Parks v. City of Oxford, Mississippi et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 46 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 1/9/2013. (psk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
FELICIA PARKS
PLAINTIFF
V.
CAUSE NO.: 3:11CV072-SA-DAS
CITY OF OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI;
JOHNNY SOSSAMAN, in his official and individual
Capacities; BAPTIST MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL-NORTH MISSISSIPPI, INC., and
JOHN DOES 1-10
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on June 6, 2011, alleging she was transported to Baptist
Memorial Hospital – North Mississippi (BMH-NM) against her will and administered medical
treatment for which she did not consent. The City of Oxford and Officer Johnny Sossaman (the
Municipal Defendants) filed a Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary
Judgment [13] which this Court has granted. While conducting discovery on issues from that
first motion to dismiss, Defendant Baptist Memorial Hospital – North Mississippi (BMH-NM)
filed the pending Motion to Dismiss [26]. After reviewing the motions, responses, record, rule,
and authorities, the Court finds that BMH-NM’s motion is GRANTED, and the claims asserted
against that party are dismissed.
Factual and Procedural Background
On June 6, 2010, Felicia Parks’ neighbor called 911 requesting an ambulance for Parks.
On the call, the neighbor asserts that Parks shot up with cocaine, took at least four prescription
Xanax pills, and is “trying to get into her car and we can’t stop her . . . .” She further commented
that she was concerned that Parks was “going to die.” An ambulance was dispatched to Felicia
Parks’ house. Police officer Johnny Sossaman, as well as up to two other officers, were also
dispatched to Parks’ residence as part of an “ambulance assist.”
When the emergency personnel arrived at her residence, Parks refused medical treatment.
Parks contends that Sossaman threatened to arrest her for disorderly conduct and failure to
cooperate with law enforcement if she did not get into the ambulance and go to the hospital.
Parks claims she refused treatment during the EMTs initial examination, upon transport to the
hospital, and also at the hospital. Despite her protestations, she was later billed by BMH-NM for
medical treatment that she contends she did not consent to.
Parks brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against BMH-NM for violations of her Fourth
Amendment and Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) rights, civil
conspiracy, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, false arrest, false imprisonment, and
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. BMH-NM contends Parks has failed to
surpass the Rule 12(b)(6) burden with her pleadings.
Legal Standards
“The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid
claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed true and are viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.
2010) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). Of course,
the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The
court must not evaluate the likelihood of the claim’s success, but instead ascertain whether the
plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible. Lone Star Fund, 594 F.3d at 387
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).
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Discussion and Analysis
Parks argues that BMH-NM, together with the Municipal Defendants, took joint and
concerted actions to deprive her of her rights under the Fourth Amendment and the EMTALA.
Parks argues she was illegally arrested without probable cause and seized by being forced into
the ambulance and administered unwanted medical treatment. It is undisputed that Parks has a
clearly established constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause. See Hebert
v. Maxwell, 214 F. App’x 451, 454 (5th Cir. 2007). However, as noted in an earlier
memorandum opinion, the Court found probable cause to arrest Parks for ingesting a controlled
substance in violation of Mississippi law. Accordingly, any arrest, therefore, was not in violation
of Parks’ constitutional rights. Because the Court finds the arrest was not unlawful, Parks’ false
arrest claims against BMH-NM fail.
Parks additionally contends that BMH-NM administration of medical treatment violated
her right to refuse medical treatment under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd et seq. That statute imposes a duty to provide emergency
medical care to any and all patients by participating hospitals. Indeed, if a “request is made on
the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must
provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s
emergency department . . . to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition . . .
exists.” 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(a) (emphasis added). The second subsection provides procedures
necessary, such as stabilizing treatment or transfer to another medical facility, when an
emergency medical condition is found. As part of that subsection, a provision allowing the
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refusal of consent to stabilizing treatment is described. This subsection is presumably the
statutory authority Parks relies on to establish her constitutional right to refuse treatment.
Plaintiff’s first hurdle in this 12(b)(6) inquiry is a non-profit hospital’s liability under
color of state law pursuant to Section 1983. Regardless of whether or not a defendant’s actions
alone caused a constitutional violation, liability can be imposed to that defendant as an alleged
member in the conspiracy. Latiolais v. Cravins, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 16481, *21 (5th Cir. Aug.
8, 2012) (citing Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1995). To prove a conspiracy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) “an agreement between private and public
defendants to commit an illegal act,” and (2) “an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.”
Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994). On the facts as alleged in the complaint,
the Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of an agreement between BMH-NM and the City of
Oxford to violate Parks’ constitutional rights. Because it is the Plaintiff’s burden to allege facts
and to show that her right to relief is plausible on its face at this set of the proceedings, the Court
dismisses Parks’ Section 1983 claims against BMH-NM for failing to show any agreement to
deprive Parks of her constitutional rights.
Moreover, as the Court has found that Parks’
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment were not violated by an unlawful arrest or
forced medical treatment, the Court dismisses Parks’ civil conspiracy claims against BMH-NM.
See Rodriguez v. Neeley, 169 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that without a deprivation
of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, no civil conspiracy claim could survive).
False Imprisonment
False imprisonment only has two elements: “detention of the plaintiff and the
unlawfulness of such detention.” Morgan v. Greenwaldt, 786 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Miss. 2001)
citations omitted). Plaintiff asserts that she was “not free from the restraint of movement and
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was imprisoned against her will.” Parks attempts to put forth additional arguments to the Court
in her response to the motion to dismiss, but at this stage of the proceeding, the Court is bound
by her initial pleading. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. Therefore, under the
standards elucidated in Iqbal and Twombly, Parks has failed to state a claim for which relief can
be granted based on her vague assertions. Id, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (“[a]sking for plausible grounds to
infer [the element of a claim] does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading state; it
simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal [that the
elements of the claim existed]).”
Assault and Battery
An assault occurs where a person “(1) acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive
contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such
contact, and (2) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” Morgan, 786 So. 2d at
1043 (citing Webb v. Jackson, 583 So. 2d 946, 951 (Miss. 1991). In her complaint, Parks recites
these same elements without explaining exactly what conduct supports the claim. Therefore,
without further explanation, the Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim is dismissed.
Remaining State Law Claims
Parks also makes a claim for emotional distress, both intentional infliction and negligent
infliction, invasion of privacy, negligence and gross negligence. As she did for the other claims,
Plaintiff has simply recited the elements necessary to prove a claim of this nature without
informing the Defendants of the conduct she relies on in making those allegations. Accordingly,
the Court dismisses these claims for failing to comply with the requirements of Iqbal/Twombly.
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Conclusion
Parks has failed to allege constitutional violations required for a Section 1983 claim.
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the standards elucidated in Iqbal and Twombly as
to her state law claims. Accordingly, BMH-NM’s Motion to Dismiss [26] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this the 9th day of January, 2013.
/s/ Sharion Aycock_________
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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