Judon v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of Synnic Judon, Jr., against Commissioner of Social Security. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings. CASE CLOSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden on 4-24-19. (ncb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
SYNNIC JUDON, JR.
NO. 1:18CV00083-JMV
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
DEFENDANT
FINAL JUDGMENT
This cause is before the court on Plaintiff’s complaint for judicial review of an
unfavorable final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying a
claim for supplemental security income benefits. The parties have consented to entry of final
judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with
any appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court, having reviewed the
administrative record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, and having heard oral
argument, finds as follows:
Consistent with the court’s ruling from the bench during a hearing held April 17, 2019,
the court finds the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Specifically, the ALJ essentially rejected opinions of two examining medical sources in favor of
the opinions of a non-examining state agency physician. On April 7, 2015, state agency
psychologist Bryman Williams, Ph.D., opined that the “MER suggest clmt has impairment in
ability to sustain A&C but appears capable of functioning in work environment; good adls noted;
MH issues are secondary to seizures.” However, on February 5, 2015, Brian Thomas, Psy.D.,
had opined that “[w]hile he would likely be able to perform routine and repetitive tasks,
consistency is likely poor . . . [and] [a]bility to sustain attention appears poor.” Moreover, two
years later, on March 21, 2017, J. Morris Alexander, Ph.D., opined that “[the claimant] would
likely be unreliable in performing routine repetitive tasks.” Dr. Alexander further indicated that
the claimant’s ability to maintain attention and concentration, deal with work stresses, and
function independently was poor.
The ALJ attributed only “some” weight to Dr. Thomas’s opinions because, according to
the ALJ, Dr. Thomas failed to explain or analyze “why consistency (as opposed to capability) is
likely to be poor.” Likewise, the ALJ attributed only “some” weight to Dr. Alexander’s
opinions, indicating only that Dr. Alexander did not opine “that the claimant could not perform
the [routine and repetitive] tasks, but merely predicting he would not do so.”
Ultimately, the
ALJ concluded “[w]hile . . . Dr. Williams . . . did not specifically address whether claimant was
capable of performing simple, routine, and repetitive work, he did opine claimant was not
disabled from a psychological perspective and ‘appears capable of functioning in a work
environment.’”
While the court agrees with the ALJ’s assessment that no medical source opined the
claimant could not perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks, the ALJ failed to give good cause for
rejecting examining medical opinions that indicate the claimant may not be able to consistently
and reliably perform this work. Indeed, the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record
regarding the issue of “consistency” before crafting the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). Furthermore, the ALJ gave no reason whatsoever for rejecting Dr. Alexander’s
opinion regarding reliability, and there was no medical opinion controverting this opinion.
Consequently, the ALJ’s rejection of the examining medical opinions in this case indicates the
ALJ failed to consider whether the claimant could perform “sustained” mental work activity on a
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“regular and continuing” basis. See SSR 96-8p (“Ordinarily, RFC is an assessment of an
individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting
on a regular and continuing basis.”). Ultimately, the ALJ’s reliance upon the state agency
physician’s conclusion that the claimant’s mental limitations do not render him incapable of
“functioning in a work environment” did not constitute substantial evidence on which to base a
decision, particularly in view of the fact that the state agency physician did not have the benefit
of the later medical report of Dr. Alexander.
On remand, the ALJ must reconsider the evidence related to the claimant’s mental
impairments. The ALJ must recontact Dr. Thomas and Dr. Alexander for clarification or further
explanation of the medical opinions rejected in this case. Further, to the extent he has not
already done so, the ALJ must obtain from these physicians a detailed assessment regarding the
claimant’s ability, function-by-function, to perform mental work activities. Finally, if necessary,
the ALJ must obtain supplemental vocational expert evidence. Ultimately, the ALJ will render a
new decision that is based upon substantial evidence in the record and that includes credible and
detailed explanations for discounting or rejecting any medical opinion. The ALJ may conduct
any additional proceedings not inconsistent with this ruling.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this case is REVERSED
AND REMANDED for further proceedings.
This, the 24th day of April, 2019.
/s/ Jane M. Virden
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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