Roper v. City of Clarksdale et al

Filing 58

ORDER granting 47 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by W. Allen Pepper on 5/23/2011. (pls)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
DELTA DIVISION
PAUL ERIC ROPER,

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09CV094-P-A

CITY OF CLARKSDALE, MISSISSIPPI;
CLARKSDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT; and
WILLIAM GERALD, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as a Police Officer with the
Clarksdale Police Department,

DEFENDANTS.

FINAL JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the court upon the defendants’ motion for summary judgment [47].
After due consideration of the motion and the responses filed thereto, the court finds as follows, towit:
Summary judgment should be entered only if "[t]here is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating through the evidentiary
materials that there is no actual dispute as to any material fact in the case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 3l7, 323 (l986). On motion for summary judgment, "[t]he inquiry performed is the
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there
are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (l986). In determining whether this burden has been met, the court should view the evidence
introduced and all factual inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Id. Furthermore, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

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summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Under the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), a party against whom a
motion for summary judgment is made may not merely rest upon his pleadings, but must, by
affidavit, or other materials as provided in Rule 56, inform the court of specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Summary judgment is not proper if a dispute about a material fact is "genuine," or in other
words the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. There is no such issue unless the evidence sufficiently supports the nonmoving party's version of the facts for a jury to return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Id.
at 249. The relevant inquiry is whether or not there is sufficient disagreement on the facts to submit
them to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party should prevail as a matter of law. Id. at
251. The issue must be genuine, and not pretended, and the evidence relied on to create such an issue
must be substantial. Southern Distributing Co. v. Southdown, Inc., 574 F.2d 824, 826 (5th Cir.
1978).
The court concludes that the plaintiff has not met his burden in demonstrating through
substantial evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact warranting trial.
The plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims – i.e., violation of his Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights – are barred by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). As stated by the Fifth Circuit in Ballard v. Burton:
It is well settled that, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct.
2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot
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recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if the alleged
violation arose from the same facts attendant to the charge for which he was
convicted, unless he proves “that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
444 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006).
It is undisputed that the plaintiff pled guilty to commercial burglary and resisting arrest
which arose from the very same incident giving rise to the instant lawsuit. The plaintiff has not
demonstrated that either of these convictions were reversed or otherwise overturned as required by
Heck. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s federal claims should be dismissed on this basis alone.
In any event, the plaintiff’s federal claims against the City of Clarksdale, William Gerald in
his official capacity, and the Clarksdale Police Department (who is an improper party) should be
dismissed because he has failed to identify a policy or policymaker and a violation of constitutional
rights whose “moving force” was the policy or custom as required by Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Pitrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir.
2001).
Furthermore, even if the plaintiff’s claims were not barred by Heck, the plaintiff’s federal
claims against William Gerald in his individual capacity should be dismissed because the plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate that Gerald is not entitled qualified immunity. See McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002)( “When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the
burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.”). Ultimately, a state
actor is entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the legal
rules that were clearly established at the time of his or her actions.” McClendon, 305 F.3d at 322323. The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that all reasonable police officers under the
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circumstances would have agreed that the alleged force was objectively unreasonable. Thompson
v. Upshur County, Tx, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The [officer’s] acts are held to be
objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the [officer’s] circumstances would have
then known that the [officer’s] conduct violated” the plaintiff’s constitutional rights) (emphasis in
original); White v Taylor, 959 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1992) (“If reasonable public officials could differ
on the lawfulness of the defendant’s actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.”).
The court now turns to the plaintiff’s numerous state law claims. Since it is undisputed that
the plaintiff was engaged in criminal conduct at all pertinent times, the defendants are correct that
all of these claims are barred pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c)(“A government entity and
its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable
for any claim ... [a]rising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity
engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police ... protection unless
the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in
criminal activity at the time of the injury.”) (emphasis added).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
(1) The defendants’ motion for summary judgment [47] is GRANTED; accordingly,
(2) All of the plaintiff’s claims against all defendants are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE; and
(3) This case is CLOSED with all parties to bear their own costs.
SO ORDERED this the 23rd day of May, A.D., 2011.
/s/ W. Allen Pepper, Jr.
W. ALLEN PEPPER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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