks's actions were objectively unreasonable. The Court finds that Plaintiffs
have failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact with respect to the objective reasonableness of
Defendant Peaks's actions. Thus, Defendant Peaks is qualifiedly immune from suit on this
action.
Nicole Taylor
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Taylor, another jailer at the Prentiss County Jail, had
direct personal contact with the Decedent and had personal knowledge of her suicidal ideations
and requests for help, yet acted objectively unreasonably by failing to make any notation or
report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, failing to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and
failing to have the Decedent evaluated by trained personneL See id.
The Court finds that
Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact with respect to the objective
reasonableness of Defendant Taylor's actions. Thus, Defendant Taylor is qualifiedly immune
from suit on this action.
E. Conclusion
In sum, the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss [34] should be GRANTED as to
Defendants Cody Farrar, Nena Isbell, Josh Hughes, Dennis Peaks, and Nicole Taylor on grounds
of qualified immunity.
The Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss [34] should be DENIED as to Marcella
Alvarado, Jo Carol Knight, and Elizabeth Lindsey at this stage of the litigation, based on
evidence sufficiency grounds.
The Court will entertain a renewed motion for qualified immunity with respect to these
Defendants at the commencement of the trial in this cause.
21
An order in accordance with this opinion
S:;J;
thi;a
SENIOR JUDGE
22
~D I 3
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