Blake v. Lambert et al

Filing 93

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION denying 66 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 1/12/2021. (sko)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
CARLA BLAKE
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-89-SA-DAS

DON LAMBERT, and
PRENTISS COUNTY

DEFENDANTS
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

Carla Blake initiated this action on June 12, 2017, by filing her Complaint [1] against
Prentiss County, Mississippi, and Don Lambert, a Prentiss County School Attendance Officer.
Judgment, as to liability only, has been entered against Lambert in his individual capacity. See
Order and Judgment [48]. Prentiss County has now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [66],
requesting dismissal of all claims against it. The Motion [66] has been fully briefed, and the Court
is prepared to rule.
Factual and Procedural Background
Sometime before September 2013, Blake had temporary custody of her nephew, S.W., a
minor school-age child. S.W. was enrolled in Prentiss County Public Schools, and Blake was listed
as S.W.’s contact in school records. On September 5, 2013, Lambert mailed a form letter to Blake
informing her that S.W. had five unexcused absences, that she was responsible for making sure
S.W. attended school, and that continued accrual of unexcused absences could lead to potential
penalties under Mississippi Code § 37-13-91. S.W. continued to accrue unexcused absences. In
January of 2014, Lambert contacted Blake by phone, and Blake informed him that she no longer
had custody of S.W. and was not S.W.’s caregiver. Blake also informed Lambert that S.W. was
now in the custody of his mother, Tracey Perry. Blake gave Perry’s contact information to
Lambert. According to Blake, Lambert apologized for the confusion and said that he would follow

up with Perry. Lambert subsequently talked with Perry by phone. Perry apparently confirmed that
she was S.W.’s mother, and informed Lambert that S.W. was sick. Lambert informed Blake and
Perry that they needed to contact the school to update the official records as to S.W.’s custody.
On June 10, 2014, Lambert swore out a “General Affidavit” for Blake’s arrest, and filed
the affidavit in Prentiss County Justice Court. The affidavit charged Blake with contributing to the
delinquency of S.W. by refusing or willfully failing to make sure that S.W. attended school, in
violation of Mississippi Code §§ 37-13-91, 97-5-39(1). According to school records, S.W. was
absent from school at least sixteen days during the 2013-2014 school year.
Based on Lambert’s affidavit, the Prentiss County Justice Court Judge issued a warrant for
Blake’s arrest. Pursuant to this warrant, a Prentiss County Deputy Sheriff arrested Blake at her
home on June 12, 2014. Blake was then booked into the Prentiss County Jail, strip searched, and
detained in a holding cell for a short period until she was able to arrange bond.
On June 17, 2014, Lambert filed an affidavit in Prentiss County Justice Court requesting
dismissal of the charges against Blake stating, “I filed an affidavit on the wrong person by
mistake.” The Justice Court Judge subsequently dismissed the charges against Blake.
Blake then initiated this action. In her Complaint [1], Blake alleged that Lambert violated
her constitutional rights because the affidavit he swore out against her was facially invalid, that
Lambert intentionally withheld exculpatory information, and that Lambert recklessly caused
Blake’s arrest without probable cause. After this Court denied Lambert’s request for qualified
immunity, Lambert appealed. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified
immunity as to Blake’s Malley claim but reversed as to Blake’s Franks claim. In accordance with
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, this Court filed an Order and Judgment [48], specifically entering
“summary judgment against Defendant Lambert in his individual capacity for Plaintiff Blake’s

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claim that Lambert violated her Constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S. Ct. 1092. With liability decided, the Plaintiff’s Malley claim
will be set for a trial on damages following the resolution of the Plaintiff’s claims against Prentiss
County.”
In addition to her claims against Lambert, Blake’s Complaint [1] asserts a claim against
Prentiss County. Specifically, Blake avers that the County is liable for “maintaining a policy,
practice, custom or usage which authorized and mandated subjecting detainees being held on nonviolent and non-drug offenses to humiliating strip searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion
or probable cause while briefly detained in a holding cell and awaiting bond.” In other words, she
asserts that the County’s policy pursuant to which she was strip searched is unconstitutional as it
relates to certain classes of persons taken into custody. The County now seeks summary judgment
on that claim.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts

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exist, the Court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000).
The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The nonmoving party must
then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted).
Analysis and Discussion
As noted above, Blake’s claim against the County concerns the constitutionality of the
County’s policy pursuant to which the visual body cavity search was conducted. Although the
parties disagree as to certain issues, the circumstances surrounding the strip search are not in
dispute. As stated by the County:
The Prentiss County Jail facility has a Contraband Prevention Policy in place which
requires that all incoming detainees/arrestees in the booking area of the Jail be
searched for the safety and security of other inmates, jailers, and members of the
public who enter the facility (e.g. jail staff, healthcare professionals, clergymen,
attorneys, etc.). Therefore, upon her arrival to the Prentiss County Jail, the Plaintiff
was strip searched in accordance with Prentiss County Jail’s policies and
procedures.
[67], p. 1. As to the specifics of the search, the County states:
Once in the strip search room, the single female jailer instructed the Plaintiff to
disrobe, squat down, and cough so that the jailer could conduct a visual inspection
of the Plaintiff for prohibited contraband and weapons. The strip search lasted
approximately two to three minutes, was conducted by the single female jailer in a
windowless room, and no one (other tha[n] the single female jailer) could see the
Plaintiff or into the room during the strip search.
[67], p. 3. Also of critical importance is the fact that Blake was never taken into the Jail’s general
population, nor was she ever considered for placement in the facility’s general population. She
was thereafter released from custody once bond was arranged.
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Again, neither party disputes the above-referenced underlying facts. However, while Blake
contends that she was subjected to an unconstitutional search, the County asserts that it is entitled
to summary judgment because the search was related to legitimate penological concerns and
therefore was in compliance with the Fourth Amendment.
Blake makes her claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 makes liable “every
person” who, under color of state law, violates federal constitutional rights. Littell v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 2018). For this purpose, municipalities, such as
Prentiss County, qualify as “persons.” Id. (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)).
However, municipalities “cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of their officials.
Direct liability is instead required.” Jauch v. Choctaw Cty., 874 F.3d 425, 435 (5th Cir. 2017)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-93; Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010)).
“Proof of municipal liability sufficient to satisfy Monell requires: (1) an official policy (or custom),
of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).’” Id. (quoting Pineda v.
City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567,
578 (5th Cir. 2001)). Here, there is no dispute as to the first two elements—the existence of a
policy of which the County’s policy makers had actual or constructive knowledge. Prentiss County
instead contends that its policy does not violate the Fourth Amendment and that Blake, therefore,
cannot establish Monell liability.
I.

Constitutionality of Prentiss County’s Policy

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. “To determine whether the search was reasonable, and thus

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constitutionally permissible, the Court must balance ‘the need for a particular search against the
invasion of personal rights that the search entails,’ considering ‘the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in
which it is conducted.’” Mabry v. Lee Cty., 168 F. Supp. 3d 940, 945 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (quoting
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 576-77, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)) (affirmed in Mabry
v. Lee Cty., 849 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2017). “In striking this balance, the Supreme Court has utilized
various different standards or tests, depending on the factual scenario presented in each case.” Id.
(citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d
639 (1989)).
Of particular importance in this case is the Supreme Court’s holding in Florence v. Board
of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566
(2011). In Florence, the petitioner was stopped in his automobile by a state trooper. Id. at 323. The
trooper’s computer system indicated that there was an outstanding warrant for the petitioner’s
arrest, and he therefore took the petitioner into custody. Id. The petitioner was held in custody at
the Burlington County Jail for six days before he was transferred to Essex County Correctional
Facility, which was, at least at the time, the largest county jail in New Jersey. Id. at 324. The
petitioner was subjected to extensive searches at both facilities. Id. The day after the petitioner was
transferred to Essex, the charges against him were dropped, and he was released from custody. Id.
Specifically, at the Burlington County Jail, the “procedures required every arrestee to
shower with a delousing agent. Officers would check arrestees for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and
contraband as they disrobed.” Id. At the Essex County Correctional Facility, “all arriving detainees
passed through a metal detector and waited in a group holding cell for a more thorough search.
When they left the holding cell, they were instructed to remove their clothing while an officer

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looked for body markings, wounds, and contraband. Apparently without touching the detainees,
an officer looked at their ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other
body openings.” Id.
The petitioner alleged that the searches to which he was subjected were unconstitutional.
Id. After noting previous cases holding that “[t]he need for a particular search must be balanced
against the resulting invasion of personal rights[,]” the Supreme Court noted that “[c]orrectional
officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake
process. The admission of inmates creates numerous risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee
population, and for a new detainee himself or herself.” Id. at 327, 330 (citations omitted).
Additionally, “[d]etecting contraband concealed by new detainees . . . is a most serious
responsibility. Weapons, drugs, and alcohol all disrupt the safe operation of a jail.” Id. at 332. The
Court also emphasized that “[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most
devious and dangerous criminals.” Id. at 334. Ultimately, after balancing the legitimate
penological interests of the facilities with the petitioner’s privacy rights, the Supreme Court held
that “the search procedures at the Burlington County Detention Center and the Essex County
Correctional Facility struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the
institutions.” Id. at 339.
Here, relying on Florence, Prentiss County asserts that its strip search policy:
is reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of the Jail[’]s duty to
protect the safety and security of the inmates, jailers, and others who enter the
facility. The Prentiss County Jail administrator decided to implement the strip
search policy based on the unique safety concerns brought on by the layout of the
Jail (i.e. the small booking area), the interaction and potential for the exchange of
prohibited contraband between detainees/arrestees in the small booking area, prior
incidents involving non-violent non-drug detainees who were found to be
concealing prohibited contraband, and the murder of the neighboring Lee County
jailer who failed to conduct such a stringent search.

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[67], p. 11. In other words, the County contends that its policy was designed to address the exact
safety concerns deemed legitimate by the Supreme Court in Florence. On the other hand, Blake
contends that the County’s argument is overly generalized and misses the mark. In particular, she
asserts that, in Florence, the Supreme Court only considered a search in the context of a detainee
who was to be placed in the facility’s general population. Here, there is no contention that Blake
was considered for placement in the Prentiss County Jail’s general population. There is likewise
no contention that Prentiss County’s policy makes any distinction whatsoever based upon whether
a particular detainee will be considered for placement in the general population. Consequently,
according to Blake, while Florence is generally instructive as to the applicable standard, it is not
directly on point.
In further support of her position, Blake cites a recent case where the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals analyzed the constitutionality of a similar strip search policy. See Hinkle v. Beckham
Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’n, 962 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2020). Hinkle involved a convoluted set of
facts which ultimately culminated in the plaintiff, a former police chief, being arrested for allegedly
stealing a trailer. Id. at 1210-15. The plaintiff was then subjected to a visual body cavity search.
Id. at 1214-15.
In addition to asserting a claim for false arrest, the plaintiff in that case alleged that
Beckham County’s policy requiring a visual body cavity strip search of all detainees violated the
Fourth Amendment. Under Beckham County’s policy, “jailers strip searched incoming inmates at
the very beginning of the booking process, before sitting down at the desk to begin the booking
paperwork and before knowing where the inmate would be housed in the facility.” Id. at 1236.
Stated differently, the policy was “to strip search all detainees.” Id. (emphasis added).

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Finding that Beckham County’s policy was unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit held
“[u]nder Florence, the jail could (1) decide that [the plaintiff] ‘will be’ housed in the jail’s general
population, and (2) then strip search him before placing him in the general population.” Id. at 1237.
However, the court noted that, by subjecting the plaintiff to a strip search before deciding that he
would be placed in the jail’s general population, Beckham County “set the cart before the horse[.]”
Id. The Tenth Circuit then emphasized several portions of the Supreme Court’s Florence opinion:
In Florence, the Court repeatedly stressed that the strip search comes after the
facility determines that the detainee “will be” placed in general population. Id.
(explaining that ‘the controversy [in Florence] concern[ed] whether every detainee
who will be admitted to the general population may be required to undergo a close
visual inspection while undressed’); id. at 325-26, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (explaining again
that “[the] Court granted certiorari to address” “whether the Fourth Amendment
requires correctional officials to exempt some detainees who will be admitted to a
jail’s general population from the searches here at issue”); id. at 335, 132 S. Ct.
1510 (“Reasonable correctional officials could conclude these uncertainties [about
whether a particular detainee is dangerous] mean they must conduct the same
thorough search of everyone who will be admitted to their facilities.”); id. at 338,
132 S. Ct. 1510 (accepting the jail officials’ argument that “the Constitution must
not prevent [detention officials] from conducting [strip searches] on any suspected
offender who will be admitted to the general population in their facilities”); id. at
338-39, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (explaining the limits of Florence’s ruling and commenting
that “[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that
would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held
without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact
with other detainees”). In other words, the “will be” condition precedes the strip
search, which itself precedes placing the detainee in the jail’s general population.
And the Court’s “will be” condition to strip searches makes perfect sense—absent
admitting the detainee to the jail’s general population, the jail would have no need
to protect the new detainee, the existing detainee population, and the detention staff
from infectious diseases, rival gang members, weapons, or contraband.
Hinkle, 962 F.3d at 1237. Blake asserts that the Court should adopt the same rationale applied by
the Tenth Circuit in Hinkle.
In analyzing these arguments, the Court again emphasizes the undisputed facts of this case.
It is undisputed that Prentiss County’s policy, like the policy at issue in Hinkle, requires all
detainees be strip searched, regardless of the offense for which they were arrested and regardless
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of whether the detainee will be placed in the facility’s general population. Additionally, Prentiss
County has admitted that it did not have an independent basis—such as reasonable suspicion or
probable cause—to subject Blake to a strip search.1
Although the Supreme Court’s holding in Florence is generally instructive, the Court
agrees with Blake’s contention that the County’s reliance on Florence alone misses the mark. In
this Court’s view, the Supreme Court made clear in Florence that it intended the reach of its
opinion to be limited. This intent is illustrated throughout the opinion. First, the Supreme Court
specifically noted that it granted certiorari to address “whether the Fourth Amendment requires
correctional officials to exempt some detainees who will be admitted to a jail’s general population
from [certain] searches.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 325-26 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Section IV
of the opinion specifically provides that “[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types
of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held
without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other
detainees. . . The accommodations provided in [such] situations may diminish the need to conduct
some aspects of the searches at issue.” Id. at 339 (emphasis added).2 In a concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts also noted that the Court’s holding may not apply in every circumstance,
specifically providing that “[t]he Court makes a persuasive case for the general applicability of the
rule it announces. The Court is nonetheless wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions, to
ensure that we ‘not embarrass the future.’” Id. at 340.
Additionally, while not binding, the Court finds the Tenth Circuit’s rationale in Hinkle to
be persuasive. As noted by the Tenth Circuit, the justifications for permitting body cavity strip

1

The County made this admission in its deposition which was conducted pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See [85], Exhibit 2.
2
The Court recognizes that Section IV of the Supreme Court’s opinion was joined only by four Justices.
However, this Court nevertheless finds its analysis instructive.

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searches set forth by the Supreme Court in Florence, such as granting deference to correctional
officials to take steps to maintain order and prevent the introduction of contraband, are not
necessarily applicable when the detainee will not be placed in the facility’s general population.
Perhaps tellingly, although Blake relied heavily on Hinkle in her Response [86], Prentiss County
failed to rebut those arguments in any fashion whatsoever in its Reply [91].
Ultimately, having considered the explicit language in Florence and taking into account
the rationale contained therein, as well as the analysis by the Tenth Circuit in Hinkle, the Court
rejects Prentiss County’s reliance upon Florence to justify its strip search policy. Instead, the Court
specifically finds that Florence does not protect Prentiss County’s policy of strip searching all
detainees, regardless of whether the detainees will be placed in the facility’s general population.
Consequently, Prentiss County is not entitled to summary judgment on that issue.
II.

Reasonableness of the Search

Although finding that the County’s policy is not sanctioned by Florence, the Court still
must consider whether the search of Blake ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Hinkle,
962 F.3d at 1238 (“Having concluded that Florence does not authorize the County’s strip-search
policy, we must still decide whether [the plaintiff] suffered an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.”). In order to ultimately prevail on her claim, Blake must show that the
specific search to which she was subjected was unreasonable. See, e.g., San Jacinto Savings &
Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that, in order to prevail on a Section
1983 claim in this context, a plaintiff must personally be subjected to an illegal search or seizure).
Stated differently, regardless of the constitutionality of the policy itself, if Blake was not herself
subjected to an unreasonable search, she cannot prevail on her claim against Prentiss County. Id.;
see also Hinkle, 962 F.3d at 1238.

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Specifically concerning inmate searches, “a regulation impinging on an inmate’s
constitutional rights must be upheld ‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”
Mabry, 849 F.3d at 236 (quoting Florence, 566 U.S. at 326). In Mabry, the Fifth Circuit
specifically noted the Supreme Court’s language in Florence that “in the absence of substantial
evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response . . . courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Id. (quoting Florence, 566 U.S.
at 328 (citation omitted)). The Fifth Circuit further noted that Florence “set up a high hurdle for
inmates challenging the constitutionality of searches.” Id. However, “substantial evidence could
demonstrate that a correctional strip search policy is an exaggerated response to security concerns
when, compared to the facts presented in Florence, the need for such a policy is lower, the
justification weaker, the intrusiveness higher, or an alternative, less invasive policy more feasible.”
Id.
On this point, Prentiss County asserts that the “strip search of the Plaintiff was reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest — the safety and security of the jail inmates and staff[.]”
[91], p. 2. Additionally, the County states that “[t]he search was conducted as a result of the
specific conditions present during the Plaintiff’s booking — i.e. the Plaintiff was an unknown
individual to Prentiss County, who came in close proximity with other detainees in the holding
area, and who could have possessed or procured dangerous and prohibited contraband.” [91], p.
11. On the other hand, Blake relies on the County’s admission that there was no independent
suspicion or probable cause to support the search. In other words, the search was conducted
pursuant to the County’s above-referenced strip search policy—not because of any particularized
reason associated with Blake. She asserts that this fact undercuts the County’s stated safety
concerns.

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The Court is well-aware of the competing interests in this case. On the one hand, the Court
is cognizant that deference should be granted to the judgment of correctional officials. See, e.g.,
Mabry, 849 F.3d at 236. Such deference is undoubtedly necessary in order to protect the safety of
jail inmates and staff members. On the other hand, however, that deference is not without
limitations. Id. (holding that a plaintiff may proceed on claims of this nature but “the burden is on
the plaintiff to prove with substantial evidence that the challenged search does not advance a
legitimate penological interest.”).
Although recognizing the heavy burden that Blake bears in order to prevail on her claim,
the Court nevertheless finds that summary judgment is not proper. In addition to emphasizing that
she was arrested on a non-violent offense and that the County admits it had no individualized
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the search, Blake also notes that she spent only 36
minutes in the booking area prior to being released. The Court finds that this fact, at least at this
stage in the proceedings, weighs in Blake’s favor. Furthermore, although the County states in its
Memorandum [91] that Blake “came in close proximity with other detainees in the holding area,”
Blake testified that, when she walked past other detainees, she was escorted by County personnel,
and there was no testimony that she ever made contact with any of these individuals. See [85],
Exhibit 3, p. 29-31. In addition to these facts, the Court notes that it is unaware whether any of the
detainees which she walked past were ever placed in the general population. That unknown is, in
the Court’s view, important, as it could impact whether the search advanced a legitimate
penological interest.
As noted above, the Court is aware that Blake bears a heavy burden. However, this Court’s
reading of Florence and Mabry is such that, while many, if not most, inmate searches should be
upheld, some searches may violate the Fourth Amendment. To grant summary judgment in this

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case—where there are unresolved questions of fact regarding the detainee’s short amount of time
in custody, where there was admittedly no individualized reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
and where the decision had not been made to place the detainee in the facility’s general
population—would, in this Court’s view, essentially eliminate any exceptions to the general rule.
Consequently, taking into account the specific facts of this case and the particular search at issue,
the Court finds that Blake has come forward with sufficient evidence to preclude summary
judgment.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Prentiss County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [66] is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this the 12th day of January, 2021.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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