Degaris et al v. Monroe County, Mississippi et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 29 Order on Motions to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 12/11/2017. (dbm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
BRANDY DEGARIS

PLAINTIFF

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-239-SA-RP

MONROE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
SHERIFF CECIL CANTRELL, and
DEPUTY JAMES DOYLE ADAMS

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brandy Degaris filed her Complaint [1] on December 27, 2016 alleging a single claim for
a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Monroe County, Mississippi, the Monroe
County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Cecil Cantrell in his official capacity, and Deputy James
Doyle Adams.1 Now before the Court are two motions to dismiss [20, 22] filed by the County
Defendants. The Plaintiff did not file any response and the allotted time for doing so has expired,
making these issues ripe for review. See L.U.CIV.R. 7(b)(3-4). The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants violated her constitutional rights while she was incarcerated in the Monroe County
Detention Center. In their Motion to Dismiss [20], the County Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s
claim is time-barred by the statute of limitations, and request that the Court dismiss all claims
against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).2

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The official capacity suit against Sheriff Cantrell is a suit against the County as the real party in interest. See Goodman
v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,
to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is
the entity.”) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (citation
omitted)). For simplicity, the Court will refer the County, the Sheriff’s Department, and the Sheriff, as the County
Defendants.
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The County Defendants request relief under Rule 12(b)(6) or alternatively under Rule 12(c). Because the County
Defendants filed their Answer [19] before filing their motions to dismiss, and Rule 12 clearly states that motions under
12(b)(6) “must be made before pleading,” the Court construes their motions as made under Rule 12(c). FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b).

Discussion and Analysis
This Court reviews a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings using the same
standards applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Phillips
v. City of Dallas, 781 F.3d 772, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540,
543–44 (5th Cir. 2010)). The complaint therefore, “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir.
2017) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937).
The County Defendants argue that the Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief
because the statute of limitations has run. “The length of the limitations period for a §1983 claim ‘is
determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state.’”
Balle v. Nueces Cty., Texas, 690 F. App’x 847, 849 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001)). In Mississippi, §1983 claims are subject to a threeyear statute of limitations under §15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code. Norwood v. City of Mendenhall,
Miss., 630 F. App’x 245, 249 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cty., 675 F.3d 911,
916 (5th Cir. 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15–1–49). Although state law controls the statute of
limitations in §1983 cases, “federal law governs when a §1983 claim accrues.” Smith v. Reg’l
Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir. 2016); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S. Ct.
1091, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007). Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run “the
moment the plaintiff becomes aware that she has suffered an injury or has sufficient information

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to know that she has been injured.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576; see also Reg’l Transit Auth., 827
F.3d at 421.
The Plaintiff filed her complaint on December 27, 2016. In her complaint, the Plaintiff
states that her injury occurred on December 24, 2013. It is apparent on the face of the Plaintiff’s
complaint that she filed outside of the three-year statute of limitations applicable in this case. See
Norwood, 630 F. App’x at 249; Edmonds, 675 F.3d at 916; see also Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 127
S. Ct. 1091; Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d at 421. The Plaintiff did not raise any evidence or
argument for tolling the statute of limitations or argue that the statute of limitations has not
otherwise run. Under the relevant statutes and precedent, the Court finds that it appears on the face
of the pleadings in this case that the applicable statute of limitations has run, and that the Plaintiff’s
claim is time-barred.
Conclusion
The County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [20] is GRANTED, and the all of the
Plaintiff’s claims against them are DISMISSED with prejudice. With all claims against them
dismissed, the County Defendants’ second pending Motion to Dismiss [22] is DENIED as MOOT.
SO ORDERED on this the 11th day of December, 2017.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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