Moody v. Lowndes County, Mississippi et al

Filing 112

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 111 Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Neal B. Biggers on 9/22/2016. (llw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
ANGELA DAWN MOODY

V.

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO: 1:14CV197-NBB-DAS

LOWNDES COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI;
TONY COOPER, in His Individual Capacity;
and SCOTT FARRELL, in His Individual Capacity

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the court upon the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
Upon due consideration of the motions, responses, exhibits, and applicable authority, the court is
ready to rule.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Angela Dawn Moody, was married to defendant Scott Farrell in 2003 and
divorced in January 2011. The couple have one child from the marriage, a daughter. As part of
the divorce decree, Moody received primary custody of their daughter with visitation rights
granted to Farrell. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Moody was a teacher at
New Hope Elementary School in Lowndes County, Mississippi.
Farrell came to the Lowndes County Sheriff’s Department on November 28, 2012, and
alleged to defendant Tony Cooper, an investigator with the sheriff’s department, that Moody had
been harassing him via electronic communications. Cooper referred Farrell to the Lowndes
County Justice Court and shortly thereafter took an extended leave from his employment for
approximately two months. During the time Cooper was out of the office on leave, Farrell met
with Allison Kizer, the county prosecuting attorney for Lowndes County, and submitted to her a

criminal affidavit for misdemeanor cyberstalking against Moody. Kizer chose not to move
forward on Farrell’s criminal affidavit because, in her opinion, the communications Moody sent
to Farrell did not meet the standards for a charge of misdemeanor cyberstalking.
Farrell contacted Cooper again when Cooper returned from his extended leave alleging
that Moody continued to harass him and asking Cooper to arrest her. Cooper met with Kizer to
discuss her opinion about appropriate charges, and Kizer opined that the charges would fall
under the felony cyberstalking statute, not the misdemeanor statute.
On November 5, 2013, Cooper contacted Moody to discuss Farrell’s allegations, and
Moody referred him to her attorney at the time, Michael Farrow. Cooper spoke with Farrow the
same day and was advised that Moody would not present her side of the story to the sheriff’s
department. Cooper then drafted and filed with the Lowndes County Justice Court a criminal
affidavit that stated as follows:
Count: 01
Angela Farrell (Moody) did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously electronically
mail or electronically communicate to Lawrence Scott Farrell repeatedly for the
purpose of threatening, terrifying, or harassing Lawrence Scott Farrell.
To wit: On November 28, 2012, Scott Farrell reported he has received numerous
text messages and emails from his former wife, Angela Farrell, after telling her to
cease emailing and texting him. Mr. Farrell has produced numerous messages
sent by Mrs. Farrell.
The affidavit erroneously states that Moody was charged under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-4515(1)(a) but should state § 97-45-15(1)(b). Moody admitted at her deposition that the factual
allegations contained in the affidavit set forth above represent a “true statement.”
Cooper’s criminal affidavit was filed with the Lowndes County Justice Court on
November 6, 2013, and the Justice Court, Judge Peggy G. Phillips presiding, issued an arrest
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warrant for Moody after a hearing and finding of probable cause. Cooper then contacted Moody
and made arrangements for her to turn herself in to the sheriff’s department, choosing not to
arrest her at the elementary school where she worked. Moody agreed and turned herself in on
November 7, 2013, at 4:13 p.m. At Cooper’s request, Sheriff Mike Arledge approved a
recognizance bond for Moody, and Moody was released on her signature at 4:42 p.m. the same
day.
Moody’s initial appearance before the Lowndes County Justice Court occurred on
November 13, 2013. She was accompanied by her attorney, Michael Farrow. Judge Phillips set
Moody’s bail at $2500. Though it is uncontested that the judge did not advise Moody that she
was required to use a bail bondsman, Moody assumed that such was the case and apparently
relied on her attorney to inform her otherwise, which he did not do. Moody thus executed an
appearance bond with a bail bondsman the same day.
The following day, an article about Moody’s arrest appeared in the local newspaper
entitled “New Hope teacher arrested for cyber stalking.” The article included Moody’s mugshot.
Moody’s preliminary hearing was held before Lowndes County Justice Court Judge Ron
Cooke on December 17, 2013. Moody was represented by Tim Hudson who called Cooper as a
witness during the hearing and asked him numerous questions about the copies of electronic
communications that were made part of the record. Moody admitted in her deposition taken as
part of the present litigation that Cooper did not provide any false or misleading testimony at the
hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Cooke dismissed the charge of felony
cyberstalking against Moody.

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Moody filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on October 21, 2014, alleging
federal claims for violation of her rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and state law claims under the Mississippi Torts Claims Act
(“MTCA”) against Lowndes County, Mississippi, and Cooper, in his individual capacity, as well
as Farrell, in his individual capacity. She asks for, inter alia, actual and punitive damages
against defendants Cooper and Farrell1 for arrest without probable cause and in violation of the
Fourth and First Amendments as well as damages for embarrassment caused her by publication
of her arrest in the Lowndes County newspaper. She also asserts that Farrell, with the assistance
of Cooper, caused her to be arrested in retaliation for her reporting Farrell to the Alabama
Department of Human Resources for his alleged failure to keep up to date with his child support
payments. She also asks the court to declare that defendant Lowndes County violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by failing to advise her of the procedures for bail established by
Mississippi Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 6.02.
The defendants were properly served and timely answered the plaintiff’s complaint.
They now move for summary judgment on all claims. Further, the individual defendants,
Cooper and Farrell, assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity, though Farrell also asserts
that he is not a “state actor” under section 1983.

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Moody alleges that Farrell is liable under section 1983 as a “state actor,” even though he is a
private citizen.

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Standard of Review
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to
“go beyond the pleadings and . . . designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Id. at 324. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be
satisfied that no rational trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Summary judgment, although a useful
device, must be employed cautiously because it is a final adjudication on the merits.” Jackson v.
Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir. 1989).
Analysis
The plaintiff alleges that Lowndes County Sheriff’s Department investigator Tony
Cooper violated her Fourth Amendment rights by “causing Plaintiff to be arrested when he knew
there was no probable cause for the arrest . . . .” The plaintiff also alleges that Cooper violated
her First Amendment rights because he arrested her for engaging in protected speech –
specifically, that the content of the electronic communications at issue here pertained to her
daughter and Farrell’s alleged failure to make his child support payments in accordance with the
couple’s divorce decree.
Qualified immunity protects a police officer or other person acting under color of state
law “insofar as his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

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of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19
(1982). The court is to apply a two-step analysis, now discretionary, to determine whether a
government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009). “First, the plaintiff must show that he suffered a constitutional violation, and then we
must determine whether the action causing the violation was objectively unreasonable in light of
clearly established law at the time of the conduct.” Lacy v. Shaw, 357 Fed. App’x 607, 609 (5th
Cir. 2009) (citing Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2007)). Qualified immunity
“provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
It is, of course, axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment requires the existence of probable
cause before a police officer may perform a custodial arrest or “cause[ ] any significant pretrial
restraint of liberty.” Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1992). Addressing false
arrest allegations within the context of qualified immunity analysis, the Supreme Court has
explained:
At common law, in cases where probable cause to arrest was lacking, a
complaining witness’ immunity turned on the issue of malice, which was a jury
question. Under the Harlow standard, on the other hand, an allegation of malice
is not sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively
reasonable manner. The Harlow standard is specifically designed to avoid
excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many
insubstantial claims on summary judgment, and we believe it sufficiently serves
this goal. Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious
that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should
issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue,
immunity should be recognized.

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Id. “Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable
cause is present are entitled to [qualified] immunity.” Haggerty v. Texas Southern Univ., 391
F.3d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 2004).
Cooper’s personal involvement with this case in his individual capacity was submitting a
criminal affidavit to the Lowndes County Justice Court in support of a felony cyberstalking
charge against Moody. Justice Court Judge Peggy Phillips then issued an arrest warrant for
Moody after a hearing and finding of probable cause. “Where an arrest is made under authority
of a properly issued warrant, the arrest is simply not a false arrest.” Comer v. Lindley, 318 F.
App’x 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982)).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized, however, that “both intentional misrepresentations in warrant
applications and material omissions from the same may give rise to Fourth Amendment claims.”
Johnson v. Norcross, 565 F. App’x 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d
1104, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 2006)).
As the defendants argue, the court’s analysis of whether Cooper is entitled to qualified
immunity should focus on whether he had a reasonable basis to believe that Moody had violated
the statute at issue. Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion that Cooper arrested Moody “when he
knew there was no probable cause,” Cooper maintains to this day that he did in fact have
probable cause to arrest her and that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
“In making a determination of probable cause, we do not require a police officer to be
perfect, nor do we want him always to err on the side of caution out of the fear of being sued.”
Martin, 973 F.2d at 453. It is required, however, that the police officer “make a reasonable
determination whether probable cause exists.” Id.

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Cooper charged Moody with a violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-45-15(1)(b) which
states:
(1) It is unlawful for a person to (b) Electronically mail or electronically
communicate to another repeatedly, whether or not conversation ensues, for the
purpose of threatening, terrifying or harassing any person.
Cooper’s affidavit in support of Moody’s arrest warrant stated as follows:
Count: 01
Angela Farrell (Moody) did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously electronically
mail or electronically communicate to Lawrence Scott Farrell repeatedly for the
purpose of threatening, terrifying, or harassing Lawrence Scott Farrell.
To wit: On November 28, 2012, Scott Farrell reported he has received numerous
text messages and emails from his former wife, Angela Farrell, after telling her to
cease emailing and texting him. Mr. Farrell has produced numerous messages
sent by Mrs. Farrell.
Moody admitted at her deposition that the factual allegations contained in the criminal affidavit
that Cooper presented to the Lowndes County Justice Court represent a “true statement.”
The plaintiff has provided the court with a great deal of alleged facts that ultimately
prove to be irrelevant to her claims. These include facts regarding Moody’s personal
background; her marriage to and divorce from Scott Farrell; problems, issues, and
communications between Moody and Farrell subsequent to their divorce; Farrell’s alleged
“mental abuse of Moody”; Farrell’s failure to keep up to date with his child support payments;
and Moody’s reporting Farrell to the Alabama Department of Human Resources. As Cooper was
not apprised of these extenuating circumstances alleged by the plaintiff in her brief prior to his
executing the criminal affidavit on November 6, 2013, the information has no bearing on the
question of Cooper’s entitlement to qualified immunity. The court will not hold Cooper
accountable for information that was not presented to him, especially in light of the fact that
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Cooper invited Moody and her attorney to his office to afford Moody an opportunity to explain
her side of the story prior to his filing the affidavit. Moody refused Cooper’s invitation,
informing him that she would not come in unless under a warrant.
As the defendants note, the criminality of the electronic communications addressed by
§ 97-45-15(1)(b) is premised upon frequency (i.e., “repeatedly”) and the nature of the conduct
(i.e., “for the purpose of . . . harassing any person.”). It is not premised upon the specific content
of the communications. Accordingly, Cooper’s affidavit in support of the arrest warrant was not
premised upon the content of the communications but rather upon Moody’s conduct. The
Supreme Court has held that “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling
recipient.” Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). Further, “it has never
been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed.” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502
(1949).
Farrell provided Cooper with text messages, email correspondence, and Facebook posts
between Moody and Farrell, which the defendants attached as exhibits to their motions for
summary judgment. In two separate communications, Farrell instructed Moody to cease sending
messages to him unless they were for the specific purpose of making arrangements regarding the
couple’s daughter. Farrell even informed Moody that he would consider further communications
harassment. On November 24, 2012, Farrell stated in a text message to Moody, “Do not text me
further unless it is to pick up my daughter. I said I will see you in court pertaining to anything
else. This will be the only time I ask . . . . Future [sic] other than picking up [A]llie [daughter]

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will be harassment.” On September 2, 2013, Farrell again instructed Moody to stop contacting
him, stating, “DO NOT contact me further unless it is to get my daughter for my visitation or
info on her. Anything else is harassment.” Yet, Moody continued to send harassing electronic
communications to Farrell.
The plaintiff asserts that Lowndes County Justice Court Judge Cooke, in dismissing the
case, stated that if they arrested every mother who was mad at her ex-husband for not paying
child support, the jails would be full. Ostensibly, the judge made this statement and the plaintiff
included it in her brief to note that the arrest in this case is perhaps not the kind of conduct the
Mississippi Legislature intended to punish in enacting § 97-45-15(1)(b). This court does not
necessarily disagree with Judge Cooke’s statement or the plaintiff’s position in this specific
regard and even questions whether the statute itself would pass constitutional muster if for no
other reason than the fact that it may be unconstitutionally overbroad. The issue of the
constitutionality of the statute, however, is not before this court. The questions the court must
address are whether probable cause existed for the plaintiff’s arrest and whether the arrest
violated the plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment rights. The court answers these questions in
the negative.
The record before the court reflects that Moody was technically in violation of § 97-4515(1)(b), in that she did, repeatedly and for the purpose of harassing, electronically mail or
electronically communicate to Farrell, and she continued to do so after he instructed her to stop.
Cooper therefore had probable cause to arrest Moody and is, accordingly, entitled to qualified
immunity as to the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.

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Likewise, the court finds that Cooper is entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiff’s
First Amendment claim. The substantive content of Moody’s electronic communications to
Farrell is not at issue because the criminality of the statute is not based thereon. That being said,
many of the electronic communications sent by Moody to Farrell contain nothing but harassing
content. For instance, Moody emailed Farrell shortly after his second marriage ended with a
picture of his recently separated wife with another man, stating, “Glad your wife is moving on.
And Michael [the other man] is a sweet sweet guy. She looks like she is much happier!!!”
Moody even acknowledged in her deposition that there was no other reason to send this message
than to be hurtful. “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as
a criminal act would raise no questions under that instrument.” Chaplinksy v. State of New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In the end, whether Moody’s communications related to
child support, hurtful comments, or other matters, the record reflects that they were sent
repeatedly, frequently, and in a harassing manner. This is a violation of Mississippi’s felony
cyberstalking statute, and Moody’s mistaken assertion that she was engaging in protected speech
in her electronic communications to Farrell does not alter that fact.
The plaintiff cites Brooks v. City of West Point, Miss., 639 F. App’x 986 (5th Cir. 2016),
in support of her argument that her arrest under Cooper’s affidavit constitutes a violation of the
First Amendment. The Brooks court held that a police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity when he arrested a person for cursing him and using profanity. Id. at 990. The
plaintiff argues that cursing is simply one form of harassment. The court finds that Brooks is not
analogous to the present case, however, because, as the Fifth Circuit acknowledged in Brooks,

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Mississippi law is clear that profane remarks to law enforcement officers, without more, cannot
be the basis for an arrest pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-7 (“Disorderly conduct; refusal to
comply with police request”). Id. at 989 (citing Jones v. State, 798 So. 2d 1241, 1247-48 (Miss.
2001) (en banc) (holding that a defendant’s profane remarks to a police officer were insufficient
to establish that the defendant had engaged in disorderly conduct)). Mississippi law is not clear,
however, as to the proposition the plaintiff appears to be arguing – that a person cannot be
charged under § 97-45-15(1)(b) as long as the person’s repeated, harassing electronic
communications are limited to a legitimate exception, including divorce or child custody issues
with the person’s ex-spouse. The plaintiff has provided the court with no published opinion by
the Mississippi Supreme Court, the Mississippi Court of Appeals, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, or any federal district court within Mississippi limiting prohibited conduct in § 97-4515(1)(b), and the court is aware of no such opinion.
Moody also asserts that she was arrested in retaliation for reporting Farrell to the
Alabama Department of Human Resources. Because Cooper had probable cause to arrest
Moody, Cooper is also entitled to “qualified immunity as to any claim plaintiff may be making
for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment.” Carney v. Lewis, No. 3:14cv286TSL-JCG, 2014 WL 7231772, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 18, 2014) (citing Reichle v. Howards, 132
S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (“[A] plaintiff cannot state a claim of retaliatory prosecution in
violation of the First Amendment if the charges were supported by probable cause.”)); Ashcraft
v. City of Vicksburg, 561 F. App’x 399, 401 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that qualified immunity
shielded defendant from First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim because the plaintiff could not

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“demonstrate[ ] that she had a clearly established ‘right’ to be free from a retaliatory arrest that
was otherwise supported by probable cause”).
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Tony Cooper is entitled to qualified
immunity. No genuine issue of material fact exists as to the plaintiff’s claims against Cooper,
and summary judgment will be granted in his favor.
Scott Farrell has also moved for summary judgment. Farrell is a private citizen and is not
employed by Lowndes County. He argues that he is, therefore, not a “state actor” under section
1983. The court agrees.
“For a private citizen . . . to be held liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege
that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors.” Priester v. Lowndes
County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit has held that a private citizen may
be liable as a state actor under section 1983 if he was a “willful participant in joint activity with
the State or its agents.” Priester, 354 F.3d at 420 (quoting Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343
(5th Cir. 1994)). To recover under this theory, the plaintiff must prove: “(1) an agreement
between the private and public defendants to commit an illegal act and (2) a deprivation of
constitutional rights.” Id. “Allegations that are merely conclusory, without reference to specific
facts, will not suffice.” Priester, 354 F.3d at 420 (citing Brinkmann v. Johnston, 793 F.2d 111,
113 (5th Cir. 1986)).
The court has already found that Tony Cooper did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, and the plaintiff has directed the court to no evidence that a conspiracy existed between
Farrell and Cooper or Lowndes County or that Farrell’s actions can be fairly attributed to the
government. Moody has made only conclusory allegations against Farrell, which are insufficient

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to survive summary judgment. The court therefore finds that no genuine issue of material fact
exists as to Moody’s federal claims against Farrell, and Farrell is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
The plaintiff also asserts a state law claim against Farrell for abuse of process.
“Mississippi jurisprudence defines abuse of process as ‘the intentional use of legal process for an
improper purpose incompatible with the lawful function of the process by one with an ulterior
motive in doing so, and with resulting damages.’” McCornell v. City of Jackson, Miss., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 605, 610 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (quoting Hyde Const. Co., Inc. v. Koehring Co., 387 F.
Supp. 702, 711-14 (S.D. Miss. 1974)). The essential elements of an abuse of process claim are:
“(1) that the defendant made an illegal and improper perverted use of the process, a use neither
warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) that the defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose
in exercising such illegal, perverted or improper use of process; and (3) that damage resulted to
the plaintiff from the irregularity.” State for Use and Benefit of Foster v. Turner, 319 So. 2d
233, 236 (Miss. 1975). The court finds that the use of the process in this case was both
“warranted . . . [and] authorized by the process.” Moody has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to this claim, and the court finds that it should be dismissed.
The plaintiff also brings claims against Lowndes County based on the issue of her bail.
She seeks a declaration from this court that Lowndes County violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by failing to give notice to arrestees of their right to be released by posting a ten
percent deposit or otherwise being released upon their own recognizance and that Lowndes
County violated Mississippi law by not warning the plaintiff of the procedures for bail
established by Mississippi Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 6.02. She also seeks a

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declaration and injunction ordering Lowndes County to refrain from arbitrarily requiring persons
to post financial bail through a professional bondsman without giving notice to the procedures
described in Local Rule 6.02.
The plaintiff’s claims relating to her bail are moot. “[C]laims for declaratory and
injunctive relief regarding the bail procedures must . . . be dismissed as moot” upon an
individual’s release from jail. Smith v. City of Tupelo, Miss., 281 F. App’x 279, 282-83 (citing
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 483 (1982)). Moody was released within the hour after her bond
was set at $2,500.00 by the Lowndes County Justice Court, and there is no indication that she
will again be before that court; thus, all of her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
relating to bail are moot. Further, she was represented by counsel at her initial appearance, and
her counsel could have advised her of her options regarding the posting of bail.
Further, plaintiff’s allegations regarding bail are essentially a challenge to the actions of a
local judge, Lowndes County Justice Court Judge Peggy Phillips. The Fifth Circuit has made
clear that “[a] local judge acting in his or her judicial capacity is not considered a local
government official whose actions are attributable to the county.” Cunningham ex rel.
Cunningham v. City of West Point, Miss., 380 F. App’x 419, 421 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, “regardless of whether
Cunningham suffered a constitutional deprivation, the City cannot be liable under the facts of
this case because the claimed deprivation was not the result of an official policy, practice, or
custom.” Cunningham, 380 F. App’x at 422.
Finally, the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Lowndes County must indemnify
Tony Cooper for any judgment against him. The court has found that Moody suffered no

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constitutional violation at the hands of Cooper; thus, the plaintiff’s request that the court order
the county to indemnify Cooper is moot.
With the exception of her abuse of process claim addressed above, the plaintiff failed to
make any argument related to state law claims in response to the defendants’ summary judgment
motions. Accordingly, the court finds that she has abandoned them. “A party who inadequately
briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338,
1345 (5th Cir. 1994).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment are well taken and should be granted. A separate order in accord with this opinion
shall issue this day.
This, the 22nd day of September, 2016.

/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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