Campbell v. Cargill, Inc.

Filing 11

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION granting #3 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. This CASE is CLOSED. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 01/17/2023. (oem)

Case: 1:22-cv-00070-SA-DAS Doc #: 11 Filed: 01/17/23 1 of 7 PageID #: 63

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN DIVISION
KENNETH CAMPBELL

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-70-SA-DAS

CARGILL, INC.

DEFENDANT
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

On May 17, 2022, Kenneth Campbell initiated this civil action by filing his Complaint [1]
against Cargill, Inc. under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29
U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Now before the Court is Cargill’s Motion to Dismiss, or, alternatively,
Motion for Summary Judgment [3]. Having reviewed the parties’ filings, as well as the applicable
authorities, the Court is prepared to rule.
Relevant Factual & Procedural Background
Campbell was employed by Cargill at its Lowndes County, Mississippi plant from 1977
until 1986 when the plant ceased operations. According to the Complaint [1], Cargill provided
Campbell paperwork stating that he had been fully vested, and an employee of Cargill verbally
told Campbell that he would receive retirement benefits. However, Campbell alleges he contacted
Cargill in 2021 to set up his pension benefits and was denied.
Campbell thereafter filed his Complaint [1], alleging that Cargill’s denial of his pension
benefits was wrongful and violated ERISA. In response, Cargill filed the present Motion [3],
requesting dismissal on the basis that Campbell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Legal Standard
“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under

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Rule 56.” FED. R. CIV. 12(d). Upon converting a 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary
judgment, the court must provide the parties “ample notice” that it may consider “extra-pleading
material” that would require conversion. Boateng v. BP, P.L.C., 779 F. App’x 217, 220 (5th Cir.
2019) (quoting Trinity Marine Prods., Inc. v. United States, 812 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2016)).
However, when the parties themselves reference matters outside of the pleadings, the notice
requirement is satisfied. Id. (citing Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1065 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Similarly, if the court converts a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to a motion under Rule 56,
“[a]ll parties must be given reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to
the motion.” FED. R. CIV. 12(d). Rule 56 provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specific reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the
court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or
declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” FED. R. CIV. 56(d)(1)(3) (emphasis added).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
Analysis & Discussion
As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether to convert Cargill’s Motion [3] to
one for summary judgment. Cargill attached to its Motion [3] a Declaration from Stacey Rice, its
Employee Benefits Lawyer, stating that Campbell did not submit a claim to the Benefits Service
Center. See [3], Ex. 1. A portion of the Plan’s claim procedures and Summary Plan Description
(“SPD”) are attached to the Declaration. Cargill relies on these exhibits to prove that Campbell did
not exhaust his administrative remedies. Campbell similarly relies on his own Affidavit describing
his interactions with Cargill to support his argument that he should be excused from the

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administrative exhaustion requirement. See [7], Ex. 1. 1 Because the parties rely on matters outside
of the pleadings, the Court must treat this motion as a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Trahan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2019 WL 491359, at *2-3 (W.D. La. Jan. 23, 2019) (unpublished)
(converting 12(b)(6) motion to motion for summary judgment where insurance company relied on
affidavit of litigation specialist to support claim that plaintiff had not exhausted administrative
remedies). 2 Where a party references matters outside of the pleadings, as both have done in this
case, the parties have sufficient notice that the court may treat the motion as a motion for summary
judgment. Boateng, 779 F. App’x at 220 (citing Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1065 (5th Cir.
1987)).
Campbell requests that the Court grant him time to conduct discovery so that he may
present all material pertinent to Cargill’s Motion [3]. Specifically, Campbell requests time to
question Rice under oath because her Declaration is unsworn and because it does not mention
whether Campbell was provided information regarding the Plan when he requested it. [7] at p. 2.
3

Although Rule 56(d) does provide a mechanism through which a party may seek additional time

to conduct discovery in connection with a summary judgment issue, that rule requires that the
specific reasons for the request be set forth in an affidavit or declaration. Even assuming Campbell
had complied with this prerequisite (which he did not), he has not “set forth a plausible basis for
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For the sake of clarity, the Court notes that Campbell does not explicitly argue that he should be excused
from the exhaustion requirement or that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Rather, his Response [7]
states that he made a claim for benefits and was denied, he did not receive an SPD, and “On that basis . . .
a factual dispute exists.” [7] at p. 3. However, the essence of Campbell’s argument is that he should be
excused from the administrative exhaustion requirement.
2
See also Wilkes v. Cargill, Inc., 2022 WL 4134745, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 12, 2022) (where Cargill filed
a motion to dismiss with a similar declaration attached and the court treated the motion as a motion for
summary judgment).
3
The Court notes that Rice’s Declaration conforms with 28 U.S.C. § 1746’s form requirements for unsworn
declarations offered in support of any matter that may be supported by a sworn declaration or affidavit.
That is, Rice “declare[s] under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct,” and signs and dates
the Declaration, as required by the statute. [3], Ex. 1 at p. 3. The Court may therefore consider the
Declaration in support of Cargill’s Motion [3].
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believing that specified facts . . . probably exist and indicate how the emergent facts, if adduced,
will influence the outcome of the pending summary judgment motion.” Waddell v. Miss. Dept. of
Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, 2020 WL 3669938, at *1 (N.D. Miss. July 6, 2020) (quoting Ruby
v. Livingston, 600 F.3d 552, 561 (5th Cir. 2010)). The only specific reason Campbell provides in
support of his request to conduct discovery is the need to question Rice on whether he was provided
a copy of the Plan. Cargill does not dispute that Campbell did not receive a copy of the Plan and,
as set forth more fully hereinafter, that issue is non-dispositive. As Campbell has not identified
specific facts that may exist and that would influence the pending Motion [3], the Court will not
delay ruling on it.
“[C]laimants seeking benefits from an ERISA plan must first exhaust available
administrative remedies under the plan before bringing suit to recover benefits.” Bourgeois v.
Pension Plan for Emps. of Santa Fe Int’l Corps., 215 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Denton
v. First Nat’l Bank of Waco, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1985)). Here, the Plan requires claims
to be submitted in writing to the Cargill Benefit Service Center, and the Plan provides a procedure
for an administrative appeal. See [3], Ex. 1 at p. 6, 11. The Plan specifically states that:
The Administrator shall notify a Participant in writing within a
reasonable period of time, not to exceed ninety (90) days, following
the Plan’s receipt of the Participants written claim for benefits, of
his or her eligibility or noneligibility (i) for benefits under the Plan
or, (ii) if the claim is for different or greater benefits, for the benefits
claimed by the Participant.
...
A Participant must use and exhaust the Plan’s administrative claims
procedures before bringing suit in either state or federal court. A
Participant’s failure to follow the Plan’s prescribed procedures in a
timely manner shall cause the Participant to lose his or her right to
bring suit regarding an adverse benefit determination.
[3], Ex. 1 at p. 6-7 (emphasis added).
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In his Affidavit, Campbell explains that in 2021 he began “contacting Cargill about [his]
pension benefits and how to begin receiving [his] benefits” and he spoke with personnel in Cargill
Human Resources Department at least four times. [7], Ex. 1 at p. 1. He alleges that he spoke with
“numerous employees” who told him that his case was being “researched.” Id. In 2022, Campbell
received an undated letter stating the following:
You recently contacted the Benefit Services Center inquiring about
a benefit due under the Cargill Pension Plan. We have reviewed our
plan records and they indicate that your plan benefits have been fully
paid. At the time you terminated employment, the Plan had a
provision that if the present value of the benefit was under $3,500 it
would be paid in a lump sum as soon as administratively possible
following termination. Based on your years of service and benefit
level, the benefit amount would have been under this threshold and
your full plan benefit would have been paid in a lump sum shortly
after your termination. Thus, no further benefits are due under the
Plan.
If you have further questions, please contact the Cargill Benefit
Service Center at 1-800-495-9006.
[7], Ex. 1 at p. 4.
As this letter illustrates, Campbell did contact Cargill regarding the status of his benefits,
but the letter makes no reference to any written submission. In fact, Cargill argues that Campbell
submitted no claim whatsoever because his informal conversations with Cargill did not comport
with the Plan’s written claim procedure and Cargill’s letter does not refer to his inquiry as a claim.
To support this argument, Cargill references Rice’s Declaration, which specifically states that “I
have confirmed with the Cargill Benefit Service Center that Mr. Campbell did not submit a claim
for a pension benefit under the Plan.” [3], Ex. 1 at p. 3. For his part, Campbell never contends that
he submitted a written claim.
The Plan clearly requires Campbell to submit a claim in writing. While Campbell asserts
that he made a claim, he at no point alleges that he submitted a claim in writing. In a relatively
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similar case where the plaintiff filed suit after numerous conversations and a similar letter
regarding his pension benefits, the Fifth Circuit held that allowing “informal attempts to substitute
for the formal claims procedure would frustrate the primary purposes of the exhaustion
requirement.” Bourgeois, 215 F.3d at 480, n. 14. In another case, Meza v. General Battery Corp.,
908 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1990), the plaintiff attempted to bring his initial claim via lawsuit. The
Fifth Circuit rejected this attempt to circumvent administrative exhaustion because it would
undermine the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement, including the need for creation of
a clear administrative record prior to litigation. Id. at 1279.
Despite these authorities, Campbell essentially asks to be excused from the exhaustion
requirement because he was “never advised or given any documentation about how to appeal this
process or file a claim” and never provided a copy of the current Plan or SPD as required by
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b). [7], Ex. 1 at p. 2. To this, Cargill responds that Campbell was no
longer a participant under the Plan after the cash out of his pension, and therefore Cargill was no
longer statutorily required to provide him copies of the Plan. In addition, Cargill directs the Court’s
attention to Meza, 908 F.2d at 1279, where the Fifth Circuit held that individuals are not excused
from exhausting their administrative remedies where they were never informed of the applicable
procedures. Consequently, Cargill asserts, even if Campbell still qualified as a participant under
the Plan, the administrator’s failure to provide current Plan documents does not excuse Campbell
from the administrative exhaustion requirement.
The Fifth Circuit previously rejected Campbell’s argument in Bourgeois, specifically
holding that “Meza imposes a duty to seek the necessary information even if it has not been made
available, and Bourgeois knew or should have known that according to the Plan, he was supposed
to file a claim with the Committee.” Id. at 480. The court further stated that “plaintiffs seeking

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ERISA plan benefits are bound by the plan’s administrative procedures and must use them before
filing suit even if they have no notice of what those procedures are.” Id. (emphasis added).
Against this backdrop, this Court finds that Campbell’s failure to comply with the plan is
dispositive. While Campbell contends that his phone calls constituted a claim, he concedes that he
did not submit a claim in writing as required by the Plan. And although he contends that he did not
have a copy of the Plan documents, he has come forward with no persuasive argument as to why
the Fifth Circuit’s holdings in Bourgeois and Meza should not apply. The Court simply cannot
excuse his failure to comply with the Plan’s claims procedure.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Cargill’s Motion to Dismiss, or alternatively, Motion for
Summary Judgment [3] is GRANTED. Campbell’s claims against Cargill are hereby dismissed
without prejudice. This CASE is CLOSED.
SO ORDERED, this the 17th day of January, 2023.

/s/ Sharion Aycock
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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