Pierce v. Lance et al
Filing
67
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 66 Judgment. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 1/2/13. (cr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
DELTA DIVISION
JAIRIE T. PIERCE, JR.
PLAINTIFF
v.
No. 2:11CV86-A-A
SHERIFF BRAD LANCE, ET AL.
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Jairie T. Pierce,
Jr., who challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he
filed this suit. The defendants have filed a motion styled as one to dismiss; however, they have
referred to matters outside the pleadings, and the court treats in instant motion as one seeking
summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2010). Pierce
has not responded, and the deadline for response has expired. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion by the defendants for summary judgment will be granted and the instant case
dismissed.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). “The moving party must show that if the evidentiary
material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to
permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden.” Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners,
204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the
burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d
202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th
Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Id., at 248. If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of allegations
essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. “Where the record,
taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is
no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th
Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water
Management Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v.
Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when there is “an actual
controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d
427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the court does not “assume that the nonmoving
party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
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General Facts as Alleged by Plaintiff1
Jairie T. Pierce, Jr. was incarcerated in the Tate County Jail from December 20, 2009,
through October 29, 2010. Pierce was present in the “old” Tate County Jail from December 20,
2009 until April of 2010, when he was transferred to the “new” Tate County Jail. There were six
to seven inmates present in each “tank” (approximately 30’ x 10.5’), which generally had six
beds, one shower, one table and six chairs. The windows in the “tank” had metal welded over
them.
Facts Regarding Failure to Protect
Pierce was transferred from the DeSoto County Jail to the Tate County Jail on December
20, 2009, at approximately 4:00 p.m. Upon arriving at the Tate County Jail, Pierce was booked
by jailer, Joe Gallop, then placed in G Tank, at approximately 4:45 p.m. From approximately
5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., the inmates, including Pierce, were placed on lockdown for dinner. After
lockdown, Pierce walked over to a table and sat down to watch television. At that time, he heard
a fellow inmate, Leroy Davis, state “Come get this man before I beat him up.” About four or
five minutes later, Pierce heard Leroy Davis state that he was going to “beat him up.” Pierce
admits that he did not know Leroy Davis was referring to Pierce himself, as he had his back
turned to Davis at the time. Davis then struck Pierce from behind. Three inmates pulled Leroy
Davis off of Pierce, and four jailers immediately rushed into G Tank when the incident occurred.
The jailers included Joe Gallop, Steve Ross, Joe Williams and Marshall Moore. Joe Williams
1
The facts set forth below are taken almost entirely from the defendants’ Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss. The plaintiff has not disputed these facts, and they comport with
the plaintiff’s submissions to the court. The court will, for the purposes of the present motion for
summary judgment only, evaluate the claims in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
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and Marshall Moore, told Pierce he could have Leroy Davis written up. Pierce filed a Complaint
with Tony Rowley, jail administrator, regarding Leroy Davis. As a result of the attack, Pierce
sustained injuries to his eye and face. Pierce was moved to D Tank after the incident to keep
him separate from Davis. About five days later, jailer Randy Polk attempted to place Leroy
Davis into D Tank but first inquired of Pierce if that would be a problem. Both Davis and Pierce
said that would cause trouble, and Davis was not placed into D Tank. Though Pierce alleged
that Davis had previously attacked other jail inmates, he had not witnessed such an attack.
Pierce believes that Leroy Davis was a menace to him, and the following defendants failed to
protect him: Sheriff Brad Lance, Joe Gallop, Steve Ross, Joe Williams, Marshall Moore,
Melissa Leathers and Tony Rowley.
Facts Regarding Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care
As a result of the attack, Pierce alleges he has sustained injuries to his eye and face.
Pierce received medical care the following Monday with jail nurse, Melissa Leathers – and
continues to receive medical care and prescriptions for the alleged injuries and other medical
needs.
Facts Regarding Conditions of Confinement
In March or April of 2010, the Tate County Jail (in its entirety) lost air conditioning for
approximately five days. During this period, there was no air circulation or fans, leaving him
miserable with the feeling that he was suffocating. During these five days, the inmates,
including Pierce, complained of the conditions daily. Pierce has not specified whether any of the
named defendants neglected the inmates.
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Facts Regarding “Strong Armed Robbery”
While incarcerated at the Tate County Jail, Pierce was relocated from the “old” facility to
the “new” facility. Pierce alleges that jailers (including Officer Chris Billingsley) in conjunction
with U.S. Marshals relocated the inmates to the new jail facility. These persons were under the
supervision of Lt. Randy Doss. During the relocation process, Pierce alleges that all of the
inmates within his “tank” were threatened – and their property was thrown into a single pile.
Pierce alleges that some of the inmates’ personal property, including his own, did not arrive at
the new jail facility. There was an offer of $5.00 to be place on each inmate’s commissary
account to offset any lost personal property during the move.
Discussion
Failure to Protect
Pierce brings a claim that the defendants failed to protect him from attack by another
inmate. “The Eighth Amendment affords prisoners protection against injury at the hands of other
inmates” Johnson v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Deliberate
indifference is the standard to apply regarding convicted prisoners who claim that prison
officials failed to protect them. Grabowski v. Jackson County Public Defenders Office, 47 F.3d
1386, 1396 (5th ir. 1995).
The deliberate indifference standard is not met “unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In the present
case, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial risk
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of serious harm,” an element the plaintiff must prove to state a proper claim under § 1983. Id. at
826 (citation omitted).
Leroy Davis is an inmate who was housed with Pierce during his stay at the Tate Count
Jail. Davis has a history of psychological problems and has been prescribed multiple
medications as treatment for those problems. Davis had scuffled with other inmates in the past.
Pierce alleged that Leroy Davis said that if the defendants did not remove “him,” then Davis
would beat “him” up. Pierce, whose back was to Davis, did not realize that Davis was talking
about him. Davis then attacked Pierce without provocation. Pierce admitted that he, himself,
could not have predicted that Davis would attack him. To the present day, Pierce does not know
why Davis attacked him.
If Pierce could discern no reason for the attack, then the defendants could not have
predicted it, either. Though Davis had fought with other inmates in the past, the defendants
could not have known that Davis would dislike Pierce enough to attack him. Once made aware
of the irrational animosity Davis harbored toward Pierce, the defendants ensured that they were
kept separate, and Davis did not attack Pierce again. These facts do not demonstrated that the
defendants knew of and ignored an excessive risk to Pierce’s safety. As such, these allegations
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Denial of Adequate Medical Care
In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff
must allege facts which demonstrate “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
prisoners [which] constitutes ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment . . . whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors or prison guards
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in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care . . . .” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104-105, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 260 (1976); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992).
The test for establishing deliberate indifference is one of “subjective recklessness as used in the
criminal law.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Under this standard, a state actor
may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless plaintiff alleges facts which, if true, would
establish that the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 838. Only in
exceptional circumstances may knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm be inferred by a
court from the obviousness of the substantial risk. Id. Negligent conduct by prison officials
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106
S.Ct. 662 (1986), Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). This same
subjective deliberate indifference standard has been applied to pre-trial detainees under the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as convicted inmates under the Eighth Amendment. See Hare v.
City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 648 (5th Cir. 1996).
In cases like this one, which arises from delayed medical attention rather than a clear
denial of medical attention, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered substantial harm
resulting from the delay in order to state a claim for a civil rights violation. Mendoza v.
Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993); Campbell v. McMillin, 83 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D.
Miss. 2000). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with medical treatment provided by prison
officials does not state a claim against the prison for violation of the Eighth Amendment by
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545 (5th
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Cir.2001), Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997).
In this case, Pierce admits that he received medical treatment for the injuries he sustained
in the attack in the days following the attack up until the time of the Spears hearing in this case.
This claim is without merit and will be dismissed.
General Conditions
“[T]he Eighth Amendment may afford protection against conditions of confinement
which constitute health threats but not against those which cause mere discomfort or
inconvenience.” Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969
(1989)(citation omitted). “Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences, and services of a
good hotel.” Id. at 849 n.5 (citation omitted). Prison officials have certain duties under the
Eighth Amendment, but these duties are only to provide prisoners with “humane conditions of
confinement,” including “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care . . . .” Woods v.
Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 n.10 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994)). Having reviewed the “totality of the circumstances,” McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d
1248 (5th Cir. 1990), the court concludes that Pierce’s claims do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
Pierce and the other inmates spent five days during March or April in the “old jail”
without air conditioning because the air conditioning unit failed. This condition was not
repeated, and the inmates were then moved into the “new jail.” In addition, the excessive heat
was beyond the control of the defendants, who took steps to correct the problem, and the failure
of the cooling unit certainly was not a policy or custom adopted by the defendants. In addition,
Pierce suffered no harm from the five hot days spent without air conditioning – only discomfort.
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He was not deprived of a “basic human need” for an unreasonable period of time. See Woods,
51 F.3d at 581. This claim will be dismissed
“Strong Armed Robbery”
In this claim, Pierce simply alleges that, during the move from the old jail to the new one,
his possessions and those of other inmates were lost. A group of defendants ordered the inmates
to get against the wall, collected their property into a single big pile, and moved the inmates and
the property to the new jail. The inmates were told that if they failed to comply they would be
tasered. The defendants did not, however, use a taser on the inmates. Some of the inmates’
property got lost during the move; other inmates received all of their property. Pierce, however,
received none of his property. These facts establish only that Pierce lost his property because the
defendants were negligent – that the defendants mislaid his belongings and could not find them
or return them to him. Negligent conduct by prison officials does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986), Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). “[The history [of the Due Process Clause] reflects
the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forbear in the
Magna Carta, was ‘intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government.’”1 The Court reasoned
We think that the actions of prison custodians in leaving a pillow on the stairs, or
mislaying an inmate’s property, are quite remote from the concerns just
discussed. Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a
1
Id., citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527, 4 S.Ct. 111, 116, 28 L.Ed. 232
(1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 235, 244, 4 L.Ed. 559 (1819))
(internal citations omitted). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963,
2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government . . . .”)
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failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury
caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process law.
...
Where a government official’s act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is
merely negligent, no procedure or compensation is constitutionally required.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The plaintiff’s claim, read in a light most
favorable to him, sounds wholly in negligence. Thus, under the reasoning of Daniels and
Davidson, supra, the plaintiff’s claim regarding the loss of his property will be dismissed with
prejudice.
In sum, the motion by the defendants for summary judgment will be granted and the
instant case dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A final
judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion shall issue today.
SO ORDERED, this the 2nd day of January, 2013.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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