Martin v. Streeter et al
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 11 Order. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 6/30/2011. (psk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
GEORGE W. MARTIN
PLAINTIFF
V.
NO. 3:11CV020-A-D
JESSIE STREETER, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The
Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, files this pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Claims
The Plaintiff has attempted to state claims for denial of access-to-the-courts and delay of
medical treatment. The Plaintiff states that a petition for writ of certiorari was denied as untimely.
He argues that he requested assistance from ILAP (Inmate Legal Assistance Program) but was not
seen until two days after the deadline for filing had passed. State court documents confirm that his
motion was indeed denied as untimely.
As for the denial of medical claim, the Plaintiff contends that he had to wait twenty days to
see a psychiatrist for migraines, stress and anxiety which he suggests was caused by ILAP. In his
motion for an injunction, the Plaintiff asks that an order be entered requiring ILAP to provide him
with legal services and relieving Defendant Brown from her responsibilities in ILAP. He also asks
to be treated by a psychiatrist.
Preliminary Injunction
It is well settled that a party must prove four elements to be entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable
injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any harm
that may result from the injunction to the non-movant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve
the public interest. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th
Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v. United States, 66 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1058,
134 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1996); Cherokee Pump & Equipment, Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246, 249 (5th
Cir. 1994); Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District , 994 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1993);
Plains Cotton Co-op Association v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1259 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S. Ct. 80, 98 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1987); Canal Authority of Florida
v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). This court pays more than lip service to the axiom
that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Cherokee Pump, 38 F.3d at 249. It is “not
to be granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries [the] burden of
persuasion.” Black Fire Fighters Association v. City of Dallas, 905 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Holland American Insurance Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985));
Cherokee Pump, 38 F.3d at 249 (quoting Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985)) (“The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is to be treated
as the exception rather than the rule”).
Access to-the-courts
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977), prisoners
possess a constitutional right of access to courts, including having the “ability . . . to prepare and
transmit a necessary legal document to court.” Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1123 (1994)).
The right of access to the courts is limited to allow prisoners opportunity to file nonfrivolous claims
challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325
(5th Cir. 1999). “Interference with a prisoner’s right to access to the courts, such as delay, may
result in a constitutional deprivation.” Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999)
2
(citations omitted). However, “[a] denial-of-access-to-the-courts claim is not valid if a litigant’s
position is not prejudiced by the alleged violation.” Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th
Cir. 1998); Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 988
(1992) (citing Richardson v. McDonnell , 841 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1988)). It is only when a
prisoner suffers some sort of actual prejudice or detriment because of the alleged denial of access
to the courts that the allegation becomes one of a constitutional nature. Walker v. Navarro County
Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1993); see Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1987).
A plaintiff must show real detriment, i.e., true denial of access, such as the loss of a motion, the loss
of a right to commence, prosecute or appeal in a court, or substantial delay in obtaining a judicial
determination in a proceeding. See Oaks v. Wainwright, 430 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1970).
In order to obtain injunctive relief the plaintiff must satisfy all four elements. Based solely
on the pleadings1, the plaintiff has clearly stated a claim and, if true, has a substantial likelihood of
success. The second element for the injunction to issue requires a threat of irreparable harm. In
support, the plaintiff simply avers that the threat of irreparable harm is obvious due to the “nature
of this case.” The court does not find the alleged presence of irreparable harm obvious. The harm–
having his writ of certiorari denied as untimely– has already occurred. Issuing an injunction will not
reverse the harm. Nevertheless, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that irreparable harm will result
without an order.
Having failed to satisfy the second element, the court will deny the motion for a preliminary
injunction arising out of the access-to-the-courts claim.
Delayed Medical Treatment
The plaintiff seeks an order requiring that he be treated by a psychiatrist. In the complaint
he takes exception to having to wait twenty days to see a doctor. With the motion for injunctive
1
An answer has not been filed.
3
relief, the plaintiff submits that he is continually being denied medical treatment for migraines and
anxiety occasioned by his experience with ILAP. Once again, the plaintiff has failed to meet his
burden.
Waiting twenty days for medical treatment for non urgent care can hardly be considered a
delay. As a result, he is far from demonstrating likely success on the merits of his claim. Also, there
is no substantial threat of irreparable harm. Having failed to make an initial showing as to the first
two elements, the court need go no further. The preliminary injunction will not issue.
Conclusion
The plaintiff has not met the burden of persuading the court that an injunction should be
issued. Accordingly, the motion (docket entry 4) will be denied. A Spears hearing will be set by
further order of the court.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion will be entered.
THIS the 30th day of June, 2011.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?