Jones v. City of West Point, Mississippi et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 29 Order on Motion to Dismiss State Law Claims. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 9/8/2015. (dbm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION

MARCUS LARAIL JONES
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-00220-SA-DAS

CITY OF WEST POINT, MISSISSIPPI
NICK COE
MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEFENDANTS

This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint [1] of Marcus Larail Jones, who
seeks actual and punitive damages from the City of West Point, Mississippi and Nick Coe, a City
of West Point police officer, for the alleged shooting and loss of Jones’ dog, “Goldie”. In
addition to claims brought under the United States Constitution, Jones asserts several state law
claims for negligence, intentional infliction of mental stress, and conversion against the City of
West Point and Officer Coe. The Defendants submitted a Motion to Dismiss All State Law
Claims [18] arguing that all of Jones’ claims based in Mississippi state law should be dismissed
with prejudice because Jones did not properly execute notice of his claims as required by the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-1, et seq. Jones has responded to the
motion, the Defendants have replied, and this matter is ripe for review. For the reasons set forth
below, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [18] is granted in part and denied in part, and all of
Jones’ state law claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Factual and Procedural Background
It is alleged Nick Coe shot Jones’ dog on the morning of February 23, 2014. Jones filed
his Complaint [1] with this Court on December 4, 2014. Jones admits that he did not properly
notice the City of West Point of his claims prior to filing his complaint as required by the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act, and concedes that dismissal of his state law claims is warranted.

The procedural question at issue in the instant motion is whether Jones’ state law claims should
be dismissed with or without prejudice.1
Discussion and Analysis
Due to the nature and scope of this lawsuit against the City of West Point and Officer
Coe, Jones’ claims are subject to the procedural prerequisites enumerated in the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act. The remedy provided by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act for claims against a
governmental entity or its employee is exclusive. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-46-7. The procedural
requirements for the remedy provided by the Act are mandatory as evidenced by the following:
“at least ninety days before instituting suit, the person must file notice of claim . . . ; [s]ervice of
notice of claim shall be made . . . [i]f the governmental entity is a municipality, then upon the
city clerk.” MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-46-11 (1)-(2(a)) (emphasis added). The ninety-day notice
requirement of the Act requires strict compliance. See Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Easterling, 928
So. 2d 815, 819 (¶ 22) (Miss. 2006) (requiring strict compliance with the ninety-day notice
requirement of the Tort Claims Act is; overruling earlier cases); Brown v. Sw. Miss. Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 989 So. 2d 933, 937 (¶ 8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the 90-day notice requirement
of the Tort Claims Act is meant to apply equally to cases in which no notice is filed, notice is
filed after the complaint, or the complaint is filed sooner than ninety days after filing notice).
In the instant case, Jones served notice of his claim on the wrong governmental entity.
Jones addressed his Notice of Claim to Clay County, Mississippi instead of the City of West
Point. Jones argues briefly that although the City did not have proper notice of his claim, the City
did have actual notice. In support of his argument, Jones references a letter attached to the
Complaint [1], from the City’s insurance carrier denying any claim for damages by Marcus

1

Because all the information necessary and relevant to the determination of this motion is readily apparent on the
face of the pleadings, it is unnecessary for the Court to reach other potential issues concerning statutes of limitation.
2

Jones. In light of the strict compliance standard articulated by the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Easterling and subsequent cases, however, actual notice to the City’s insurer does not cure
otherwise statutorily defective notice. A letter from an insurer denying a claim or coverage does
not meet the statutory standard for notice of denial of a claim under the Mississippi Tort Claims
Act either, which requires: “[a]ll notices of denial of claim shall be served by governmental
entities upon claimants by certified mail.” MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-46-11; Blackston v. George
Cnty., 102 So. 3d 1182, 1188 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (holding county failed to serve notice of the
denial of claim through insurer).
“The notice-of-claim requirement ‘imposes a condition precedent to the right to maintain
an action.’” Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Stringer, 748 So. 2d 662, 665 (¶ 10) (Miss. 1999)
(quoting Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So. 2d 261, 265 (¶ 12) (Miss.1999)). Furthermore, “[t]he
ninety-day notice requirement is jurisdictional.” Bunton v. King, 995 So. 2d 694, 695-96 (¶ 8)
(Miss. 2008) (citing Stringer, 748 So. 2d at 665). Because the notice requirements of the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act are jurisdictional, Jones’ failure to comply requires dismissal of his
state law claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Lamb v. Booneville Sch.
Dist., No. 1:08-CV-254-SA, 2009 WL 843116, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 26, 2009).
Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims at
this time, the Court will not address the merits of these claims or potential statute of limitations
arguments. All relevant information necessary for ruling on the instant motion is apparent on the
face of the Plaintiff’s complaint or attached thereto. This Court has not considered any matters

3

outside the pleadings, precluding the need to treat the Defendant’s motion as one for summary
judgment.2
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based in state law with prejudice for
failure to comply with the terms of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. To the extent Defendants requested the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims,
that request is GRANTED. To the extent that Defendants requested such denial be with
prejudice, that request is DENIED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims based in Mississippi state law
are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED this the 8th day of September, 2015.

/s/__Sharion Aycock ________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

As Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) states: “if, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment
under Rule 56.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (emphasis added).
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