Rideout v. Allstate Insurance, Inc.
Filing
144
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 82 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 83 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Michael P. Mills on 11/18/2013. (lpm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
DELTA DIVISION
PAMELA RIDEOUT
PLAINTIFF
V.
NO.: 2:11CV222-MPM-JMV
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
DEFENDANT
ORDER
This cause comes before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 [Doc. 82, 83]. The plaintiff has responded in opposition to the motion.
Upon due consideration of the memoranda and relevant law, the court is now prepared to rule.
Pamela Rideout is an African American woman who was employed by Allstate. She
alleges Allstate discriminated against her on the base of race with respect to compensation,
promotion, work assignments, resources, and other adverse terms pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The plaintiff, Ms. Rideout, was employed by defendant starting in March 2006 as a
Market Distribution Associate (MDA). It is alleged Ms. Rideout, who was the only black female
MDA in her region, was paid less than the other MDAs employed on or near her hire date. Each
new MDA was given resources by Allstate which included: a twenty-four month development
plan, home office, cell phone, access to reports, an expense account, and particular assignments
among other benefits.
Ms. Rideout claims she was provided with an unofficial, hand-written development plan
that only allowed her ten months rather than the twenty-four months to complete. Further, as
early as May 14, 2006, Rideout informed her manager at Allstate that her access to essential
resources was unreasonably delayed. She was not provided a cell phone until September 2006, a
laptop until March 2007, and was not provided a printer until October 2007. Ms. Rideout also
claims she was assigned a market with limited potential and placed in a low-performing agency
with numerous personal and financial challenges at a higher percentage than her similarly
situated peers. John Meyer, a Caucasian male who managed the Tennessee territory of the
Southern Region, allowed Rideout’s peers to select the agents for their respective markets, and
left the remaining rejected agents for Ms. Rideout according to her complaint.
Ms. Rideout contends Meyer routinely related to her in a dismissive and/or offensive
manner and stated she was being “overly anxious” regarding the development plan and assigned
market. Plaintiff met with human resource representatives of the defendant in March and June of
2006 to inform them of the racial discrimination she was encountering with Meyer and an
incident in which a Caucasian peer referred to another African American as a “big black gorilla.”
Ms. Rideout states several people laughed at the statement, including the manager, John Meyer.
After discussing the ongoing issues, Rideout noticed a marked increase in hostility from
Meyer, and her resources continued to be delayed. Despite not having access to the correct
resources, plaintiff met her goals but other Caucasian MDAs did not.
Meyer additionally demanded Ms. Rideout surrender her law license although there was
no policy within Allstate which prohibits MDAs from holding a law license. Ms. Rideout offered
to suspend her license, but Meyer and the Regional Field Sales Consultant, Carl Tackett, rejected
her idea and insisted she surrender her license or face possible termination.
Ms. Rideout met with Mike Brown, the Regional Distribution Leader, in October 2007 to
handle her discrimination complaint and her low performance rating despite the fact she met or
exceeded all measurable goals. Brown admitted Meyer’s actions were wrong and needed to be
addressed. Brown amended Rideout’s rating and offered her an opportunity to participate in the
2
Talent Acceleration Program, a program reserved for Allstate’s forty most effective employees.
Ms. Rideout was accepted into the program and the program required her to work in the
corporate office in Northbrook, Illinois for twenty-four months, June 2008 until May 2010.
During the time Ms. Rideout was in the Talent Acceleration Program, she states she was
not subject to any racial discrimination.
Ms. Rideout states in February 2010, she was denied the opportunity to be considered for
a promotion and the not-posted-position was filled by a less qualified Caucasian male. Further,
she was denied the opportunity to be considered for several other regional positions.
In April 2010, Rideout was informed that if she returned to the Southern Region, she
would have to take a position in Kentucky, without the benefit of a relocation package. Robert
Moseley1, a human resource representative, informed her she would not need to relocate because
the market could be successfully managed remotely, yet plaintiff claims similarly situated white
peers were not required to manage their territories from remote locations. Moseley indicated Ms.
Rideout could not return to the Memphis market because it could only sustain one Field Sales
Leader (FSL). However, plaintiff learned that the Memphis market was split into two markets
and the new market that emerged from the split was awarded to a Caucasian male from Florida.
Allstate announced Rideout would return to Memphis as a FSL in May 2010. Ms.
Rideout contends however that she believed the Kentucky market was assigned to her and it was
not a temporary assignment.2 Defendant refers the court to a conversation Rideout had with
Moseley and Eric Harvey, in which Moseley stated that there “were a lot of moving parts.”3
Plaintiff argues that defendant misrepresents the timing of the plaintiff’s notes that relate to the
1
In the complaint, Moseley is spelled two ways: Moseley and Mosely.
Whether the personal notes cited to by counsel prove Rideout knew it was a temporary position or not is best left
for the finder of fact.
3
Defendant states this phone conversation was illegally recorded by the plaintiff using an audio recording device;
however that issue is not before this court.
2
3
phone conversation and they are in response to her learning that the Kentucky assignment was
temporary. Further she argues the telephone conversation and the meaning of Moseley’s
statement is an issue for the jury.
Despite Ms. Rideout contending she was not happy to move to Chicago due to having a
young son, she now contends she wanted to leave Memphis for the Kentucky market, but did not
tell Moseley of her preference because “he did not ask… the very market I preferred had been
assigned to me… and no indication that knowing my preference would make a difference to the
decision…” Further, plaintiff testified she would have left the TAP program early to come back
to the Southern Region and “would have came back for anything to be with [her] son.”
Rideout learned that the Kentucky position was awarded to a Caucasian male who was
provided a relocation package but was later terminated due to his inability to pass the initial
background check.
Ms. Rideout was assigned a market in May 2010 that was comprised of sixty percent
African American agents4 and a similarly situated white FSL was awarded a territory with
significantly less African American agents.
It is alleged in the complaint that after Rideout filed a formal charge of discrimination
with the EEOC in August 2010, Robert Emmich became more openly dismissive and
disrespectful of her. Plaintiff uses as an example that Emmich counseled plaintiff about her
communication skills, and stated she used too many “big words” that intimidate and confuse
people, but rarely challenged Caucasians’ communication skills. A Caucasian FSL referenced to
plaintiff as a “bitch” during a meeting and Emmich did not admonish the employee after several
other FSLs complained to HR. Ms. Rideout filed an internal complaint in November 2010
4
In plaintiff’s complaint she states that “African American Agents historically have agencies comprised of African
Americans. African Americans historically do not purchase securities which is a large portion of the FSL’s goals.”
4
regarding the incident because she thought it was unacceptable that the Region’s investigation
did not find “mal-intent” with this behavior and perceived it as a personal matter.
Plaintiff began reporting to Emmich on January 1, 2011. Emmich disclosed Rideout’s
confidential performance discussions with her peers but did not disclose this information
regarding Rideout’s peers to other employees. On February 15, 2011, Moseley investigated
Rideout’s claims that Emmich’s conduct was retaliatory in nature. Moseley acknowledged that
Emmich should not have conversed regarding Rideout’s development with her peers. Rideout
also states Emmich exhibited a tolerance for racially offensive conduct when on June 2, 2011 he
excused her peers’ behavior because “some people just can’t get past skin pigmentation” and
later stated that he understood how a recruit would assume she was white because she was “so
articulate.”5 Ms. Rideout again met with Moseley to express concerns with Emmich’s ability to
assess her performance in an unbiased matter. Plaintiff states she was subjected to retaliatory
conduct by Emmich and he subjected her to greater scrutiny than her similarly situated
Caucasian peers.
After meeting with Moseley and Emmich in May 2011, Rideout experienced additional
interference with her market from Emmich, other members of management and other Caucasian
FSLs. Ms. Rideout states Emmich routinely avoided meeting with her and her agent, but met
with and supported similarly situated Caucasians. Plaintiff reported to Emmich that a high
performing agent was violating several policies and procedures and receiving enhanced
commissions as a result of his activity. Rideout claims that rather than investigate her concerns,
Emmich helped disguise the agent’s activity to avoid a corporate security investigation and he
5
The declaration filed by the plaintiff states that it was Walsh who responded with the skin pigmentation remark and
later that Emmich admitted an FSL in his territory “couldn’t get past skin pigmentation.” Regardless, the court notes
it was Allstate employees who made such remarks and that management was aware of the remarks.
5
also secretly assisted in the process of removing the agent out of her market by circumventing
the policies and procedures.
Ms. Rideout claims the market assigned to her had problems not experienced by other
FSLs, and because of her race she was not fairly assigned a market. Instead she contends she was
the only FSL required to cross state lines, her market was populated with several defunct agents,
she was assigned agents who had already received termination notices, she encountered an agent
using a crack cocaine pipe in his office, and she observed a used condom openly displayed on an
agent’s desk. As a FSL, Rideout’s bonuses were tied to the goals of the agents.
Rideout further claims that her market was adjusted in December 2011 to adversely
impact her earning potential, and she received an Unsatisfactory Notice after conversations and
emails regarding the accuracy of her goals. The instant action was filed on November 16, 2011
and was amended on August 1, 2012. Plaintiff resigned on August 23, 2012, after accepting a job
with a company, Jabil, while still employed by Allstate.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In deciding whether a fact issue has been created, courts must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Harris ex rel. Harris v.
Pontotoc Cnty. Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 685, 690 (5th Cir. 2011).The existence of a factual dispute
does not preclude summary judgment if the dispute is neither material nor genuine. Liddell v.
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., 2011 WL 6781012 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 27, 2011) (citing
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F. 3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)). A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party. Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 990 (5th Cir.2011).
6
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by: citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made
for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant
or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Id. “[C]onclusory allegations,
speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden in a
motion for summary judgment.” Jordan v. Cleco Corp., 2013 WL 673438 (W.D. La. Feb. 22,
2013) (citing Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir.2002)).
Plaintiff did not complain to the EEOC about the incidents between her hire in 2006 and
June 2008 until she filed her Charge in August 2010. Defendant argues any events between 2006
and 2008 are non-actionable. As stated in her surreply, plaintiff “includes the facts of her
employment prior to 2008 as background and to demonstrate the culture of discrimination that
existed in the Southern Region throughout her employment…it is clear that all the actionable
conduct occurred in 2008 and later.” Therefore, plaintiff’s claims arising under her employment
until June 2008, need not be addressed under the procedural requirements of Title VII or Section
19816, but are hereby waived by plaintiff.7
6
See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (Four-year statute of limitation for claims “arising
under” federal statutes without a statute of limitations that were enacted after December 1, 1990.
7
Plaintiff states her “work at the corporate office was without racial incident” and that explains the gap between the
two time periods of alleged discrimination. Plaintiff’s contention of discrimination is not helped by counsel’s
“typographical error” in her response brief in which she states “no cause of action arose prior to 2010.” Counsel
states however it was intended to state “no cause of action arose prior to those alleged in her 2010 EEOC Charge of
Discrimination.” Further, plaintiff states the facts prior to 2008 are background to demonstrate the culture of
discrimination that existed in the Southern Region throughout her employment.
7
Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment.8 Ms. Rideout
was employed by Allstate for over six years, and although she complained of racial slurs and
unpleasant name calling during her employment, she has failed to demonstrate that the
conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. See
McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007). It is clear to the court that the actions
of both the employees and managers of Allstate are unbecoming to any professional setting,
however they do not rise to the level of constructive discharge in Ms. Rideout’s case. Ms.
Rideout cites the Unsatisfactory Notification she received after she had begun to search for a
new job to bolster the constructive discharge claim, however again this does not rise to the level
needed to survive summary judgment.9 Further, Ms. Rideout negotiated a position with a
different company while she was still employed by Allstate and resigned from Allstate knowing
she was moving into her new position with Jabil. Therefore there is no actionable claim for back
pay, and Ms. Rideout suffered no harm in relation to a constructive discharge claim.
The court considers Rideout’s remaining claims based on Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
under the same rubric of analysis. Raggs v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468
(5th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against based on her race and thus the court
turns to the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Ms. Rideout claims Allstate
retaliated against her for complaining of the racial discrimination, failed to promote her to two
8
The court is not certain plaintiff has even properly asserted a cause of action for constructive discharge but
assuming arguendo, it is properly before the court on this motion, the court addresses it below.
9
The court does not reach the conclusion that the Unsatisfactory Notification cannot be used to demonstrate
retaliation against Ms. Rideout, and leaves that determination for the finder of facts.
8
manager training positions and they failed to assign her to the Kentucky market. These
remaining claims are best left to the jury.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Rideout must show: (1) she
engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)
there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co. ., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1995) (citation omitted).
In order to make a circumstantial prima facie case of unlawful race discrimination in her
failure to promote claim, Rideout must introduce evidence that: (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (3) despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) after her rejection, the
position was filled by someone of a different race or remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. at
802.
If plaintiff has established the elements of her prima facie case, the burden of production
then shifts to Allstate to produce evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was
preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Once the defendant has articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action at issue, plaintiff must present
“substantial evidence” that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2008). To show pretext on summary judgment,
the plaintiff must substantiate her claim through evidence demonstrating that discrimination lay
at the heart of the employer’s decision. Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir.
2002).
9
The courts are not in the business of analyzing hiring decisions within a company based
on whether a particular individual was better qualified than a peer, especially in this case where
Ms. Rideout relies on her own resume as proof she was clearly better qualified. However, when
it is alleged that the environment of Allstate’s Southern Region was in such a state that bigoted
remarks were laughed at by fellow employees and managers, it becomes more likely the plaintiff
will show pretext by proving the reasons proffered by Allstate are unworthy of credence.
Allstate, through briefing, states multiple reasons why plaintiff was not promoted, or assigned to
the Kentucky market, and in fact given “growth markets” and not underperforming markets.
However the reasons set forth do not entitle Allstate to summary judgment, even with their
burden being only of production, and not persuasion.
In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that plaintiff has established triable fact
issues regarding whether she was not promoted and not given the Kentucky market due, at least
in part, to her race amid the racially hostile work environment in which she was employed.
Although the evidence presented to the court at this juncture does not present a strong case for
the plaintiff, summary judgment is not proper. Plaintiff faces an uphill battle to prove Allstate’s
actions were motivated by her race or because she complained about discrimination. It appears to
the court, however, that the plaintiff has claimed every action, or lack thereof, by Allstate during
her six years of employment amounted to racial discrimination and that it caused adverse
employment opportunities. Plaintiff has, in this instant, the benefit of being the non-moving party
and therefore all inferences are in her favor. The parties have presented to the court full briefing
on the issue of summary judgment and it is apparent there is still a genuine issue as to material
facts that would affect the outcome of this case. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is
10
DENIED in part and GRANTED as to plaintiff’s claims between 2006 and 2008, and
GRANTED as to plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim.
IT IS ORDERED this the 18th day of November, 2013.
/s/ MICHAEL P. MILLS
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?