Hughes v. Dyncorp International, LLC

Filing 79

ORDER denying Motions in Limine 65 and 69 . Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 8/23/2016. (dbm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION

DEANN HUGHES

PLAINTIFF

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-109-SA-DAS

DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL, LLC

DEFENDANT
ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Dyncorp’s motions in limine to
exclude evidence purporting to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination [65], and
evidence that a prior employer accommodated the Plaintiff's class schedule [69]. The Plaintiff
responded [71, 72] and the Defendant replied [73, 74], making these motions ripe for review.
Motion to Exclude Pattern and Practice Evidence
Based on the briefing in this case it is likely that the Plaintiff will seek to introduce
evidence at trial that the Plaintiff and her former supervisor Duncan, were the only African
American managerial employees at any of the ten sites operated by the Defendant employer, that
the Plaintiff was the only female managerial employee, and that Duncan and the Plaintiff were
the only managerial employees ever to be suspended by the Defendant. The Defendant now
seeks to exclude this evidence arguing that it is irrelevant and that its prejudicial effect outweighs
its probative value. The Plaintiff indicated that she may seek to use this evidence in both
statistical and comparative ways.
A plaintiff may use statistical evidence in a disparate treatment case “to show that an
employer’s justification for a discriminatory act is pretext.” Hollins v. Premier Ford Lincoln
Mercury, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 736, 752 (N.D. Miss. 2011) (citing Plemer v. Parsons–Gilbane,
713 F.2d 1127, 1137 (5th Cir. 1983)). However, the Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he

probative value of statistical evidence ultimately depends on all the surrounding facts,
circumstances, and other evidence of discrimination.” Hollins, 766 F. Supp.at 752 (citing Int’l
Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977)).
Similarly, evidence of disparate treatment, that other similarly situated employees were
treated differently, can be used to establish that an employer’s stated reason for taking an adverse
action against an employee is pretextual. Rutland-Simpson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. App’x 314,
318 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401. Based on these authorities, the Court
finds that so long as the Plaintiff provides an appropriate foundation and context at trial, this
evidence is relevant and will not be excluded at this time.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403. (emphasis added) The Defendant
argues that the introduction of Duncan’s suspension could result in a “mini-trial” over the
reasons and circumstances for Duncan’s suspension, and confuse the jury. Because, based on the
current record, it does not appear that the circumstances surrounding Duncan’s suspension are in
dispute, this argument by the Defendant is not well taken.
The Defendant next argues that evidence of Duncan’s suspension is prejudicial and will
confuse the jury because evidence of allegedly bad treatment of Duncan is not admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to prove bad treatment of the Plaintiff. The Defendant relies on

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Schrand v. Fed Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1988) to support their argument. Schrand
is easily distinguishable from the instant case. The Schrand Court excluded evidence of bad
treatment of “two employees of a national concern, working in places far from the plaintiff's
place of employment, under different supervisors.” Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d
152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988). In the instant case, Duncan was the Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor,
and it is alleged that they were both suspended at the same time for the same reasons. The
Plaintiff cites to numerous cases distinguishing Schrand on this basis. See Lewis v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., No. CIV A-06-CA-058LY, 2007 WL 1100422, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2007)
(allowing evidence offered by plaintiff that coworker worked under the very supervisor he
alleges discriminated against him, and was terminated under similar circumstances as him), and
Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing Schrand on a similar
basis). Because the factual bases for Duncan and the Plaintiff’s suspensions share common facts,
the Court finds the logic of these cases distinguishing Schrand persuasive and will not exclude
this evidence on this basis at this time. For these reasons, the Defendant’s motion to exclude
pattern and practice evidence is denied.
Motion to Exclude Class Schedule Accommodation Evidence
Based on the briefing it is likely that the Plaintiff will seek to introduce evidence at trial
that her previous employer, the Defendant’s predecessor, accommodated her class schedule by
allowing her to adjust her working hours. The Defendant objects to the introduction of this
evidence arguing that it is irrelevant and its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. The
Plaintiff alleges that her previous employer allowed her flexible working hours so that she could
attend classes. Much of the dispute in the instant case surrounds the Plaintiff’s requests for a
similar accommodation from the Defendant. Plaintiff worked for her previous employer, L-3, for

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a number of years before the Defendant took over L-3’s contract. Although the Plaintiff had a
new employer, her duties, immediate supervisor, and the vast majority of her coworkers and
subordinates remained the same. Because it is unclear at this time precisely how the Plaintiff
may seek to use evidence of her prior employer’s accommodation at trial, the Defendant’s
motion to exclude will be denied. This ruling is in no way indicative of how the Court may rule
on a similar objection at trial, depending on the case ultimately presented.
Conclusion
For all the reasons state above, the Defendant’s Motion to exclude evidence purporting to
establish a pattern or practice of discrimination [65] is DENIED.
Defendant’s Motion to exclude evidence that a prior employer accommodated plaintiff's
class schedule [69] is also DENIED.

SO ORDERED this the 23rd day of August, 2016.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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