American General Life Insurance Company v. Hannah et al
Filing
46
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 45 Order on Motion to Stay, Order on Motion to Hold in Abeyance. Signed by Glen H. Davidson on 12/10/12. (mhg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO.1: 12-CV -00087-GHD-DAS
EMMA M. HANNAH; HEATHER NAKOLE HANNAH;
LETOYA JA'KIA HANNAH; JAMEELA VERNA Y HANNAH;
and JASMINE KIARRA HANNAH, by and through her mother
and general guardian, Janice H. Hannah
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY AND
DENYING MOTION TO DENY OR DEFER CONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the Court are (1) a motion to stay discovery [15] filed by Defendants
Heather Nakole Hannah; LeToya Ja'Kia Hannah; Jarneela Vernay Hannah; and Jasmine Kiarra
Hannah, by and through her mother and general guardian, Janice H. Hannah (the "Other
Defendants"); and (2) a motion to deny or defer consideration [24] of the Other Defendants'
motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Emma M. Hannah ("Hannah"). Both motions
are ripe for review. Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the motion to stay discovery
[15] is well taken and should be granted, and that the motion to deny or defer consideration of
the motion for summary judgment [24] is not well taken and should be denied. l
1 These, and any other conclusions in this memorandum opinion and order, are reached in the context of
the standards governing the present motions before the Court, without considering any specific substantive
arguments in the context of the standards governing motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment on
the pleadings. Thus, the conclusions expressed in the memorandum opinion and order do not suggest that the Court
will rule in a particular way when addressing the merits of either the motion for summary judgment or the motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
1
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In a prior state court proceeding, Hannah pled guilty and was convicted of manslaughter
in connection with the death of her husband, Winfred L. Hannah (the "Decedent"). Hannah's
direct appeals and all post-conviction remedies are now exhausted. On April 23, 2012, Plaintiff
American General Life Insurance Company ("Plaintiff") filed an interpleader complaint asserting
allegedly competing claims among Hannah and the Other Defendants to proceeds of an
insurance policy issued to the Decedent. The subject policy identified Hannah as the designated
beneficiary of the policy proceeds and the Other Defendants, who were his children, as
contingent beneficiaries.
Hannah and the Other Defendants filed separate answers to the
complaint.
On October 17, 2012, the Other Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment [16],
as well as a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion for summary judgment
[17].
The Other Defendants contend that the facts relevant to their motion for summary
judgment are already established, and thus, that discovery should be stayed pending the Court's
ruling on their motion for summary judgment.
On November 5, 2012, Hannah filed a response in opposition to the motion to stay
discovery [20], a motion for judgment on the pleadings [23], and a Rule 56(d) motion to deny or
defer consideration [24] of the Other Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Although
Hannah has also filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, she contends that the
Court should stay consideration of the Other Defendants' motion for summary judgment while
ruling instead on her motion for judgment on the pleadings.
2
B.
Motion to Stay Discovery
Trial courts have "broad discretion in discovery matters."
Seiferth v. Helicopteros
Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco
AB, 205 F.3d 208, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir.
1982))). "[A] plaintiffs entitlement to discovery prior to a ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is not unlimited, and may be cut off when the record shows that the requested
discovery is not likely to produce the facts needed by plaintiff to withstand a [Rule 56] motion
for summary judgment." Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ofAm., 694 F.2d 1017, 1029-30 (5th
Cir. 1983). "Discovery is not justified when cost and inconvenience will be its sole result."
Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intern. AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404,436 (5th Cir. 1990).
In the case sub judice, the Other Defendants request that the Court stay discovery in the
case pending the Court's ruling of their motion for summary judgment, which raises two
questions: (1) whether res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel prohibit Hannah
from benefiting from the subject policy proceeds; and (2) whether Hannah is barred from
receiving any benefit of the subject policy proceeds under the Mississippi Code. Hannah agrees
that the Court should stay discovery, but requests that the Court stay discovery only for the
purpose of ruling on her motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the collateral estoppel
doctrine. Hannah further requests that the Court rule on her motion before it rules on the Other
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Hannah maintains that discovery is needed on
issues raised by the Other Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Upon due consideration, the Court finds that discovery should be stayed in this case
pending the resolution of the motion for summary judgment and the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, both of which raise questions of law that cannot be answered by discovery.
3
C Rule 56(d) Motion to Deny or Defer Consideration ofMotion for Summary Judgment
After responding to the Other Defendants' motion to stay discovery, Hannah filed a Rule
56(d) motion requesting that the Court suspend ruling on the Other Defendants' motion for
summary judgment until ruling on Hannah's motion for judgment on the pleadings and that the
Court grant her an opportunity to conduct discovery to develop her opposition to the motion for
summary judgment.
Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justifY its opposition,
the court may:
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take
discovery; or
(3) issue any other appropriate order.
FED. R. Cry. P. 56(d). Rule 56(d) is a safe harbor that has been built into the rules so that
summary judgment is not granted prematurely. See, e.g., Union City Barge Line v. Union
Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129, 136 (5th Cir. 1987). "Given the precautionary nature of the rule,
these requests ordinarily are treated and reviewed liberally. Technical, rigid scrutiny of a Rule
[56(d)] motion is inappropriate." Id Although reviewed liberally, the Rule 56(d) should not be
granted unless the movant demonstrates "1) why the movant needs additional discovery and 2)
how the additional discovery will likely create a genuine issue of material fact." Stearns Airport
Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1999)(citation omitted).
"The movant must be able to demonstrate how postponement and additional discovery
will allow him to defeat summary judgment; it is not enough to 'rely on vague assertions that
discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts.''' Stearns Airport Equipment Co., 170
4
F.3d at 535 (quoting Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990)); Int'l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F .2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir. 1991 ) (citations omitted); see also
Krim v. BancTexas Grp., Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993) (movant must show how
discovery will lead to genuine dispute of fact). A nonmovant is not entitled to a continuance if it
"fail[s] to explain what discovery [it] did have, why it was inadequate, and what [it] expected to
learn from further discovery" and gives only "vague assertions of the need for additional
discovery." Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962,968 (5th Cir. 1999) (in part quoting Reese
v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494,499 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Leza v. City ofLaredo, No. 12-40273,2012 WL 5295625, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 29,2012) (finding
no abuse of discretion when district court denied Rule 56( d) motion because movant failed to
present affidavit or declaration showing entitlement to additional discovery on facts essential to
movant's opposition to summary judgment motion).
Hannah argues in her Rule 56(d) motion that the Other Defendants' motion for summary
judgment is "unfounded" and "premature" and that the Court should suspend ruling on that
motion until ruling on Hannah's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Hannah further argues
that discovery is needed to explore medical causation issues surrounding the death of the
Decedent and, specifically, whether Decedent experienced respiratory problems which led to his
death. Hannah attaches to her motion the Decedent's hospital discharge summary. Hannah
further questions the credibility of the state medical examiner who performed the Decedent's
autopsy; Hannah contends that the state medical examiner "was the only witness for the
prosecution" in the prior state court proceeding. Hannah does not identify what discovery is
needed in this respect, but attaches to her motion thirty-four pages of various letters, press
5
releases, and articles that she contends "call[
] into question [the state medical examiner'S]
credentials, his abilities, and his credibility."
The Court finds that Hannah's Rule 56(d) motion fails to demonstrate how additional
opportunity for discovery would assist her in justifying her opposition to the motion for summary
judgment. Although she seemingly argues that additional discovery would call into question the
credibility of the state medical examiner who performed the autopsy of the Decedent, and that
additional discovery would tend to show that respiratory failure was a cause of the Decedent's
death, she has not demonstrated how discovery pertaining to these factual issues would allow her
to further develop her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Hannah has failed to
show how discovery-the search for facts-would assist her in opposing the questions of law
raised by the Other Defendants' motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Brazos Valley Coal.
for Lifo, Inc. v. City of Bryan, Tex., 421 F.3d 314,327 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Hannah has
failed to demonstrate how additional discovery would allow her to further develop her opposition
to the motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that her Rule 56(d) motion is not well taken
and should be denied.
D. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Other Defendants' motion to stay discovery [15] shall be GRANTED,
and discovery shall be STAYED pending the Court's resolution of both the motion for summary
judgment and the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Hannah's motion to deny or defer
consideration [24] of the motion for summary judgment shall be DENIED.
A separate order shall be issued in accordance with this opinion this day .
.
~
THIS, the l$L day of December, 2012.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?