White v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. et al

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 72 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Glen H. Davidson on 7/23/12. (tab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

DELTA DIVISION

SHIRLEY WHITE, as wrongful death
beneficiary of KEITH PERKINS, DECEASED

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09-CV-00161-GHD-JMV

v.

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,

and TUNICA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A. Introduction
This matter is before the Court on the motion [25] of Defendant Tunica County, Mississippi
for summary judgment on all state law claims asserted against it because it is immune from liability
pursuant to the inmate exemption of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"), Mississippi Code

§ 11-46-9(1)(m). Tunica County also seeks summary judgment as to Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983
constitutional deprivation claim on the basis of an alleged lack ofproof of the essential elements of
that claim.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment on the state law claims, Plaintiff argues

that Mississippi Code § 11-46-9(1)(m) is unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection
Clause ofthe United States Constitution applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. As
for the motion for summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff initially asserted that
additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was necessary in
order for it to respond to the motion. See Motion for Discovery [39]. The Court granted that request
and permitted Plaintiff ninety days to conduct such discovery, following which Plaintiff was required
to file, within ten days, any opposition to the motion it might have. See Order [50]. Plaintiffhas not

filed any opposition to the motion for summary judgment with regard to the Section 1983 claim, and
it has been well over a year since the response was due. For this and the reasons discussed below,
the court finds the Defendant Tunica County's motion meritorious in all respects.

B. Factual Background
Plaintiff Shirley White seeks damages against Tunica County pursuant to state law and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged wrongful death ofher brother, Keith Perkins, a prison inmate. Initially,
Perkins was incarcerated at Tunica County Detention Facility ("TCDF"). While housed there,
Perkins was provided medical care for an epileptic condition. This medical care included the
medications Lamictal, Tegratal, and Keppra. These were Perkins' prescribed medications because
he reported an allergy to Dilantin. He remained at TCDF until June 12,2008. On that date, at 0800
hours, Perkins signed for and was administered his final prescribed dosages ofLamictal, Tegratal, and
Keppra, and at 0831 hours, he was transferred to CMCF by a correctional officer or officers. Perkins'
medications and medical records were not transported with him at the time of this transfer.
Consistent with the general practice of the TCDF, however, a medical synopsis regarding Perkins'
condition and allergies was given to the transporting officer prior to leaving the TCDF.
Perkins arrived at CMCF at 1431 hours on June 12, 2008. He was provided a medical
screening at 1640 hours that same day, and he signed a required MDOC form entitled "Mississippi
Department ofCorrections, Prison Medical History and Screening." The form indicates that Perkins
suffered from a "Seizure Disorder"; that his current medications were Lamictal, Tegratal, and Keppra;
and that he had a medication allergy to Dilantin. Perkins was scheduled for a physical to be
performed at a later date and was transported to general population in a different building.
Interdisciplinary Medical Notes from June 14, 2008 state that "lIM to clinic stating 'I been here
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almost a month and they ain't gave me none of my medicine.' IIM acknowledges hx of epilepsy.
States he knows sz was coming knows meds and claims compliance until transfer to CMCF." On
June 16, 2008, Perkins was prescribed different medications than those administered during his
incarceration at TCDF and was transported to Central Mississippi Medical Center for uncontrolled
seizure activity. There, Perkins died following a cardiac arrest. The complaint [I] alleges that Tunica
County "failed to take the necessary steps to assure that Perkins' medical records and medications
were transported with him" to CMCF. See PL's CompL [1]

e.

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10.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Cry. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548,91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Weaverv. CCA Indus., Inc.,
529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). "The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of
record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving
party to carry its burden." Beck v. Tex. State Bd. ofDental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548). After a proper motion for summary
judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for triaL Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91
L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621
(5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505.
"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

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properly preclude the entry ofsummary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary
will not be counted." Id. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505. If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in
support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine dispute is presented. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548. "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Fed. Sav. & Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503
(5th Cir. 1992).
The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

Allen, 204 F.3dat621;PYCAIndus., Inc. v. Harrison Cnty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist.• 177 F.3d 351,
161 (5th Cir.1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper. 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir.
1995). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.

1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit. Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998). In the absence ofproof,
the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts."

Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).

D. Discussion

1.

Plaintiff's State Law Claims
a.

Burden of Proof

A statute enacted by the Mississippi Legislature is presumed constitutional. Vance v. Lincoln

Cnty. Dep'tofPub. Welfare, 582 So. 2d 414, 419 (Miss. 1991). Accordingly, a party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute must prove his case by showing the unconstitutionality of the statute
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; Exxon Corp. v. Bd. ofEduc. ofLamar Cnty.. Miss., 849 F. Supp.

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479,489 (S.D. Miss. 1994). The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated: "This Court will strike down
a statute on constitutional grounds only where it appears beyond all reasonable doubt that such statute
violates the constitution." Wells v. Panola Cnty. Bd. ofEduc., 645 So. 2d 883, 888 (Miss. 1994). The
court has further stated:
[O]ne who assails a legislative enactment must overcome the strong
presumption of validity and such assailant must prove his conclusion
affinnatively and clearly establish it beyond a reasonable doubt. All
doubt must be resolved in favor ofthe validity of a statute. If possible,
courts should construe statutes so as to render them constitutional
rather than unconstitutional ifthe statute under attack does not clearly
and apparently conflict with organic law, after first resolving all doubts
in favor of validity.
Loden v. Miss. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 279 So. 2d 636, 640 (Miss. 1973) (citations omitted); see also
Hoops V. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 536 (Miss. 1996); Richmondv. City ofCorinth, 816 So. 2d 373 (Miss.

2002).

h.

Analysis

There is no dispute that Section § 11-46-9(1)(m), as it stands, entitles Tunica County to
immunity from Plaintifrs state law claims. Section 11-46-9(1)(m) bars an inmate ofa correctional
facility from bringing suit against a governmental entity. The section provides in pertinent part:

Governmental entities and employees; exemption from liability
(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the
course and scope oftheir employment or duties shall not be liable for
any claim:

(m) Of any claimant who at the time the claim arises is an
inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal fann,
penitentiary or other such institution, regardless of whether such

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claimant is or is not an inmate of any detention center, jail,
workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution when
the claim is filed;

MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1 )(m). This statute has been repeatedly upheld as providing immunity
to the State and its political subdivisions from suits by prisoners. See Mahaffey v. Pearl River Cnty.,
No.l:07cvl070-RHW,2009WL 1507418(S.D.Miss.May29,2009)(findingcountyimmunefrom
inmate's state law claim for injuries sustained during a motor vehicle accident); Whitt v. Gordon, 872
So. 2d 71 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding dismissal on immunity grounds of inmate's claim
against state employees for injury sustained in motor vehicle accident which occurred during
inmate's transport to prison facility); Carter v. Miss. Dep 't ofCorrections, 860 So. 2d 1187 (Miss.
2003) (holding governmental entity immune from negligence suit for wrongful death of inmate);
Wallace v. Town ofRaleigh, 815 So. 2d 1203 (Miss. 2002) (holding statute barring inmate from

suing governmental entity was .constitutional and that prisoner fell within statutory bar); Sparks v.

Kim, 701 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Miss. 1997) (MTCA inmate exception to waiver ofsovereign immunity
held a bar to wrongful death claim against county).
Here, however, Plaintiff opposes dismissal of her state law claims on the ground that the
statute is unconstitutional because it violates the United States Constitution's mandate of equal
protection. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that prisoners are considered, or should be considered, a
suspect class or quasi-suspect class and/or that the statute at issue impinges a fundamental
constitutional right of prisoners to receive adequate medical care. If correct in these assertions,
Plaintiff accurately argues that the immunity statute is subject to a "strict scrutiny" analysis (for

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suspect classification or impingement of a fundamental constitutional right) or a "substantial
relationship" analysis (for quasi-suspect classification). See Mass. Rd. ofRetirement v. Mugia, 427
U.S. 307, 314, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976); Grimes v. Pearl River Water Supply Dist.,
930 F.2d 441,444 (5th Cir. 1991). In the alternative, Plaintiff asserts that even ifprisoners are not
a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and the statute does not impinge a fundamental constitutional right
of prisoners, it nevertheless violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution because the
statute bears no "rational relationship" to a legitimate state interest. As the Plaintiff aptly notes, such
a relationship is required of any legislation facing a constitutional challenge where that legislation
involves neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect classification or a fundamental constitutional right. The
Court will address Plaintiffs arguments in turn.
With respect to Plaintiff's first argument, both the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Mississippi Supreme Court have concluded that prisoners are not a suspect class for purposes of
triggering a strict scrutiny analysis of challenged legislation. See Carson v. Johnson, 112 F .3d 818
(5th Cir. 1997); Wallace, 815 So. 2d 1203. Plaintiff has cited no authority to the contrary. With
respect to Plaintiffs next argument, in her brief, she cites Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of

Cleburne, Texas, 726F.2d 191,197 (5th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that prison inmates constitute
a quasi-suspect class. According to Plaintiff, "[a]lthough prisoners are not a suspect class, 'they do
share enough ofthe characteristics ofa suspect class to warrant heightened scrutiny.' " PI.' s Br. [41]
at 8. However, Cleburne, in fact, neither holds nor suggests that prisoners are a quasi-suspect
classification. I

The Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have at least implicitly

I In Cleburne, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "although mental retardates are not a suspect class, they do
share enough of the characteristics ofa suspect class to warrant heightened scrutiny." Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 197
(emphasis added). However, the United States Supreme Court actually vacated this holding, finding that mental

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recognized that prisoners do not constitute a quasi-suspect classification, as both courts have clearly
held that the analysis applicable to prisoner challenges to the constitutionality of legislation is
whether there is a rational relationship between the challenged legislation and a governmental
interest. See Carson, 112 F.3d 818; Wallace, 815 So. 2d 1203.2 Ifprisoners were, instead, entitled
to quasi-suspect classification, those courts would have applied a substantial relationship analysis.
Moreover, in instances where the issue ofwhether prisoners qualify as a quasi-suspect classification
has been specifically addressed by other courts, those courts have consistently found the
classification inapplicable. See, e.g., Bell v. Holder, No.2: 11 cv488-WHA, 2012 WL 777186 (M.D.
Ala. Mar. 8,2012); Nakao v. Rushen, 542 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ca. 1982).
The Court next turns to Plaintiff's alternative argument that the statute is subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis because it offends a fundamental constitutional right of prisoners. Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that the statute offends prison inmates' constitutional right to receive reasonable
medical care. However, as is plain from the face of the statute-which language is quoted above-it
does no such thing. The subject of medical care is nowhere addressed in the section of the MTCA
at issue here. Instead, the statute does no more than reaffinn, as to prisoners, the long-recognized
and constitutional sovereign immunity ofthe State with regard to state law claims. See Wallace, 815
So. 2d 1203; Grimes, 930 F.2d 441.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that even under the least stringent analysis for addressing
constitutional challenges to legislation, the rational relationship test, the statute at issue is

retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard ofjudicial review. See City of
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985).
2 See also Phillips ex reI. Phillips v. Monroe Cnty., Miss., 311 F.3d 369,376 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Prisoners
are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class ....").

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unconstitutional because it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose. In
particular, Plaintiff contends that the statute deprives prisoners of adequate medical care, and that
because prisoners are dependent on the State for the provision of adequate medical care, the statute
is "irrational." Again, Plaintiff has wholly misconstrued the subject ofthe statute which, as noted
above, does not address the provision of medical care. Moreover, although not addressed at all by
Plaintiff, this Court notes that the Mississippi Supreme Court has already considered the very
challenge to the instant statute made here and has held that 1) the rational relationship test is the
appropriate test; and 2) the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state concern. In
Wallace, an injured inmate argued that the subject statute violated the Remedy Clause, Due Process

Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Mississippi and the United States Constitutions. 815
So. 2d 1203. Each ofthese theories was considered and rejected by the Mississippi Supreme Court.
!d. With regard to the equal protection claim, in particular, the Wallace court reasoned that the claim

failed because it found that "[t]he Legislature had a legitimate purpose in protecting governmental
entities from claims brought by inmates." !d. at 1207. Consequently, the court found that the
plaintiff in that case failed to establish that the statute was unconstitutional under the rational
relationship test. !d. Wallace has been cited with favor by the Southern District ofMississippi. See,
e.g., Mahaffey v. Pearl River Cnty., No. 1:07cvl070-RHW, 2009WL 1507418 (S.D. Miss. May29,

2009); and Hodge v. Flynn, No. 2:07cv40-KS-MTP, 2007 WL2727263, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 17,
2007).
In the face of such established precedent, and in the absence of any controlling law to the
contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiffs challenge to the constitutionality of Section 11-46-9(1)(m)
is without merit, and that there are no triable issues of fact regarding whether Defendant Tunica

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County is immune from suit pursuant to the MTCA with regard to Plaintiff's state law claims.
Accordingly, Tunica County is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's state law claims.

2.

Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims
In support of its motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims, Tunica

County asserts that Plaintiff has failed to identify a policy or custom that resulted in deliberate
indifference to Keith Perkins' known serious health condition and/or has failed to offer proof that
a delay/denial of medical care occasioned thereby caused Perkins' death. In response to these
arguments, Plaintiff asserted that in order to bring forth evidence ofthe same, she needed to conduct
limited discovery. The Plaintiff was thereupon granted a period ofninety days from June 17, 2010,
in which to conduct this discovery and was expressly ordered to file any opposition to the motion
for summary judgment that it might have within ten days thereafter. The Plaintiff has never filed any
such response or opposition, and well over a year has lapsed since the response was due. Because
the Plaintiff has come forth with no proof of a custom or policy of Tunica County that manifested
itself in deliberate indifference to Perkins' serious medical needs and/or proofthat the same caused
his death, summary judgment is appropriate on this claim. 3

E. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Tunica County's Motion for Summary Judgment
should, and is hereby, GRANTED in all respects.

3SeeMonellv. Dep'tofSoc. Servs. ofthe CilyofNew York, 436 U.S. 658,690,98 S. Ct. 2018, 56L. Ed. 2d
611 (1978) (holding that local governments may be sued directly under Section 1983 where the alleged
unconstitutional action is part of an official policy or custom of the governmental body). See also Conner v. Travis
Cnly., 209 F. 3d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Counties and supervisors are not liable for constitutional violations
committed by county employees unless those violations result directly from a municipal custom or policy.").

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P.J..The Court shall enter a final judgment on these claims in accordance with this opinion, THIS,
~ day of July, 2012.

SENIOR JUDGE

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