Huskey v. Fisher et al

Filing 36

ORDER denying 34 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 4/11/18. (jla)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
MATTHEW HUSKEY
v.

PLAINTIFF
No. 1:17CV140-SA-JMV

MARSHALL FISHER, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER
This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the
court’s final judgment [28] denying the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction. The court interprets the motion, using the liberal standard for pro se
litigants set forth in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), as a motion for relief from a judgment
or order under FED. R. CIV. P. 60. An order granting relief under Rule 60 must be based upon:
(1) clerical mistakes, (2) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (3) newly
discovered evidence, (4) fraud or other misconduct of an adverse party, (5) a void judgment, or (6)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the order. Id.
In his motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, Mr. Huskey
requested an order from the court requiring: (1) defendant Hall to arrange for the plaintiff to have
a physical examination and to stop harassment from officers; (2) the defendants to ensure that his
food is not contaminated; (3) the defendants to refer him to an outside physician; and (4) the
defendants to place him in the Maximum Security Unit (“MSU”) at Unit 720 at the Central
Mississippi Correctional Facility. Mr. Huskey was housed at the Central Mississippi
Correctional Facility in Pearl, Mississippi, when he filed the motion for a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction.
As discussed in the original order denying Mr. Huskey’s motion for a temporary

restraining order or preliminary injunction, Mr. Huskey suffers from paranoid schizophrenia – a
fact which the court cannot ignore, given the nature of the allegations in this case. The court has
already dismissed as delusional Mr. Huskey’s claims that prisoners and prison staff monitor his
every action with hidden cameras, as well as his claims that, no matter where he is housed, the
guards and prisoners there contaminate his food.
In his present motion to reconsider, Mr. Huskey has offered a statement by an inmate
housed at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility that he overheard inmates bragging about
putting substances in his food. He argues that the court should grant his motion for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction based upon the inmate’s statement. Based upon the
most recent address Mr. Huskey provided to the court, he has since been moved to the Wilkinson
County Correctional Facility in Woodville, Mississippi.
He also alleges that medical staff have informed him that he suffers from a bacterial
infection and have prescribed him antibiotics and medication to treat acid reflux. In addition, he
concedes that prison medical officials referred him to an outside orthopedist, who examined him
and sent a report back to prison doctors.
Mootness
As to most of his claims, Mr. Huskey has not shown that he still requires injunctive relief.
A party seeking injunctive relief must show that he needs it at the time of the motion:
A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief “must satisfy the court that relief is needed.”
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953).
To meet this standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that there exists some cognizable
danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to
keep the case alive.” Id. at 633.
Paige v. Sauseda, No. 5:10-CV-00054-BG, 2011 WL 8184443, at *9 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2011),
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report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:10-CV-00054-C, 2012 WL 2512010 (N.D. Tex. June
29, 2012). If such relief is no longer required, the motion for injunctive relief may be dismissed
as moot. After filing the instant motion, Mr. Huskey was transferred to another facility, and,
generally speaking, the transfer of a prisoner to another institution renders his request for
injunctive relief moot:
The transfer of a prisoner out of an institution often will render his claims for injunctive
relief moot. [The plaintiff], however, argues that his alleged constitutional violations
are capable of repetition yet evading review.
[A plaintiff] must show either a demonstrated probability or a reasonable expectation
that he would be transferred back to [the prison where the incidents occurred] or
released and reincarcerated there.
Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citations, quotations, and footnotes
omitted). Mr. Huskey has not made such a showing; as such, his motion for reconsideration as to
his claims of food contamination will be denied. Though it is possible that he could be transferred
back to the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility, he has not shown that such a move is likely.
In addition, Mr. Huskey has now been examined both by prison doctors (for possible food
contamination and for his broken arm) and an outside specialist (for his broken arm). Thus, his
requests for relief on those grounds have also become moot. Finally, he is not entitled to a
transfer to the place of his choosing, especially when, as here, there is no proof that his current
location poses a danger to him. Inmates have neither a protectable property or liberty interest to
any particular housing assignment or custodial classification, either under the United States
Constitution or under Mississippi law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5t Cir. 1995); Wilson v.
Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992); McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1250 (5th Cir. 1990)
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(citations omitted); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 47-5-99 to -103 (1993).
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff has neither asserted nor proven any of the specific
justifications for relief from an order permitted under Rule 60. In addition, the plaintiff has not
presented “any other reason justifying relief from the operation” of the judgment. As such, the
plaintiff’s request for reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this, the 11th day of April, 2018.
/s/ Sharion Aycock______
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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