Payne v. Benton County et al

Filing 65

MEMORANDUM OPINION and Order re 64 Order Dismissing Case. Signed by Glen H. Davidson on 11/14/12. (tab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

WESTERN DIVISION

DERRICK DARNELL PAYNE

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:llcv136-GHD-DAS

vs.

DEFENDANTS

BENTON COUNTY, et al.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings suit against Defendants under
42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that Defendants conspired to maliciously prosecute him for the crime
of capital murder. Pending before the Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment and
Plaintiffs responses thereto. Having fully considered the submissions ofthe parties and the
applicable law, the Court finds that the motions for summary judgment should be granted, for the
reasons that follow.

Record History'
Plaintiff was selling drugs in 2004. Reginald Walls, a resident of DeSoto County,
Mississippi, had served as one of Plaintiffs runners in the drug trade on a few occasions. (See
PI. 's Trial Tr. 5, Ex. A to Def. Thompson Mot. Summ. J. Memo at doc. entry no. 59). Walls
disappeared in May of 2004, and when an investigation into his disappearance was launched by
the DeSoto County Sheriff's Department, law enforcement officers learned of the relationship
between Plaintiff and Walls. (See id. at 118, 140-41).
In 2006, Plaintiff's then-wife, Lakentra, was being held in the Marshall County Jail on a

The facts underlying this claim are taken from the trial transcript of Plaintiffs murder
case. (See doc. entry no. 59, Exhibit A).
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charge of forgery. (See id. at 25-26, 40-41, 79). When she was questioned about Walls'
disappearance, she infonned Marshall County officers that she witnessed Plaintiff shoot Walls,
and she stated that she knew the general location of the body. (Id. at 118-19). After the Marshall
County Sheriffs Office contacted State Investigator Alan Thompson, who agreed to assist in the
search for Walls' body, Lakentra gave another statement to FBI agent Larry Peagues, Defendant
Thompson, and Deputy Kelly McMillan ofthe Marshall County Sheriff's Department on
February 27,2006. (ld. at 138-39). Investigating officers traveled with Lakentra to an
approximate location in Benton County where she believed Walls' body was placed, although
she could not identifY the specific road Plaintiff had turned down the night of the murder. (ld. at
16,51-56). After searching an area that matched the description given by Lakentra, Walls' body
was located and an arrest warrant issued for Plaintiff on a charge of capital murder. (See id. at
124). The District Attorney's Office pursued an indictment against Plaintiff, and Defendant
Thompson was the only witness to testifY at the grand jury proceedings. (See Preliminary Hr' g
Tr. 14-15, Ex. C to Defs. Mot. Summ. J. Memo at doc. entry no. 57). Lakentra was later indicted
on a charge of accessory after the fact. (See PI.' s Trial Tr. at 58-59).
Plaintiffs capital murder trial commenced on June 29, 2009, before the Circuit Court of
Benton County, Mississippi. Lakentra testified at trial that she and Plaintiff, who divorced in
April 2007, had known Walls "pretty well." (ld. at 3-5). She stated that on or about May 9,
2004, she and Plaintiffhad a few drinks with Walls at a club, and that they decided to leave the
club and go to Club Emotion in Marshall County. (ld. at 10). She maintained that, prior to their
arrival at Club Emotion, Lakentra put some "sleep drops" in Walls' liquor upon Plaintiffs
instructions. (ld. at 13,23). She testified that Walls became sick, and the trio left Club Emotion
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around 11 :00 p.m., headed toward Benton County. (Id. at 11, 13). She alleged that, after driving
down a dirt road for a few minutes, Plaintiff pulled the car over and questioned Walls about
drugs Plaintiff believed Walls had stolen. (/d. at 7, 12). She maintained that Walls exited the
vehicle with her help, and that when Walls denied having any knowledge of the missing drugs,
Plaintiff grabbed him and shot him multiple times. (Id. at 13-14). Lakentra stated that Plaintiff
dragged Walls' body over a hill, and that she and Plaintiff then drove to a convenience store in
Memphis, Tennessee. (/d.).
On cross-examination, Lakentra testified to the circumstances of her statement. She
stated that she was motivated to confess because she had been having dreams that she felt were a
"sign that God gave [her] to do the right thing" when asked about the crime. (See id. at 42). She
specifically denied that she was threatened by law enforcement officers. (See id. at 55). She also
testified that she took officers to the approximate location where Walls' body was located, but
that she could not pinpoint the location because the murder occurred years earlier in an
unfamiliar location. (See id. at 53-58). She maintained that she voluntarily gave statements to
law enforcement officers and agreed to testify without a plea offer out of a desire "to do the right
thing[.]" (Id. at 24).
Defendant Alan Thompson testified at trial that he was a Captain with the Mississippi
Bureau of Investigation during the investigation of Walls' murder, and that he worked the case in
cooperation with local law enforcement agencies. (See id. at 115-16). He stated that he had been
made aware of Walls' disappearance in 2004, such that he had some familiarity with the
circumstances when he went to interview Lakentra. (/d. at 118-20). After her statement was
taken on February 27,2006, he maintains that he contacted Benton County Sheriff McMullen,
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because the area described by Lakentra was in or near Benton County. (!d. at 121). He stated
that, once in the approximate area, Defendant Thompson and other law enforcement officials
realized the roads had been recently paved. (!d. at 123-24). Following a search of the area, he
maintained, Walls' remains were found in an area "exactly the way Lakentra had pictured it[.]"
(!d. at 124). He denied that any coercive techniques were used during the course of the interview

with Lakentra. (!d. at 146-48).
Plaintiff took the stand in his own defense. He was found not guilty and acquitted of all
charges on July 3, 2009. (See, e.g., id. at 313).
Plaintiff's Allegations and Relief Sought
Plaintiff claims that Defendants coerced Lakentra into implicating him in Reginald
Walls'murder. At the time Lakentra gave a statement to police implicating Plaintiff in the
murder, she was being held as a pretrial detainee at the Marshall County Sheriffs Department.
Plaintiff maintains that the Marshall County Sheriffs Department instigated the investigation
and prosecution against him because he had previously been acquitted on charges of bank
robbery in Marshall County. He alleges that, out of a desire to falsely implicate him in the
circumstances surrounding Walls' disappearance and murder, Defendants threatened to take
Lakentra's baby away from her if she did not cooperate.
In the instant suit, Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights under the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with claims of malicious prosecution and civil
conspiracy. Named as defendants in this action are Benton County, the Benton County Sheriffs
Department, Marshall County Sheriffs Investigator, Kelly McMillan, the Sheriff of Benton
County, Arnie McMullen, and Alan Thompson, a retired Captain with the Mississippi Bureau of

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Investigation. Defendants McMillan and McMullen are sued in both their official and individual
capacities, while Defendant Thompson is sued in his individual capacity only.
Plaintiff maintains that his capital murder prosecution has caused him mental pain and
anguish, and that he has been forced to increase his medications since being prosecuted for
capital murder. He seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $1 million dollars and
punitive damages in the amount of $500,000 against each named defendant. He also requests
state tort damages for malicious prosecution in the amount of $500,000 against each named
defendant.

Defendants' Allegations
Defendants Benton County, Marshall County, Kelly McMillan, and Arnie McMullen
have moved for summary judgment, maintaining that Plaintiffs prosecution was supported by
probable cause, such that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prosecution
on capital murder charges violated his constitutional rights. They further maintain that there was
no causal link between Plaintiffs prosecution and a Benton County or Marshall County policy or
custom as necessary for liability to attach to the County defendants. Finally, Defendants
maintain that they are entitled to qualified immunity for the claims against them in their
individual capacities. Likewise, Defendant Alan Thompson has also moved for summary
judgment, asserting that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings and evidence, viewed in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, illustrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56{a),{c); Celotex Corp. v.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is deemed "material" if"its resolution in favor of
one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law." Sossamon v. Lone Star
State o/Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5 th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Once the motion is
properly supported with competent evidence, the nonmovant must show that summary judgment
is inappropriate. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5 th Cir. 1998);
see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The nonmovant cannot rely upon "conclusory allegations,
speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions" to satisfy his burden, but rather, must set forth
specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue as to every essential element of his claim.
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5 th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); Morris, 144 F.3d at
380. If the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party," then there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242,248 (1986). If no proof is presented, however, the Court does not assume that the
nonmovant "could or would prove the necessary facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5 th Cir. 1994).
County and Official Capacity Claims2
Plaintiffs claims against County officials in their official capacities are the same as
claims against the County itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Therefore,
Plaintiffs claims against Kelly McMillan and Arnie McMullen in their official capacities are
construed as claims against Marshall County and Benton County, respectively. Under § 1983, a

The Sheriff's Department of either sued county is not a governmental entity amenable to
suit in this action, because it does not have a separate legal existence apart from the county. See,
e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 927 So.2d 733, 737 (Miss. 2006); see also Darby v. Pasadena Police
Dept., 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5 th Cir. 1991).
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municipality is not vicariously liable for its officer's actions on a theory of respondeat superior.
See Ed. ofCounty Commiss ofBryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). To impose
liability on either County, Plaintiff must prove that his injury was caused due to action taken
pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. See Monell v. NY. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691-95 (1978); Piotrowski v. City ofHouston, 237 F.3d 567,578 (5 th Cir. 2001).
Initially, the Court finds that there is no independent constitutional claim for "malicious
prosecution." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1994) (substantive due process does not
support malicious prosecution claim); Cuadra v. Houston Independent School District, 626 F.3d
808,812 (5 th Cir. 2010). Instead, to sustain his claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the
prosecution was unsupported by probable cause. See Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 812-13. Plaintiff fails
to do so. In this instance, the grand jury and State trial court both found probable cause for
Plaintiff's prosecution, and Lakentra's testimony was independently verified by the discovery of
Walls' body. The Court finds that, to the extent it is raised by Plaintiff, the State law tort of
malicious prosecution is likewise barred, as the "want of probable cause in the institution of the
proceedings" is a necessary element of the tort. See Tebo v. Tebo, 550 F.3d 492,498-99 (5 th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted). In this case, the State prosecution was supported by probable cause as
determined by the grand jury and circuit judge.
Additionally, the Court finds that there is no causal link between Plaintiff's prosecution
and any policy or custom of either Benton County or Marshall County that allegedly deprived
him of a constitutional right. In this case, prosecution was directed by the State of Mississippi's
District Attorney's Office, and neither County exercised control over the grand jury proceedings,
indictment, or commencement and prosecution of the case. The probable cause determinations

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of the State trial court supersede Plaintiff s claims of constitutional deprivation by the County
defendants. See Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278,291-92 (5 th Cir. 2005) (trial court's ruling that
evidence is admissible and constitutes probable cause constitute a "superseding cause" for
purpose of Section 1983 liability). Therefore, all named Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment for Plaintiffs County and official capacity claims.
Individual Capacity Claims
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, though, once it is properly raised, the
plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the defense by demonstrating that the allegedly wrongful
conduct violated clearly established law. See Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5 th Cir.
1992). It is a two-pronged inquiry that requires the Court to first determine "whether [the
plaintiff] has adduced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact suggesting [the
defendant]'s conducted violated an actual constitutional right." Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d
322,326 (5 th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). lithe evidence shows that the plaintiff's
constitutional rights were not violated, his claims must be dismissed. Id. If a violation of a
constitutional right is shown by the facts, the second inquiry is "whether the defendant's actions
were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in
question." Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404,411 (5 th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This
determination is "based on the viewpoint of a reasonable official in light of the information then
available to the defendant and the law that was clearly established at the time of the defendant's
actions." Id.; see also Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386,393 (5 th Cir. 2009). Therefore, in
deciding this issue, the Court determines whether the challenged conduct, when viewed in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff, amounts to a constitutional violation, and if so, whether the right was

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clearly established at the time of the conduct. See Werneck, 591 F.3d at 39-93; see also Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
Whether a defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable is an objective inquiry, and "a
particular defendant's subjective state of mind has no bearing on whether that defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity." Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447,457 (5 th Cif. 2001)
(citation omitted). If all officials of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the
plaintiff s rights were violated, qualified immunity remains intact. Tarver v. City 0/Edna, 410
F.3d 745, 750 (5 th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). This standard protects "all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law[,]" protecting those officers "who
reasonably but mistakenly commit a constitutional violation." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986); Glenn v. City o/Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312-13 (5 th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). An inquiry into objective reasonableness is a question oflaw for the
Court. See Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5 th Cir. 2010).
Defendant McMillan, an investigator with the Marshall County Sheriffs Department,
merely questioned Lakentra, who stated that she was not threatened or coerced by the
investigating officers. (See, e.g., PI.' s Tr. 42; 52-55). Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that
Defendant McMillan personally participated in any allegedly wrongful acts. Similarly, Plaintiff
does not allege that Sheriff McMullen personally participated in the acts alleged by Plaintiff as
wrongful, nor does Plaintiff maintain that he implemented an unconstitutional policy that led to
the alleged deprivation. See, e.g. Gates v. Texas Department o/Protocol, 537 F.3d 404,435 (5 th
Cir. 2008) (holding that supervisory official may be liable only ifhe affirmatively participates in
acts or implements unconstitutional policies that result in the constitutional injury). Rather, he

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maintains that McMullen failed to supervise those that pursued a malicious prosecution. As
previously stated, the District Attorney's Office pursued the prosecution of Plaintiff, and it was
supported by probable cause. Plaintiffhas not established that either Defendant McMillan or
Defendant Sheriff McMullen violated a clearly established law as it existed at the time of the
events leading to Plaintiff's arrest, and both are entitled to qualified immunity.
Finally, the Court considers whether Defendant Alan Thompson is entitled to qualified
immunity. At trial, both Lakentra and Defendant Thompson testified that Lakentra was not
coerced or threatened during questioning. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Trial Tr. at 42,55,58, 122).
Therefore, there is no evidence from which a rational jury could find her statement involuntary
and its resulting use to violative of Plaintiff's rights. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
167 (1986) ("Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not
'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.").
Moreover, even if Defendant Thompson did tell Lakentra that she would lose custody of
her child unless she cooperated with law enforcement officials, such action would not violate
clearly established law. See Kunik v. Racine County, 106 F.3d 168, 174-75 (7 th Cir. 1997)
(holding that defendants did not violate clearly established rights of which reasonable officers
would have been aware by playing on the plaintiff's physical vulnerability as a pregnant woman
and implying that only by cooperating would she have her baby outside of prison); Self v. Collins,
973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5 th Cir. 1992) (holding that "[n]either 'mere emotionalism and confusion',
nor mere 'trickery' will alone necessarily invalidate a confession"). Rather, Defendant
Thompson told Lakentra to tell the truth, which is a strategy that has been held objectively
reasonable. See United States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53, 56 (5 th Cir. 1975); (Pl.'s Trial Tr. at 146).
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Defendant Thompson is entitled to qualified immunity.
Conclusion

The Court finds that Defendants' motions for summary judgment [doc. entry no. 56, 58]
should be GRANTED, and this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All pending
motions are DISMISSED as moot. A final judgment in accordance with this opinion and order
will issue this day.
SO ORDERED this the

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l'fday of November, 2012.

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