Higginbotham v. State of Mississippi
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 13 FINAL JUDGMENT granting Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge Glen H. Davidson on 6/18/14. (jlm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
J. C. HIGGINBOTHAM
PETITIONER
v.
No.l:13CV207-GHD-JMV
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se petition of 1. C. Higginbotham for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The State has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely filed
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and Higginbotham has responded. The matter is ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the State's motion to dismiss will be granted and the instant petition
for a writ of habeas corpus dismissed as untimely filed.
Facts and Procedural Posture
1.c. Higginbotham, is in the custody the Mississippi Department of Corrections and is
currently housed at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution in Leakesville, Mississippi. On May
1,2009, Higginbotham pled guilty to one count ofCapital Murder in the Circuit Court ofWinston
County, Mississippi. On December 1, 2009, he was sentenced to serve life in the custody ofthe
Mississippi Department ofCorrections (MDOC). By statute, there is no direct appeal from a guilty
plea. See Miss. Code Arm. § 99-35-101. Higginbotham then filed a Motion for Post-conviction Relief
in the Winston County Circuit Court on November 22, 2011 (signed on November 10, 2011). On
January 12,2013, the circuit court denied the motion. Higginbotham appealed the decision to the
Mississippi Supreme Court, and on February 26, 2013, the Mississippi Court ofAppeals affinned.
Higginbotham v. State, 122 So.3d 1205 (Miss.Ct.App. 2013) reh 'g denied, Juny 23, 2013, cert. denied,
Oct. 10,2013 (Case No. 2012-CP-00204-COA).
One-Year Limitations Period
Decision in this case is governed by 28 U.S.c. § 2244(d), which provides:
(d)( I) A I-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State
action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
28 U. S.C. § 2244(d)(l) and (2).
As Mississippi law has no provision to appeal from a guilty plea, Higginbotham's
judgment became final on December 1,20009, the date he was sentenced. See Roberts v. Cockrell,
3192 F.3d 690 (5 th Cir. 2003). The deadline for Higginbotham to seek federal habeas corpus
relief thus became December 1,2010, one year after his conviction became fmal. Higginbotham
sought state post-conviction collateral relief on November 22,2011 (signed on November 10,2011),
but the application was filed after the federal habeas corpus deadline expired. As such, Higginbotham
does not benefit from statutory tolling of the federal limitations period. In addition, he filed a previous
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federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus on December 8,2010 in this court (Case No.1: 11 CV64
SA-DAS. That petition was dismissed on April 21 , 2011, for failure to exhaust state court remedies.
However, the filing ofa federal petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus does not toll the one-year statute
oflimitations. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,121 S.Ct. 2120,2129 (2001); see also Grooms v.
Johnson, 208 F.3d 488 (5 th Cir. 1999); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5 th Cir. 1999).
Under the "mailbox rule," the instant pro se federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is deemed filed on the date the petitioner delivered it to prison officials for mailing to the district
court. Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398,401, reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied, 196 F.3d 1259
(5 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1057, 120 S. Ct. 1564, 146 L.Ed.2d 467 (2000) (citing
Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 376-78 (5 th Cir. 1998)). In this case, the federal petition was
filed sometime between the date it was signed on October 17, 2013, and the date it was received
and stamped as "filed" in the district court on October 21,2013. Giving the petitioner the benefit
of the doubt by using the earlier date, the instant petition was filed 1,051 days after the
December 1, 2010, filing deadline. The petitioner does not allege any "rare and exceptional"
circumstance to warrant equitable tolling. Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513-14 (5 th Cir. 1999).
The instant petition will thus dismissed with prejudice and without evidentiary hearing as
untimely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). A final judgment consistent with this memorandum
opinion will issue today.
SO ORDERED, this, the
~
~ day of June, 2014.
JJJ /J9~
SENIOR JUDGE
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