Estate of Robbie Lashay Lewis Stacks, et al v. Prentiss County, Mississippi, et al
Filing
95
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 94 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Order on Motion to Alter Judgment, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Senior Judge Glen H. Davidson on 11/20/13. (rel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
ESTATE OF ROBBIE LASHAY LEWIS STACKS and
MATTHEW STACKS, Individually and on Behalf of the
Other Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Robert Lashay
Lewis Stacks
v.
PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO.1: 12-CV-00032-GHD-DAS
PRENTISS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI;
CITY OF BOONEVILLE, MISSISSIPPI; and
MARCELLA ALVARADO, JO CAROL KNIGHT,
and ELIZABETH LINDSEY, in their individual capacities
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO DEFENDANTS
ELIZABETH LINDSEY, MARCELLA ALVARADO, AND JO CAROL KNIGHT
Presently before the Court is a motion for reconsideration [49] filed by Defendants
Marcella Alvarado, Jo Carol Knight, and Elizabeth Lindsey challenging the Court's denial of
qualified immunity to them.
For the following reasons, the Court finds the motion for
reconsideration [49] is well taken and that these three Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.
A. Procedural Background
On February 13,2012, Plaintiffs initiated this action against Prentiss County; the City of
Booneville; and several individuals who were employed as jailers at Prentiss County Jail at the
time of the alleged events: Marcella Alvarado, Cody Farrar, Josh Hughes, Nena Isbell, Jo Carol
Knight, Elizabeth Lindsey, Dennis Peaks, and Nicole Taylor (collectively, the "Individual
Defendants"). Plaintiffs seek damages in connection with the suicide of the Decedent Robbie
Lashay Lewis Stacks (the "Decedent") while incarcerated at the Jail.
Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants violated the Decedent's Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
1
adequate medical and mental health care and the prevention of suicide. 1 Defendants answered
the complaint and subsequently, prior to engaging in discovery on the merits, the Individual
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss [34] on qualified immunity grounds. Although the motion
was styled a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Individual Defendants attached matters outside the pleadings to their motion papers. Because
the Court considered the attached matters in its ruling, the Court converted the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d). See FED.
R. CIV. P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56."); Clark v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 798 F.2d 736, 745 (5th Cir. 1986).
On March 18, 2013, the Court entered a memorandum opinion [47] and Order [46]
granting qualified immunity to Defendants Cody Farrar, Nena Isbell, Josh Hughes, Dennis
Peaks, and Nicole Taylor, but denying qualified immunity to Defendants Marcella Alvarado, Jo
Carol Knight, and Elizabeth Lindsey on evidence sufficiency grounds.
On April 5, 2013, Defendants Marcella Alvarado, Jo Carol Knight, and Elizabeth Lindsey
("These Defendants") filed the present motion for reconsideration [49], wherein they challenge
the Court's denial of qualified immunity to them.
Specifically, they challenge the Court's
application of the standard of review in converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment, as well as the Court's ruling on objective reasonableness. Plaintiffs have
filed a response and attached declarations from four inmates who were incarcerated with the
Decedent at the time of her suicide. These Defendants have now filed a reply, wherein they state
I Although Plaintiffs fail to explicitly mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the complaint, they plead the elements
of a Section 1983 cause of action, that is, that there was a deprivation of the Decedent's Eighth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by persons acting under color of state law. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330-31,106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986); Evans v. City o/Marlin, Tex., 986 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1993).
2
that the Court should reconsider its denial of qualified immunity to them in light of Plaintiffs'
newly submitted exhibits, which These Defendants contend demonstrate that they are qualifiedly
immune from suit.
Recognizing the complexity of the issues before it, the Court has carefully re-reviewed
the qualified immunity motion papers and has carefully reviewed the parties' arguments on the
motion for reconsideration and Plaintiffs' newly attached submissions as part of the summary
judgment record.
B. Legal Standards
1. Motion/or Reconsideration Standard
"While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion for
reconsideration, such a motion may be considered either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend
judgment or a Rule 60{b) motion for relief from judgment or order." Shepherd v. Int'l Paper
Co., 372 F.3d 326, 328 n.l (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Hamilton Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147
F.3d 367, 371 n.lO (5th Cir. 1998». However, by their terms, Rules 59 and 60 apply only to
final judgments. See FED. R. Cw. P. 59 (concerning motions to alter or amend a judgment); FED.
R. Cw. P. 60{b) (providing relief from "a final judgment, order, or proceeding"). See also FED.
R. CIV. P. 60{b) advisory committee's notes of 1946 ("The addition of the qualifying word 'final'
emphasizes the character of judgments, orders[,] or proceedings from which Rule 60{b) affords
relief[.]"); McMillan v. MBank Fort Worth, NA., 4 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1993) ("A Rule 60{b)
motion cannot be filed until a final judgment has been entered.").
A district court's decision to deny qualified immunity based on evidentiary sufficiency is
not a final decision. Gibson v. Kilpatrick, No. 12--60905,2013 WL 5806947, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct.
29, 2013) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238
3
(1995); Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2006)). See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516
U.S. 299, 313, 116 S. Ct. 834, 133 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1996) ("[D]eterminations of evidentiary
sufficiency at summary judgment are not immediately appealable merely because they happen to
arise in a qualified-immunity case; if what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is nothing
more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular conduct occurred, the
question decided is not truly 'separable' from the plaintiffs claim, and hence there is no 'final
decision ... .' "); Hunter v. Bishop, 51 F. App'x 482,2002 WL 31318797, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002)
(per curiam) ("Here, the district court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment on
grounds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to what occurred between Defendant and
Plaintiff which must be resolved before the court could determine whether Defendant is immune
from suit. Because this determination was merely one of 'evidentiary sufficiency,' we lack
jurisdiction to hear Defendant's appeal."). Any such non-final ruling is controlled by Rule 54(b),
which provides:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief-whether
as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action
as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all
the parties' rights and liabilities.
FED.
R. ClV. P. 54(b). "Rule 54(b) authorizes a district court to reconsider and reverse its prior
rulings on any interlocutory order 'for any reason it deems sufficient.'" United States v. Renda,
709 F.3d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Saqui v. Pride Cent. Am., LLC, 595 F.3d 206, 210-11
(5th Cir. 2010)).
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2. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317,322,106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). See FED. R. CN. P. 56(a); Weaver v.
CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). The rule "mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322,106 S.
Ct. 2548.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the
court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. /d. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
Under Rule 56( a), the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and by ..
. affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Accord Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th
Cir. 2001); Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). In applying
the summary judgment standard, the court must construe "all facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citing Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2005). However, "a nonmovant may not
overcome the summary judgment standard with conc1usional allegations, unsupported assertions,
or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence." McClure v. Boles, 490 F. App'x 666, 667 (5th
5
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007». With
the foregoing legal standards in mind, the Court turns to the issues before it.
C. Analysis and Discussion
On a qualified immunity motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must "demonstrate
the inapplicability of the [qualified immunity] defense" by "present[ing] sufficient evidence to
create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding both prongs of the two-prong qualified
immunity test." Beaulieu v. Lavigne, No. 12-31061,2013 WL 4478228, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 22,
2013) (per curiam) (citing Club Retro, LLC v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) (in tum
citing McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc»). First, he
must present evidence that the facts alleged demonstrate that the government official's conduct
violated the plaintiff's constitutional right. [d. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 V.S. 194,201, 121 S.
Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001».
Second, he must show that the right was clearly
established. [d. (citing Saucier, 533 V.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151). Courts have discretion to
decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, -
/d. (citing
V.S. - - , - - , 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)
(internal citation omitted».
As the Court stated in its earlier memorandum opinion [47] and Order [46], the parties
agree that Plaintiffs have satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, that is, that
Plaintiffs have alleged the violation of a clearly established Eighth Amendment right2 by
2 The
Fifth Circuit has stated:
Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners . . . look to different constitutional
provisions for their respective rights to basic needs such as medical care and
safety. The constitutional rights of a convicted state prisoner spring from the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and, with a
relatively limited reach, from substantive due process. The constitutional rights
of a pretrial detainee, on the other hand, flow from both the procedural and
substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... The State
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claiming that Defendants acted with subjective deliberate indifference to the Decedent's health
or safety by denying adequate medical care and failing to take measures to prevent the
Decedent's suicide. See Defs.' Reply Supp. Mot. Recons. [59] at 6 n.l. Indeed, an alleged
"failure to provide adequate protection against a prisoner's known suicidal impulses is
actionable." Anderson v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., 286 F. App'x 850, 857 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(citing Evans v. City ofMarlin, Tex., 986 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)).
Therefore, the dispositive issue before the Court was, and is, whether the right was
clearly established, that is, whether sufficient evidence raises a question that the conduct of each
or any of These Defendants was objectively unreasonable in light of the then clearly established
law. See Williams v. Kaufman Cnty., Tex., 352 F.3d 994, 1002 n.12 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[I]f a right
is clearly established enough to impart fair warning to officers, then their conduct in violating
that right cannot be objectively reasonable."). In the Court's earlier memorandum opinion [47]
and Order [46] ruling on the Individual Defendants' qualified immunity motion, the Court found
that there was insufficient factual evidence in the record to decide the question of law on
cannot punish a pretrial detainee. ... Since the State does punish convicted
prisoners, but cannot punish pretrial detainees, a pretrial detainee's due process
rights are said to be at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections
available to a convicted prisoner.
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633,639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted; emphases in original). Although a distinction is drawn between the rights of pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners, "no constitutionally relevant difference exists between the rights of pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners to be secure in their basic human needs." Id. at 647. ''The deliberate-indifference standard
applies when determining whether a jail official's episodic act or omission violated a [an inmate's constitutional]
right to medical care and to be secure from harm, including self-inflicted harm." Kflne ex rei. Kane v. Cnty. of
Hardeman, Tex., 254 F.3d 1081,2001 WL 564126, at *1 (5th Cir. May 17,2001) (per curiarn}(citing Hare, 74 F.3d
at 647-48); see Jacobs v. Wesl Fe/iciana Sheri.ffs Dep '1,228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000)}.
In the case sub judice, the Decedent was convicted on charges of contempt of court, careless driving, and
driving without a license. Her sentence was suspended, and she was incarcerated at the Jail for the purpose of
paying off her fines through the Jail's work program. Although the Decedent perhaps was not a typical convicted
prisoner, she was convicted and required to pay fmes that she could not have otherwise paid without participation in
the Jail's work program. For all intents and purposes, she was a convicted prisoner. Thus, the Court will apply the
Eighth Amendment's subjective deliberate-indifference standard in evaluating the claim.
7
objective reasonableness, but that the question could be reconsidered at a later stage in the
litigation. In light of Plaintiffs' new evidentiary submissions, the Court now reconsiders the
issue of whether each of These Defendants' actions was objectively reasonable. See Meadours v.
Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 422 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007).
Defendant Elizabeth Lindsey
First, the Court turns to the meat of Plaintiffs' case: her allegations against Defendant
Lindsey, a jailer at the Prentiss County Jail.
The Court must determine if Plaintiffs have
presented sufficient evidence showing that "[Defendant Lindsey] kn[ew] that [the Decedent]
face[d] a substantial risk of serious harm" and "disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it," or, in other words, "acted or failed to act with deliberate
indifference to that risk" to overcome Defendant Lindsey's qualified immunity defense. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 847, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994); Martin
v. Seal, 510 F. App'x 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Gobert, 463 F.3d at 345-46).
Deliberate indifference requires a showing that Defendant Lindsey (1) was "aware of facts from
which an inference of excessive risk to [the Decedent's] health or safety could be drawn," and
(2) "that [Defendant Lindsey] actually drew an inference that such potential for harm existed."
See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d
1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998)). This "extremely high standard to meet" requires Plaintiffs to show
that Defendant Lindsey "refused to treat [the Decedent], ignored [her] complaints, intentionally
treated [her] incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton
disregard for any serious medical needs." Martin, 510 F. App'x at 314 (quoting Domino v. Tex.
Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
8
The undisputed evidence before the Court indicates that Defendant Lindsey had seen red
welts on the Decedent's arm and knew that the welts were due to the Decedent's attempts to hurt
or cut herself on a metal table, 3 that the Decedent had expressed her desire to hurt or cut herself
to Defendant Lindsey,4 that the Decedent had expressed her need to be alone to Defendant
Lindsey,s that Defendant Lindsey had informed the Decedent that the only place she could be
alone was the isolation chamber and that Decedent had agreed to go to the isolation chamber and
after that began requesting to go to the isolation chamber, 6 and that Defendant Lindsey placed
the Decedent in the isolation chamber and that she remained in the isolation chamber for hours
until Defendant Lindsey moved her back to her cell in order to place another inmate in the
isolation chamber. 7
The question is whether Defendant Lindsey was aware that the Decedent was on the
verge of committing suicide (a clearly serious harm). According to Plaintiffs, the answer is yes.
Declarations from various inmates who were incarcerated with the Decedent indicate that other
inmates were aware of the Decedent's intent to commit suicide. s Interestingly, the declaration of
3 See Lindsey Ail. [45-1] 1\7 ("[The Decedent] showed me her anns where she had rubbed them on a
table. Her arm had red welts in a couple of places, but the skin was not broken."); Lindsey Shift Report 2/18/2009
[45-3] at I ("[The Decedent] showed me her arms. There were red welts on the inside forearm length[-]wise from
elbow to wrist varying in size. No skin was broken."); Inmate Aldridge Decl. [55-1] at 2 ("She showed me her arms
that night when she got out to shower. They had marks on them."); Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4 ("[The
Decedent] had tried to cut her wrists on a metal table in her room."); Inmate Mitchell Decl. [55-3] at 2 ("She showed
me her arms where she had been trying to cut her arms on the table in her room.").
4 See Lindsey Shift Report 2/18/2009 [45-3] at 1 ("[The Decedent] said, 'I want to cut myself.' "); Inmate
Mitchell Decl. [55-3] at 2 ("[The Decedent] said she was going to hurt herself.").
5 See,
e.g., Lindsey Aff. [45-1] 1\8 ("[The Decedent] told me that she just wanted some peace and quiet.").
W8-9; Inmate Aldridge Dec!. [55-1] at 3; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 6.
6
Sef! Lindsey Aff. [45-1]
7
See Pis.' Compl. [1] 1131; Lindsey Aff. [45-1] 1110; Inmate Aldridge Decl. [55-1] at 3.
8 See Inmate Aldridge Decl. [55-1] at 2-3 ("[The Decedent] was telling me that night that she was tr[y]ing
to kill herself, but everything was to[o] dull.... She didn't want me to tell, but I told other inmates. It worried me.
. .. She told me she lost everything and no one cared."); Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 3 ("Tuesday[, February] 17th
is the fIrst time I heard [the Decedent] say anything about suicide."); Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4 (during the
9
Sandra Aldridge, an inmate who was incarcerated with the Decedent, states that approximately
two days before the Decedent's suicide, the Decedent "didn't want [Inmate Aldridge] to tell [of
the Decedent's intention to commit suicide]" but that Inmate Aldridge "told other inmates." See
Inmate Aldridge [55-1] at 2. This evidence tends to show that the Decedent wanted to keep her
suicidal ideations private.
However, the evidence presented by Plaintiffs supports that the
Decedent told Defendant Lindsey that she was trying to kill herself by cutting her wrists and
"had lost everything, including her family and her home, and had nothing more to live for." PIs.'
Compl. [1] ~ 29; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4,6; Inmate Shinault Decl. [55-4] at 2.
According to the evidence presented by Defendant Lindsey, the answer is no. Defendant
Lindsey maintains that the Decedent never expressed to her any intent to commit suicide. See
Lindsey Aff. [45-1]
~~
7, 13 ("It did not occur to me that [the Decedent] had any desire to kill
herself because it would have been impossible to do so by rubbing her forearm on that table....
[The Decedent] never told me that she wanted to commit suicide or kill herself. I never heard
from any other officers or inmates that [the Decedent] wanted to commit suicide or kill
herself.").
Based on the conflicting evidence from both sides, including the several inmate
declarations and Defendant Lindsey's affidavit and shift reports, a clear genuine dispute of
material fact exists as to whether Defendant Lindsey was aware that the Decedent was on the
verge of committing suicide. Defendant Lindsey's statements in her affidavit that she was not
aware that the Decedent was on the verge of suicide are not enough to eliminate the genuine
dispute of fact. See Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2003).
Decedent's bathing time, she "told Tina Pitts that she was going to kill herself."); Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 5, 6
("I really didn't think [the Decedent] was going to do it. I told [the Decedent] that cutting her wrists was going to
hurt.... [The Decedent] said something about tying her sheet to the vent. ... [S]he said she was going to tie her
sheet on the air/heat vent and hang herself."); Inmate Mitchell Decl. [55-3] at 2 ("She had started [sic] that she
wanted to kill herself because life wasn't fair.").
10
However, even assuming that Defendant Lindsey knew about the Decedent's suicidal
ideations, Plaintiffs cannot prevail against Defendant Lindsey unless they can also establish that
Defendant Lindsey's actions were objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law.
Although deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard, Plaintiffs "need not show that
[Defendant Lindsey] acted or failed to act believing that hann would actually befall [the
Decedent]; it is enough that [Defendant Lindsey] acted or failed to act despite [her] knowledge
of a substantial risk of serious hann." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S. Ct. 1970. Defendant
Lindsey was not required to take flawless action or reasonable action to prevent the Decedent's
suicide-even assuming she was aware of the suicide risk. To satisfy the deliberate indifference
standard, Plaintiffs must show that Defendant Lindsey refused to treat the Decedent, ignored the
Decedent's complaints, intentionally treated the Decedent incorrectly, or engaged in any similar
conduct that clearly evinces a wanton disregard for the Decedent's serious medical needs. See
Domino, 239 F.3d at 756.
Plaintiffs claim that the Decedent voiced her desperation and suicidal ideations to
Defendant Lindsey, telling Defendant Lindsey "that she had lost everything, including her family
and her home, and had nothing more to live for" and that "[the Decedent] told the Defendant
Lindsey that she was trying to kill herself by cutting her wrists and showed the Defendant
Lindsey her arms," but that in return, Defendant Lindsey "ignored" the Decedent and told her
she had bigger fish to fry. PIs.' Compl. [1]
11 29; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4, 6; Inmate
Shinault DecL [55-4] at 2. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Lindsey and the Decedent had more
than one "verbal confrontation." PIs.' CompL [1]
ml 28,
30. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
Lindsey was verbally combative with the Decedent, infonning the Decedent at one point when
she would not come and pick up her lunch tray that she was "not [her] maid and would not 'taze'
11
her but would beat the hell out of her" and that "Defendant Lindsey then slammed [the
Decedent's] cell door shut." PIs.' Compl. [1]
'II 28; Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4, 6; Mitchell Decl.
[55-3] at 2. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Lindsey would not allow the Decedent to
remain indefinitely in the isolation chamber, despite her desire to do so, because another inmate
had to be placed in the isolation chamber for disciplinary reasons. Pis.' Compl. [1]
'II 31; Inmate
Aldridge Decl. [55-1] at 3; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4; Inmate Mitchell Decl. [55-3] at 2;
Inmate Shinault Decl. [55-4] at 2. Plaintiffs maintain that despite the Decedent's vocalization of
her suicidal ideations and showing physical evidence of a desire to kill herself, Defendant
Lindsey failed to make any notation or report of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, failed to notify
the next shift of the situation, failed to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and failed to have
the Decedent evaluated by trained personnel.
Defendant Lindsey concedes that she told the Decedent she had bigger fish to fry, but
argues that she made the statement that she had bigger fish to fry with respect to a report that the
Decedent had flashed her breasts and wrote notes to the male inmates, and that the statement was
not in response to any statement made by the Decedent. See Lindsey Aff. [45-1]
'II 5; Lindsey
Shift Report 211512009 [45-2] at 1. It is undisputed that the Decedent had gotten in trouble for
writing letters or notes to the male inmates. Lindsey Shift Report 2/1512009 [45-2] at 1; Inmate
Aldridge Decl. [55-1] at 2; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 3. It is also undisputed that the
Decedent had trouble getting along with the other inmates. See, e.g., Lindsey Shift Report
211512009 [45-2] at 1; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 3. Defendant Lindsey further argues that
before her shift ended she wrote on the "Pass on Information" sheet to keep a watch on the
Decedent because the Decedent had complained to her that she was having difficulty breathing.
See Lindsey Aff. [45-1] 'II 12.
12
These Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not shown that all officers would have
known in Defendant Lindsey's situation that their actions amounted to a constitutional violation,
because Plaintiffs have offered no proof that all other officers would know that verbally
confronting an inmate and placing an inmate in her cell where he or she ultimately killed herself
were constitutional violations. These Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' allegations at most raise
questions as to whether Defendant Lindsey failed to do more to prevent the Decedent's suicide
or furnished the opportunity for the Decedent to commit suicide by placing her back in her cell
both of which do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs' allegations and evidence at most show that Defendant
Lindsey failed to act reasonably to alleviate the risk that the Decedent would commit suicide-a
failure that does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See Martin, 510 F. App'x at 315
(citing Domino, 239 F.3d at 756). Although "[a] reasonably prudent [person] may well have
deemed it necessary to [take certain precautions]," to be "deliberately indifferent, [Defendant
Lindsey] would have had to have chosen not to [take those precautions] with the expectation that
some harm would result to [Defendant Lindsey]." See Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 489 n.7
(5th Cir. 1999). To overcome Defendant Lindsey's qualified immunity defense in the case sub
judice, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Defendant Lindsey "had the requisite mens rea; that [s]he
[was] actually aware of the risk [that the Decedent would commit suicide], yet consciously
disregarded it." See Martin, 510 F. App'x at 315 (quoting Lawson v. Dall. Cnty. Tex., 286 F.3d
257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted». Plaintiffs have failed to do so. On
the evidence before the Court, the most that can be said is that Defendant Lindsey was negligent
in failing to keep a closer watch on the Decedent than she did, that her verbal reactions to the
Decedent may have further agitated the Decedent, and that she made a mistake in assuming that
13
the Decedent would not commit suicide.
None of these inferences support the extremely
difficult standard of deliberate indifference. The factual evidence is troubling and makes one
ponder whether the Decedent would have been able to effectuate her suicide if circumstances had
been different. For instance, the evidence indicates that the Decedent was in a cell by herself
because she could not get along with the other inmates and/or had gotten in trouble for her
actions with respect to other inmates. See Inmate Aldridge [55-1] at 3; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55
2] at 3. If the Decedent had been in a cell with another inmate, she might not have been able to
effectuate her suicide. However, given the situation, she was not able to be put in a cell with
another inmate at that time. The circumstances of this case are disturbing but do not preclude
qualified immunity to Defendant Lindsey.
It is troubling to this Court that a plaintiff is required to meet such an exacting burden in
order to bring an Eighth Amendment claim against jail officials in an inmate-suicide case,
especially considering the likelihood of inmate suicide in general. See generally LINDSAY M.
HAYES, NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE: 20 YEARS LATER (National Center on Institutions and
Alternatives, April 2010). However, this Court is bound by the precedent of the United States
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which do not support a finding of
deliberate indifference on these facts.
Therefore, Defendant Lindsey is entitled to qualified
immunity.
Defendant Marcella Alvarado
Second, the Court turns to Plaintiffs' allegations against Defendant Alvarado, another
jailer at the Prentiss County Jail, and the declarations of several inmates who were incarcerated
with the Decedent at the time of the alleged incidents: Plaintiffs allege that the Decedent told
Defendant Alvarado that she was having suicidal thoughts and showed Defendant Alvarado cuts
14
on her wrists from trying to cut herself on a metal table in her room. PIs.' Compl. [1]
~
24;
Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4. Plaintiffs further allege that the Decedent told Defendant
Alvarado to take her to the isolation chamber because she could not take it anymore, Inmate
Aldridge Decl. [55-1] at 3, and that Defendant Alvarado complied with the Decedent's request,
placing her in the isolation chamber for several hours. PIs.' Compl. [1]
~
26; PIs.' Mem. Br.
Supp. Resp. Opp'n to Defs.' Qualified Immunity Mot. [41] at 3; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4;
Inmate Mitchell Decl. [55-3] at 2.
After Defendant Alvarado placed the Decedent in the
isolation chamber, Defendant Alvarado "watched [the Decedent] carefully" and then "passed the
situation along to [Defendant Nicole Taylor]." Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 6. Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant Alvarado failed to make any notation or report of the Decedent's suicidal
ideation, failed to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and failed to have the Decedent
evaluated by trained personnel. PIs.' Compl. [1]
~
25.
These Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not shown that all officers would have
known in Defendant Alvarado's situation that their actions amounted to a constitutional
violation, and that Plaintiffs have at most alleged that Defendant Alvarado failed to do more to
prevent the Decedent's suicide, allegations which do not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference.
In viewing all the summary judgment evidence before it, the Court is of the opinion that
Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that raises a question that the conduct of Defendant
Alvarado was objectively unreasonable in light of the then clearly established law. The evidence
before the Court demonstrates that when faced with the Decedent's requests to be placed in the
isolation chamber and at least vocalized unhappiness, Defendant Alvarado complied with the
Decedent's request and placed her in the isolation chamber. The declaration of Inmate Hamm
15
tends to show that Defendant Alvarado even watched the Decedent carefully while she was in
the isolation chamber and informed another jailer of the situation. See Anderson, 286 F. App'x
at 862 (evidence that jail official checked on inmate is indicative that jail official did not ignore
risk of harm to inmate). Plaintiffs' strongest argument is that Defendant Alvarado did not do
enough to prevent the Decedent's suicide-specifically, she allegedly did not put the Decedent
on suicide watch, make a notation in the record of suicidal ideations, or have trained personnel
evaluate the Decedent. Plaintiffs' allegations and evidence at most demonstrate that Defendant
Alvarado acted negligently. To show an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff "must typically
show that a defendant acted, not just negligently, but with deliberate indifference." Minneci v.
Pollard, -
U.S. - , - , 132 S. Ct. 617, 625, 181 L. Ed. 2d 606 (20l2) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (internal quotation marks omitted)}. As stated in the Court's earlier
analysis, deliberate indifference means "knowingly and unreasonably disregarding an objectively
intolerable risk of harm." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846, 114 S. Ct. 1970. Even viewing all the
evidence in Plaintiffs' favor, Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that Defendant Alvarado
knowingly and unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of harm. Therefore, on
the evidence before the Court, Defendant Alvarado is entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendant Jo Carol Knight
Third, the Court turns to Plaintiffs' allegations against Defendant Knight, another jailer at
the Prentiss County Jail, and the declarations of several inmates who were incarcerated with the
Decedent at the time of the alleged incidents: Plaintiffs allege that the Decedent asked Defendant
Knight to place her in the isolation chamber, but that Defendant Knight ignored her requests.
PIs.' Compl. [1] ,-r 32; Inmate Aldridge Decl. [55-1] at 3; Inmate Hamm Decl. [55-2] at 4, 6.
Plaintiffs further allege that Knight at one point slammed the Decedent's cell door shut. PIs.'
16
Compl. [1]
~
32; Inmate Aldridge Decl. [55-1] at 3; Inmate Hamm Dec!. [55-2] at 4,6. Finally,
Plaintiffs allege with respect to Defendant Knight that she failed to make any notation or report
of the Decedent's suicidal ideation, failed to place the Decedent on suicide watch, and failed to
have the Decedent evaluated by trained personne1.
These Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not shown that all officers would have
known in Defendant Knight's situation that denying an inmate's request to be placed in the
isolation chamber amounted to a constitutional violation.
In viewing all the summary judgment evidence before it, the Court is of the opinion that
Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that raises a question that the conduct of Defendant
Knight was objectively unreasonable in light of the then clearly established law. The sparse
evidence concerning Defendant Knight before the Court demonstrates that when faced with the
Decedent's requests to be placed in the isolation chamber and at least vocalized unhappiness,
Defendant Knight if anything, failed to act because she did not perceive a suicide risk. Plaintiffs'
allegations of Defendant Knight's conduct at most demonstrate negligent inaction, which as
stated in the Court's earlier analysis, does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836, 114 S. Ct. 1970; Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S. Ct. 668,88 L. Ed. 2d 677
(1986)). Thus, even viewing the evidence in Plaintiffs' favor, Plaintiffs have failed to allege
deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Knight. Therefore, Defendant Knight is also
entitled to qualified immunity.
D. Conclusion
17
In sum, These Defendants' motion for reconsideration [49] is GRANTED, and
Defendants Elizabeth Lindsey, Marcella Alvarado, and Jo Carol Knight are DISMISSED as
parties to the action based on qualified immunity.
Jl !! 8~
An order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
THIs.theJO~YOfNOvember.2013.
SENIOR JUDGE
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