Page v. Starks et al
Filing
77
ORDER granting 61 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge David A. Sanders on 1/28/2016. (rrz)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
JOSHUA BROOKS PAGE
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO: 1:14CV221-DAS
DANNY EARL STARKS,
ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on plaintiff Joshua Brooks Page’s motion for partial
summary judgment (#61) against defendant Danny Earl Starks. The underlying action seeks to
recover damages for Starks’ conduct that allegedly deprived Page of his constitutional rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that Page’s
motion should be granted.
I. Background
On October 17th, 2012, Danny Earl Starks, along with several other Monroe County
sheriff’s deputies, responded to a domestic violence report at Joshua Brooks Page’s home. By
the time Starks arrived at the scene, Page was in handcuffs and in the custody of two other law
enforcement officers. However, according to Starks, Page was far from subdued. While he was
being removed from the residence, Starks alleges that Page was cussing at the law enforcement
officers and spit on his face, thereby causing Starks to strike Page.
Subsequently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the incident, and Starks
was prosecuted for assault. By criminal information, Starks was charged with the following:
On or about October 17th, 2012, in Monroe County, in the Northern District of
Mississippi, the defendant, DANNY EARL STARKS, while acting under color of
law as Sheriff’s Deputy with the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, unlawfully
assaulted [plaintiff] by striking [plaintiff] in the head and face with his fist,
thereby willingly depriving [plaintiff] of the right, secured and protected by the
United States Constitution and Laws of the United States, to be free from the use
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of unreasonable force by a law enforcement officer…All in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 242.
Doc. 61-4. Starks ultimately pleaded guilty to assaulting Page under color of state law pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 242. On the heels of Starks’ conviction, Page filed this action, alleging an
excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In the present motion for partial summary judgment, Page argues that because Starks
pleaded guilty to assault under § 242, he is liable as a matter of law, leaving only the issue of
damages to be litigated.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure if “[t]here is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The rule “mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails
to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the
record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323.
The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324.
On motion for summary judgment, “[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of
determining whether there is a need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably
be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (l986).
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To determine whether there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, the court must consider
“all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making any credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir.
2007) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). The court
must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150;
“however, a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.’” Id. (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
III. Discussion
Page’s motion for partial summary judgment depends on whether the doctrine of
offensive collateral estoppel is applicable to this matter. According to the Fifth Circuit, to bar
relitigation of an issue previously decided, Page must show: “(1) the issue under consideration is
identical to that litigated in the prior action; (2) the issue was fully and vigorously litigated in the
prior action; (3) the issue was necessary to support the judgment in the prior case; and (4) there is
no special circumstance that would make it unfair to apply the doctrine.” Winters v. Diamond
Shamrock Chemical Co., 149 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 1998). Trial courts have broad discretion to
determine whether the offensive collateral estoppel bar should apply. Id. at 392.
If a civil suit is filed on the heels of a criminal conviction, “the general rule is that
collateral estoppel applies equally whether the prior criminal adjudication was based on a jury
verdict or a guilty plea.” Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1974). “Because of the
existence of a higher standard or proof and greater procedural protection in a criminal
prosecution, a conviction is conclusive as to an issue arising against the criminal defendant in a
subsequent civil action.” United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1974).
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1. Whether the issue under consideration is identical to that previously litigated.
To reiterate, the underlying issue is whether Starks is liable as a matter of law under
Page’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. For liability to attach, Page must show he suffered “(1) an injury
that (2) resulted directly and only from [Starks’] use of force that was excessive to the need and
that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.” Flores v. City of Palcios, 281 F.3d 391,
396 (5th Cir. 2004). Starks’ conviction turned on precisely this issue. To be convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 242, an individual must have: (1) willfully, (2) deprived another of a federal
constitutional right, (3) under color of law. United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 431-32 (5th
Cir. 2003). Starks pleaded guilty to depriving Page of the right to be free from the unreasonable
use of force by a law enforcement officer—a Fourth Amendment violation. The Fourth
Amendment analysis under § 242 is identical to that employed in § 1983 excessive force claims.1
Moreover, this is not an issue of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. For example, in
Vela v. Alvarez, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the doctrine
of collateral estoppel in a suit brought under § 1983. 507 F. Supp. 889 (S.D. Tex. 1981). Like
the case at bar, the defendant was a former police officer who had been convicted under § 242
for assaulting the plaintiff, and thereby, depriving him of his constitutional rights under the
Fourth Amendment. Noting that the issues in the two actions were virtually identical, the court
held the defendant was precluded from relitigating those issues previously decided in his
criminal conviction. Id. at 889. Therefore, the predominant issue determined during Starks
criminal proceedings—whether he violated Page’s Fourth Amendment rights—is identical to the
1
For violations arising under the Fourth Amendment, the prosecution must establish “(1) an injury, which (2)
resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of
which was (3) objectively unreasonable.” United States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2004).
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issue now before the court—whether Starks is civilly liable to Page for his use of excessive
force.2
2. Whether the issue was fully and vigorously litigated in the previous action.
At first blush, the answer would appear issue was not fully litigated in the previous
action: Starks’ conviction was the product of a plea agreement. As previously stated, however,
the general rule in the Fifth Circuit is that collateral estoppel applies even if the prior criminal
adjudication was based on a guilty plea. Brazzell, 493 F.2d at 490. Bound by precedent, the
court finds Starks’ guilty plea satisfies the “fully and vigorously litigated” requisite.
3. Whether the issue was necessary to support Starks’ previous conviction.
For the reasons discussed above, the court also finds that the issue presently under
consideration was necessary to support Starks’ criminal conviction. Without establishing Starks
had violated Page’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of unreasonable force, an
essential element under § 242 would not have been satisfied—deprivation of a federal
constitutional right.
4. Whether any special circumstances exist that would make preclusion inappropriate.
The Supreme Court has set out three special circumstances that would make issue
preclusion unfair, none of which are applicable here: (1) when the plaintiff easily could have
joined the previous action but chose not to; (2) if the defendant had little incentive to defend
vigorously; and (3) if the judgment upon which the plaintiff seeks to rely is itself inconsistent
with a previous judgment in favor of the defendant. Parklane Hosiery, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 330-31 (1979).
2
Lending further support to this conclusion, the Supreme Court has declared 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to be analogues of one another, with “linguistic differences” not “thought to be substantive.” Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 214 n. 23 (1970); see also Fundiller v. Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1985)
(noting that § 242 serves as the criminal counterpart to a § 1983 claim).
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Nevertheless, Starks argues preclusion is inappropriate because establishing a Fourth
Amendment violation under § 1983 requires proving that he “acted with malice, in a sadistic
manner, for the sole purpose of causing harm and for no other reason.” Doc. 70. Because this
standard is higher than that applied to his criminal proceedings, Starks contends he cannot be
precluded from litigating whether his use of force was unreasonable. However, the standard
Starks cites in support of his argument arises under the Eight Amendment,3 and therefore, it is
inapplicable here because Page needs only to prove that Starks’ use of force was “objectively
unreasonable” to recover under his § 1983 excessive force claim. Flores, 281 F.3d at 396.
Consequently, precluding Starks from relitigating whether he violated Page’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from the use of unreasonable force would be neither inappropriate
nor unfair.
Accordingly, the court finds the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in this instance.
As a result, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Starks used excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment when he struck Page. Starks is estopped from arguing that
his use of force was objectively reasonable, and thus, he cannot show there is a genuine issue for
trial.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment
(#61) is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this, the 28th day of January, 2016.
/s/ David A. Sanders
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3
In the case cited by Starks, Bonet v. Shaw, the court explains that the plaintiff’s claim alleged a violation of the
Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment: “In order to prevail on a claim alleging a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, plaintiff must establish that defendants acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm to
plaintiff.” 669 F. Supp. 2d 300, 304 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
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