Jackson v. State of Mississippi
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 16 Order Dismissing Case. Signed by Neal B. Biggers on 3/13/12. (tab)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
DELTA DIVISION
JEFFREY J. JACKSON
versus
PETITIONER
Civil Action No.: 2:11CV167-NBB-SAA
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the pro se petition of Jeffrey J. Jackson,
Mississippi prisoner # 100300, for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent
has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, and Petitioner has responded. The Court finds the
matter ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In the Circuit Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi, Petitioner was convicted of three
counts of aggravated assault (Counts I, II, and III) and one count of murder (Count IV). On
December 5, 2003, he was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of fifteen years on Counts
I and II, twenty years on Count III, and life on Count IV.1 The Mississippi Court of Appeals
affirmed his convictions and sentences by order issued on July 28, 2009. See Jackson v. State,
28 So. 3d 638 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied, December 15, 2009, cert. denied, February
25, 2010 (Cause No. 2007-KA-00154). On July 13, 2010, Petitioner signed an application for
leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court, and the application was denied by the
Mississippi Supreme Court on August 11, 2010.2 Petitioner now seeks federal habeas relief by
1
ECF No. 12-1.
2
ECF No. 12-3 and 12-4.
way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus that was signed on August 2, 2011.3
Resolution of Respondent’s motion turns on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of –
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or the laws
of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and (2).
Petitioner did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court after his convictions
and sentences were affirmed. Therefore, Petitioner’s State court judgment became final on May
26, 2010, which is ninety (90) days after the February 25, 2010, decision. See Roberts v.
Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that “direct review includes a petition for
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court”). Because Petitioner’s post-conviction application was
3
The original petition, listed as ECF No. 1, does not bear Petitioner’s signature or date.
Petitioner attached the date and signature by way of an exhibit to the petition. See ECF No. 6.
pending between July 13, 2010 and August 11, 2010, the federal limitations period was tolled for
twenty-nine (29) days beyond the May 26, 2011, deadline. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (tolling
the federal statute of limitations while a “properly filed” application is pending). Therefore, the
deadline for Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was June 24, 2011.4 However, the petition in
this action was not filed until at least August 2, 2011, which is the date it was signed. See
Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the “mailbox rule” deems a
pro se prisoner’s petition filed on the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing). The
instant petition was filed some thirty-nine (39) days after the one-year federal limitations period
expired.
The limitations period of the AEDPA may be equitably tolled if Petitioner can
demonstrate “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way” to prevent timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549,
2562 (2010) (citations omitted). It is available only in “rare and exceptional circumstances.”
Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In this case, Petitioner
maintains that he is entitled to equitable tolling based on inadequate assistance from the Inmate
Legal Assistance Program (“ILAP”), an inadequate prison law library, and administrative moves
that have prevented him from filing within the limitations period. The Court finds that
Petitioner’s complaints do not constitute “rare and exceptional circumstances” that warrant
equitable tolling, and the petition is untimely. See, e.g., id. at n.3 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
inadequate law library does not constitute “rare and exceptional circumstance”); Felder v.
4
Although Petitioner did seek a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court following the denial of his application for post-conviction relief, the United
States has held that certiorari review from state collateral review does not statutorily toll the
federal limitations period. See Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1084-85 (2007).
Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that “mere ignorance of the law or lack of
knowledge of filing deadlines does not justify equitable tolling”); Townsend v. Epps, Cause No.
2:06cv199-M-A, 2007 WL 1687461 at *3 (N.D. Miss. June 8, 2007) (noting that inmates in
custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections have “access to the AEDPA and all other
legal materials through the Inmate Legal Assistance Program”).
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to § 2244(d)”
and DISMISSES with prejudice the petition filed in this cause.
SO ORDERED this the 13th day of March, 2012.
/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS
SENIOR U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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